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Abstract 
The anomaly of low fertility among the scheduled castes in Kerala is studied in the context 
of caste system changes through a detailed case study of one group, the Vettuvans. The 
fertility trends of the Vettuvans in Engandiyour village revealed a close link with caste-
system changes. Engandiyour, in parallel with Kerala as a whole, was transformed from a 
traditional caste-system based to that of a non-traditional caste system based society in the 
twentieth century. The main forces that triggered caste-system changes in Engandiyour 
were land reform and Gulf migration; both took place in the 1970s. The new status of 
ownership of a small parcel of land, as well as the freedom from the tenancy led them to 
visualise possibilities not only of maintaining their newly acquired status, but also of 
improving further upon it. The Vettuvans being a patrilineal community, the role of sons in 
the family is vital. Only through sons can they achieve the goal of maintaining and 
improving their social and economic position, as daughters leave their parents upon 
marriage to live with their husbands in their homes. While Vettuvans valued sons for their 
security and mobility value, daughters were valued for their traditional role of home-
makers. The value of sons and daughters, however, did not lead to high fertility . In fact the 
Vettuvans have exceptionally low fertility levels and preferences, an apparent paradox. 
This thesis reveals that the Vettuvans believe that in their changed circumstances, the 
security and mobility aspirations could be met most easily if they have children who are 
well educated and employed in non-traditional occupations. To educate children to an 
employable level and to get employment in non-traditional areas remain hugely difficult 
tasks, given the poor economic conditions of the Vettuvans and their employment 
prospects. Thus, while valuing both sons and daughters highly, the Vettuvans, for practical 
reasons, limit themselves to two children at most. Thus Vettuvan fertility cannot be 
understood except in the institutional context within which they take their childbearing 
decisions. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: 
Objectives, Perspectives, and Methodology 
1. 1 Introduction 
Fertility and mortality have been falling in India and the demographic transition-
from high fertility and mortality to low fertility and mortality-is under way (See 
Table 3.1). Remarkable variations in fertility across states are also evident in India 
from various surveys (IIPS, 1995; Sample Registration System (SRS) Bulletin, 
various years; Manna, 1998). In addition, there are marked differences in fertility 
between the broad north and south cultural regimes (Satia and Saseendran, 1991; 
Dyson and Moore, 1983). For example, while the northern states of Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan1 have total fertility rates (TFRs) higher than 4 
children per woman, the southern states of Kerala, Goa and Tamil N adu have TFRs 
lower than or close to replacement-level fertility, i.e., 2.1 children per woman (IIPS, 
1995:96). Diversity, therefore, is an essential feature of Indian fertility. 
Kerala state captured worldwide attention because of its unique achievements in 
controlling population at relatively low income levels. According to the 1992-93 
National Family Health Survey (NFHS), the TFR for Kerala2 was 2.0 children per 
woman, the lowest among the major Indian states3, and well below the all-India 
average (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:58; IIPS, 1995:96). The 
economic conditions in Kerala indicate that the state's domestic product or per capita 
income has been lower than that of most of the Indian states and of the all-India 
1These four states contribute about 40 per cent of India's population. Bose (1988:xxxiii) termed 
these states 'BIMARU states', meaning 'sick states' in demographic terms. 
2TFR refers to the three-year period preceding the survey 1992-93; the TFR in 1991 according to 
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare was 1.8 (IIPS, 1995:6). 
3 Among all the 24 states and the National Capital Territory of Delhi (the erstwhile Union Territory 
of Delhi which recently attained statehood), Goa had the lowest in the 1992-93 NFHS. 
average (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:5). This is widely seen as 
surprising. Broadly speaking, those nations with TFRs of 2 children per woman or 
close to it have higher per capita income than nations with TFRs higher than 2 
children per woman (World Bank, 1993:238-239,290). In absolute GNP per capita 
terms, Kerala's income was less than 2 per cent of the United States' GNP per capita 
in 1991, while both shared a TFR of around 2.1 children per woman (World Bank, 
1993:238,291). This suggests that Kerala's fertility decline has taken place at 
relatively low income levels, in both relative and absolute terms, going against the 
general pattern4. Despite its low income levels, Kerala has shown remarkable 
progress in several key areas of development such as education and literacy, infant 
and child mortality, and life expectancy, with levels that are substantially better than 
the all-India average, and other individual states (Ratcliffe, 1983: 14). In 1991 these 
indicators for Kerala were much closer to such economically developed nations as 
Australia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom (World Bank, 1993:239). Thus, 
Kerala may be seen as a paradox where several unusual patterns of development 
have taken place. 
As Kerala's fertility transition is considered as a victory under unfavourable 
economic circumstances, there has been a variety of explanations put forth by 
researchers. Two major strands of explanations have been advanced by researchers 
to explain fertility transition in Kerala: economic and social. The economic 
explanation is that the poor economic conditions in the state have forced large 
sections of labouring communities in Kerala to adopt family planning, particularly 
sterilisation (Mencher, 1980; Basu, 1986). The social development argument is that 
improvements in key social sectors such as literacy and education (Mehrotra, 1965; 
Krishnan, 1976; Mahadevan and Sumangala, 1987; Nag, 1989; Bhat and Rajan, 
1997; Krishnakumari and Moli, 1997); land reform and other social justice policies 
(Ratcliffe, 1978, 1983; Franke and Chasin, 1989; Zachariah and Kurup, 1984); 
culture and status of women (Gulati, 1976; Devi, 1997); higher age at marriage 
(Gulati, 1976; Jayasree, 1989); mortality decline (Zachariah, 1983); and efficient 
family planning services (Zachariah and Kurup, 1984; Zachariah, 1997) have played 
a vital role in the fertility decline. Although not a complete explanation, others have 
pointed out the importance of the settlement pattern and ecological setting of Kerala 
in facilitating demographic transition through key developmental variables (Franke 
and Chasin, 1989:23; Srinivasan, 1995:246; Bhat and Rajan, 1997:48). Despite 
years of research, the debate on the causes of Kerala's fertility decline continues 
(Gopinath, 1998). One potential explanation has, however, been ignored-changes 
4 Sri Lanka may also be an exception to this generalisation. 
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in the caste system5. 
A discussion of caste-system changes in Kerala as a possible explanation for the 
fertility transition is missing in the fertility literature. It may be noted that Kerala 
remained one of the most traditional caste-system societies in India until about the 
mid-twentieth century (Aiyappan, 1965: 123; Iyer, 1970:46; Franke and Chasin, 
1989:75; Gopalakrishnan, 1994:292; Jeffrey, 1994:2). Under the traditional caste 
system6, the lower castes were exploited both economically and socially by the 
upper castes. The lower castes of Kerala lived as tenants of upper castes for 
generations, until land reform provided them tenure of small parcels of land on 
which their huts stood. Although caste-system reform efforts have been in operation 
since the nineteenth century, a non-traditional caste system evolved only after the 
1970s as a result of forces such as land reform, Gulf migration 7, and other social and 
economic changes in Kerala. Possibly, the most notable change that Kerala has 
experienced in the twentieth century has been the diminishing role of the caste 
system in determining people's social and economic destiny (Iyer, 1970:48-49; 
Ratcliffe, 1983:22). There is a correspondence between caste-system changes and 
the timing and pace of fertility transition in Kerala. Yet no serious attempt has been 
made so far to link the caste-system changes in Ker ala to an understanding of the 
fertility transition. This thesis argues that the study of fertility change in Kerala 
needs to be linked to caste-system changes. 
While the debate on the causes of fertility transition continues, Kerala has revealed 
yet another anomaly in its fertility in the 1992-93 Kerala NFHS. This is the steep 
fertility decline noticed among the economically, and until recently socially, 
disadvantaged population of Kerala. The Hindu lower castes, officially known as the 
scheduled castes8, showed a TFR of 1.37 children per woman in the 1992-93 Kerala 
NFHS. This is lower than the TFR ( 1. 66) recorded for the Hindus9, and for the total 
population (2.0) of the state. No other state, except Assam and Bihar, demonstrated 
a lower fertility for its scheduled castes than the total population. In fact, the 
5This and similar terms are explained in the Glossary given in the appendix. The caste system 
which formerly prevailed in Kerala is discussed in Chapter 2. 
6Division of Hindu society into four vama or jati based on ritual purity. A detailed discussion of 
the caste system is given in Chapter 2. 
7Temporary employment migration to the oil rich Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Iraq, Qatar, Yemen Arab Republic, and Jordan. Chapter 2 gives 
more details. 
8Defined in Chapter 2. There were 68 scheduled castes in the 1981 Census of Kerala. To be in a 
scheduled caste one should follow the Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist religion (Ghosh, 1997:149;154-
155). In Kerala no Sikh and Buddhist scheduled castes are reported. 
9Hindus include scheduled castes. 
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scheduled castes' TFR in Kerala was the lowest recorded for the scheduled castes 
among all the Indian states. Even Goa, which showed the lowest fertility for the 
total population among all the states in India in 1992-93 had a substantially higher 
fertility for the scheduled castes (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS , 1995:58; 
IIPS, 1995:96; various volumes of the 1992-93 National Family Health Survey of 
India). Another anomaly in the scheduled-caste fertility in Kerala is the turnaround 
in scheduled castes' and non-scheduled castes' fertility. The 1992-93 Kerala NFHS 
has evinced a lower fertility for scheduled castes than for the Hindus in Kerala as a 
whole. However, surveys conducted before the 1990s revealed that scheduled castes 
fertility was then higher than that of other Hindus. Thus the scheduled-castes 
fertility transition is unusually rapid, even within a Keralan context. 
However, in contrast to the interest demonstrated by researchers in explaining the 
overall fertility transition in Ker ala, no study has been published on the fertility 
decline of Kerala's scheduled castes. Explanations offered to explain Kerala's 
fertility decline are inadequate to understand the anomaly in the scheduled-castes 
fertility. For example, if the poverty hypothesis is generalisable, why did the 
scheduled castes, who form the largest group of agricultural labourers10, have a 
higher fertility than the rest of the Hindus in the 1960, 1970s and presumably 
earlier? In fact they were much poorer in the 1960s and 1970s than in the 1980s or 
1990s (Ratcliffe, 1978, 1983). There is no evidence to indicate that the nutritional 
and health status of scheduled-caste women has deteriorated during the transition 
period so as to reduce their fertility in Kerala (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS , 
1995). 
On the other hand, if social developments are responsible for the lower fertility of 
the scheduled castes compared to the non-scheduled caste Hindus, why did the 
scheduled castes experience a much steeper fertility decline than the non-scheduled 
castes? In other words, why did the scheduled castes respond to social development 
at a much faster pace than the non-scheduled castes? In fact , the key social 
development indicators such as education, literacy, standard of living, and economic 
status of the non-scheduled castes have been much higher than those of the 
scheduled castes throughout the transition period (United Nations, 1975:37-38; 
Mencher, 1980; Bhat and Rajan, 1997:44,58-59) Obviously, the poverty and social 
development hypothesis has little to offer in explaining the scheduled castes' fertility 
transition in Kerala. 
10The poorest sections of Kerala society; they accounted for about 40 per cent of Kerala's 
population in 1981. 
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The premises of the present research are these anomalies in the fertility decline of 
the scheduled castes of Kerala. The focus, however, is on the reasons for the fertility 
decline of one scheduled-caste community in Kerala. The study examines the ways 
in which the caste-system changes, land reform, and Gulf migration affect the 
fertility behaviour of the scheduled castes through a process that has reshaped the 
social and economic mobility aspirations that determine the benefit of children. It 
examines the constraints that the new institutional environment, characterised by a 
non-traditional caste system, poses for the cost of children, using an institutional 
approach advanced by Greenhalgh (1988, 1990a, 1995) and McNicoll (1994). This 
study was carried out among the Vettuvans, a scheduled-caste community in a 
village in central Kerala, using the micro-demographic method developed by 
Caldwell (Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell, 1982; Caldwell, Hill and Hull, 1988). The 
field work for this study was conducted during March - December, 1997. 
1.2 Proposition and objectives 
1.2.1 Proposition 
This study considers social reform, land reform, and Gulf migration as three 
exogenous factors in Kerala that changed the traditional caste system, where 
ascribability dominated achievability, to a non-traditional caste system 11 , where 
achievability dominated ascribability. In the non-traditional caste-system society it 
became possible for scheduled-caste families to move up the social and economic 
ladder. The mobility goals of the scheduled-caste families were to have a respectable 
social and economic status in the local community. Their mobility strategy was to 
educate their children to a level that enabled them to get salaried and respectable 
jobs. Another mobility strategy of scheduled-caste families was to adopt certain 
practices of the well-to-do, but not of a specific caste or religious group12, to show 
their improved social and economic position in the local society. Kerala's poor 
industrialisation and economic development were constraints in obtaining a salaried 
and respectable job, irrespective of jobs reserved for the scheduled castes in the 
government sector. Another significant constraint was posed by the costs of raising 
11This does not necessarily mean a caste-free society; it only means that caste is not used in the 
social and economic relations in the society. In this context, land reform, Gulf migration and social 
change can be regarded as exogenous to the caste system. 12The process of lower castes adopting the practices of upper castes is called Sanskritisation by 
Srinivas (1966), who defined it as ' the process by which a "low" Hindu caste, or tribal or other 
group, changes its customs, ritual, ideology, and way of life in the direction of a high, and 
frequently, "twice-born" caste' (Srinivas, 1966:6). 
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children, particularly educating them to an employable level. All these constraints 
mean longer waiting periods in obtaining employment for children; that is, in 
Caldwell's ( 1982) terms, larger and longer wealth flows from parents to children. 
Additional constraints posed by the changed institutional environment were first, the 
small areas of family land received by the scheduled castes through land reform, and 
second, the increasing dowry 13 , that was difficult to arrange. While small areas of 
family land and mobility aspirations discouraged the scheduled castes from having 
more than one son, higher amounts of dowry and the limited mobility of daughters 
encouraged parents to minimise the number of daughters. However, the traditional 
role of daughters did not allow the desired minimum to be zero. The main mobility 
unit in the scheduled castes in the non-traditional caste system has been the 
patriarchal, patrilineal, and patrilocal family. In such cultures sons are valued highly 
for their role in the very survival of the family. The fertility strategy of the family, 
mediated by culture, was then to adjust the number of its offspring to the lowest 
possible. 
1.2.2 Objectives 
The overall objective of the present research is to investigate the causes of fertility 
decline among the Vettuvans, a scheduled caste community in Kerala. The 
following are the study's specific objectives. 
(i) To review the caste-system changes, social development and economic changes 
in Kerala in an historical perspective. 
(ii) To review and assess fertility transition in Kerala. 
(iii) To determine the fertility levels, trends, and family planning practices of the 
Vettuvan community in order to assess the extent of the fertility change. 
(iv) To examine the role of land reform and Gulf migration in the caste-system 
changes in the study village and the social and economic status of the Vettuvans. 
(v) To examine marriage practices, family, gender relations, and intergenerational 
relations among the Vettuvans in the traditional- and non-traditional caste system. 
(vi) To identify security-mobility goals and strategies of the Vettuvans in the non-
traditional caste system. 
(vii) To examine the security-mobility costs and benefits of Vettuvan children in the 
non-traditional caste system. 
13Discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
6 
1.3 Theoretical perspectives on fertility transition 
Before addressing these specific objectives, it is worthwhile considering the most 
relevant theories that attempt to explain why fertility transitions take place in human 
populations. This has been a central question in demography. Research in the field 
of population has provided us with insights about fertility transitions across regions, 
nations, and communities. One of the important findings from the research of the 
twentieth century is that the world population has taken diverse pathways to lower 
its fertility (Cleland, 1994; Kirk, 1996:386; McNicoll, 1998:38). According to 
McNicoll (1998:38) 'there is no unique path of development, so no single pattern of 
fertility transition'. Fertility has declined under different levels of economic 
development, social development, political regimes, family planning efforts, 
mortality levels, and cultural backgrounds. For example, Bangladesh has shown that 
fertility decline can take place under a strong family planning programme14, even if 
the economy is largely poor (Cleland, 1994:243-244). The British fertility decline, 
on the other hand, had taken place at relatively high income and industrialisation 
levels compared to the present developing world (Caldwell, 1982:326). Variations 
are also observed in the level, onset, and intensity of fertility transition within nation 
states. For example, India's two states Kerala and Uttar Pradesh have shown extreme 
variation in fertility, as the TFR for Kerala was 2.0 children per woman and that for 
Uttar Pradesh was 4.82 children per woman according to the 1992-93 NFHS (IIPS, 
1995:96). Do we have a theory in demography to explain the diverse pathways of 
demographic transition or its absence? Regarding the theoretical developments in 
fertility, McNicoll pointed out: 
It is widely agreed that we do not have an adequate theory of fertility, if by theory we 
mean a coherent body of analysis linking a characterisation of society and economy, 
aggregate or local, to individual fertility decisions and outcomes, able to withstand 
scrutiny against the empirical record (McNicoll, 1980:441). 
McNicoll's view about fertility theories in 1980 seems valid even in the 1990s. For 
example, Kirk (1996:361) revealed the following as the status of demographic 
theory in 1966: 'demography is a science short on theory, but rich in quantification'. 
However, Caldwell maintains that, although a unifying fertility theory, a theory that 
can explain fertility declines and differentials in any time and place, is yet to 
emerge, the efforts in that direction have been one of the reasons for the impressive 
progress in the discipline. In this regard, Caldwell ( 1997) noted in his IUSSP 
presidential address: 
14such arguments are now questioned on the ground that there has been a substantial improvement 
in the overall social and economic situation of the Bangladeshis (Caldwell et al., 1999). 
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The unitary theory of fertility transition will have to embody both long-term 
underlying economic and demographic trends and ideas and ideologies, legitimization, 
and assistance in access to contraception. No one could seriously maintain that the 
nineteenth-century British, had they found themselves in circumstances similar to 
those in contemporary India or China-where the government and the elites insist that 
family limitation is a social and a moral duty and where the pill, sterilization, and 
abortion are approved and easily obtainable--would have delayed the onset of strict 
limitation of marital fertility to the late 1870s. The pursuit of the unitary theory will be 
intellectually rewarding, and doubtless that pursuit will itself result in further 
demographic change (Caldwell, 1997:810) 
The following section will examine some of the important fertility theories that have 
been used to explain fertility changes in both contemporary and historical 
populations 15 . 
1.3.1 Classical demographic transition theory 
Classical demographic transition theory, or simply 'demographic transition theory', 
is one of the most discussed theories in demography; as Demeny (1972) put it, 'the 
central preoccupation of modern demography'. N otestein is considered to be the first 
formulator of demographic transition theory16, which posits a three-stage transition 
composed of a pre-transitional phase of high fertility and high mortality and thus 
slow population growth; a transitional stage of falling mortality resulting in rapid 
population growth; and a post-transitional stage of low fertility and mortality rates 
bringing a return to slow or no population growth. The causes of such transition are 
broad forces of modernisation such as urbanisation and industrialisation. These 
broad forces of modernisation alter the economics of childbearing in such a way that 
a large number of children becomes a disadvantage to parents as costs of child 
rearing rise and benefits of children lessen. The social, economic and aspirational 
changes brought about by urbanisation and industrialisation can be best viewed from 
Notestein's own words: 
The new ideal of the small family arose typically in the urban industrial society. It is 
impossible to be precise about the various causal factors, but apparently many were 
important. Urban life stripped the family of many functions in production, 
consumption, recreation, and education . . . In factory employment the individual 
stood on his own accomplishments. The new mobility of young people and the 
anonymity of city life reduced the pressure toward traditional behaviour exerted by the 
15For a review of history of the population theories, see Overbeek (1974). 16 Although Frank Notestein is considered to be the first to propose a transition model of fertility 
using data from various countries in the world, similar ideas were earlier put forth by Warren 
Thomson in 1929, Adolphe Landry in 1934, and Carr-Saunders in 1936. See Kirk (1996) for a 
discussion of classical demographic transition theory. 
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family and the community. In a period of rapidly developing technology new skills 
were needed, and opportunities for individual advancement arose. Education and a 
rational point of view became increasingly important. As a consequence, the cost of 
child-rearing grew and the possibilities for economic contributions by children 
declined. Falling death rates at once increased the size of the family to be supported 
and lowered the inducement to have many births. Women, moreover, found new 
independence from household obligations and new economic roles less compatible 
with childbearing (Notestein, 1953 quoted in Kirk, 1996:364) 
Evidence from the European Fertility Project and recent fertility transition 1n 
economically less developed countries in Asia has provided an opportunity to 
evaluate demographic transition theory in more recent as well as historical 
populations. Based on these observations and other theoretical aspects, the 
demographic transition theory is criticised for several weaknesses. These include its 
giving an overstylised and incomplete account of the major determinants of 
demographic change; an inaccurate depiction of the historical process; inattention to 
class specificity of demographic change; ethnocentric assumptions about the units of 
demographic decision making and behaviour (Greenhalgh, 1990a:92); a unilinear 
view of societal change; the rational pursuit of self-interest; universal principles 
applying to all societies regardless of their cultural variations in values and beliefs 
(Hayes, 1994:5-7); and using a limited set of information to develop a general 
theory (Cleland and Wilson, 1987:5-6). Although demographic transition theory is 
known as theory, for some it is an 'idea,' a 'generalisation' or a 'framework for 
analysis' (Szreter, 1993). According to Teitelbaum (1975:420), 'the theory offers 
only partial explanation of European trends and ambiguous advice for developing 
countries'. This view was shared by Ratcliffe (1983) in an examination of 
demographic transition theory in the context of Kerala, where he indicated that 
demographic transition theory had failed to explain the demographic change. 
However, some consider demographic transition theory to have explanatory and 
predictive value, probably higher than many of the later modifications and 
alternatives. Chesnais17 (1992:5) considers demographic transition theory to be the 
only interpretative scheme that reflects a synthetic and coherent view of 
contemporary demographic changes. Mason ( 1997 :448-449) was sceptical about the 
decadal time scale in the European Fertility Project used to test a demographic 
transition theory that used a centennial scale. She believed that, since the test was 
not fair, the allegations made against demographic transition theory using the 
European Fertility Project were not justifiable. Kirk (1996:383) suggests that there 
is no alternative theory of equal value in forecasting future populations or as a guide 
17Chesnais (1992) also criticised many aspects of the demographic transition theory. 
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to empirical research. In a comprehensive review of demographic transition theory 
Kirk notes the present status of the theory as follows: 
The demographic transition was born a lusty infant some 50 years ago. With all its 
shortcomings, it remains at the centre of the demographic stage (Kirk, 1996:384). 
Considering the view that demographic transition theory is largely inadequate for 
the purposes of description, explanation or prediction of fertility, one would expect 
alternative theoretical formulations. The following section briefly considers some of 
the post classical theoretical works. 
1.3.2 Post-classical fertility transition theories 
As indicated earlier, trust in the classical demographic transition theory began to 
fade with the findings from the European Fertility Project launched in 1963. This 
project was designed to test demographic transition theory with historical data from 
700 provincial-level units throughout Europe. The most important finding of this 
project was that there was no consistent relation between the timing of the onset of 
fertility decline and measures of social and economic development (Knodel and van 
de Walle, 1979). This project, however, provided several leads to further thinking 
about fertility decline, particularly the role of culture in fertility change. Five major 
strands of post-classic attempts to theorise fertility transitions are examined in the 
following sections. 
1.3.2.1 Ideational change theory 
The European Fertility Project indicated that the levels of fertility were more closely 
linked to language, ethnic and geographic groups (Knodel and van de Walle, 1979; 
Watkins, 1986). This led some to think that birth control ideas were diffused within 
similar cultural regimes, without much relation to social and economic structure. 
Among those who advocated this view were Cleland and Wilson (1987) who 
proposed that ideational change is more important than structural changes for 
fertility transition, using illustrations from both European and Asian fertility 
transitions. The supportive evidence for their argument was the weak link between 
economic structure and fertility and a stronger link with culture and education. They 
argued that both education and culture determine the initial acceptability of new 
ideas and the quick spread of birth control ideas within many societies. Ideational 
change is claimed to have more force in initiating fertility transition than as an 
explanation of the later phase of controlled fertility. The motivation for birth control 
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is an aspect that is missed in this approach. Another weakness of this approach was 
the narrow focus on attitudes towards birth control (Greenhalgh, 1995:7,9) and the 
incomplete nature of its explanations (Mason, 1997: 445). 
1.3.2.2 Wealth-flow theory 
Caldwell's theory, the wealth-flow theory, is another approach that evolved from 
dissatisfaction with classical transition theory (Caldwell, 1982: 117-122). Unlike 
other theorists, Caldwell based his theory mostly on his own intensive field work 
conducted in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Caldwell, 1982:3-5). Wealth-flow 
theory is an integration of economic and social approaches to explain fertility 
change. According to Caldwell (1976, 1980, 1982), in pre-transitional societies the 
net flow of goods and services is from children to parents. Reversal of the direction 
of this flow-from parents to children-is the driving force behind fertility decline. 
The causes of such changes are the emergence of Western ideas regarding the non-
patriarchal, child-centred nuclear family, which replaces the joint-family system 
with its vested interest in high fertility. Under the nuclear family arrangement, the 
locus of decision making will be the conjugal couple. Since parents want to give 
emotional and economic care to their children in a Western mode, family size falls 
because such care is expensive: 
In general, in societies of every type and stage of development, fertility behaviour is 
rational, and fertility is high or low as a result of economic benefit to individuals, 
couples, or families in its being so. Whether high or low fertility is economically 
rational is determined by social conditions: primarily by the direction of the 
intergenerational wealth flows. This flow has been from younger to older generations 
in all traditional societies; and it is apparently impossible ( or at least, examples are 
unknown) for a reversal of flow-at the great divide-to occur before the family is 
largely nucleated both emotionally and economically. A fair degree of emotional 
nucleation is needed for economic nucleation; and considerable amounts of both are 
required before parents are free to indulge in ever greater expenditures on their 
children (Caldwell, 1982: 152) 
Caldwell's (1976, 1978, 1982) theory has been criticised on various grounds. 
Thadani ( 1978) criticised Caldwell's views about the relationship between the 
economic nucleation and emotional nucleation of the family, and their link to the 
macro and micro changes. Lack of testability is yet another weakness in the theory 
(Greenhalgh, 1990a:86; 1995:7). Handwerker (1986:13-14) argues that the key 
claims of wealth-flow theory have not been submitted to clear tests. Applicability of 
Caldwell's theory beyond sub-Saharan Africa is questioned by Mason (1997:444), 
who gives examples from Western Europe and East Asia, where she indicates that 
fertility did not decline according to Caldwell's theory. One of the central 
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assumptions in Caldwell's theory, that fertility will decline only when there is a 
reversal in the direction of intergenerational resources, and when children become a 
net economic burden, is questioned in a recent study in Cote d'Ivoire, a sub-Saharan 
African country where fertility remains exceptionally high (Stecklov, 1999). 
Furthermore, an attempt to apply wealth-flow theory in Kenya had led to the 
following conclusion 18 . 
Fertility declines are now clearly underway in rural Kenya in the absence of the 
changes that are supposed to produce them according to Caldwell's theory (Thomas et 
al., 1994:362). 
Caldwell's theory has been an important theme in demographic discussions and 
research in the 1980s and early 1990s. It seems, however, that the theory has not 
developed further with new evidence and know ledge in the area of population. As 
Greenhalgh (1995:7) noted, 'Caldwell himself is no longer actively pursuing the 
wealth-flows program'. Despite all these weaknesses, Caldwell's theory has 
undeniably generated intellectual vigour and stimulus in the discipline. 
1.3.2.3 Microeconomic theories 
The economic component in the demographic transition theory, i.e., that 
modernisation of society changes the economics of child rearing in such a way that 
it becomes economically disadvantageous to parents, is believed by some to be the 
seed for economic theories of fertility (Cleland and Wilson, 1987:7; Kirk, 1996). 
The microeconomic application to fertility known as the 'Chicago school approach' 
or 'new household economics' or 'demand theories' has come from Becker ( 1960) 
and others (Schultz, 1969). The central argument posed by these economists is that 
reduced demand for children will reduce fertility, and thus result in fertility 
transition. Using the microeconomic theory of consumption, Becker ( 1960) 
developed an economic theory to explain fertility change. In this theory children 
were treated like any other consumer durables, costing time and money, but 
providing psychic benefits. The theory suggests that households decide on the 
optimal number of offspring given their costs, household income, and the 
households' relative preference for children and other goods: 
Children are viewed as a durable good, primarily a consumer's durable, which yields 
income, primarily psychic income, to parents. Fertility is determined by income, child 
cost, knowledge, and tastes. As increase in income and a decline in price would 
increase the demand for children, although it is necessary to distinguish between the 
18see also Mahmud and Mcintosh (1980) for an analysis of Caldwell's view on the welfare of large 
families. 
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quantity and quality of children demanded. The quality of children is directly related 
to the amount spent on them (Becker, 1960:231). 
The microeconomic theory of Becker and others has been criticised by several 
scholars (Blake, 1968; Hawthorn, 1970:57-60). Blake (1968) criticised the 
approach, disputing that having a baby was comparable to the acquisition of a 
consumer durable such as an automobile. 
Considering the criticisms of the microeconomic approach, Easterlin ( 197 5, 1978) 
modified the economic framework by incorporating sociological aspects. Easterlin's 
framework envisages modernisation as influencing fertility through the intervening 
variables of supply, demand, and costs of regulating births. It does not assume 
priority or dominance among different economic, socio-economic and cultural 
variables. According to Kirk (1996), the quality of Easterlin's synthesis induced the 
National Research Council's Panel on Fertility Determinants to adopt it as the basic 
framework for its massive study on Determinants of Fertility in Developing 
Countries 19. 
Despite its modifications, the economic theory of Easterlin has come under criticism 
from scholars. According to Greenhalgh (1995:8), although Easterlin's work has 
broadened the scope of consumer-choice models, they still focus on the economic 
calculus of fertility decision making, neglecting contextual and historical forces 
impinging on those cost-benefit deliberations. Kirk ( 1996) points out the following 
weakness in Easterlin's model: 
The transition model has thus received a great deal of attention. But its practical 
application faces difficulties. The dependent variable is the number of children a 
woman has borne by the end of her reproductive life, and, therefore, takes a cohort, 
rather than a period perspective. This is useful for some purposes, but not useful for 
the analysis of current events. Furthermore, it assumes a fixed life cycle (i.e. parents 
decide at the time of their marriage what number of children they want, and adhere to 
this decision throughout their fecund years), and it makes no allowance for changes 
with time and experience. This view certainly conflicts with actual experience (Kirk, 
1996:371). 
A critical review of demand theories offered by Cleland and Wilson ( 1987: 15) 
identified serious flaws in the economic approaches. They noted that England had 
all the economic traits stated in demand theories to bring about a fall in fertility for 
centuries before the transition began. They also suggested that evidence from the 
contemporary pre-transitional societies regarding value of children is less clear cut 
19see Bulatao and Lee (1983). 
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and more controversial than proposed in the microeconomic theories. 
1.3.2.4 Institutional theories 
Institutional determinants of fertility proposed by McNicoll ( 1980, 1994) and others 
(Greenhalgh, 1988, 1990a, 1995) form yet another strand of fertility theory. 
According to McNicoll (1994), the patterns of reproductive change are largely 
shaped by the institutional endowments each society has inherited from its past and 
by the continuing process of rationalisation of individual behaviour as it adjusts to 
realities, hopes and expectations. The institutional endowments include family and 
local community, family and property law, the local dimension of public 
administration; the stratification system and the mobility path it accommodates; and 
the labour market. Characterisation of any society by such features reflects its 
unique history. It is argued that in the long run there could be a convergence of 
institutional structures and individual behaviours based on the effect of expectations. 
McNicoll ( 1994) illustrated how family type and community structures can 
influence reproductive strategies. He argued that some combinations of institutional 
endowments permit a smooth path to low fertility, while other combinations impede 
that process (McNicoll, 1994:211). McNicoll (1998:24) pointed out that much of the 
breakdown of rigid stratification and gender systems occurs as new technologies and 
institutions open new routes of upward mobility, and pose new threats to those 
disinclined to respond. According to Greenhalgh ( 1995), McNicoll's institutional 
demography recognises historical contingency and societal specificity, and embraces 
narrative modes of explanation that can accommodate such forces as gender and 
power that are difficult to incorporate into standard empirical models of 
demographic behaviour. McNicoll's institutional approach is a bottom-up approach 
where the cognitive environment of individual demographic decisions will be 
outlined first, followed by a sketch of local institutional and cultural configurations, 
and finally the larger forces shaping institutional change. Greenhalgh's (1988) 
political economy, a variant of the institutional approach, is a top-down approach 
beginning with an understanding of the historically developed global forces that 
shape the local demographic regimes, then identifying the ways these impinge on 
regional, national and local institutional environments, and finally tracing their 
effects on individual fertility behaviour (Greenhalgh, 1990a:87). Greenhalgh's 
(1990a:88) explanations of fertility transitions embrace 'not only the social and 
economic, but also the political and cultural aspects of demographic change'. 
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1.3.2.5 Social mobility theories20 
Social mobility is one of the earliest attempts to explain fertility decline; Dumont is 
considered a pioneer in this field. Dumont (1890, referred to in Overbeek, 1974:80) 
suggested in his concept of capillarite sociale (social capillarity) that societies 
which are democratic, like the France of his time, had many opportunities for their 
inhabitants to improve themselves. On the other hand, in many civilisations the 
static rigid organisational culture did not provide opportunities for improvements in 
people's social and economic conditions. Dumont argued that just as a column of 
liquid had to be thin in order to rise under the force of gravity, a family had to be 
smaller in size in order to rise in the social ladder: 
Any man tends ... to climb unceasingly, as oil rises in a lamp wick ... For one who 
starts at the bottom to arrive at the top, it is necessary to run fast and not to be 
encumbered with baggage. Thus, while an ambitious man can be served by a good 
marriage, ... his own children, particularly if they are numerous, almost inevitably 
slow him down (Dumont 1890, quoted in Greenhalgh, 1988:630) 
It is important to note in Dumont's argument that a society of democratic nature is a 
precondition for the social capillarity principle to operate. A rigid state with strong 
class or caste structure has to be transformed first to a less strong class or caste 
society for the social capillarity principle to apply. The Schneiders (1996) found a 
similar situation in their Sicily town study in Italy. They revealed that the landless 
labourers were prevented from lowering their fertility by inter-class relations of 
dominance or subordination that robbed them of the ability to visualise opportunities 
and to achieve smaller families. 
The security and mobility desires of individuals in shaping their fertility are evident 
in Taussig's ( 1911) classic work. Taussig suggested awakened ambition of the 
individual as a cause for decline in birth rates. According to him, the Western 
European fertility decline in the nineteenth century was due to the spread of 
education; newspapers and books; cheap movement by railway and steamship; new 
modes of employment; large-scale production and the factory system. He attributed 
marital fertility decline to parents' desires to maintain their social and economic 
position, as well as to raise the social and economic position of their children. 
20 Apart from the above views, there is much in the literature in sociology that deals with mobility 
and.fertility linkages. An extensive review of most of the work carried out before the mid-1980s is 
provided by Kasarda et al. (1986). 
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Davis (1963) further elaborated on the mobility-fertility linkages in his theory of 
multiple responses. Davis argued that, when mortality declined and population 
growth increased, families tended to use every means to maximise their new 
opportunities and avoid relative loss of status: 
Under a prolonged drop in mortality with industrialisation, people in Northwest 
Europe and Japan found that their accustomed demographic behaviour was 
handicapping them in their effort to take advantage of the opportunities being provided 
by the emerging economy. They accordingly began changing their behaviour. Thus it 
was in a sense the rising prosperity itself, viewed from the standpoint of the 
individual's desire to get ahead and appear responsible, that forced a modification of 
his reproductive behaviour (Davis, 1963:352). 
Blake ( 1972) shared the notion of mobility as an inevitable consequence of changes 
in the social stratification of a society: 
... once a status system based heavily on ascription ( on the status of one's family 
rather than one's accomplishments) is overthrown (through the loss of castes, or a 
functioning aristocracy), individuals do not have a choice concerning whether they 
will participate in the new system. They must make an effort to achieve and maintain a 
respectable social status, or they run the risk of becoming virtual nonentities in the 
society (Blake, 1972: 175). 
The fertility-as-mobility framework developed by Greenhalgh (1988) is an 
institutional approach that incorporates the mobility aspirations causing fertility 
decline. She linked fertility with mobility aspirations to explain the fertility 
transition in East Asia. She proposed two realms-the security and mobility, and 
institutional environments-that decide the cost and benefit of children. 
1.4 Conceptual scheme 
The basic assumption in the conceptual scheme for the present study is that in a 
rigid exploitative system of social arrangement, such as the traditional caste system, 
it is not possible to improve lower-caste people's social and economic position. 
However, once the traditional caste system is changed to a non-traditional caste-
system society, it is feasible to move up the ladder of social and economic mobility 
(Blake, 1972). In the mobility scale, the first step is to protect the social and 
economic status from declining (security), and then to move up (mobility) on the 
status ladder. This realm is the security-mobility system, which includes the social 
stratification structure, the family unit, and the security-mobility goals and 
strategies. The other realm is the institutional environment. This includes the 
regulative principles and the formal and informal organisations that structure the 
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world people live in (Greenhalgh, 1988:639; McNicoll, 1994:206). In the area of 
fertility, the institutional environment includes economic, educational, socio-
political, and health institutions. The two realms affect fertility in many ways. In the 
simplified scheme, the security-mobility system determines the security and 
mobility benefits of children to parents and other older family members. The 
institutional environment defines the cost of children and the terms in which cost-
benefit calculations about children are made. Culture influences how closely 
behaviour, including fertility, follows from cost-benefit considerations (Greenhalgh, 
1988:639). 
According to Greenhalgh (1988:639), in such a framework the nature and strength 
of the relation between the number of children born and raised, and security and 
mobility strategies, vary from society to society, and from time to time. Three main 
sources of variation postulated by Greenhalgh (1988) are: the costs and security-
mobility benefits of children, the nature of contraceptive technology available, and 
the sensitivity of culture to the costs and benefits of children. 
In the present study the two realms-security-mobility and institutional 
environment-will be examined in the selected scheduled-caste community in order 
to examine their fertility decline. Table 1.1 illustrates the links between the security-
mobility system, the institutional environment, and fertility both in Kerala and in the 
study village. The following sections examine details of each realm in relation to the 
present study. 
1.4.1 Security-mobility system 
1.4.1.1 Social stratification 
In the present research social stratification is characterised by the non-traditional 
caste-system society, where individual or family merit decides a family's or its 
members' social and economic status in the local community. In the early years of 
the twentieth century, Kerala society was stratified on the basis of the caste-system 
principles which did not permit social or economic mobility for the scheduled 
castes. However, caste-system changes cleared the path for social and economic 
mobility of the scheduled castes. Thus, as Davis ( 1963) noted, a society that allows 
every community to progress socially and economically is a prerequisite for creating 
social and economic aspirations of lower socio-economic classes. 
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1.4.1.2 The security-mobility unit 
In the traditional caste system of Kerala, the landlords had tremendous influence on 
the family decisions of scheduled-caste tenants21 . For example, the tenant family 
head had to obey the landlord for most of the important matters such as marriage of 
children, education, and work participation. This was primarily due to the economic 
dependence of the scheduled castes on the upper castes. In the non-traditional caste 
system, however, the scheduled-caste families became socially and economically 
independent. That is, the family could take decisions for its members, set their goals 
for further development and adopt appropriate strategies to achieve their goals. 
1.4.1.3 Security-mobility goals 
In the non-traditional caste system of Kerala, the scheduled castes are likely to have 
a strong desire to maintain and improve social and economic status. It is possible 
that the scheduled castes will adopt all available means to maintain and improve 
their social and economic position. The first priority, however, would be to maintain 
the newly acquired ownership of land and social status entailed by the land reform. 
That means they will attempt not to become tenants and a socially subordinate group 
again. Once security is ensured, they will then try to improve their social and 
economic position, their mobility. Thus, security and mobility are considered as part 
of a continuum in the goal hierarchy. 
1.4.1.4 Security-mobility strategies 
The strategies designed to maintain the already achieved social and economic status 
are termed security strategies, and those aimed at enhancing social and economic 
status are called mobility strategies (Greenhalgh, 1988:647). In the non-traditional 
caste system, the best way for the scheduled castes to achieve security and mobility 
goals would be by educating their children to an employable level. The strategy of 
the scheduled castes would also involve adopting some of the practices of the 
economically and socially well-to-do in order to show their improved social and 
economic status. 
21see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the influence of the upper castes on the lower castes' 
family formation and timing of marriage. 
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1.4.2 Institutional environment 
While the security-mobility system defines the security and mobility benefits of 
children, the institutional environment determines the costs of children and the terms 
in which cost-benefit calculations about children are made (Greenhalgh, 1988:639). 
The institutional environment relevant in Kerala and the study village includes the 
economy, contraceptive methods and their availability, and the health situation. The 
key elements of this are summarised below. 
1.4.2.1 Economy 
Remittances from migrants working in the Gulf countries have led to an economic 
boom which in turn has provided opportunities for economic progress, even for 
those who could not participate directly in the migration process, such as the 
scheduled castes. With the remittances from the Gulf, it has become possible for the 
scheduled castes to change their occupations to more skills-based occupations 
needed in the village. The remittances from the Gulf have also made it possible for 
the scheduled castes to spend money on the education of their children and on 
improving their living conditions. 
1.4.2.2 Family planning 
The availability and nature of contraceptive methods influence the number of 
children born, apart from the cost-benefit considerations. The national family 
planning programme, operating through government outlets such as Primary Health 
Centres22 and sub-Centres, and the networks of private medical institutions in the 
state provide contraceptive services on a voluntary basis. 
1.4.2.3 Health situation 
If the health situation of a population is improved, relatively low fertility is 
sufficient to obtain the desired number of children. The health situation includes the 
level of infant and child mortality, and maternal health. The health situation depends 
on the availability of medical care, nutritional status, and the overall economic 
situation that determines the standard of living. 
22Tbe network of government-run health units in the rural areas, set up in India after 1951 on the 
recommendations of the 1946 Bhore Committee (Srinivasan, 1995:318). 
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Table 1.1: Links between the security-mobility system, the institutional 
environment, and fertility in the non-traditional caste-system in Kerala and the study 
village 
Features of security-
mobility system and 
institutional 
environment 
Security-mobility 
system 
Caste-system changed to 
a non-traditional caste 
system 
Condition of the lower castes in 
Kerala and the village 
Open to mobility 
Scheduled castes become working 
class 
Caste identity not used to 
discriminate or promote social 
interactions in the society 
Security-mobility unit Patriarchal, patrilineal, and 
patrilocal family 
Security-mobility goals Desire to acquire social and 
economic status in the society 
Security-mobility Education 
strategies Non-traditional occupation 
Implications for security, mobility, 
and fertility 
No caste restrictions to mobility 
Strong incentive to climb the ladder 
of success; desire to maintain and 
improve social and economic position 
Family is responsible for meeting 
mobility goals; sons are central and 
long-term family members, thus 
essential to fulfilment of family goals 
Maintain the newly acquired social 
and economic status; families strive 
to get salaried and respectable job 
Sons are key resources in mobility 
strategies; perceived high benefits 
from sons 
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Table 1.1 ( continued) 
Features of security-
mobility system and 
institutional 
environment 
Institutional 
environment 
Economy 
Educational system 
Socio-political 
institutional 
intermediaries between 
government and family 
Health conditions 
Contraceptive 
technology 
Conditions in Kerala and village 
Remittance-based economy, 
economic boom through 
remittances, labour demand, food 
production very low, high demand 
for land for housing 
Implications for security, mobility, 
and fertility 
Opportunities for economic progress, 
use of cost-benefit calculations 
Shift to fee-paying English-medium Direct and indirect educational costs 
schools, government schools free high 
Absent 
Improvements in health status; 
infant and child mortality very low 
Free to pursue mobility goals and to 
adjust strategies to environmental 
opportunities and constraints 
Relatively low fertility necessary to 
obtain desired number of children 
Modern permanent methods readily Fertility more likely to be close to 
available that needed for mobility goals 
Note: adapted from Greenhalgh, 1988:640-41. 
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1.5 Methodology 
The institutional approach requires detailed understanding of the institutional 
arrangements of the population in question. This involves intensive and time-
consuming research. Inevitably, therefore, such research can be applied only to 
relatively small populations. This section outlines the methodology used in this 
thesis. 
1.5.1 Kerala 
Since selection of Kerala was predetermined, this paragraph gives only some basic 
information. Kerala's social, economic and demographic aspects are discussed in 
detail in Chapters 2 and 3. Kerala state is located on the south-west coast of India; in 
1991 it had 38,863 square kilometres of land and 29.1 million people23 . It represents 
3.4 per cent of the population and 1.27 per cent of the land area of India. Kerala has 
1,384 villages distributed in 14 administrative districts. About 80 per cent of 
Kerala' s population live in rural areas (Director of Census Operations, 1991: 5). At 
the time of India's independence in 1947, Kerala state, as we officially know it 
today, did not exist. It consisted of three administrative units: two princely states, 
Travancore and Cochin located in the south, and Malabar in the north. Malabar was 
under the direct administration of the British Madras Presidency24. On 1 July 1949 
the two princely states were merged to form the state of Travancore-Cochin. The 
present state of Kerala came into being on 1 November 1956 under the States 
Reorganisation Act of 1956 (Department of Public Relations, 1976:124). 
23Demographic details of Kerala are given in Chapter 3. 24When Malabar was first annexed by the British, it was first placed under Bombay Presidency (Baden-Powell, 1892: 178). 
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1.5.2 Choice of the scheduled-caste community 
As a large number25 of castes make up the scheduled castes of Kerala, it was 
important to select a community which had a fertility decline. The Vettuvans are a 
scheduled-caste community in central Kerala, where I planned to conduct my field 
work. But first I had to find enough evidence to prove that fertility among the 
Vettuvans had indeed declined. Data on fertility from various Primary Health 
Centres (PH Cs) in Trichur district and my discussion with field staff from the Sub-
Centres convinced me that fertility had declined among the V ettuvans of Trichur 
district. Besides, I had a better understanding of the Vettuvan community than any 
other scheduled-caste community in Kerala because they are found mostly in the 
Trichur district of Kerala from which I come. All these factors contributed to the 
selection of the Vettuvan community for the present research. 
1.5 .3 Choice of the village 
Once the Vettuvan community was selected, it was necessary to select a village 
which had enough Vettuvan households needed for this study in Trichur. I had a 
sound knowledge of the caste composition of Engandiyour village as this was the 
place where I conducted field work for my Masters thesis (Saseendran, 1986). I 
knew from my 1986 field work that the Vettuvans formed the largest scheduled-
caste community in the village. The 1991 Census suggested that about 23.6 per cent 
(or 4893 persons) of the village population belonged to scheduled castes (Director of 
Census Operations, 1991:90). To obtain an accurate estimate of the number of 
Vettuvan households in the village, I used the voter list26 of 1994. The total number 
of the Vettuvan families identified from this list was 700. Because Engandiyour 
village had enough Vettuvan households to meet my needs, I decided to select 
Engandiyour. 
1.5 .4 Why study one scheduled-caste community? 
Typically, one scheduled-caste community dominates one village or even one 
taluk27 . Thus, to have a proper representation of more than one community, two 
different geographic locations would have been selected. Although an additional 
location would have enhanced the representativeness of the study to the wider 
25In 1981 there were 68 scheduled castes in India. A list of scheduled castes is given in Appendix-
3. 
26List used for election purposes. 
27 A taluk (revenue division) on an average has 5-10 villages in its jurisdiction. 
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community of scheduled castes, that would have been difficult to achieve 
considering the time and money needed. Furthermore, this research did not aim to 
represent the entire scheduled-castes community of Kerala; rather it aimed to study 
fertility change of a scheduled-caste community in the hope that such a study would 
throw light on the processes that led to the fertility decline of the scheduled castes. 
1.5.5 Selection of Vettuvan households 
As indicated earlier, the Vettuvan households were identified using the 1994 voter 
list, which contained all the households in the village. Since voter lists are generally 
prepared with consultation of all political parties the possibility of any households 
being missing from the list is very small. The ref ore, a voter list can be considered a 
complete list of households in the village. From this voter list, all the Vettuvan 
households were identified with the help of a local political leader. Since the 
Vettuvans have some typical family names, it was easy to identify their families. My 
familiarity with the Vettuvan family names enabled me to verify the Vettuvan 
households identified by the local leader. 
However, using the 1994 voter list did pose some problems. That is, households that 
had been formed (mostly through family partition) since 1994 were not included in 
the voter list. Further enquiries revealed that in Engandiyour, household partitions 
had been few in the 1990s. For example, the total increase in the number of 
households between 1991 and 1995-96 in the whole village was about 7 per cent 
(Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996; Director of Census Operations, 1991). This 
suggests that between 1994 and 1997, the increase in the number of Vettuvan 
households may not be significant enough to change the number of households 
selected using the voter list of 1994. That is, the number of Vettuvan households in 
the 1994 voter list may not be significantly different from that of the number of 
households which existed during my study in 1997. 
The voter list provided information on name, age, sex, and family name of each 
member of the households above 18 years of age. The voter list was classified 
according to wards28 of the village. This enabled me to group the V ettuvan 
households for the ten wards, which made data collection easily manageable. 
From the list of all the Vettuvan households, which totalled 700, 350 households 
were selected on a systematic random sample basis, without replacement; that is 
28 Administrative divisions. Details are given in Chapter 5. 
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every second household was selected for the study. A non-replacement strategy was 
adopted because then the interviewers would not have to take decisions in the field 
as to whether to include or exclude a particular household when the listed household 
could not be interviewed for some reason. 
1.5.6 Data needed for the study 
Since this study is about understanding fertility decline in a selected scheduled-caste 
community using an institutional approach, detailed information was necessary on 
both macro and micro situations. The macro-level data needed included the state-
level information on caste-system reforms, land reform, Gulf migration and other 
migrations, economic change and social development in general. The micro-level 
data needed included data on the village, families, and couples. Village data needed 
were data on the social, political and economic histories. Family-level data needed 
included family types, intergenerational relations, and data on gender and sex roles. 
Couple-level data needed in this study were mainly data on fertility, family 
planning, and values related to children. 
1.5.7 Choice of the method 
In demographic research, anthropological methods of data collection have become 
popular in the recent decades (Caldwell, Hill and Hull, 1988; Greenhalgh, 1989, 
1990a:88; Obermeyer, 1997:813). The method used in demographic research is 
generally guided by what information one is seeking, and the theoretical approach 
being adopted. Sometimes a combination of methods is used as each method offers 
different types of information that complement each other. The two methods 
commonly used in demographic research are qualitative methods, largely adopted 
from anthropology29 , and quantitative methods based on surveys. Steckler et al. 
(1992: 1) have pointed out that both qualitative and quantitative methods have 
weaknesses which can be compensated for by the strengths of the other. Regarding 
the multiple use of methods in understanding demographic processes Fricke ( 1997) 
noted: 
I argue, however, that placing demographic processes within a cultural matrix calls for 
a special kind of research effort, one that combines within the same project the 
multiple methods suitable for gathering different kinds of data and one that places all 
analytic strategies within more encompassing models of cultural and social action (Fricke, 1997: 3 81) 
29See Knodel (1997) for a critical examination of anthropological and qualitative methods in 
demography. 
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The present study has adopted a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies-the micro approach developed by Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell 
(1988:9-43) during their field work in Karnataka. The micro-approach included use 
of available data sets; mapping and census of village; participant observation; 
unstructured interviews; surveys. In addition the micro-approach generated 
hypotheses during the project and collected data on those items. 
The micro-approach was considered appropriate for this project because of the 
nature of the data needed. For example, to collect data on fertility , it was more 
appropriate to use quantitative methods. A census of households and structured 
interviews of selected respondents were adopted in this study as part of the 
quantitative methods. To understand the underlying causes of observed fertility , 
more insight into the social and economic relationships between communities in the 
past and present was needed. Consequently, anthropological methods of field work 
were adopted, involving techniques such as general observation, informal 
conversation, in-depth interviews, and focus-group discussions. 
1.5.8 Rapport with the community 
The success of any field work depends on how well the researcher is accepted by the 
community under study. My top priority, therefore, was to gain maximum co-
operation from the Vettuvan community. This was a challenge in Engandiyour 
village where the Vettuvan households were spread all over the village, except for a 
few colonies that have emerged recently. Each family needed to be told about my 
intention, and support had to be sought on an individual household basis; this was 
time-consuming. To overcome this problem I approached a few eminent members 
of the Vettuvan community, the gatekeepers, and explained the project to them in 
detail. They were happy that their community was a topic of interest in overseas 
universities. The community has group gatherings once in a while to discuss various 
aspects of their social life, and they suggested to me that I could meet the group 
during one such occasion and explain the project to the group. These gatherings 
involved a group of Vettuvans from various thara, parts of the village, and at least 
one man from each family was expected to attend. I used such gatherings to 
communicate with members of the Vettuvan community about my study and the 
support I needed from their families. 
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I also benefited from the local political leaders and the village Panchayath ( council) 
president, who showed interest in spreading information on the project during her 
visits to various wards in the village. When I advertised investigator positions in the 
local newspaper, many scheduled-caste families became aware of this project. Two 
of my investigators were from the Vettuvan community, which also helped my entry 
into the community. Over and above this, some villagers knew me and my family 
very well; those who knew me well communicated with those who did not. This also 
made entry into the community easier. By the time I began my interviews, almost 
everyone from the Vettuvan community knew that someone would visit their house 
and ask questions about various aspects of their life. This made my entry to each 
household familiar rather than strange. Despite all these efforts, questions were 
invariably asked. These included: 'Why do you want to know all this?' 'What 
benefits are we going to get from this?'. I managed to win their confidence by 
repeating that the work was an academic exercise and had nothing to do with 
government policies or programmes. Since education and academic pursuits are 
valued highly in the village and among the Vettuvans, I always obtained the 
necessary co-operation during my field work. 
1.5.9 Quantitative data collection 
Quantitative data for the present study were collected primarily through surveys. 
Structured interview schedules were administered to the respondents by face-to-face 
interviews. Details of these interviews are discussed in the following sections. 
1.5.9.1 Translation, pre-testing and formatting 
Before the field operations, interview schedules were prepared in English. Each 
interview schedule was then translated into the local language, Malayalam. The 
village dialect was used instead of the written language; the Malayalam translations 
were done by me as I had enough know ledge of the local language. It should be 
mentioned here that Vettuvans speak a dialect of Malayalam which is slightly 
different from the dialect used by other communities in the village, and is 
considered the language of the poor and illiterate by the villagers. The dialect used 
in the pre-testing of questionnaires was the dialect used by the Vettuvans, but it 
emerged during the pre-testing interviews that the Vettuvans did not like other 
people using their dialect to interview them; therefore, the language was modified to 
a more standard dialect. For pre-testing, 10 interviews each from different 
questionnaires were conducted in the village. Pre-testing provided a few other 
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recommendations for change in the structure of the questionnaire and questions. 
Since pre-testing was conducted without any time lag between interviews, lessons 
could not be learned about real interviews where there was a time lag. For example, 
in the real interviews, household interviews were done first, couple interviews were 
done after almost a month, and other interviews still later. We had to change our 
strategy on timing of interviews, as many people did not find it interesting to answer 
questions when we made several visits. 
After the suggestions from the pre-testing were incorporated, the schedules were 
formatted using computer software which uses the Malayalam script. Each 
questionnaire had a title which very clearly indicated the name of the Australian 
National University, so that people were able to read it and convince themselves that 
it was genuinely an academic study. This had significant bearing on the entire field 
operation. I had given special attention to giving sufficient space to write answers, 
and the entire schedule had a professional look, which again enhanced the 
seriousness of the whole data collection business, not only from the point of view of 
respondents but also for those who helped me to collect data. 
1.5.9.2 Selection, training, and supervision of data collection 
To employ the best investigators from and around the village, an advertisement was 
placed in the local newspaper and local libraries. Six investigators were selected for 
this study, of whom four were women. All investigators selected for this study had 
some university education and a few years of experience in marketing with private 
lending institutions and with the health and family welfare programme. 
After selection, each investigator was given tra1n1ng which involved a detailed 
session on the project. Emphasis was placed on ensuring the investigators clearly 
understood each question in the interview schedules, and how they would ask these 
in the field. Once they became familiar with questions in the interview schedules 
and techniques of interviewing, all the investigators were asked to administer them 
in their neighbourhood (not a part of pre-testing). This was to prove that they 
understood all the questions fully; they could seek further clarifications, if needed. 
In the middle of my field work, one investigator left when he obtained a job and 
another one left for personal reasons; this forced me to select two more investigators 
in the middle of the survey. After initial training they joined the other investigators 
to receive first-hand training. After a week of training they became part of the 
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investigator team, and the entire team then remained until the end of the data 
collection. 
The strategy of data collection was that each investigator would go to a 
predetermined ward, and to the selected number of households scheduled for each 
day. This enabled me to supervise each investigator's work efficiently. Supervision 
of work involved checking interview schedules on the spot for completion, 
correctness and thoroughness. 
1.5.9.3 Data collection through interview schedules 
Vettuvan Household Survey 
Vettuvan Household Survey interviews were the first structured interviews 
conducted with the selected households of the Vettuvan community. The head of the 
household or a responsible adult member30 of the household was entitled to be a 
respondent in this interview. Each interview, excluding the introduction, lasted on 
average 40 minutes. The purpose of this interview was to collect basic information 
from each household. These include details of each member of the household, house 
type, amenities in the house, possessions in the household, land ownership, animal 
husbandry, living standards, inter-caste interactions, and division of work in the 
household. Because of non-co-operation, changes of address, and temporary 
absence, 10 households could not be contacted from the total number of 350 
households selected. Thus, the total number of households interviewed in this study 
was 340. An English version of the household interview scheduled is given in 
Appendix- I 'Survey Instruments'. 
The household interviews were completed in March 1997. This one-month-long 
household survey laid the foundations for subsequent work among the Vettuvans. 
We used Vettuvan Household Surveys to inform each household about the project, 
what we would need from them, and how often we would meet them for this 
purpose. 
30 A person who can provide the information needed in the Household Interview Schedule. The 
investigator was to decide the ability of the respondent in the field according to the guidelines 
provided to him or her. 
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Vettuvan Husband's Survey, and Vettuvan Wife's Survey 
The content of both Vettuvan Wife's and Vettuvan Husband's Surveys was the same, 
except for a section on birth history which targeted women only. The objective of 
this interview was to collect detailed information about a birth history, various 
aspects of preference for number and sex of children, opinions about the usefulness 
of male and female children, changes in the usefulness of male and female children, 
family planning use, and old-age-security concerns. The English version of the 
couple interview schedule is given in Appendix-I 'Survey Instruments'. 
From the Household Survey, all couples in which the wives were in the age group 
15-49 years were selected for the Wife's and Husband's Surveys. There was a total 
number of 350 currently married couples. My purpose was to interview all of them; 
however, I was able to interview only 308 wives and 269 husbands. Some men and 
women could not be interviewed because some women had left their husband's 
house in order to give birth in their natal homes in other villages, some men were 
away for work, and some did not want to be part of the survey. The Vettuvan Wife's 
and Vettuvan Husband's Surveys were planned initially as the first set of interviews 
after the Household Survey. But where we could not interview either husband or 
wife during our visit, we conducted the elderly-interviews as a part of the Elderly 
Vettuvan Survey, of those aged 60 years and over. Thus, after the Household 
Survey, we could not follow a strict protocol in terms of which survey should be 
done first, which second and so on. The Vettuvan Wife's interview schedules were 
administered by women and the husbands' interviews by men; each interview lasted 
on average 60 minutes. All interviews were conducted at the respondents' homes. To 
avoid imposing on respondents' time, we avoided contacting women for wives' 
interviews during busy hours. Similarly to avoid inconvenience, we arranged 
appointments with those men who regularly went to work. Since we already had 
good rapport with the households, it was rather easy to start interviews without 
much questioning of their purpose. 
Survey of School-Going Children 
The purpose of this interview was to collect information about the education of the 
child, expenditure on education, perceptions about the use of education, and child 
labour. The English version of the interview schedule is given in Appendix- I 
'Survey Instruments'. All children currently studying in a school or college were 
identified from the Household Survey. There was a total of 315 children attending 
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an educational institution at the time of the Vettuvan Household Survey; of these, I 
was able to interview parents or guardians of 254 children. Some parents or 
guardians could not be interviewed because, since there was a 4-5 months gap 
between the Household Survey and the Survey of School-Going Children, some 
children had completed their education31 . In some households more than one child 
was at school and parents or guardians were not willing to provide information 
about all children. We had planned to interview either the mother or the father. 
Wherever we could not find parents, or where children were living with their 
relatives, the children's guardian or a responsible family member was interviewed. 
Elderly Vettuvan Survey 
The purpose of this interview was to collect information about economic activities, 
support from children, and living arrangements of the elderly Vettuvans. The 
interview schedule is given in Appendix-I 'Survey Instruments'. There were 163 
persons aged 60 years and above identified for this survey from the Household 
Survey. Of these 163 elderly we interviewed 138. Some were too sick to be 
interviewed; some were not available; and some, who had been alive at the time of 
the Household Survey, had died before the Elderly Vettuvan Survey. 
Table 1.2: Sample size in each type of survey, Engandiyour, 1997-98. 
Vettuvan 
Household 
Survey, 1997 
340 
Vettuvan 
Husband's 
Survey, 1997 
269 
1.5.10 Qualitative data collection 
Vettuvan 
Wife's 
Survey, 1997 
303 
Survey of 
School-Going 
Children, 1997 
254 
Elderly 
Vettuvan 
Survey, 1997 
138 
Bogue ( 1993b) suggests the following as one of the most effective situations for the 
use of qualitative methods: 
Study of conditions, situations, forces, and influences that usually are not overtly 
visible, but are expressed latently as 'power,' 'domination,' 'discrimination,' 
'exploitation,' 'dependency,' 'abuse,' 'harassment,' 'alienation,' 'mental health,' 'altruism,' 
'assimilation' and similar terms for which objective indicators are few and/or unknown (Bogue, 1993b:24-5). 
31 Academic year ends in April-May in Kerala. 
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Qualitative data were collected in this study in order to examine the caste system, 
mobility aspirations, the effect of land reform and Gulf migration on inter-caste 
behaviour, and the role of children in the mobility-security aspirations of the family. 
The purpose of the qualitative data was to generate rich, detailed, valid process data 
that would leave the study participants' perspectives intact (Steckler et al., 1992: 1). 
The following are the methods used for collecting qualitative data in the present 
study. 
1.5.10.1 Informal conversations 
In my field work informal conversations proved a significant source of information 
in understanding the underlying causes of fertility change. During the course of field 
work I conducted over 50 individual or group conversations; of these 23 
conversations were recorded for this study. The participants in these conversations 
included the village Panchayath members, staff from the Village Panchayath office, 
local political leaders, and residents of the village from various religious and caste 
groups. Informal conversations in the present research were often unplanned. These 
conversations took place in work places, the market, banks, schools, at social 
functions and festivals. The location of the place was very important in selecting a 
particular topic for conversation. For example, if the conversation was at a marriage 
function, the conversations were mostly focused on such issues as the marriage 
expenses, marriage customs, age at marriage, and employment and marriage. If the 
conversations were at a school and with a teacher, then it could be about English-
medium private schools, transport to schools, school uniforms, expenses in 
education, difficulties in educating children, employment, or comparison of the 
present system with the past. The informal conversations also depended on the 
characteristics of the person. These included occupation, interest, and social 
position. 
Informal conversations that I had in the village sometimes involved more than one 
person. Although I had no direct control of the topics of conversation, many aspects 
that were of interest to the present research were discussed. In the informal 
conversations, an obvious issue was recording the conversations. On no occasion 
could I write down the details of conversation immediately. Often it was done late in 
the day when I completed my diary. One of the important objectives of these 
conversations was to test certain views I had about particular issues. 
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1.5.10.2 In-depth interviews 
Using an interview guide (a list of topics to be discussed), I interviewed 12 
individuals in this study. The respondents were Vettuvans (males, females) , Nairs 
(males), and Ezava (males). The purpose of these interviews was to obtain details 
about family relationships, old-age-security concerns, inter-caste relationships, 
mobility aspirations, fertility motivations, and the value of children. Each interview 
took on average two hours. Interviews were done alone and often outside the 
person's residence. I jotted down main points during the interviews and later 
expanded on them. 
1.5.10.3 Focus-group discussions 
I organised four focus groups of women to obtain their views on expectations from 
children, marriage, inter-caste relationships, and their mobility aspirations. The 
focus groups were organised in the Sub-Primary Health Centres32 (Sub-PHC) of the 
village. The average number of respondents was 10-12 in each group. Their ages 
varied between 24 and 50 years, and they were from around the sub-centre locality. 
The discussions were recorded on tape. 
1.5.10.4 General observations 
Observation notes were a very important source of data in the present research. 
Inter-caste interactions and behavioural aspects were some of the key areas where 
the observation technique was most useful: for example, how members of the 
Vettuvan community were treated by other caste groups; the level of respect an 
educated Vettuvan was given compared to an uneducated Vettuvan in the village; 
how Vettuvan children were dressed compared to children from other communities; 
how marriage functions were celebrated; and how Vettuvan children were treated by 
the family while sick compared to children from other communities. 
1.5 .11 Secondary data sources 
The major secondary data used in this study are various census reports, the National 
Family Health Survey (NFHS), records from the Primary Health Centre (PHC), 
records from the village Panchayath, and other published work. 
32 A level lower than PHC. 
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The National Family Health Survey33 (NFHS) is a national survey conducted in the 
24 states of India and the National Capital Territory of Delhi. The NFHS in Kerala 
was conducted in October 1992 and February 1993, covering all 14 districts with a 
representative sample of 4,332 ever-married women aged 13-49 from 4,387 
households (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995). 
Various census reports have been used in this research to obtain data on scheduled 
castes and their characteristics, such as education and occupation. District Census 
Handbooks were used to obtain details of the population and other details on the 
village. To obtain historical accounts of Kerala's caste system, caste-system reforms, 
land reforms, pre-Independence administration, various books and documents were 
used. These include Gazetteers, Kerala Bhasha Institute Publications, and history 
books on Kerala. 
I have used Primary Health Centre (PHC) records on fertility , immunisation, and 
contraceptive use for the year 1995-96. The village Panchayath report based on the 
village survey in 1996 was also used in this research to obtain more details about 
the village and to make comparisons with my survey data. 
1.5.12 Quality of data 
Age reporting is often an issue in demographic surveys. Age reporting can be 
influenced by factors such as ignorance, culture, fear, or cut-off dates. In the present 
study, adequate care was taken in both the training and data collection stages to 
obtain accurate age data. Initially 14 March, the Malayalam New Year, was 
proposed as the cut-off date for a completed year; this had to be changed after a few 
interviews, because respondents were more familiar with the Christian than the 
Hindu calendar in referring to their ages. Unfortunately pre-testing could not 
identify this problem. To verify the age reported by respondents, we checked the 
ages with the voter list and the ration cards34 which bear the name, age, and 
relationship with the head of household of every member. Since we had interviews 
designed for husbands, wives, school-going children, and elderly persons, we cross-
33This project was funded by USAID, New Delhi. The International Institute for Population 
Sciences, Bombay provided co-ordination and guidance (IIPS , 1995). The second phase of NFHS is 
~resently in operation. 
4This card is supplied by the Civil Supplies Department of Kerala state: it shows the eligibility of 
the family for concessions to buy rice, oil , sugar, and kerosene. It is a document required for 
applying for passports, fee concessions in colleges, employment opportunities, unemployment 
benefits and many other legal purposes. Therefore, every household member, including the newly 
born, is added as soon as possible as the entitlement for groceries will increase. 
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checked and corrected ages wherever we found discrepancies with the age data in 
the household schedule. We corrected the household age data on the assumption that 
the age data of wives, husbands and their children would be more accurate when 
they reported their own ages, rather than the head of the household reporting other 
individuals' ages, particularly those of daughters-in-law. Despite all these efforts 
Myers' index (United Nations, 1955) showed a digit preference (22 and 20 for males 
and females, respectively). Age heaping was found in ages ending in O and 5, and 
was particularly evident in the older age groups. This pattern in age reporting is also 
reported in the Kerala NFHS (PRC, Thiruvanandapuram and IIPS, 1995:213). Age 
reporting was complete in this survey. 'Data quality Tables' are given in Appendix-
2. 
In this research, I made efforts to ensure that the data quality was not influenced by 
external factors. These included making an appointment; arranging a quiet place to 
conduct the interview; arranging some tea for refreshment; recording and noting 
points; and ensuring confidentiality about the discussion. 
1.5.13 Analysis of data 
1.5.13.1 Quantitative data 
The first step in the analysis of quantitative data was to code the open-ended 
answers. In order to develop a code book all the answers to open-ended questions 
were noted down on a separate sheet. These answers were then coded, taking into 
account the similarity of answers and the objectives of the study. The coded answers 
were then transferred into the SPSS programme directly. 
Quantitative data were analysed using demographic methods and survey data 
analysis methods. While demographic methods include cohort-wise analysis of 
parities, and calculation of rates and ratios, the survey data analysis methods 
adopted in this study were appropriate cross-tabulations. 
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1.5.13.2 Qualitative data 
In general, there are no set procedures for the analysis of qualitative data. This view 
is very clear from the observations made by Patton ( 1990): 
[In analysing and interpreting qualitative data] there are no formulas for determining 
significance. There are no ways of perfectly replicating the researcher's analytical 
thought processes. There are no straightforward tests for reliability and validity. In 
short, there are no absolute rules except to do the very best with your full intellect to 
fairly represent the data and communicate what the data reveal given the purpose of 
the study. 
This does not mean that there are no guidelines to assist in analysing the data. But 
guidelines and procedural suggestions are not rules. Applying guidelines requires judgement and creativity. Because each qualitative study is unique, the analytical 
approach used will be unique. Because qualitative inquiry depends, at every stage, on 
the skills, training, insights, and capabilities of the researcher, qualitative analysis 
ultimately depends on the analytical intellect and style of the analyst. The human 
factor is the great strength and the fundamental weakness of qualitative inquiry and 
analysis (Patton, 1990:372) 
In this study, qualitative data are mostly used to narrate changes in the social and 
economic relationships in the village, and people's thoughts about these changes. 
The data were generally analysed against the theoretical framework adopted in this 
study. For example, while analysing the security-mobility system in the village, I 
have used the changes in social stratification as a theme, and then culled all relevant 
information gathered through in-depth interviews, focus-group discussions, 
observation notes, and informal interviews. 
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1.6 Organisation of thesis 
This introductory chapter has sketched out the essential intellectual terrain of the 
thesis and outlined the methodology of data collection and analysis. With these 
aspects made clear, we can move on to the detailed research. 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the traditional caste system in Kerala and how it has 
been transformed in recent decades by social, political and economic changes. 
Chapter 3 examines previous research on fertility transition in Kerala. It argues that 
the failure to consider the transformation of the caste system represents a significant 
weakness of the previous research on the topic. Chapter 4 gives a detailed 
quantitative overview of fertility and family planning in the study population, the 
Vettuvans of Engandiyour village. It shows that Vettuvan fertility is indeed 
extremely low and so its determinants may be broadly similar to those for scheduled 
castes throughout Kerala. 
Chapter 5 describes the institutional setting of the fertility in Engandiyour village. It 
provides the detailed local perspective from which Vettuvan families take their 
childbearing decisions. It shows that the village's recent history is typical of much of 
Kerala. Chapter 6 considers the specific mobility and security motivations of 
Vettuvan families. It pays particular attention to marriage, sex roles and old-age 
security. Chapter 7 examines the perceived costs and benefits of children to 
Vettuvans, and how these correspond with the aspirations discussed in Chapter 6. 
Given the highly differentiated sex roles that exist, sons and daughters are 
considered separately. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of the main findings and arguments. 
It also speculates on the possible wider significance of the results. 
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Chapter 2 
Institutional Environinent: 
Caste-System Changes, Social Development, and 
Economic Change in Kerala 
Nothing more vividly illustrates the transformation of Kerala in the twentieth century 
than the way people use their hands. In the old Kerala that began to dissolve rapidly in 
the 1920s, a low-caste man put 'his left hand on his breast, and his right over his 
mouth', if he dared to speak to his superiors 'for fear his breath may pollute the air'. By 
the 1950s, however, it was more likely that men-and increasingly women too-
would use their hands differently: as clenched fists, shaken above their heads, as they 
chanted 'Inquilab Zindabad' (victory to revolution) and marched in demonstrations (Jeffrey, 1992:1). 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of changes in the social and 
economic organisation of Kerala society and the economic and social implications 
of these for the scheduled-caste communities. This provides a macro-institutional 
setting for the discussions that follow in the remaining chapters about the fertility 
decline of the scheduled castes, and the study community in particular. I have 
outlined the traditional caste system that prevailed in Kerala during the nineteenth 
century in order to reveal the economic and social condition of the 'untouchables' in 
that period. An attempt is also made to illustrate the changes brought by various 
reform agents such as the Christian missionaries, the lower-caste reformers, Gulf 
migration, and the agrarian reforms of various governments in transforming Kerala 
from a society based on a traditional caste system to one based on a non-traditional 
caste system. In brief, the present chapter outlines institutional environment in 
Kerala: the regulative principles and the formal and informal organisations that 
structure Kerala society. As McNicoll (1994:206) noted, characterisation of any 
society by such features reflects its unique history. 
2.2 The traditional caste system in Kerala 
Old Kerala [roughly before 1950s] was a place of boundaries and constraints-
boundaries on where particular people might go; constraints on what they might do. 
People lived in discrete groups which connected with others in regulated, symbolic 
ways. In the seclusion of their great houses and palaces, a few high-status people, 
usually elders, made the major decisions about peace and war, land and trade, and 
sexual liaisons and religious ceremonies (Jeffrey, 1992: 19). 
The caste system had been the organisational principle of Kerala society for 
centuries (Jeffrey, 1994:241). Caste is a system of social stratification characterised 
by hierarchy, heredity, pursuit of one or a few particular occupations, inequality, 
endogamy, restriction as to taking food from outsiders, and the notion of 'purity' and 
'pollution' associated with hierarchy (Jha, 1997: 18). Under the caste system Hindu 
society is divided into four groups, or chaturvama. Each group in the chaturvama is 
known as a vama with different ritual 'purity' levels. Depending on the 'purity' level 
of each vama, caste or jati was determined 1. Each caste will have a particular social 
status in the caste hierarchy and will have specific functions to perform. 
Accordingly, the Brahmins were at the top, followed by Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, and 
Sudras. Those Hindus who do not come under these four caste categories were the 
'untouchables'. They were also known as out-castes or inferior castes. While 
Brahmins hold the most prestigious profession of religious scholarship and teaching, 
the 'untouchables' were slaves doing all sorts of manual and menial jobs such as 
labouring and scavenging for higher castes. With minor differences the caste system 
was common in any Hindu society in India (Bains, 1994:4). 
The basis of caste or jati lies in its theological ordination. The theory of dharma in 
Hinduism insists on the pursuit of the specific occupation assigned to each caste. 
Thus, persons born in one particular caste could not change their caste, that is, caste 
status was ascribed2. And they had to perform the occupation assigned to that caste; 
no change was feasible. The caste system, the ref ore, has been a closed system 
denying social mobility to its members (Bougle, 1958:30; Bailey, 1963:107-124). 
The main feature of the caste system relevant in this research is that it perpetuated 
inequality in society in such a way that the 'untouchables' had to suffer under this 
system for centuries (Bains, 1994:9-10). 
1Tuere is some disagreement on the relation between varna andjati. 2 Even in 1997, this aspect of caste prevailed in Engandiyour. 
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The caste system in Kerala is believed to have originated with the invasion of the 
Aryans3 from north India sometime between the eighth and the eleventh century 
after Christ (Kurian, 1986:7). During the sangam age, the early centuries of the 
Christian era, caste-based social or economic organisation was absent in Kerala 
(Oommen, 1971: 12). Historians suggest that when a decisive number of Aryans 
migrated to Kerala, they started to inject caste consciousness and the caste division 
into the society. While the Aryans retained their status as the top caste, the Brahmin, 
they passed on the next highest status to what had previously been the dominant 
sects. Thus, the rulers and their relatives were accepted as Kshatriyas and their 
military men as Sudras (Kurian, 1986:9). The Brahmins and Nairs were known as 
savamar (Aiyappan, 1965:5). The trading communities of Kerala were Muslim and 
Christian rather than Hindus. Thus, Vaisya, the trading community found elsewhere 
in India, was not found in Kerala (Mathew, 1986:38; Kurian, 1986:9). The Aryans 
also created a number of inferior castes to provide various services for them and 
other upper castes. These inferior castes included the Ezavas and Kammalans, and 
were collectively known as avamar (Aiyappan, 1965:5). There was yet another 
category of population who were not part of the caste hierarchy. They were the 
'depressed' castes or 'untouchables', the scheduled castes of post-Independent India. 
Their position was the lowest in the whole society. Important castes, their 
occupations, and share in population are described in the fallowing paragraphs and 
Table 2.1 to provide a clearer understanding of the various caste communities and 
their production relations in the traditional caste system of Kerala. It is important to 
mention here that, since Independence, caste-related information has not been 
collected in the Indian Censuses. The latest caste-based information available about 
Kerala is the 1968 Nettur Commission report. There is continuing debate about the 
inclusion of caste in the 2001 Indian Census (Pinto, 1998). 
3Early invaders and settlers of the Indian subcontinent (Srinivasan, 1995:315). 
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Table 2.1: Castes and their characteristics in Kerala, 1968 
Caste categories Occupation Kerala names Per cent of Kerala 
population 
Brahmins Priests, N amboodiri, 2 
Landlords Tamil Brahmin 
Kshatriyas Soldiers, Upper Nair 2 
Administrators 
Vaisyas Artisans, Kammalans 7 
Traders Christians 21 
Muslims 19 
Sudras Cultivators, Lower Nair 14 
Servants 
Coconut tree climbers Ezavas 22 
(or Iravas, Thiyyas) 
Untouchables Farm and menial Pulayas, 8 
workers Cherumas 
Tribal population Farmers and workers Adivasi 1 
Notes: Four per cent not accounted for above are for various other castes; the percentages are 
for 1968 as estimated in the Kerala government-sponsored Nettur Commission. 
Source: Franke and Chasin, 1989:72. 
While there are several views on when and how the caste system was formed in 
Kerala, it is indisputable that Kerala had a very strong caste system from the 
seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. Aiyappan (1965: 123) compared the 
caste system that existed in Kerala from the sixteenth to the middle of the nineteenth 
century to South Africa's system of Apartheid. A nineteenth-century Indian 
reformer, Swami Vivekananda, called Kerala 'a madhouse of caste' (Franke and 
Chasin, 1989:75). The most important implication of the formation of the caste 
system in Ker ala was the transfer of land from the local population to the Aryan 
immigrants, the Brahmins (Varghese, 1970: 10-11; Oommen, 1971: 13). It is reported 
that the local population handed over their land property to the temples in order to 
avoid paying tax to the government as temples were exempted from land tax4. 
Oommen (1971) argues that the Brahmins, who were the custodians of the temples, 
legalised the land given to the temples by the local population to their advantage. 
4 All other land property was taxed by the then Chera Kings to finance their war with the Chola Kings. 
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Eventually, the local population of Kerala became economically and socially 
marginalised. In the course of time the legal owners of the land became tenants of 
the upper-caste Hindus. Thus, the formation of the caste system in Kerala pushed 
the local population to the lowest social and economic levels. 
2.2.1. N amboodiris 
Namboodiris are the Kerala Brahmin. As mentioned earlier, they occupied the 
highest position in the caste hierarchy (Alexander, 1968:41; Fuller, 1976:33-34; 
Jeffrey, 1994: 11). In 1968 the Namboodiris accounted for only about two per cent 
of Kerala's total population (Franke and Chasin, 1989:72); yet they controlled 
virtually all the land in Kerala (Shea, 1959:76; Oommen, 1971:11; Herring, 
1983: 158). According to legend, the god Parasuraman, who is credited with the 
creation of Kerala, awarded all of the land in it to the N amboodiris and hence they 
become the owners of the Kerala land (Jeffrey, 1994:25). Thus, they were both 
socially and economically the highest community in Kerala. Their supremacy in 
Kerala society is evident in Nagam Aiya's report in the 1875 Census: 
His [the Brahmin's] tenants ... bow down to him not simply as a landlord but as their 
royal liege and benefactor, their suzerain master, their household deity, their very God 
on earth ... His position is holy; his directions are commands; his movements are 
processions; his meal is nectar. He is the holiest of human beings. He is the 
representative of God on earth (Census of 1875, quoted in Jeffrey, 1994: 11) 
In Kerala, before the 1950s, Namboodiris practised primogeniture; that is, only the 
eldest son was allowed to marry in his own caste. The Nair, a caste below them, 
welcomed N amboodiri males as evening visitors to have liaisons with their women, 
under the custom of sambandam5 (Jeffrey, 1994: 11). This custom of the 
N amboodiris is believed to have kept their population size static and their wealth 
from decreasing (Shea, 1959:77). But when the Nair changed their family 
organisation and inheritance practices, they became increasingly reluctant to allow 
the Namboodiri the liberty with their women they had previously enjoyed (Shea, 
1959:78). The '1933 Act of Madras Namboodiri' permitted individual members of 
the Namboodiri community to claim separate shares of family property. The Act 
also allowed children of younger sons to inherit property. Owing to several forces, 
the traditional social and economic status of the N amboodiri caste disappeared in 
Kerala after the 1950s. 
5Sambandam means 'connection'. For a full discussion on sambandam, see Fuller, 1976:73-122. 
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2.2.2. Nair (Nayar) 
The Nair constitute the Sudra (the rulers of this community, the Upper Nair, were 
known as Kshatriya) community of Kerala. They were second to the Namboodiri in 
the social and economic hierarchy of Kerala society. There are several divisions 
within the Nair, some with lower and others with higher status (Shea, 1959:79; 
Fuller, 1976:38-43). Iyer (1970:48) reported that there were 116 subdivisions among 
the Nair in 1901. Thus, the Nair were highly heterogeneous both in social and 
economic terms. In 1968 they accounted for about 16 per cent of the Kerala 
population. But the higher-status Nair were only two per cent of Kerala's population 
(Franke and Chasin, 1989:72) . 
The Nair practised matrilineal kinship until around 1933 (Shea, 1959:79). Their 
marriage system, sambandam, allowed women to choose any husband they wanted, 
and to have any number of them with the consent of the tharavad karanavar, the 
joint family head. In 1933, the Madras marumakkattayam Act, which enabled 
partition of tharavad, led to several changes in the social and economic life of the 
Nair. Until about the beginning of the twentieth century they dominated Kerala's 
economic and social life. Jeffrey, an expert on the Nair community, noted the 
following at the end of his book The Decline of Nair Dominance in Kerala: 
. . . by the beginning of the twentieth century, it was apparent that they [Nair] could no 
longer regard buoyancy as their birthright; in future, like Christians and avama 
Hindus, they too would have to swim (Jeffrey, 1994:247). 
2.2.3 Thiyyas or Ezavas (Izhuvans) 
Thiyyas6 are mostly concentrated in north Kerala, and Ezavas in south Kerala. They 
were one of the lower castes in Kerala. The Ezavas are believed to be the 
descendants of those who migrated from Ceylon7, the present Sri Lanka (Aiyappan, 
1965:119-120; Iyer, 1970:5). The Ezavas have been a numerically significant caste 
in Kerala; they constituted about 22 per cent of Kerala's population in 1968 (Franke 
and Chasin, 1989:72). In the new Kerala, they have emerged to become a 
progressive community because of their educational and economic advancement 
(Mathew, 1986:23; Velayudhan, 1998:2480). 
6 Also known as chogans in north Travancore and Cochin. 7This view is criticised by Gopalakrishnan (1994:285-86) quoting a study by Aiyangar (undated) 
that argued that since the total population of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1891 was 30 lakhs (3 million) 
and the total number of Ezavas and Tamil Channas was 20 lakhs in south India during the same 
time, it is not likely that about two-thirds of Ceylon's population would have migrated to South India. 
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2.2.4. Scheduled castes 
The constitutional order for recogn1s1ng the scheduled castes was issued under 
Article 341 of the Constitution of India. This Article declares that 'The President 
'may with respect to any State or Union Territory, and where it is a State after 
consultation with the Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the castes, 
races, or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall for the 
purpose of this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes in relation to that 
State or Union Territory, as the case may be' (Wadhwa, 1975:250). It is further 
stated in Article 366 (24) that 'Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the 
list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification any caste, race, or tribe'. 
Therefore, Scheduled Castes may be defined as those groups which are included in 
the Scheduled Caste Order of the Government of India, in force from time to time. 
The Scheduled Caste Order is, thus, an order containing a list of castes entitled to 
benefit from the various special arrangements such as reservations in employment 
and education, and soft loans. This Schedule was originally promulgated by the 
British Government of India in 1936, but the term 'scheduled castes' only became 
widely used after Independence (Mendelsohn and Vicziany, 1998:4; Santhakumari, 
n.d.:2-3). The terms Harijan8 and 'untouchables' are also used to denote the same 
groups of people. The scheduled castes of Ker ala are the former untouchable castes 
of Hinduism (Santhakumari, n.d.:3). In this thesis, the term 'scheduled caste' will 
ref er to both the scheduled castes of post-Independent India and the pre-Independent 
Harijan or 'untouchables'. It is also important to note that the scheduled castes 
represent only the weaker (socially and economically) sections of the Hindu, Sikh, 
and Buddhist society (Ghosh, 1997). In 1950 an Order made under Article 341 of 
the Constitution had declared that 'no person who professes a religion different from 
Hinduism shall be deemed to be a member of Scheduled Caste', but in 1956 the Sikh 
religion was included with Hinduism as part of this order. In 1990 Buddhist 
scheduled castes were treated on a par with Hindus. However, scheduled-caste 
converts to Islam or Christianity are not considered as members of the scheduled 
castes (Ghosh, 1997:149,154-155). 
In India, the scheduled-caste population according to the 1991 census was 138.2 
million, 16.7 per cent of India's total population. In 1991, Kerala's scheduled-caste 
population was 2.9 million, 9.9 per cent of the total population (Director of Census 
8The term 'Harijan' meaning Sons of God was coined by Mahatma Gandhi for the lower-caste people of India. 
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Operations, 1991). The 1981 Census recorded 68 scheduled castes in Kerala. A list 
of these scheduled-caste communities is given in Appendix-3. 
2.2.5. Christians 
Christianity is one of the important religions in Kerala, accounting for one-fifth of 
its population (Director of Census Operations, 1991). Syrian Christians are believed 
to have been converts of upper castes by St Thomas in the first century A.D. 
(Kurian, 1986: 1; Jeffrey, 1994: 16). The new Christians (pudiya Christians) are the 
descendants of the members of lower castes such as the Ezavas, the Pulayas and the 
Parayas, converted by the missionaries in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries (Kurian, 1986:3). Among the Christians, like the Hindus, there are several 
different groups indicating their different origin and status in Ker ala society (Iyer, 
1970:51). For example, the status of pudiya Christians is as low as other lower 
castes (Fuller, 1976:36), but the Syrian Christians enjoy a status comparable to that 
of the Nair. Christians are mostly concentrated in the Travancore and Cochin 
regions of the state. 
2.2.6. Muslims 
Arab traders are believed to have introduced Islam into Kerala during the seventh or 
eighth century A.D. It was during the time of Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan9 that many 
Hindus were converted to Islam. Shea (1959:89) argues that lower-caste Hindus 
were converted to Islam from 1871. From the presence of new Islam (pudiya Islam) 
and the evidence based on differences in inheritance laws and caste customs 
prevailing among Muslims, it is almost certain that there has been conversion of 
Hindus to Islam. According to Shea (1959:89) conversion offered the low-caste 
Hindu an escape from onerous indignities, a mass inferiority complex, and possibly 
abject poverty. 
In Kerala, Muslims have been mostly concentrated in the Malabar district (Fuller, 
1976:36). Their economic position before the 1950s was poor as they were tenants 
to the upper-caste Hindus. Although they remained outside the caste hierarchy, 
socially and economically their status was roughly comparable to that of the Ezavas 
(Radhakrishnan, 1980:2095). The Mappila rebellion10 of 1921 was a result of this 
9Toey conquered Malabar and converted many Hindus to Islam. 
lOMappilas are the Muslims of Malabar region. During the Mappila riots, reported murders 
numbered 468, dacoities 5941, arson 352. The most distressing occurrence which took place on 10 November 1921 resulted in the death by asphyxiation of 70 Mappila persons while they were being 
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exploitation by upper-caste Hindus and the colonial state which provided support for 
this exploitation (Panikkar, 1989). Muslims, like Christians, constitute nearly one-
fifth of Kerala's total population (Director of Census Operations, 1991). 
2.3 The economic and social situation of the lower castes under the traditional 
caste system 
The description of the social situation of the scheduled-caste communities in Kerala 
in this section refers mostly to the time when the traditional caste system was in 
practice: before the middle of the twentieth century. However, each social practice 
discussed below had its own time span; some were abolished earlier than others. 
2.3.1 'Untouchability' and 'unapproachability' 
As indicated earlier, the caste system. existed in Kerala in one of its severest forms 
(Shea, 1959:88; Iyer, 1970:46; Jeffrey, 1994:2; Gopalakrishnan, 1994:292). Social 
distances between the various caste groups were extremely rigid (Jeffrey, 1994: 18-
19). This is evident from the physical distance that the lower castes had to maintain 
from the higher castes. For example, a Nair had to keep seven feet away from. a 
Nam.boodiri; an Ezava 32 feet; a Cheruman 64 feet; and a Nayadi from 74 to 124. 
The Ezava on the other hand had to keep 32 feet away from a Nair, and a Cherum.an 
32 from an Ezava. In some areas, lower castes were even 'unseeable', as the m.ere 
sight of them. ritually polluted their social superiors (Zachariah, 1968:368). The low 
castes such as Ezava and Kammalans, and scheduled castes were not permitted to 
use the roads and other public places used by upper castes. They were prohibited not 
only from entering a Hindu temple but even from. going close to it. They were also 
forbidden to go to schools where the upper-caste children studied. Huts of the 
scheduled castes were located at a distant place from the N amboodiri ill um and Nair 
tharaward. What this meant was that scheduled-caste people had to have a highly 
secluded lifestyle, restricted to agricultural fields and huts. How these exploitative 
traditions have been abolished is discussed in sections 2.5 and 2. 7 which examine 
the role of Christian missionaries, lower-caste reformers, and land reform in 
changing Kerala society. 
conveyed from the disturbed area to the Bellary jail (Madras District Gazetteers, 1933:viii). For a field-based investigation of the underlying causes of the Malabar rebellion, see Panikkar, 1989. 
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2.3.2. Slavery and serfdom (adima sambradayam) 
Slavery was yet another element in the caste system that placed the scheduled castes 
in an economically exploitative situation: 
One of the most striking and important peculiarities of the Indian forms of servitude is 
their close connection with the caste-system. Most types of servile status were 
hereditary, and in general the 'serfs' and 'slaves' belonged to the lowest castes (Kumar, 
1965:34). 
Slavery in Malabar, Cochin, and Travancore had prevailed from remote times, most 
probably from the time of the conquest of the aboriginal inhabitants by the invaders 
and settlers from north India (Kurian, 1986: 11). Table 2.2 provides information 
about the percentage of slaves to the total population of British Malabar during the 
period 1800 to 1901. The table shows that about 10-15 per cent of Malabar's total 
population during the period 1800-1901 were agricultural or government slaves. The 
slaves, invariably, were from the scheduled-caste communities of Kerala (Kumar, 
1965:34-41, 68). 
Table 2.2: Slaves/serfs as a percentage of total population, 
Malabar, 1800-1901 
Year % of slaves 
1800-1 13-15 
1807 13.7 
1819 15.2 
1857 11.7 
1871 13.2 
1881 11.7 
1891 11.9 
1901 10.5 
Source: Kumar, 1965:54. 
Among the scheduled-caste communities, Cheruman, Pulaya, Paraya, Vettuvan, and 
Ulladar were some of the important slaves of Kerala (Eapen, 1985:32). As a result 
of hard work and poor working conditions, most of the slaves had poor health. The 
food grain they received for a day's work was significantly lower than that needed 
for the amount of work they did, and for maintaining good health. When the slaves 
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fell sick, they received no food grain from the landlord. The overall situation of a 
slave can be no better explained than by citing Samuel Mateer: 
The men are in wretched filthy clothes. There is much suffering from sickness, the dirt 
of the house produces vermin and itch, which deprives them of rest by day and sleep 
by night. A respectable native must cover his nostrils with his cloth when he enters 
amongst them, for the stench and filth. The aged, if there are any, suffer from debility, 
and may lie helpless day after day until they die; infants suffer from sores, diarrhoea, 
worms and want of food; adults from headache and indigestion, ague, dysentry, [sic] 
and intermittent fever (Mateer, 1884 quoted in Jeffrey, 1994:22). 
Reports indicate that slaves were treated like animals by their masters, the upper 
caste landlords. For example, slaves could be traded, sold or mortgaged for money 
or kind 11 . The owner had the right to kill a slave. When slaves were sold, families 
were separated12. Children born to a slave were the property of the owner (Kumar, 
1965:37; Fuller, 1976:22). Under slavery, scheduled-caste people had no economic 
or social independence. Various attempts to abolish slavery in Kerala are discussed 
in section 2.5. 
2.3.3. Uriyam, or forced labour 
Uriyam, or forced labour, was another version of slavery practised in Kerala. Both 
landlords and governments were reported to have used this system to force 
scheduled-caste people to do work for very low or no remuneration. Uriyam was 
used in non-agricultural sectors. Governments employed the system to construct 
roads and other government works. Landlords forced scheduled-caste people to 
work for temples and other public places. 
2.3.4. Breastcloth 
The basic right to even cover one's own body was denied under the caste system, 
reflecting the extreme powerlessness of lower castes. Women of all castes below the 
Nair were forbidden to wear breastcloths. Similarly, the lower-caste men were 
denied covering below their knees. None of the scheduled castes were allowed to 
11Buchanan (1870:67-68 cited in Kumar, 1965:36) mentions three modes of transferring slaves (i) jamam or sale , where the full value of the slave was given and the property entirely handed over; (ii) kanom or mortgage, where the proprietor received a loan and a quantity of rice, to show that his property in the slave was not extinguished, but could be resumed once the loan was repaid; (iii) 
pattan or rent, where the slave was hired out for an annual sum, the hirer paying the cost of 
maintenance. 
12However in some areas in Malabar, there were restrictions on selling a husband and wife to two different people. 
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use foot wear. Section 2.5 will discuss various efforts to eradicate this practice from 
Kerala society. 
2.3.5. Land-caste relationships under the traditional caste system in Kerala 
In Kerala, roughly up to 1950, there existed a clear land-caste relationship in Kerala 
(Herring, 1983: 158). In the caste system, as indicated earlier, the Brahmin were the 
legal owners of land, janmon right13, that is they had absolute, tax-free 
proprietorship. They did not cultivate the land they owned according to the janmon 
rights (Baden-Powell, 1892: 154; Kumar, 1965:23-26). They entrusted their land to 
the Nair who assumed kanom rights, absolute proprietorship with a small tax. They 
had the right to sublet the land to others. Thus, the Nair in turn let out the land to the 
tenants or karalar who were mostly Ezavas, Syrian Christians, and Muslims. These 
tenants with the slaves (scheduled castes of post-Independent India) cultivated land 
(Miller, 1961:264; Herring, 1983:157). Thorner (1956:35 quoted in Herring, 
1983: 157) observed that 'a many-tiered edifice of interests in the land-janmies, 
kanamdars, verumpattamdars-rests on a mass of landless labourers known as 
Cherumas, Pulayas, or Poliyars'. Kumar (1965:66) noted that in Malabar the lower 
castes almost never held any land and that their opportunities for mobility were very 
limited. It was, however, the scheduled-caste population who worked in agriculture 
and fed the entire upper castes under the regime of the feudal caste system. Table 
2.3 summarises the land-caste situation existing in Kerala in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. 
Table 2.3: Caste and land relations in early twentieth century, Kerala 
Caste 
Namboodiri 
Nair 
Ezava 
Untouchables 
Right to land 
Absolute right over land 
Absolute right over land with tax paid to Brahmin 
Tenants to Nair, rent to be paid to Nair 
Landless labourers with no rights to any of their produce 
Source: Kumar, 1965:66. 
13The legend of the origin of janmom illustrates the relationship between ritual status and land. Having created Kerala, Parasuraman divided it among the Namboodiri Brahmins, who acquired 
absolute right to the soil (Jeffrey, 1994:25). 
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Although the British fully colonised Malabar in the nineteenth century, no change in 
the status of the scheduled castes took place. In fact, the British rule in Malabar in 
the 1800s was reported to have had a negative effect on the tenants as the land 
revenue system was made permanent, affecting all land bought under that system 
(Kumar, 1965:87). Kumar notes: 
. . . when the British took over the district [Malabar] in 1792, ... the British not only 
made settlements with them but issued a proclamation recognising them as 'landlords' 
with the right to expel the kanamdars when their leases expired (Kumar, 1965:87-88) . 
Although some efforts were made by the British in the subsequent years to retrieve 
the situation by means of tenancy legislation, the legislation benefited only a small 
number of well-to-do tenants leaving a large mass of cultivating tenants 
(Namboodiripad, 1968:94). Thus, the British rule in Malabar only reinforced the 
caste based land relationship that existed. 
Data on land holding by various communities in the Travancore region in 1931 
suggests a clear land-caste association (see Table 2.4). For example, Brahmins held, 
on average, 15.6 acres of cultivable land per owner and 12.89 acres of non-
cultivable land per owner. The Nair on the other hand, who possessed about 39 per 
cent of the total cultivable land, possessed only 1.71 acres of cultivable land per 
owner. Partition in the joint families in the 1920s and 1930s is attributed to such low 
holdings of cultivable land among the Nair (Sivanandan, 1979:475). What is 
important to note, however, is the fact that most of the land ( about 7 4 per of 
cultivable land and 62 per cent of non-cultivable land) in Travancore regions was 
held by upper-caste Hindus and Syrian Christians. The 'depressed' castes held only 
0.85 per cent of the total cultivable land and 2.43 per cent of non-cultivable land in 
the Travancore region. A similar trend existed in the land holding pattern in 
Ramanakara (located in Travancore) where Fuller (1976) studied the Nair 
community during the period 1971-72. According to the land records of 
Ramanakara village in 1908, Nair and Brahmins held about 64 per cent of the total 
land in the village (Fuller, 1976:29). Fuller's own survey in the village also indicated 
that about 43 per cent of the Nair held about 86 per cent of the total land (Fuller, 
1976:30). 
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Table 2.4: Landholding by caste in Travancore, 1931 
Caste Proportion of area Average area per owner 
Cultivable Land Non-cultivable Cultivable Land Non-
Land cultivable 
land 
Brahmin 8.75 3.05 15.60 12.89 
Nair 38.70 30.18 1.71 2.95 
Syrian Christian 26.08 29.03 2.69 3.90 
Muslim 5.02 6.13 1.72 2.69 
Ezava 6.77 12.13 1.11 1.95 
Other Hindu 10.88 9.12 1.85 1.48 
Other Christians 2.95 7.93 1.07 2.28 
Depressed Hindua 0.85 2.43 1.03 1.43 
All communities 100.00 100.00 2.20 2.57 
Note: aRefers to the scheduled castes of the post-Independent India. 
Source: Sivanandan, 1979:475. 
A clear association between caste and land is thus evident from the information 
available from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Kerala. The discussion 
in this section shows that the scheduled castes had been subjected to both social and 
economic subordination in the period before the 1950s. 
2.4 Lower-caste reforms and the caste-system changes before Independence 
Notable lower-caste reforms began in Kerala during the nineteenth century. Two 
major factors that initiated lower-caste reforms in Kerala were the activities of 
Christian missionaries and of the social-reform leaders from the lower-caste 
communities. It is the work of these two groups of reformers that later translated 
into the communist movements and progressive governments that made relevant 
legislation for the social and economic development of the lower-caste people of 
Ker ala. The fallowing two sections deal with the role of Christian missionaries and 
the lower-caste reformers in improving the social and economic status of the lower 
castes. 
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2.4.1. Role of Christian missionaries 
When Christian missionaries came to Kerala in the early nineteenth century, the 
scheduled castes were suffering under the caste system. Evidence indicates that until 
the 1840s there was very little challenge to the governments or landlords from the 
missionaries or from the lower castes (Jeffrey, 1994:34). But the missionary build-
up gradually changed that position. The missionaries' commitment to the uplift of 
the lower castes is evident in Jeffrey's words: 
The missionaries, however, were prepared to challenge the principles of Malayali [people of Kerala] society-the hierarchy of ritual status, the privileges of the high 
castes and the disabilities of the low-and to call on British governments to force the 
Travancore sirkar [government] to change some of its discriminatory laws (Jeffrey, 
1994:35). 
The two important rmss1onary groups that worked in Kerala and contributed 
significantly to the social and economic uplift of the lower castes were the Church 
Missionary Society (CMS) and the London Missionary Society (LMS). In 1847, the 
CMS and the LMS 14 joined to protest against slavery of lower castes. They 
presented a joint petition to the Travancore Maharaja (King). This petition, signed 
by 12 missionaries, pleaded for the abolition of slavery. The missionaries again 
petitioned in 1848 as there was no significant response to their earlier appeal. 
During the same period missionaries worked closely with slaves, and a few schools 
were opened for them. This aroused conflicts between the mission, and the landlords 
and government. The impression propagated by the landlords and the government in 
refusing missionary appeals against the slavery was that liberation from slavery 
would have a negative effect on agricultural production. However, missionaries 
continued their efforts by publications and in other ways to send the message to 
England and other British locations in India. Although the Travancore sirkar 
(government) proclamation entitled the emancipation of children born after 1853 
from sirkar slavery, it was not considered a significant measure because only about 
6,000 slaves were under sirkar, while altogether about 130,000 slaves were in 
Travancore. After a series of struggles with the Travancore sirkar, Madras 
government and landlords, the missionaries succeeded in achieving their goal on 24 
June, 1855 when the proclamation of the abolition of slavery was formally issued 
(Eapen, 1985; Jeffrey, 1994). 
14CMS activities in Kerala are discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2 of Eapen (1985). 
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In the Malabar region which was under the direct rule of British, slavery was 
abolished in 1843 (Gopalakrishnan, 1994:470) as a result of Britain's abolition of 
slavery in 1792. 
Uriyam, or forced labour, another economic exploitation of the lower castes, was yet 
another focus of attack for the missionaries. As early as 1815, missionaries were 
successful in making Syrian Christians and other Christians exempt from 
performing uriyam for temples. In 1821, Christian converts also received the right 
not to perform uriyam on Sundays. The practice of uriyam is reported to have 
continued in the countryside, and the missionaries had to have the proclamation 
repeated in 1851. Christian converts' right not to follow the caste-system rules from 
that point increased tremendously. Seeing the converts, their fellow caste-men also 
avoided uriyam. By 1857 uriyam had decreased remarkably. After Independence, 
the constitution of India also banned forced labour. Article 23 of the Indian 
Constitution states 'Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of 
forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an 
offence publishable in accordance with law' (Wadhwa, 1975:249). 
The missionaries' role in achieving the right to use breastcloths was far more 
significant in reducing the caste distinctions than its own merit as an individual 
right_. In 1829, after some rioting with upper castes, the missionaries achieved 
confirmation of an earlier proclamation allowing converts to wear a jacket, but not 
the upper cloth of the Nair or the blouse of the Tamil Brahmin. Because of their 
poverty converts could not use this opportunity. The missionaries' efforts to bring 
clothes from England helped the converts to wear them. The use of upperclothes 
aroused conflicts between converts and upper castes. After a series of petitions and 
disturbances the right to use an upper covering, which was granted to Hindus and 
Christian Shanar15 women in 1859, was extended to all women in 1865, although 
the style used by Nair women was still forbidden to the low castes (Gopalakrishnan, 
1994:472). 
Jeffrey (1994:62) argues that the rmss1onaries offered the low castes resources 
which had not previously been available to them. It was the efforts of the Christian 
missionaries in Ker ala that prepared the state for later reforms to take place. They 
showed the lower castes, the suppressed, that they had been exploited and that they 
needed to organise and fight for equality. The most important resource they 
provided to the in was education. The Christian missionaries were the first reformers 
15Lower-caste converts to Christianity. 
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who sowed the seeds of a non-traditional caste system in Kerala. 
2.4.2. Role of lower-caste social reformers 
As indicated, the work of Christian nuss1onaries helped abolish several social 
practices associated with the caste system in Kerala. The missionaries also gave 
tremendous leadership and courage to the lower castes to fight against the injustices 
perpetrated against them by the upper castes. Improving education of the scheduled 
castes seems to have been important in this regard. It was at the beginning of the 
twentieth century that lower-caste reformers emerged as fighters for their own 
uplift. One of the prominent figures among such reformers was the Ezava leader, 
Sree Narayana Guru. The doctrine of this eminent man was 'one caste, one religion, 
and one God', which attracted many Keralans, including some from the upper castes 
(Gopalakrishnan, 1994:514). Sree Narayana Guru's efforts to abolish social 
injustices such as 'untouchability', 'unapproachability', and non-entry to temples, 
were made through his Sree Narayana Guru Dharma Paripalana Yogam (SNDP 
Y ogam), an Ezava organisation formed in 190316. The Vaikom satyagraha, or truth 
struggle of 1924 and Guruvayoor satyagraha of 1931-32 are the two landmark 
events that sought temple entry, thus removing 'untouchability' from Kerala (Franke 
and Chasin, 1989:78). Sree Narayana Guru's and the SNDP's efforts were significant 
in the Temple Entry Proclamation of 1936 in Travancore, even though the Guru 
died in 1928. In Madras Presidency, the Temple Entry Act was passed in 1938 (Iyer, 
1970:50). 'Untouchability' was banned in India under Article 17 of the Indian 
Constitution (Wadhwa, 1975:249) which in 1955 became the 'Untouchability' 
Offence Act (Bains, 1994:24). 
A Pulaya (scheduled caste) reformer, Ayankali, is one, among others, who fought 
for temple entry, school entry, and the abolition of slavery and other social injustice 
against the lower castes in general and Pulayas in particular. He organised Sadujana 
Paripalana Sangam in 1905 to organise all Pulayas to fight against social injustices. 
Organised efforts by the 'untouchables' were influenced by the revolt of the Ezavas, 
who formed the most influential community among the lower castes (Mathew, 
1986:26). While the contributions of the lower-caste reformers were not sufficient to 
eradicate the entire system of injustice that prevailed under the caste system, they 
paved the way for organising the lower castes and fighting for social and economic 
justice, which led to later communist activities in the state. 
16see Menon, 1994:61-71 for a detailed discussion of SNDP in the Kerala social reform. 
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2.5 Communist ideology and land-reform agenda in Kerala 
The roots of communist thinking in Kerala can be traced to various sources. One is 
the efforts made by the Christian missionaries and reformers from the lower castes 
to seek social and economic equality for the lower castes. Sree Narayana Guru's 
organisation, SNDP Y ogam, is considered by some historians as the foundation for 
communist development in Kerala (Gopalakrishnan, 1994:528). In Kerala, the role 
of the missionaries was to educate the lower castes about their rights and modernise 
their thinking through education, enabling them to take up jobs in non-traditional 
areas, and eradicating some of the social evils in the society. Although the Christian 
missionaries did not directly influence the formation of a communist movement in 
Kerala, their efforts were strong enough to empower the lower castes to organise 
and demand a change. 
The successes in removing some of the social practices of the caste system such as 
'untouchability', 'unapproachability', and non-entry to temples moved Kerala society 
from an extreme caste-system society to a moderate caste-system society. It is 
believed that in the aftermath of the temple-entry struggles, the lower castes became 
more and more united with the Kerala's growing trade union and Communist 
movement (Franke and Chasin, 1989:79-80). 
However, there is little evidence of any attack by the Christian missionaries or the 
lower caste reformers on tenancy. The major obstacle that the majority of lower 
caste tenant communities faced during this time was the high rent associated with 
tenancy. Thus, up to the mid-1950s, the lower-caste communities continued to 
suffer socially and economically. The issue of tenancy and high rents was the issue 
that led to further struggle and transformed the lower caste struggle to a more 
communist movement in Kerala. The tenancy and rent situation that existed in 
Kerala before Independence is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
A survey conducted by the Malabar Tenancy Committee17 (MTC) in Malabar in 
1940 revealed that 90 per cent of the total cultivated land was owned by non-
cultivators and was leased out to cultivators (Namboodiripad, 1968:95). The 
situation in Cochin was similar to that existing in Malabar. Data on rent paid to 
landlords gathered in a survey conducted by Cochin Kisan Sabha 18 (CKS) in 1948 
17Malabar Tenancy Committee was formed in 1940 as a result of pressure from peasant unions for 
making more land available for cultivation. During the 1930s there was a shortage of food grains 
and control was exercised over existing stocks by landlords (Menon, 1994:163). 18Cochin farmers ' association. 
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revealed that the rent paid to landlords varied from 62 per cent to 90 per cent of the 
gross produce (Namboodiripad, 1968:96). The 1931 economic survey conducted in 
Travancore also revealed similar exploitation of the tenants by upper castes 
(Namboodiripad, 1968:97). A study in Cochin in 1940 revealed that cultivator 
households were paying at least 50 per cent and sometimes even above 7 5 per cent 
of the gross returns to their landlords (Herring, 1983:161). Varghese (1970:41) also 
reported higher land revenue during the nineteenth century in Malabar, where in the 
case of cultivators, if tenants were unable to pay the rent, the landlords had the 
power to evict them without compensation. 
The major political, social and economic issue in Kerala after the independence of 
India in 1947 was the various aspects of tenancy. With agrarian reforms as the major 
agenda item, the Communist movement emerged as a full-blown political party 
ready to co_ntest power in the State Assembly when India became independent. The 
next section discusses the post-Independence reforms, particularly those that 
occurred after the formation of the present Kerala state in 1956. 
2.6 Land reform and caste-system changes since the formation of Ker ala state 
The Communist Party in Kerala, as elsewhere, asserted its ideological position as 
the provider of social-economic justice to the disadvantaged communities, who had 
been exploited socially and economically by the upper-caste Hindus. They stood for 
the causes of the lower castes, peasants, and industrial workers of Kerala. The 
Communists used the slogan 'land to the tiller' in their various electoral campaigns 
all over Kerala (Gopalan, 1959). They proclaimed that they would bring radical 
changes in the exploitative agrarian relations in Kerala. The poor, the lower castes, 
and other socio-economically backward communities perceived the Communist 
Party as their political organisation. 
This feeling was reflected in the first general election after the formation of Ker ala 
State in 1956. It was no surprise that the Communists won the election, as the 
majority of the Kerala population was experiencing some form of social or 
economic exploitation, whether Hindu, Muslim or Christian. This is very clear from 
the fact that the Communists gained representation from areas where poor peasants 
and labourers were concentrated (Herring, 1983: 163). The government in Kerala 
was unique in that it was the first democratically elected Communist government in 
the world. Regarding the significance of the victory of the Communist Party, 
A.K.Gopalan, an architect of Kerala Communist Party, wrote in 1959: 
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And so in Kerala, for the first time in India, or in any capitalist country, a Communist-
led government was formed through the process of elections conducted under 
bourgeois rule (Gopalan, 1959:95) 
One of the important gains of the Communist government just after assuming power 
in 1957 was to stay the eviction of tenants (mostly kudikidappukar) by landlords by 
proclaiming the Stay of Eviction Proceedings Ordinance (United Nations, 1975:59; 
Herring, 1983: 163). On 10 June, 1959 a set of comprehensive proposals for land 
reform, the Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill19 (KARB), was passed by the Legislative 
Assembly (State Parliament) (Herring, 1983:171). It sought to give permanent 
tenure rights to all tenants, to establish the right of tenants to purchase the land 
which they tilled, and to put a ceiling on the total area of land a primary family unit 
could own (Herring, 1983:164-166; Zachariah, 1983:173). The opposition to the 
Bill from the upper castes and other right-wing political parties was tremendous. 
This led to the downfall of the state government in 1959 by a presidential decree 
(United Nations, 1975:61; Ratcliffe, 1978:127). Although the Agrarian Relations 
Bill had been passed by the State Assembly, it had not received presidential assent, 
and thus was not a law (Herring, 1983: 171). 
In the subsequent elections, though the Communists increased their vote by nearly a 
million, right-wing parties won the election because of the united work of the 
opposition parties. A Congress-Praja Socialist-Party (PSP) government was then 
formed. This government revised and passed the Agrarian Relations Bill; it was 
signed to law on January 21, 1961, but was nullified by the Supreme Court in 1961 
and Kerala High Court in 1963 (Herring, 1983: 172-17 5). This government 
introduced the Kerala Land Reform Act, 1964 which dropped key radical changes 
proposed in favour of tenants by Communists. The Congress ministry fell in 1964 
and Presidential Rule was in force until elections in 1967. This time the United 
Front20 coalition led by the left wing of the Communist Party won the elections. In 
1969 the left-wing government amended the 1964 Act which drastically changed the 
1964 version in favour of the tenants. This Act came into effect on 1 January 1970. 
This Land Reform (Amendment) Act of 1969 enabled hut dwellers to become 
owners of the land on which their huts stood (United Nations, 1975:64). 
19The Bill was drafted by the revenue minister Ms. K.R. Goury in consultation with the Planning Commission, government of India. For a discussion about land reform efforts in the British Malabar See Radhakrishnan, 1980. 
20The Communist Party had split in 1964 over a variety of issues. The faction with the more 
consistently left ideology retained the great majority of the party cadres and mass base, particularly 
the agrarian base and formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI(M). The right faction, known as the Communist Party of India, or CPI is a much smaller partner in the coalition (Herring, 1983: 179). 
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The Kerala Land Reform Act is widely regarded as one of the most thorough and 
well implemented in South Asia (Herring, 1980:A-59; Franke and Chasin, 1989:58; 
Jeffrey, 1992: 176). 
Rural labouring people made up close to 10 million people or 40 per cent of Kerala's 
total population in the 1980s. Their acquisition of their hut sites stands as the major 
achievement of the land reforms of the 1970s ... The patch of ground on which they 
lived was their own, and they understood that now they had a right to it which they 
could defend with legal and political mechanisms if a former landlord tried to 
intimidate them (Jeffrey, 1992: 180). 
According to Ratcliffe (1978: 128), the land reform in Kerala, although implemented 
imperfectly, served to redistribute income within the state. This experience is in 
sharp contrast to land reform measures legislated in the rest of India, where such 
reform either has not been implemented at all or has been implemented in such a 
way as to favour the privileged (Oommen, 1994: 118). 
According to Raj (United Nations, 1975:59), the political climate in Kerala has 
made implementation of the land reforms different from the rest of India. Regarding 
the effect of land reforms on the distribution of wealth Raj reports: 
Though the area of land transferred to the landless (mainly 'hutment dwellers') could 
not have been very much, there is no reason to doubt that land reforms in Kerala taken 
as a whole have helped to reduce inequalities in wealth and income, despite the 
limitations of the legislation and the impediments to its effective implementation (United Nations, 1975:70). 
Herring (1983) has provided a complete account of events that led to the 1969 Land 
Reform Act in his book Land to the Tiller. According to Herring (1983:211), the 
core of the land reform-the abolition of landlordism21-was remarkably 
successful, despite delays, setbacks, and evasion. The land reforms benefited the 
scheduled-caste tenants, or Kudikidappukar, who leased a house-site and some land 
from landowners, but owned virtually no land. Such tenants constituted almost half 
of all tenants. The kudikidappukar on average received one-tenth of an acre of land 
under the land reform. However, this provided them considerable security 
particularly in contrast to their historical condition of slavery and serflike bondage 
(Herring, 1983:213). 
21 Exploitative aspect. 
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Mencher's ( 1980) village studies in Palghat and Kuttanad regions in Kerala showed 
that land reforms did reduce larger land ownership of upper-caste Hindus. It also 
provided permanent rights to agricultural labourers over their houses and a tiny 
piece of land immediately around their houses. However, Mencher argues that there 
were still many families with very large land holdings in the surveyed villages. 
Families managed this by putting land in different names of relatives who did not 
live in the village. Further evidence arises from the fact that when the Agrarian 
Relations Bill was introduced in the State Assembly in 1959, it was estimated that a 
surplus of 720,000 hectares would be available for redistribution. But the extent of 
surrender was only 67,000 hectares, less than one-tenth of the estimated surplus 
( Oommen, 1994: 126). 
According to Oommen ( 1994: 121-122), although 'landlordism' has been abolished 
from Kerala, one cannot say that land has passed on to a class of sturdy self-
cultivating peasantry. Kerala had a large number of 'absentee' farmers, such as 
teachers, shopkeepers, lawyers, and government employees; and most politicians 
have their farming avocations. Although land reform provided ownership rights to 
the tenants, they still did not gain the land they cultivated. An important 
achievement, however, was the provision to assign one-tenth of an acre of land to 
the tenants, or kudikidappukar, who comprised the slaves of the past. It is estimated 
that 300,000 kudikidappukars benefited from the land reforms (Oommen, 
1994: 122). 
Table 2.5: Percentage of rural labour households owning land, Kerala, 
1950s to 1983-84 
Years 
1950s 
1964-65 
1983-84 
Agricultural labour 
households owning 
land 
virtually none 
70 
92 
Source: Jeffrey, 1992: 179. 
Other rural labourer Total households 
households owning 
land 
virtually none 
60 
95 
owning land 
virtually none 
67 
93 
60 
Franke and Chasin ( 1989) recognised the problems in transforming an agranan 
society from a traditional caste system into a small farmer system. They concluded: 
Despite all these dangers and limitations, however, there can be little doubt that land 
reform has improved the lives of the vast majority of people in Kerala's countryside. For tenants who received rice land, the land is often the source of one-half to all of their basic food needs. Now there is no rent to be paid. Now there is no fear of eviction (Franke and Chasin, 1989:59). 
To sum up, it is evident that many social practices that prevailed in Kerala 
associated with the caste system were removed in the twentieth century as a result of 
efforts by the missionaries and lower-caste reformers, and the effective 
implementation of the land reform by various governments. 
2. 7 Migration from Kerala 
The purpose of this section is to outline the magnitude of migration from Kerala to 
other states in India and overseas for employment and its possible effect on the 
social and economic life in Kerala. The discussion in this section is based on 
published documents and research publications. 
Migration of Keralans to countries such as Sri Lanka, Burma, and South Africa 
began in the early nineteenth century (Kumar, 1965: 128,135). Most of the migrants 
to these countries were the poor, mostly agricultural labourers. The number of these 
migrants was not enough to make any radical changes in the social and economic 
conditions of Kerala. However, such migration is believed to have had some effect 
on the local social structure, as Kumar noted: 
Emigration [ employment migration overseas] must also have increased social mobility in other ways; the emigrants would return with greater knowledge of agricultural techniques and less willingness to abide by caste restrictions. The emigration would be particularly strong for the lower castes since they were the more immobile (Kumar, 1965:142). 
Although migration from Kerala began in the nineteenth century, Kerala remained a 
net in-migrant state till about the early twentieth century. It was only from the 
decade 1931-40 that Kerala experienced significant net out-migration (Kurup et al, 
1965: 14-15). In the twentieth century, Keralans have migrated on a large scale to 
industrial cities such as Madras, Bombay, Delhi, and Calcutta for employment. The 
majority of the migrants in this category were educated men and women. 
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Migration of Ker al ans for employment to the Gulf countries began after the land 
reforms were implemented in the 1970s. Although there is evidence that people 
from India had been migrating to the Gulf countries as early as the 1950s and 1960s 
(Gulati, 1983:2), the momentum increased in the 1970s when oil prices shot up 
(Nair, 1994). The pioneers of the 1970s upsurge were the Muslims of Kerala 
(Gulati, 1983). However, all other communities subsequently followed the trend. In 
1990 the number of Indians in the Gulf was estimated to be around 900,000 to one 
million. According to the 1992-93 Kerala NFHS, 21 per cent of the 4,387 
households surveyed had at least one migrant related to the head of the household 
working outside the country, most of them in the Gulf countries. Table 2.9 shows 
the number of workers in the Gulf region from India and Kerala during the period 
from 1975 to 1982. The table shows that, overall, about half of the migrants in the 
Gulf region from India were Keralans. However, over time the proportion of 
Keralans has reduced. 
Table 2.6: Number of migrant workers in the Gulf region from 
India and Kerala, 1975-82 (in thousands) 
Year India 
1975 154 
1977 214 
1979 350 
1982 800 
Source: Gulati, 1983:37. 
Kerala 
n.a 
135 
187 
350 
Per cent 
63 
53 
44 
As revealed in Table 2. 7, migration from Kerala to the Gulf countries is not 
uniform. The highest number of migrants has been from the Trichur and Malapuram 
districts. A closer examination reveals that these districts, particularly Malapuram 
district, have the highest proportions of Muslim population. It is reported that 
because of the religious affiliation, Muslims are more prone to migrate to the Gulf 
countries than are other communities (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 
1995:191). This fact is further supported by the findings from the 1992-93 Kerala 
NFHS that current migrants are more likely to be Muslim than Hindu or Christian 
(PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995: 191). The scheduled castes are the least 
likely to migrate. The Kerala NFHS indicated that of the total scheduled-caste 
households surveyed less than three per cent had a migrant in the Gulf or in a 
foreign country. This is in contrast to about 22 per cent among the non-scheduled-
caste households (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995: 191). No study to date 
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can suggest reasons for the non-participation of the scheduled castes in the Gulf 
migration. Poor educational levels of the scheduled castes compared to other 
communities cannot be a reason, as illiterates have constituted a good proportion 
among the Gulf migrants (Gulati, 1983:39). Factors related to their poor economic 
and social status seem to be more relevant. It is possible that the scheduled castes 
could not raise the funds needed for the initial expenses in arranging a visa and 
tickets. 
Table 2.7: Distribution of emigrants to the Gulf region, by districts, 
Kerala, 1980 
District Number of emigrants, Number of emigrants, 
(thousands) per 1000 population 
Trivandrum 21.1 8.14 
Quilon 18.8 6.67 
Alleppy 17.0 7.25 
Kottayam 4.2 2.45 
Idukki 0.3 0.30 
Ernakulam 3.8 1.51 
Trichura 37.9 15.53 
Palghat 7.0 3.44 
Malapuram 34.8 14.50 
Calicut 17.1 6.49 
Cannan ore 24.6 8.27 
Kerala 186.6 7.33 
Note: astudy district. 
Source: Nair, 1994:104. 
Regarding other characteristics of the migrants, the Kerala NFHS indicated that 
nearly three-fourths of the migrants had completed middle school or less (PRC, 
Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995). Data based on a 1979 survey also indicated 
poor educational levels for the migrants. Thus, Gulf migration, by and large, has 
been unskilled migration: nearly 50 per cent of the migrants were labourers or 
engaged in unskilled work (Gulati, 1983:39). Yet another feature of Gulf migration 
is the dominance of males. The Kerala NFHS revealed that 93 per cent of the 
migrants were males, and most of them were under 30 years of age. While there are 
some reports in the popular magazines (for example, India Today, 1982) about the 
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social effect of the Gulf migration, only a few studies based on serious research are 
concerned with the impact of Gulf migration on the family of the migrants. 
Gulati's (1983) study focuses on the effects of Gulf migration on the family. 
Increased inter-family interaction, an increase in joint living, an increase in female-
centred households, an increase in dowry, and an increase in women's 
responsibilities were some of the important effects. On the psychological side, 
women in the migrant families faced many tensions, pressures, conflicts and 
anxieties. Nair (1994: 107), on the contrary, believes that the negative stories about 
the impact of Gulf migration are exaggerated. He argues that households of migrants 
have, on the whole, admirably adjusted to the changed situation and encountered the 
problems completely and effectively. One of the important socio-economic effects 
of Gulf migration was to change the traditional pattern of distribution of wealth. 
Nair (1983:90) showed that families that were looked down upon until they had 
become a Gulf migrant family were now invited to social occasions as they became 
richer from remittances from the Gulf. 
While there could be several consequences of migration, the economic effect on 
migrant families has been significant and immediate. Table 2.8 shows remittances 
from the Gulf countries to India and Kerala's share of the remittances. According to 
Nair's (1994:109) estimate the total remittances to Kerala between 1975-1988 
amounted to about Rs. 7,000 crores (70,000 millions). However, he suggests that if 
remittances through non-banking channels are included the amount could be over 
Rs. 10,000 crores. 
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Table 2.8: Estimated remittances to India and Kerala from the 
Gulf region, 1975-1988 
Years 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
Total 
Remittances to 
India 
(Rs. crores) 
132 
270 
487 
481 
790 
1,219 
1,098 
1,371 
1,500 
1,714 
1,628 
1,717 
2,028 
14,435 
Source: Nair, 1994:109. 
Share of Kerala in 
remittances 
(Rs. crores) 
66 
135 
243 
240 
395 
609 
549 
685 
750 
857 
814 
858 
1,014 
7,215 
Per cent of 
Kerala share 
50.0 
50.0 
49.8 
49.8 
50.0 
49.9 
50.0 
49.9 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
49.9 
50.0 
49.9 
A survey conducted in 1983 among 696 households in Kerala indicated that about 
40 per cent of the households spent remittances on either constructing or renovating 
their houses. The amount used by these households is about 27 per cent of the total 
savings disposed by migrant families. Some of the important uses of remittances 
were for repaying loans, marriages, purchase of consumer durables, purchase and 
improvement of landed property, gifts and donations, purchase of ornaments, 
education and medical treatment (Nair, 1994: 110). Another study conducted in 
Trichur district in Kerala revealed that 52 per cent of the income from the Gulf was 
used on consumption expenditure (Agro-economic Research Centre, 1982:452). Yet 
another study conducted in 1977 in two villages in Trivandrum in Kerala showed 
that nearly three-fourths of the remittances were spent on buying land and 
constructing houses (Mathew and Nair, 197 8: 151). 
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Associated with Gulf migration and remittances is the increasing cost of living in 
Kerala (Gulati, 1983: 13; Mahadevan and Sumamgala, 1987:40). The cost of land is 
one item that has become exceptionally high. According to a study conducted in the 
early 1980s, the high demand for land pushed the prices of housing plots to about 
10-20 times higher within a short span of five years (Mathunny 1984 quoted in 
Gopikuttan 1990:2084). Expensive marriages and the practice of giving a high 
dowry are other aspects of the increased cost of living. Although a large sum of 
money has poured into the state since the 1970s from the Gulf countries, its effect 
on industrial growth was small. No visible improvements are noted in employment 
levels and industrial growth. In fact, the per capita net domestic product during 
1970-1986 has improved only marginally, from Rs.596 to Rs.614. 
Table 2.9: Use of remittances by the households, Kerala, 1992-93 
Property acquired by the household from 
the remittances 
Land 
House 
Shop/business 
Car/van 
Gold/jewellery 
Other 
Total 
Per cent 
40.6 
58.3 
4.0 
0.6 
30.3 
19.4 
175 
Source: PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS , 1995: 193. 
To sum up, the Gulf migration improved the living standards of people in Kerala. 
As far as the present research is concerned, the Gulf migration provided ample 
opportunities for the scheduled castes to improve their social and economic position, 
although they themselves were not involved in the migration. 
2.8 Social development in Kerala 
2.8.1 Education 
In almost any discussion on Kerala, demographic or otherwise, literacy 
achievements do not go unmentioned. How did Kerala achieve and maintain an 
appreciable level of literacy? Kerala's literacy achievements are considered to be 
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related to its culture and to European nuss1onaries (Eapen, 1985; Zachariah, 
1997:98; Mendelsohn and Vicziany, 1998: 168). Before the British colonial 
annexation of the Malabar region, Malabar had several traditional schools often 
associated with N amboodiri illum or Nair tharavard. These schools were created by 
upper-caste Hindus, presumably for their own advantage. They include institutions 
such as Salais22, Sabha Mutts23 , Patasala24, Kalaries25 and Gokulam26 . Similar 
institutions were found in Travancore (Jeffrey, 1994:68) and Cochin regions as well. 
Under British rule, the number of schools directly managed by government and by 
others27 increased significantly. The role of the German Basel Evangelical Mission 
was particularly important in the spread of Western education in the Malabar region. 
The Germans opened a primary school in Kallayi (in Malpuram district) in 1848 
(Eapen, 1985:55). In March 1926, there were 3,528 educational institutions28 in 
Malabar district alone (Madras District Gazetteers, 1933: 109). It is important to 
mention here that during the period 1930-31 under the Labour Department, there 
were 39 elementary schools for the scheduled castes in Calicut, Palghat, Chriakkal 
and Kurumbranad thalukas (a part of a district) in Malabar. 
In the Travancore region, the role of Christian nuss1onaries in developing an 
educational culture was vital for the spread of education in Kerala. Travancore, 
which was under native rule, declared state (government) support for education in 
1817. It was during this time that the Christian Missionary Society (CMS) opened 
its first school in Alleppey. By 1821 the CMS under the leadership of Norton had 
established seven schools (Eapen, 1985:57). Norton's contribution is particularly 
important from the point of view that he created schools for various castes. By 1916, 
after 100 years of CMS work, 307 schools were established in the Travancore-
Cochin area. Fearing the potential threat of the missionaries' English-language 
education the local rulers established as many Malayalam (local language) schools 
as they could. The number of schools in the government sector in 1894 was 225, and 
government aided schools 1,388. But lower-caste persons were largely excluded 
from these benefits as low-caste members were not permitted to study in 
22Vedic institutions for the study of grammar, technology, philosophy, law etc. Admission was 
restricted to Brahmin children. 
23Residential schools for Namboodiri youths. Vedas, Sastras, Sanskrit and science were taught. 24Writing, arithmetic, the Kavyas and a smattering of astronomy and astrology were taught to 
u~per-caste children in these village schools. 2 Physical training was the main theme of these centres. 26centres of higher learning 
27Tois includes municipal, local funded, aided, unaided categories. 28rnstitutional categories are colleges, secondary schools, elementary schools, training schools, special colleges and oriental colleges. 
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government schools (Jeffrey, 1994:73). In 1894-1895, Travancore began a small 
programme of grants for low-caste children. In Travancore primary education in 
Malayalam was made mandatory in 1902. In 1911-1912 caste restrictions in schools 
were formally abolished in Travancore, while in Cochin state, mandated free 
education in Malayalam began in 1908. 
The relative backwardness of scheduled castes and backward castes in education in 
the traditional caste system is reflected in Table 2.10. The table reveals that 
education at the time was restricted to upper-caste people. In all three regions-
Travancore, Cochin, and Malabar-the literacy rate of the Pulayas (scheduled caste) 
was less than 6 per cent in 1931, while the Brahmins had a literacy rate of more than 
50 per cent in all three regions. 
Table 2.10: Literacy rates for selected castes, Travancore, 
Cochin and Malabar, 1931 
Caste/Religion 
Brahmin 
Nair 
Ezava 
Pula_yaa 
Travancore 
50.9 
35.5 
21.3 
3.3 
Cochin 
68.0 
55.7 
26.2 
5.3 
Malabar 
57.0 
37.4 
NA 
1.9 
Note: aone of the numerically important scheduled-caste communities in Kerala. 
Source: Sivanandan, 1979:476. 
Christian missionaries' efforts to improve the educational levels of Kerala, and of 
the lower castes in particular, had several consequences in the overall educational 
progress in the state. For example, when the missionaries began schools for the 
lower castes and encouraged them to attend, the local rulers feared the educational 
progress of the lower castes. These fears and competition generated a feeling that 
education can improve both social and economic status. Thus, during the early 
twentieth century a genuine belief in the value of education pervaded in Malayali 
(people of Kerala) attitudes. By the mid-1950s, awareness of the importance of 
education had spread to every corner of Kerala: 
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The Investigator asked a small number of villagers what their object was in sending their children to school. The common reply was 'to acquire knowledge'. And knowledge, they believed, is good; a person without education is a beast. Most of the 
villagers are too poor to educate their children to the standard required for jobs, yet they send their children to school in the sincere belief that schooling is good (Aiyappan, 1965:95). 
Table 2.11 reveals that Kerala had consistently higher literacy than India. In 1961 
the total literacy rate for Kerala was 47 per cent, while for India as a whole it was 24 
per cent. While both Kerala and India progressed significantly after that, the gap in 
literacy between Kerala and India remained. The changes in female literacy have 
been particularly interesting. In 1961 Kerala's female literacy rate was 39 per cent 
and that of India as a whole was 13. Even in 1991, India's female literacy was less 
than half that of Kerala. Evidence suggests that literacy in Kerala has been higher 
than in India ever since Christian missionaries started working in Kerala. Reports 
suggest that in Malabar district 20 per cent of males and 5 per cent of females were 
literate even in 1921 (Madras District Gazettes, 1933: 108). In Travancore, the 1875 
census revealed a total literacy rate of 5. 7 4. Literacy levels of the scheduled castes 
in Kerala, however, have been lower than that of the general population, particularly 
during the traditional caste system. 
Table 2.11: Percentage literate among total and female populations) 
Kerala, SCs, and India, 1961-1991 
State/ 
Country 
Kerala, All 
India, All 
1961a 
T 
47 
24 
F 
39 
13 
1971a 
T 
60 
30 
F 
54 
19 
1981b 
T 
69 
36 
F 
65 
25 
1991b 
T 
90 
52 
F 
87 
39 
Notes: Figures given are for all ages. T= total; F= female; SC=Scheduled Castes; aBased on 5+ population; bBased on 7+ population. 
Sources: Superiendent of Census Operations, 1967: 156,176; Director of Census Operations 1971:44; Census of India, 1981:280; Director of Census Operations, 1981:288-89; Director of Census Operations, 1991. 
When Kerala state was formed in 1956, it possessed a reasonably good educational 
infrastructure and popular support for education. After 1956, education became the 
responsibility of the state government, although the Central government is expected 
to lay down broad policies and co-ordinate state activities. Since education has been 
a state responsibility, the nature of its growth and structure has been significantly 
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influenced by state policies and actions (Kuttikrishnan, 1994:350). In Kerala 
education has been encouraged and all governments have continued to spend 
relatively large shares of the budget on it. In 1985-86, nearly 40 per cent of the total 
development expenditure was spent on education. By 1987-88 the educational 
expenditure in the state had grown 23 times from the level of 1960-61. Furthermore, 
Kerala paid the most serious attention to school education compared to higher 
education. In 1987-88, 81.3 per cent of money for education was spent on school 
education. Within school education, primary education was allocated 52.16 per cent 
of the total educational expenditure in 1987-88. 
Table 2.12: Per capita expenditure on education, Kerala and India, 1960-1988 
Year Per capita expenditure 
Kerala (Rs) India (Rs) 
1960-61 
1970-71 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1987-88 
Source: Kuttikrishnan, 1994:351. 
10.90 
28.00 
85.00 
167.00 
207.00 
6.31 
15.00 
47.00 
102.00 
136.0 
Democratisation of education was yet another consideration of various governments 
in Kerala (Kuttikrishnan, 1994:356). In tertiary educational institutions, 15 per cent 
of seats were reserved for scheduled castes after Independence. In addition, they 
were given a concession of 5 per cent of marks in the minimum percentage required 
for admission to any course. Educational concessions were also given to scheduled-
caste students. For example, scheduled-caste students could obtain a lump sum grant 
to cover costs of text books, stationery and clothing (Santhakumari, n.d.: 12). While 
such provisions were laid down by the Central government, these were applicable to 
all states as guidelines or principles. The question, then, was implementation. In 
Kerala, progress in the literacy levels of the lower castes, compared to that of 
scheduled castes in other states, indicates that some of these schemes were 
implemented in a timely manner. 
Involvement of the private sector in education has been yet another way for fast 
expansion of educational institutions in Kerala. In 1984, 60 per cent of the schools 
and 80 per cent of the colleges were under private management. 
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The Kerala Peoples' Science Movement (KPSM), a left-wing organisation, formed 
in 1963, also made a significant contribution towards improving adult literacy in the 
state, particularly that of the poor and disadvantaged. During the 1970s, the 
Movement set up study classes, medical camps, and literacy programmes in villages 
(Franke and Chasin, 1989:52). Volunteers were the key component of the Kerala 
Literacy Mission which has been a part of the KPSM. 
Although literacy levels in Kerala have been higher than the all-India average, the 
proportion of those who matriculated or had higher levels of education has not been 
higher in Kerala. For example, of those who were literate in 1981 in Kerala, only 
about 14 per cent had high school education or above compared to 20 per cent in 
India. Furthermore, the percentage of those who had graduation or above in Kerala 
was only half of the all-India average. 
Table 2.13: Educational levels of literate population in Kerala, 1961-1981 and 
India 1981 
Level of education 1961 Kerala 1981 Kerala 1981 India 
Without formal education 68.09 28.85 30.8 
Primary 25.56 32.49 31.5 
Middle 
-- 24.39 17.6 
Matriculation/higher secondary 6.34 11.05 15.7 
Graduate and above 
-- 1.96 3.9 
Certificate holders 
-- 1.24 0.5 
Source: Kuttikrishnan, 1994:362. 
The evidence provided above on Kerala's education suggests the following. First, 
education was encouraged in Kerala by the Christians and by the local Rajas, 
although their objectives were different. Secondly, contrary to the popular feeling 
that Kerala is educationally advanced, Kerala is not better than India when we look 
at the levels of education of those who are educated, suggesting that Kerala could be 
better referred to as a 'literate state' than an 'educated state'. In Kerala primary level 
education is distributed more equally than the Indian average; this makes education 
in Kerala different from the rest of the country. Thirdly, the educational status of the 
scheduled castes has improved to the general literacy level of caste Hindus in the 
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present decade. Furthermore, literacy levels of the scheduled castes of Kerala have 
been much higher than the all-India average literacy levels from at least the 1950s. 
2.8.2. Health facilities 
Educational attainment is not the only aspect in which Kerala excels. Health care is 
also a high priority. Public health-care initiatives in Kerala have a long history. For 
example, in the nineteenth century native rulers of Travancore and Cochin took an 
active part in public health programmes (Nayar, 1986: 163). They enforced sanitary 
measures in temples, markets, and other public places and developed a paramedical 
public-health and sanitation infrastructure in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. In 1865 the Maharaja of Travancore opened a hospital in Trivandrum that 
offered free treatment to everyone. 
Distribution of health services is another striking feature of Kerala's health-care 
system: this is evident from Tables 2.14 and 2.15. In 1988, about 56 per cent of the 
total hospital beds in Kerala were distributed in rural areas compared to just 18 per 
cent for India as a whole. The Kerala NFHS revealed that about 98 per cent of the 
surveyed villages contained at least one health facility, and about 90 per cent of the 
population had a hospital within 10 kilometres (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and 
IIPS, 1995: 184). 
Table 2.14: Health facilities, Kerala, 1992-93 
Distance to facility PHC 
Within the village 82.7 
<5km 2.6 
5-9 km 8.8 
10+ 3.2 
Do not know 2.7 
Total 2er cent 100 
SC 
92.1 
0.8 
3.6 
0.3 
3.2 
100 
Either 
PHC/SC 
96.2 
0.8 
1.8 
--
1.2 
100 
Hospital 
66.4 
4.3 
18.9 
9.3 
1.1 
100 
Notes: PHC is primary health centre and SC is primary sub-centre. 
Source: PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and TIPS, 1995:184. 
Dispensary/ 
clinic 
87.4 
9.6 
0.9 
1.0 
1.1 
100 
Any health 
facility 
98.2 
1.8 
100 
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Since the per capita expenditure on health for Kerala from the Central government is 
not very different from that spent nationally, the involvement of the private sector 
seems to be significant in Kerala. In 1988, about 60 per cent of hospital beds in 
Kerala were in the private sector compared to 29 per cent in India as a whole. The 
percentage of hospitals in the private sector in Kerala was 92, compared to 56 per 
cent for India. 
Table 2.15: Hospital beds and expenditure on health, Kerala and India, 1988 
State/ 
Country 
Hospital beds 
per 1000 
population 
Percentage of 
beds in rural 
areas 
Percentage of Government 
owned: 
Hospitals Beds 
Per capita 
expenditure on 
Healtha 
Kerala 259 56 8 
India 77 18 44 
Note: aAverage annual government expenditure in rupees for 1983-88. 
Source: Bhat and Rajan, 1997:47. 
40 47 
71 42 
Infrastructure and availability of services do not necessarily translate into optimal 
use of services. One of the important features of the public health care system in 
Kerala has been the regular attendance of doctors, nurses and other staff. Observers 
believe that demand from the people has been the fundamental reason for this. As 
Mencher ( 1980) pointed out, the success of health programmes in Kerala is 
primarily because of the awareness of people of Kerala about their rights to health 
care. Mencher ( 1980), who observed government Primary Health Centres in Kerala 
and the neighbouring state, Tamil N adu, reported of the public demand for health 
services: 
There is no question that politicisation of people in Kerala has played a major part in 
affecting people's health ..... In Tamil Nadu (Kerala's neighbouring state), more than half the times I visited a primary health centre one doctor was on leave, another was 
attending a conference, or one doctor was off on some training programme, or had gone to see his or her sick mother, etc. This was not the case in Kerala. When I visited 
a primary health centre in Kerala, I normally found two doctors assigned to the post 
there hard at work and people waiting in a queue for treatment....... if a PHC was 
unmanned for a few days, there would be a massive demonstration at the nearest 
collectorate led by local leftists, who would demand to be given what they knew were 
entitled to. This has had the effect of making health care much more readily available for the poor in Kerala (Mencher, 1980: 1782). 
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Franke and Chasin ( 1989) discussed in great detail how the present health system 
has managed to meet the health needs of poor people in Kerala. They argue that 
Kerala's health care is the result of popular demand and that government is 
compelled to meet such demands: 
In Kerala, health care is a right. Ordinary people have struggled for -it. They expect it. They demand it. They continue to struggle to maintain, expand, and improve it (Franke and Chasin, 1989). 
2.8.3. Mortality decline 
The ready availability of health care is reflected in Kerala's low mortality29 (Panikar 
and Soman, 1984). The crude death rate (CDR) of Kerala declined from around 25 
per thousand population in 1940 to around 6 per thousand population in 1988-92, 
while the CDR in India declined from 31 per thousand population to 12 per 
thousand population during the same period. Thus, Kerala's mortality decline has 
been faster and steeper than that observed for India. The decline in infant mortality 
is yet another impressive achievement in Kerala compared to India. The infant 
mortality rate (IMR) in Kerala which stood at 242 per thousand live births during 
the period 1911-1920 declined to 66 per thousand in the period 1961-71 (Raj an and 
Zachariah, 1998:44). The IMR has further dropped to 14 in 1996 compared to 72 for 
India (SRS, 1998). 
Expectation of life is yet another indicator associated with the decreased mortality in 
Kerala. For example, the male expectation of life at birth has increased from 44.3 to 
73 years between the periods 1951-61 and 1991-96. For females the corresponding 
figures were 45.3 to 79 years (Rajan and Zachariah, 1998:48). In other parts of 
India, female life expectancy is lower than male life expectancy. 
29 According to Panikar and Soman (1984), high morbidity and low mortality co-existed in Kerala. 
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Table 2.16: Crude death rate (CDR) and infant mortality rate (IMR), Kerala and 
India, 1940-1992 
Year CDR IMR 
Kerala India Kerala India 
1940 25.0 31.2 
- 161 
1951-61a 19.7 28.2 74c 112c 
1961-71a 12.2 20.8 61c 122c 
1971-81a 8.6 15.2 
1971-75b 8.6 15.5 57 134 
1976-80b 7.3 13.9 46 124 
1981-85b 6.6 12.1 32 104 
1986-90b 6.1 
- 24.2 91.2 
1988-92b 6.0 
- 19.8 
Note: acensus analysis; bsRS estimates. 
Source: CQulati, 1976: 1227; Bhat and Rajan, 1997:38. 
Table 2.17 shows the Infant Mortality Rate for various religion/caste groups in 
Kerala. In 1979 scheduled castes had the poorest health status in Kerala: their IMR 
was twice the Kerala average. Compared to the all-India average, however, the IMR 
for the scheduled castes was about 44 per cent lower. 
Table 2.17: Infant mortality for various religious/caste groups in Kerala, 1979, 
1992-93 
Religion/ 1979 1992-93a 
Caste 
Kerala India Kerala India 
Hindu 45 138 23 90.4 
Muslims 43 126 43.9 76.6 
Christians 27 
-- 27.7 49.9 
Scheduled caste 85 152 -- 107.3 
Scheduled tribe 
-- 120 -- 90.5 
All 42 136 31 86.3 
Note: aBased on births in the 10 years preceding the survey. 
Source: Bhat and Rajan, 1997:44; TIPS, 1995:215. 
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2.8.4. Population and family welfare programme 
Kerala's success in family planning is well known, and is reflected in fertility levels 
since its implementation with the clinical3° approach in 1951. Since the government 
family planning programmes have been provided through health facilities (primary 
health centres, sub-centres, and clinics), the distribution of family planning service 
outlets is well distributed across rural and urban areas. As the family planning 
programme is a Central government programme, the inputs in manpower and other 
resources have been similar to those of the rest of the country. However, its 
implementation has been more efficient than in other parts of the country. The 
extension31 approach was adopted by the national family planning programme in 
1963-64. Several camps were organised during the period 1970-73 (Mahadevan et 
al, 1989:203). The famous tubectomy camp of Ernakulam organised in 1971 was 
one of the largest camps ever conducted in India, with a total of 62,913 tubectomies 
performed in just one month. 
An integrated approach to family planning was adopted during the period 197 4-77. 
The expanded immunisation programme was introduced in 1978 to provide 
vaccination for all eligible children and mothers. The Maternal and Child Health 
(MCH) programme was included in the Family Planning (FP) Programme in 1978 
and a new name, Family Welfare Programme, introduced to show the programme's 
overall objectives beyond just family planning (Saseendran, 1993: 1). 
The Universal Immunisation Programme (UIP) was introduced in 1985-86 with the 
aim of expanding to all areas for the entire population. The Family Planning 
programme of India has been voluntary. Although sterilisation is the most popular 
family planning method, other spacing methods such as IUDs, condoms, and pills 
are available under a cafeteria approach. The demographic aim of the programme is 
to achieve a net reproduction rate (NRR) of 1.0 by 2011-2016. It may be noted here 
that Kerala state had already reached a replacement level of fertility of 2.1 children 
per woman in early 1990 (Rajan and Zachariah, 1998: 1) 
30People were expected to go family planning clinics to receive family planning services. 31 Aimed at providing family planning message and service through a network of Primary Health Centres and sub-Centres in rural areas and through urban centres and family welfare training 
centres (Srinivasan, 1995:33). 
76 
2.9 Economic change in Kerala 
While social development has been rapid, Kerala is rated as an economically 
backward state32 (United Nations, 1975:7; Ratcliffe, 1978: 124; Zachariah and 
Kurup, 1984:55; Basu, 1986:274; Nag, 1989: 152; Isaac and Tharakan, 1995). 
Kerala's per capita income in 1960-61 was Rs 259 against the national average of Rs 
306, around 15 per cent less than the Indian average. During the 1980s, the gap in 
per capita income between India and Kerala increased, and in 1986, Kerala stood 
about 37 per cent lower in per capita income than India (Franke and Chasin, 1989). 
In fact, during the 1980s the per capita income of Kerala recorded a decline of 0.1 
per cent, while India recorded an increase of 3 per cent (PRC, Thiruvanthapuram 
and IIPS, 1995:5). Thus, Kerala's domestic economy has been slowing. The 
following paragraphs examine some of the specific features of Kerala's economy. 
Closely related to the poor economy in Kerala is the poor development of 
industrialisation. With poor expansion in industry, the state is considered 
industrially backward (Mohan, 1994:218; Pillai, 1994:259; Sankaranarayanan and 
Bhai, 1994:299). Evidence suggests that industrial development initiatives in Kerala 
began as early as 1881 when an American opened a factory to make clothes in 
Quilon (Sankaranarayanan and Bhai, 1994:299). However, for some reason, 
industry did not grow the way the educational and health sectors did. Among the 
registered factories in India, Kerala's share was only 3 per cent in 1987-88, less than 
the state's share of population. The Central Industrial Investment (CII) in Kerala 
seems to have diminished since the 1980s. In 1988, CII investment in Kerala was 
just 1.59 per cent, nearly half of its entitlement with regard to population size and 
much lower than its share in 197 5. Political reasons are often put forward for this 
decline in Central government assistance to Kerala. Similarly, the state's 
commitment to the social sector is one reason for less investment in the industrial 
sector. According to Namboodiripad (1968:9), a prominent communist leader and 
ex-chief minister of Kerala, the earlier expansion in education, medical and health 
services and road construction absorbed part of the labour force which otherwise 
would have been employed in modern industries, and resulted in the limited 
expansion of industry. Scholars also believe that the political climate and unsound 
development policies are responsible for the poor economic performance of Kerala 
(Prakash, 1994:36). Mohan (1994:235) argues that the era of militant trade unionism 
32During the peak remittance period the share of remittances could be as high as a quarter of the 
state's domestic product. A paper presented at the AKG centre-sponsored International Congress on Kerala Studies indicated that with the inclusion of remittances from the Middle East, per capita income in Kerala could be higher than the national average (Isaac and Tharakan, 1995:1996). 
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is on the decline, but unfortunately it seems that labour unrest remains a stigma that 
makes private investors shy away from the state. Poor industrialisation in the state 
has had adverse effects on its educated population: educated men and women leave 
the state as there are few opportunities for work. 
Table 2.18: Central industrial investment in Kerala (Rs.crore) , 1970-1988 
Year Kerala All India Percentage 
1970 116 3,885 2.99 
1975 202 6,242 3.24 
1980 423 18,161 2.33 
1985 831 47,323 1.76 
1986 923 56,806 1.62 
1987 1,074 68,119 1.58 
1988 1,307 82,150 1.59 
Source: Mohan, 1994:227. 
The poor agricultural production of Ker ala is revealed by the importation of food 
grains and the shrinking of agricultural land. Despite the higher return per acre 
compared to other states, the deficiency in meeting food requirements was nearly 50 
per cent in Kerala during the early 1960s (Kurup et al., 1965:3; Namboodiripad, 
1968:4)). In 1991 about three decades later, about 80 per cent of the food grain 
requirement of Kerala was met though imports from other parts of India (Prakash, 
1994:18-19). It is important to note here that there has been a massive conversion of 
rice33 fields to coconut plantations and other cash crops which require less labour. 
Thus, agriculture, particularly rice production, could not cope with the growing 
population. Kerala, therefore, is not self-sufficient in food production 
(Radhakrishnan et al., 1994: 160). Low per capita land availability (Kurup et al. , 
1965:3), the conversion of agricultural land into housing plots, a labour shortage, 
and an increase in wages are some possible reasons for the stagnation of agriculture, 
apart from the technical and climatic factors (Sivanandan, 1994). 
33Rice is the staple food of Kerala. 
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During 1975-1983 the percentage growth rate of the area under rice cultivation was 
-1.54. This decline is significant considering the fact that rice accounts for about 23 
per cent of the gross cropped area and about 95 per cent of the total area under food 
crops in Kerala during the period 1981-82 (Sivanandan, 1994: 150; Radhakrishnan et 
al., 1994: 160). The area under cultivation as well as production of rice in Kerala 
showed a generally rising trend until about the mid-1970s, and thereafter a declining 
trend. The rate of decline has been steeper in the area used for agriculture 
production. Productivity on the other hand has shown a rising trend throughout. 
Thus, the declining trend in production has been due to a decline in land areas under 
cultivation (Radhakrishnan et al., 1994). 
Another measure of the economic situation of the state is the unemployment figures. 
According to a survey conducted in 1987, about 40 per cent of the labour force was 
unemployed. This included about 26 per cent who had not worked a single day 
during the reference year, and about 14 per cent who had worked at least one day 
but less than 183 days in a year (Prakash, 1994:23). 
Despite its dismal economic growth, Kerala has shown remarkable progress in 
poverty alleviation34. The proportion of rural poor declined from around 60 per cent 
in 1957-58 to 17 per cent in 1987-88. In contrast, during the same period the 
percentage of rural poor in India dropped only to 30 per cent from 53.4 per cent. 
What Kerala has demonstrated then is that decline in poverty is not totally a function 
of the economic performance of the state. In Kerala it happened under the combined 
effect of land reform, Gulf migration and other social and economic changes. 
34For a detailed analysis of poverty in Kerala see Mohanadas (1994). 
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Table 2.19: Proportion of rural poor, Kerala and India, 1957-1988. 
Year Kerala All India 
1957-58 59.6 53.4 
1959-60 62.3 48.7 
1960-61 57.8 42.0 
1961-62 50.3 42.3 
1963-64 52.8 49.1 
1964-65 60.7 50.4 
1965-66 70.7 51.1 
1966-67 67.1 57.4 
1967-68 63.4 57.9 
1968-69 64.6 53.5 
1970-71 62.0 49.1 
1973-74 49.3 47.6 
1977-78 47.37 51.2 
1983-84 26.05 40.4 
1987-88 17 30 
Source: Mohanadas 1994:88; PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS , 1995:5 
Although Gulf migration, social development, and social justice could be achieved 
in Kerala on a large scale, there is no corresponding progress in industrial 
development or agriculture production in the state. Kerala's economic base is the 
remittances from Gulf countries and other states of India. Without domestic 
economic development, the economy of Kerala will be fragile lending less impetus 
for future economic growth and social development. Although the lower castes 
benefited from the economic boom and subsequent changes in the labour market in 
Kerala, sustainable progress can be achieved only if the economic boom is translated 
to more stable growth. 
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2.10 Conclusion 
One of the important conclusions of the present chapter is that there has been a 
transition in the social and economic organisation of Kerala society: from a 
traditional caste system society to a non-traditional caste system, one in which caste 
plays a much smaller role. The causes of this transition include the work of 
Christian missionaries, the efforts of lower-caste reformers, land reform, and the 
Gulf migration. All these forces have worked in a sequence where each reinforced 
the other. For example, had there been no Gulf migration following the land reform, 
the effect of land reform on lower-caste welfare might not have been so significant. 
Thus, what happened in Kerala is unique to its social, political and economic setting. 
The same forces may not have the same impact on the caste system in other parts of 
the country. The social developments achieved in Kerala are mostly the offshoots of 
the same forces that caused caste-system changes or were produced by caste-system 
changes. Thus, the caste-system changes and social development need to be viewed 
as complementary. Much of the success in achieving social development in Kerala is 
because of the empowering of lower-caste people in Kerala: the lower castes could 
ascertain their rights. For the rest of India, empowering the lower castes by 
removing the traditional caste system could improve social development, a way to 
fertility decline. In the next chapter, the fertility of Kerala, particularly the 
scheduled-caste fertility, is examined in the context of the social and economic 
changes discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Fertility Transition in Kerala: 
Scheduled Caste and Non-Scheduled Caste 
Fertility Turnaround 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed Kerala in terms of macro-institutional environment. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the fertility changes and explanations for 
those changes in Kerala in recent decades. Explanations for fertility change will be 
examined in the context of the institutional environment outlined in Chapter 2. The 
chapter also examines the changes in the fertility of the scheduled castes and non-
scheduled castes. A synthesis of various explanations for fertility change in Ker ala is 
undertaken in the light of the fertility theories discussed in Chapter 1. Finally, 
consideration is given to lessons from the available literature which could explain 
the fertility change in the scheduled castes. 
3.2 Fertility transition in Kerala 
Fertility and mortality in Kerala have fallen in Kerala substantially in the second 
half of the twentieth century. Before the 1960s no significant fertility decline took 
place, as indicated by the unchanged crude birth rate (CBR) shown in Table 3.1. 
Compared to India, both the pace and the magnitude of fertility decline in Kerala 
have been notably greater since the 1960s. Table 3.1 indicates that the CBR of 
Kerala dropped by half during the period 1960-1997, while for India the CBR 
declined by slightly over one-third during the same period. The total fertility rate 
(TFR) of Kerala declined by about 10 per cent between 1951-60 and 1961-70, 32 
per cent between 1961-70 and 1971-1981, and 41 per cent from 1971-80 to 1992-
93. The corresponding changes in India were 4.7 per cent, 13 per cent, and 35 per 
cent. Clearly Kerala has been one of the low-fertility1 states in India from at least 
the 1960s (Srinivasan, 1995:86-87, 245). The significant decline in fertility since the 
1960s is closely linked to the transformation of Kerala to a non-traditional caste-
system society. 
Decline in mortality in Kerala occurred before fertility started to decline 
substantially. As revealed in Table 3.1 Kerala had substantially lower crude birth 
rates than the all-India average. The crude death rate for Kerala in 1997 stood at 6.2 
per thousand population, compared to 8.9 per thousand population in India. 
Table 3.1: Trends in CBR, TFR and CDR for Kerala and India, 1931-1992 
Year CBR TFR CDR 
Kerala India Kerala India Kerala India 
1931-40C 40.oa 45.0 -
- 25.0 31.2 
1941-50C 40.0b 40.0 -
- 20.0 27.4 
1951-60C 39.0 42.0 5.6 6.3 16.1 22.8 
1961-70C 37.0 41.0 5.0 6.0 13.5 19.0 
1971-81 d 28.1 37.2 3.4 5.2 8.6 15.2 
1990-92e 19.6 28.7 2.0 3.4 6.2 10.0 
1997f 17.9 27.2 -
- 6.2 8.9 
Notes: aTravancore state; bTravancore and Cochin; CBased on publications of Registrar General of India, including Sample Registration System Bulletins; dBased on Census analysis, ebased on NFHS, fbased on SRS estimates (provisional); - indicates not available. Sources: For CBR and CDR csrinivasan, 1995:241; dBhat and Rajan, 1997:54; enPS, 1995:96,206; fsRS, 1998:1; For TFR c,dBhat and Rajan, 1997:54; enPS, 1995:96. 
As shown in Table 3.2, the changes in Kerala's fertility have taken a long time to 
bring down its population growth. During the period 1901-1991, Kerala's population 
more than quadrupled while India's population only tripled. Table 3.2 shows that 
Kerala's population grew faster than India's until 1971, but more slowly since then. 
The growth of Kerala's population in the mid-twentieth century seems to have had 
significant effects on the land needed for cultivation and housing as the density of 
population was high. High population growth and the tenancy system in Kerala had 
pushed the lower castes to extreme economic hardships which resulted in peasant 
struggles (Menon, 1994). 
1The marital fertility rate was higher in Kerala than the Indian average and started declining from 1966 (Srinivasan, 1995:241). For example, the marital fertility was 242.38 for Kerala compared to 211.36 for all India (rural) during the period 1958-59 (Raman, 1965:69). 
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It is suggested that the lower growth rate in Kerala than India since 1971 has been 
due to the lower fertility in Kerala2 (Bhat and Rajan, 1997:36). A substantial fertility 
decline as well as decline in growth rate in Ker ala since 1971 match the land reform 
implemented in Kerala in the 1970s. In 1991 Kerala's population was 29,098,518, 
which is about 3.4 per cent of India's total population (Director of Census 
Operations, 1991). 
Table 3.2: Population growth trends, Kerala and India, 1901-91 
Year Population ('000s) Growth rate 
Kerala Kerala India 
1901 6,396 
1911 7,148 1.09 0.56 
1921 7,802 0.90 
-0.03 
1931 9,507 1.98 1.04 
1941 11,032 1.50 1.33 
1951 13,549 2.08 1.25 
1961 16,904 2.24 1.96 
1971 21,347 2.26 2.20 
1981 24,454 1.77 2.22 
1991 29,099 1.31 2.11 
Notes: Growth rates refer to the exponential growth rate since the previous date. 
- indicates not available. 
Source: Srinivasan, 1995:240. 
Table 3.3 shows the 1992-93 NFHS data on TFRs for various states in India. 
According to the table, Kerala had the lowest TFR among all the Indian states, 
except for Goa3; both these states recorded below-replacement-level fertility4 . 
Compared to some of the major northern states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, 
Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, the TFR of Kerala was substantially lower. 
2No change in territory has taken place since 1956, i.e. since the formation of Kerala (Director of Census Operations, 1991:23). 3Goa was a Union Territory (directly governed by the Central Government) until 1987 (Srinivasan, 1995:228). Goa's population was only about 0.14 per cent of India's population in 1991, while Kerala's share was 3.44 per cent (Director of Census Operations, 1991). The conditions under which fertility declined in Goa were significantly different from those in Kerala, especially with regard to income levels (Srinivasan, 1995). 4 A TFR of 2.1 is a reasonably close approximation of replacement-level fertility for a population of low mortality: one in which the probability of survival from birth to the reproductive ages is nearly 1.0 (Demeny, 1995:2). 
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Although Kerala's TFR was lower than the TFR of southern states, the difference 
was smaller than the difference between the TFR in Ker ala and the TFR in the 
northern states of India. For example, Tamil N adu, a neighbouring state of Kerala, 
had about 24 per cent higher TFR, while Uttar Pradesh, a northern state, had 141 per 
cent higher TFR than Kerala (IIPS, 1995). 
Table 3 .3: Total fertility rate for various Indian states and percentage 
variation from the Kerala TFR, 1992-93 
County/State 
India 
Goa 
Assam 
Orissa 
West Bengal 
Madhya Pradesh 
Delhi 
Rajas than 
Punjab 
Haryana 
U ttar Pradesh 
Tamil Nadu 
Karnataka 
Maharashtra 
Himachal Pradesh 
Gujarat 
Andhra Pradesh 
Bihar 
Kerala (Base value) 
Source: UPS, 1995. 
TFR 
(Total) 
3.39 
1.90 
3.53 
2.92 
2.92 
3.90 
3.02 
3.63 
2.91 
3.99 
4.82 
2.48 
2.85 
2.86 
2.97 
2.99 
2.59 
4.00 
2.00 
Per cent variation from the 
TFR of Kerala 
+ 69.5 
- 5.0 
+ 76.5 
+ 46.0 
+46.0 
+ 95.0 
+ 51.0 
+ 81.5 
+45.5 
+ 99.5 
+ 141.0 
+ 24.0 
+42.5 
+43.0 
+ 48.5 
+49.5 
+ 29.5 
+ 100.0 
Since the trends to lower fertility and mortality are so general, the state-by-state 
differences can also be expressed by the number of years each state is behind 
Kerala. Some of the key demographic variables in this method are shown in Table 
3.4. In 1997, for example, regarding the crude birth rate, the major states of India 
lag between three and over 25 years behind Kerala. Much larger lags in years are 
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found for all other indicators. The state that shows the lowest time lag concerning all 
indicators, except for the infant mortality rate (IMR), is Kerala's neighbouring state, 
Tamil N adu. States that show the highest variation from Kerala are highly populated 
northern states such as Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan. 
Table 3.4: Time lag (in years) of other states behind Kerala in selected demographic 
and health parameters, 1997 
Demographic variables and lag period in years from Kerala 
State CBR CDR IMR TFR Male age at Female age at 
marriage marnage Andhra Pradesh 11 21 29 25 >80 >80 Assam 22 25 30 30 na na Bihar 25 27 30 >50 >80 >25 Gujarat 18 19 29 18 >80 40 Haryana 22 21 29 30 >80 50 Karnataka 10 19 27 14 30 40 Madhya Pradesh 25 25 >30 30 >80 >80 Maharashtra 13 18 20 14 60 50 Orissa 15 25 >30 28 60 40 Punjab 12 19 19 14 60 10 Rajas than 25 24 >30 >50 >80 >80 Tamil Nadu 2 10 27 12 20 10 U ttar Pradesh 25 25 >30 >50 >80 50 West Bengal 10 25 27 14 30 40 India 21a 8.9 25 28 50 50 
Kerala ( 1997) 17.9 6.2 12 2.3 27.2 21.8 
Notes: Time lags are calculated using Kerala's experience as a basis for comparison. For example 
Andhra Pradesh had a 1997 CBR of 22.8, a level Kerala reached in 1986, so Andhra Pradesh lags behind Kerala by 11 years in CBR; aExcludes Jammu and Kashmir. Value of TFR for Kerala refer 
to 1988; age at marriage for Kerala refers to 1981. 
Sources: Sample Registration Systeni Bulletin (April 1998:1); Srinivasan, 1995:124, 241. 
To sum up, the evidence presented in this section clearly suggests that Kerala is one 
of the lowest fertility and mortality states in India. In terms of the demographic 
transition theory, Kerala falls in the last phase where fertility and mortality are low. 
More significantly, Kerala's fertility levels in the 1990s are indicative of below-
replacement fertility. Furthermore, Kerala has already achieved the demographic 
goals set by India to be achieved by the year 2015. The timing and pace of fertility 
transition in Kerala and the pace of its caste-system changes appear to be similar, 
suggesting a possible link between them. 
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3.3 Turnaround in scheduled castes' and non-scheduled castes' fertility 
Kerala, besides being one of the lowest-fertility states in India, also shows the 
lowest fertility for the scheduled castes among all the Indian states. The fertility of 
scheduled castes and 'total population' of various states in India as revealed in the 
1992-93 NFHS is displayed in Table 3.5. While Kerala scheduled castes had a TFR 
of 1.37 children per woman, the state of Uttar Pradesh had a TFR of 5.56, the 
highest among all the Indian states in the 1992-93 NFHS. 
Another striking feature of the fertility of Ker ala is its lower TFR recorded for the 
scheduled-caste communities compared to the total population. In fact Kerala was 
the only state, except for Assam and Bihar5, in India that shows lower fertility for 
the scheduled castes than for the total population. While in Kerala the TFR of the 
scheduled castes was 32 per cent lower than that of the total population, it was about 
99 per cent higher in Goa, the state which has the lowest fertility of all Indian states. 
Considering the below-replacement-level fertility of the total population in Kerala, 
the still lower fertility of the scheduled castes poses an important question: why is 
scheduled caste fertility lower than the fertility of the total population in Ker ala? As 
will be shown in later this chapter, no study has been conducted to answer this 
question. 
5Bihar shows the fertility of its scheduled castes slightly below the overall value (1 % ). But it important to note that Bihar has substantially higher fertility than Kerala. 
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Table 3.5: TFR for the total population and scheduled-caste population for major 
Indian states, 1992-93 
County/State 
India 
Goa 
Orissa 
West Bengal 
Madhya Pradesh 
Delhi 
Rajas than 
Punjab 
Haryana 
U ttar Pradesh 
Tamil Nadu 
Karnataka 
Maharashtra 
Himachal Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh 
Gujarat 
Bihar 
Assam 
Kerala 
TFR 
(SC? 
3.90 
3.78 
3.68 
3.52 
4.71 
3.62 
4.26 
3.39 
4.61 
5.56 
2.79 
3.15 
3.04 
3.10 
2.61 
2.98 
3.95 
2.77 
1.37 
TFR 
(Total )b 
3.39 
1.90 
2.92 
2.92 
3.90 
3.02 
3.63 
2.91 
3.99 
4.82 
2.48 
2.85 
2.86 
2.97 
2.59 
2.99 
4.00 
3.53 
2.00 
Per cent variation from TFR 
of total population 
+15 
+ 99 
+ 26 
+ 21 
+ 21 
+ 20 
+ 17 
+ 16 
+ 16 
+ 15 
+ 13 
+ 11 
+6 
+4 
+ <1 
-1 
-22 
-32 
Notes: - indicate no notable difference; ascheduled castes; bTotal population. 
Sources: National Family and Health Survey, 1992-93: various volumes. 
Since the fertility of the scheduled castes was considerably lower than that of the 
total population in Kerala, it is interesting to examine whether the scheduled castes 
had lower fertility than the non-scheduled caste Hindus. Data which permit such an 
assessment are not abundant. However, one of the studies conducted in Ker ala by 
Kerala University during the period 1963-64, covering 534 married women aged 20-
39 in rural areas of Trivandrum, does address this issue. This revealed that the 
average number of children ever born was significantly higher among the scheduled 
castes than the non-scheduled caste Hindus (see Table 3.6). For example, the 
fertility (children ever born for women aged 35-39) of the upper-caste Nairs was 
about 29 per cent lower than that of the scheduled castes. Similarly, the Ezavas, a 
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caste higher in social status than the scheduled castes, had a fertility about 12 per 
cent lower than that of the scheduled castes. In brief, in 1963-64 except for the 
Muslims, the scheduled castes had the highest fertility (George, 1976:4). 
Table 3.6: Average number of live births for various caste or religious groups, 
1963-64 in rural Trivandrum, Kerala 
Religion/ 
Caste 
Nairs 
Ezavas 
Scheduled castes 
Christians 
Muslims 
20-24 
1.63 
1.58 
2.15 
2.09 
-
Note: - indicates very few cases. 
Source: George, 1976:4. 
Age group (years) 
25-29 30-34 35-39 
3.14 4.40 5.11 
3.26 4.45 6.29 
3.59 4.68 7.16 
3.42 4.36 4.52 
3.00 6.00 8.00 
Fertility data from two World Bank Fertility Surveys (WBFS) conducted in selected 
districts6 of Kerala also provide results by caste and are given in Table 3.7. The 
results suggest that the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes 7 had the highest 
marital fertility in the two surveys during the periods 1965-70 and 197 5-80. The 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes had about 31 per cent higher fertility than the 
Nairs. This difference reduced to about 9 per cent during 1975-80. During the 
period 1965-70 to 1970-80, Nair fertility declined by only about 14 per cent while 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes registered a 28 per cent decline. The 
conclusion of the analysis in this paragraph is that not only that the fertility of the 
scheduled castes had declined during the period 1965-70 to 197 5-80, but also that it 
had declined faster than that of the N airs. Furthermore, as a result of greater pace in 
the fertility decline among the scheduled castes, the difference in the fertility 
between N airs and scheduled castes has been reduced during the period 197 5-80 
compared to 1965-70 period. Why did the scheduled castes' fertility decline faster 
than the N airs' fertility during the period 1965-70 to 197 5-80? This is yet another 
question for which answers are not readily available in the literature. 
6These districts were Palghat, Ernakulam, and Alleppey. 7Scheduled castes and Tribes are combined in this study. However, since scheduled tribes form so 
small a part of the population, the values in Table 3.7 can be regarded as those of the scheduled-
caste population. 
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Table 3.7: Total marital fertility ratea for Nairs and SC/ST, World Bank Fertility 
Survey of selected districts in Kerala, 1965-70 and 197 5-80 
Caste 
Nairs 
Scheduled castes and scheduled tribes 
1965-70 
4.9 
6.4 
1975-80 
4.2 
4.6 
Per cent decline 
-14 
-28 
Note: aTotal marital fertility is for ages 20-40 years, SC/ST scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. 
Source: Zachariah and Kurup, 1984:56. 
Table 3.8 gives the TFRs for major religious and caste groups from the 1979 SRS 
Survey, the 1981 Census and the 1992-93 Kerala NFHS. According to the 1979 SRS 
survey of Kerala, the TFR for rural areas was 2.85 children per woman with the 
highest value for Muslims and the lowest value for Christians. Compared to the 
'total Hindus', the scheduled castes had a higher TFR. 
In 1981, the average TFR for rural Kerala was 2.52. Here again the lowest and 
highest fertility was for Christians and Muslims, respectively. Compared to 'total 
Hindus', as in the 1979 SRS survey, fertility for the scheduled castes was higher. 
The pattern and the level of fertility between total Hindus and the scheduled castes 
did not change during this time span, although the gap narrowed. 
The situation revealed in the 1992-93 NFHS was totally different from the previous 
surveys of 1979 and 1981. The lowest fertility in the 1992-93 NFHS was not for 
Christians but for the scheduled castes. Compared to the total Hindus, not only was 
the scheduled-caste fertility lower, but substantially lower, by about 17 per cent. 
Why did this happen? Since the most significant change in fertility has occurred for 
the scheduled castes, factors that influenced the fertility behaviour of scheduled 
castes seem to have changed in Kerala. 
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Table 3.8: Total fertility rate for various caste/religious groups, Kerala 1979-
1993 
Caste/Religion 1979 1981 1992-93 
Rural Rural Rural+ Urban 
Hindu 2.49 2.26 1.66 
Muslim 4.15 3.72 2.96 
Christian 2.43 2.16 1.78 
Scheduled caste 2.74 2.41 1.37 
Scheduled tribe - 3.02 1.29 
All Kerala 2.85 2.52 2.00 
Note: Hindus include scheduled castes; - indicates no cases. 
Sources: Bhat and Rajan, 1997:58-59; PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:58. 
Table 3.9 gives a broad summary view of scheduled castes' fertility as revealed in 
various surveys discussed earlier. Since the measures of fertility are not readily 
comparable, the purpose is to give a broad view of fertility change among the 
scheduled castes in Kerala. The conclusion that can be drawn from the table is that 
fertility of the scheduled castes has indeed declined to a very low level. It also 
indicates a gradual decline from 1965-70. 
Table 3.9: Trends in scheduled-caste fertility since the 1960s, Kerala 
Years 1963-64 1965-70 1975-80 1979 1981 1992-93 
Fertility 7.16a 6.4b 4.6b 2.74c 2.41 C 1.37d 
Notes?Children ever born; bTotal marital fertility rate (scheduled caste/tribe);cTotal fertility rate (rural); dTotal fertility rate (total population). 
Sources: Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8. 
To sum up, available data indicate that the scheduled castes in Kerala had much 
higher fertility than the total Hindus and non-scheduled-caste Hindus in the past-
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Although the gap between the fertility of scheduled-
caste and total Hindus (and non-scheduled-caste Hindus) has been shrinking since 
the 1970s, it was only in the 1990s that a turnaround in scheduled caste and non-
scheduled caste fertility was observed. This reversal is made evident in Table 3.10. 
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As revealed in Chapter 2 the most important change for the scheduled castes in 
Kerala in the twentieth century was abolition of tenancy and freedom from caste 
system bondage. The land reform abolished tenancy and provided small parcels of 
land, followed by economic changes due to employment migration to the Gulf 
countries. Both the land reform and Gulf migration have had a significant impact on 
their fertility though changes in their aspirations and changes in the institutional 
environment. This issue is examined in great length in the case study of Vettuvans 
in the following chapters. 
Table 3 .10: Fertility variation of scheduled castes compared to total Hindus and 
non-scheduled caste Hindus since the 1960s, Kerala 
Years 
Scheduled caste fertility 
variation from non-
scheduled caste 
Hindus/total Hindus 
1963-64a 
+ 29 
1965-70a 
+ 32 
1975-soa 1979b 1981b 
+9 +7 +6 
Notes: a,Scheduled caste fertility from Nair; bscheduled caste fertility from total Hindus. 
Sources: Computed from Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. 
3.4 Explanations offered for Ker ala's fertility change 
1992-93b 
-17 
The previous sections showed the fertility transition in Kerala and the scheduled 
castes' and non-scheduled castes' fertility turnaround. The three questions that need 
answers based on the discussions in the previous sections are: Why did fertility 
levels drop to substantially low levels in Kerala? Why did the scheduled-caste and 
non-scheduled caste fertility turnaround occur in Kerala? And why is scheduled-
caste fertility the lowest in Kerala? 
Broadly speaking, there are two major strands of explanations for Kerala's fertility 
transition: social development (including social justice) and poverty. The social 
development hypothesis broadly assumes that developments in key social sectors 
have influenced the fertility transition in Kerala (Mehrotra, 1965; Gulati, 1976; 
Ratcliffe, 1978, 1983; Zachariah and Kurup, 1984; Franke and Chasin, 1989; Nag, 
1989; Bhat and Rajan, 1997). The poverty argument is that the poor economic 
situation of the large majority of people in Kerala caused fertility decline (Mencher, 
1980; Basu, 1986). These two sets of explanations are examined by a review of 
published literature. 
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3 .4.1 The social development hypothesis 
3 .4.1.1 Education 
One of the important social developments noted in Kerala is in the sector of 
education8. Several scholars have attributed the changes in fertility behaviour to the 
direct and indirect influences of literacy and schooling in Kerala (Mehrotra, 1965; 
George, 1976:4-7; Krishnan, 1976; Ratcliffe, 1978; Nayar, 1986; Nag, 1989; Bhat 
and Rajan, 1997; Krishnakumari and Moli, 1997; Zachariah, 1997). One of the 
important ways in which education influences fertility is by pushing the age at 
marriage of both men and women to a higher level, thus reducing the reproductive 
span. 
While discussing the influence of education on age at marriage in Kerala, it is 
important to bear in mind that Kerala has had a relatively high age at marriage from 
the beginning of the present century compared to India, long before the spread of 
education. For example, in 1901 the average age at marriage of women in Kerala 
was 17.1 years compared to 13.2 years for India (Gulati, 1976). The question, then, 
is whether or not education influenced the marriage age of Kerala men and women. 
Gulati ( 197 6) was sceptical about the general impression among the researchers that 
education is a reason for the higher age at marriage in Kerala. She pointed out that 
in Ker ala both education and age at marriage were higher for women for a long 
period. The reason for the higher age at marriage was not education but 
marumakkathayam, the matrilineal kinship system which existed in Kerala. 
Under marumakkathayam, succession is traced through the female line, and property 
descends from mother to daughter. Gulati pointed out that under such a system of 
kinship, marriage does not call for a change in residence for girls on their marriage. 
A matrilocal residence system, Gulati argued, would reduce the concern arising 
from a marriageable daughter staying on with her own parents. In contrast, she 
assumes that the absence of marumakkathayam in other parts of India may have 
caused concern to parents if marriageable daughters remain unmarried and stay with 
them (Gulati, 1976; Misra and Saseendran, 1988). In other words, parents from non-
marumakkathayam communities are more likely to have their daughters married at 
early ages than are parents from marumakkathayam communities. 
8 Education and literacy in Kerala are discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Gulati further suggested that when the marumakkathayam system weakened, 
coincidentally, the education of women and practice of dowry increased among 
many Hindu communities. This helped to keep the female age at marriage from 
falling and to some extent increased it. The positive statistical relationship found 
between female education and female age at marriage, she pointed out, has been 
viewed as education determining age at marriage. In Kerala the higher age of 
marriage came first and the expansion of female education came later; hence, the 
general view that education in Kerala caused the higher age at marriage may not be 
accurate for the early part of the twentieth century. However, since the 
marumakkathayam system was practised by only about half of the population of 
Kerala, Gulati's argument that the marumakkathayam system kept the marriage age 
higher in Kerala can be challenged. 
Krishnan (1976), for example, argues for a stronger link between education and age 
at marriage. He showed that the female literacy rate rose from 12 per cent in 1921 to 
45 per cent in 1961, with a corresponding increase in age at marriage. For example, 
the average age at marriage of women rose from around 15. 9 years before 1921 to 
18. 6 by 1961. He suggested that the rise in female education could be an important 
reason for the higher age at marriage. 
Krishnan's (1976) study further indicated that female education was a cause for low 
levels of fertility. Although there is a logical sequence in the interpretation that, 
when female education improves, age at marriage also improves, and an increased 
age at marriage will lower fertility, evidence (Gulati, 1976: 1233), particularly for 
the early twentieth century does not support Krishnan's view. 
Using the 1961 Fertility Survey in Kerala, Mehrotra ( 1965: 164-17 4) carried out a 
detailed analysis of the relationship between education, age at marriage and fertility 
in rural and urban areas. The study revealed that in the rural areas illiterate and 
elementary-educated women with a marital duration of 15 years or more had an 
average of 5.6 children compared to 4.9 children for women with high school 
education. In urban areas, on average, illiterate women had 5. 6 children, 
elementary-educated women had 5.4 children, and women with high-school-
education had 4.1 children. 
Mehrotra's ( 1965: 172) study further revealed the importance of a woman's education 
compared to her husband's education in reducing fertility. The wife's education had 
a greater effect in lowering fertility than her husband's. Further, a high-school 
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education was considered to be the minimum needed for an appreciable decline in 
fertility. The study also reveals that illiterates did not act differently with regard to 
fertility in rural and urban areas, while literates did act differently. In fact rural-
urban differentials in fertility increased with an increase in education; women with 
high school education in urban areas had substantially lower fertility than women 
with high school education in rural areas. No effort was made in Mehrotra's study to 
provide reasons for such variations in fertility. 
In a comparative study of fertility and mortality transitions in Kerala and Punjab, 
Nag (1989:150,155) suggested that the effect of education on the proximate 
variables of fertility explained more than anything else the considerable decline in 
vital rates in both states. For Kerala, higher female education, widespread school 
facilities and their utilisation were given as the important factors influencing the 
proximate determinants such as good family planning and health services, their 
effective utilisation, and delayed age at marriage. But how all these changes were 
achieved in Kerala is much more important than just numbering the proximate 
determinants of fertility and mortality. 
A regression analysis carried out by Krishnakumari and Moli (1997: 166), using 
district-level data for the two decades 1971-1991, revealed that female literacy was 
the most important factor explaining variations in female age at marriage across 
districts in Ker ala. Although female literacy was an important factor in explaining 
female age at marriage, it was less important in explaining male age at marriage. 
The explanatory variables the study incorporated were the proportion of effective 
male literates, proportion of effective female literates, percentage of urban 
population, sex ratio, female work participation rate, male work participation rate, 
and the proportion of labour force in agriculture. This study appears to have been 
guided by data availability rather than any conceptual framework, as it ignored 
many important variables such as religion, caste, women's status, economic status, 
practice of dowry, that have been reported as having an important role in 
determining the marriage age of both men and women. 
Mahadevan and Sumangala ( 1987) provided a set of reasons for the increase in age 
at marriage for different age groups. They proposed 'aspiration and economic 
streams' for the delay in marriages. The aspiration stream includes delaying of 
marriage because of education or employment. Mahadevan and Sumangala argued 
that if there was an aspiration for better education and occupation, then both men 
and women would delay their marriage. The 'economic stream' involves delaying 
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marriage because of the cost of marriage. That is, parents may delay the marriage of 
daughters for want of funds to arrange sufficient dowry. Similarly, the marriage of 
sons may be delayed if they have financial obligations to fulfil in their family: 
Initially, the age at marriage of girls and boys goes up to 16 years (that is, up to final year of schooling), because they are getting an education. The marriage age goes further to 21 or 25 years when they wish to have higher education. After attaining 
education, marriage gets further delayed, mostly on account of economic difficulty (Mahadevan and Sumangala, 1987:79). 
Jayasree's (1989) study in three community development blocks in Trivandrum 
district showed a higher age at marriage for Hindus, followed by Christians and 
Muslims. Jayasree believed the higher age at marriage of women among the Hindus 
accounted for their lower fertility and the lower age at marriage for the higher 
fertility of the Christians and Muslims. She also studied some of the important 
determinants of age at marriage. These are the cost of arranging a marriage, various 
reasons for early and late marriage, and socio-economic variables. The most 
important reason for higher age at marriage among the Hindus was the cost of 
. . 
arranging marriages. 
The indirect role of education in fertility is also evident in the literature. Ratcliffe 
(1978: 137) indicated that status and social mobility of women in Kerala have 
increased with educational attainment, as an increasing number of women are 
entering the service sector. But, contrary to Ratcliffe's observation, Indian censuses 
indicate that the female work participation rate has declined since 1961. For 
example, the female work participation rate in Kerala was 19. 7 per cent in 1951 and 
dropped to 16.6 per cent in 1981 (Kumar, 1994:3250). Ratcliffe (1978:138) further 
pointed out that alternatives to childbearing become a real choice only for educated 
women. An increase in education, he added, will increase age at marriage. He 
identified attractive alternatives to marriage as a reason for 22 per cent of women in 
the age group 15-44 in Kerala remaining never- married9 in 1969. Lack of evidence 
to indicate that women who remained never-married in Kerala had an 'attractive 
alternative to marriage', however, left his view untested. The role of increasing 
dowry in keeping many women unmarried, though it was not explored, could be one 
reason, as is evident from many other studies (J ayasree, 1989). 
One of the most recent works that has linked fertility to education is a statistical 
analysis carried out by Bhat and Rajan (1997) using data from the 1961, 1971 and 
9The figure 22 per cent Ratcliffe mentioned does not reflect the percentage of women remaining 
unmarried by age 45-49. 
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1981 censuses. According to their analysis, the most significant variable in the 
decline in fertility between 1961 and 1981 was female literacy. They rejected almost 
every other possibility proposed by earlier researchers to explain Kerala's fertility 
decline: 
... there was no other significant factor [ other than female literacy] that could explain 
the decline in CWRs [Child Women Ratio] in either Kerala, or in all the 19 districts 
combined ... This is a surprising finding given the long list of factors-land reforms, 
female autonomy, ecology, unemployment, to name a few-which are said to be 
responsible for the decline in fertility in Kerala (Bhat and Rajan, 1997:69). 
Kerala's fertility decline, Bhat and Rajan believe, took place according to the 
diffusion theory of Cleland and Wilson (1987). Their view is that education helped 
in the diffusion of birth control ideas to all sections of society including the 
illiterates. Accordingly, the channel of diffusion has been from literates to illiterates. 
They argued that the first to use birth control will be the educated. Once it is 
approved by educated women, illiterate women will follow suit. While several 
questions can be asked about their methodology and interpretation, and the evidence 
provided, only one question is raised here10. How can a minority of 'above primary 
school educated' women have a decisive role in the fertility behaviour of 'illiterate 
and/or below primary' level educated women? An examination of the female literacy 
data used by Bhat and Rajan reveals that the majority of Kerala women-about 86 
per cent in 1961, 82 per cent in 1971, and 72 per cent in 1981-had only primary 
education or less (Saseendran, 1998). 
Furthermore, some studies in Kerala indicated that an educational level of women 
above high school is needed for an appreciable change in fertility (Mehrotra, 
1965: 178; George, 1976:6). Evidence from by Basu (1986:267), however, regarding 
the sterilisation users during the period 1956-61 by occupation suggests that about 
57 per cent of users were unskilled workers, agricultural labourers or cultivators. 
Assuming the general pattern that the educational level of unskilled workers, 
agricultural labourers and cultivators will be lower than that of skilled workers, 
business people, professional and other such workers, it can be said that many of the 
initial users of family planning in Kerala were illiterates. Under such circumstances 
it is less plausible to trace the path of diffusion from literates to illiterates. This is 
further supported by the fact that innovators of birth control come largely from the 
economically and most probably from the educationally backward groups 
(Zachariah, and Kurup, 1984): 
lO For a fuller review of Bhat and Rajan's paper see Saseendran (1998). 
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. . . the prevalence rate of sterilisation was highest among those with 1-4 years of 
schooling, not among those with more than 10 years of schooling; among Ezawas and 
the scheduled caste communities, not among the Nairs; and among women from households with per capita monthly expenditure of Rs. 50-59, not among those with 
monthly expenditures above Rs. 120 (Zachariah and Kurup, 1984:70). 
A further challenge to the view that education is a vital factor in declining fertility in 
Kerala comes from data derived from the 1980 and 1991 surveys conducted in three 
districts of Kerala. While the 1980 survey indicated a significant and consistent 
decline in fertility with an increase in female and male schooling, the 1991 survey, 
on the contrary, indicated inconsistent and less significant declines in fertility with 
female and male schooling (Rajan et al., 1996:282). It appears that educational 
variations with regard to fertility noticed in Kerala in 1980 may have represented 
caste category, and what was evident in 1991 was the diminishing relevance of those 
caste categories in shaping fertility differentials. In 1980 education and caste were 
probably matching each other; that is, lower caste entailed lower education and 
higher caste higher education, thus producing a consistent relation with fertility. 
This is consistent with the data on caste differentials in fertility discussed earlier in 
the chapter. By 1991, the match between education and caste may have lessened, 
thus resulting in an inconsistent relation of education with fertility. If education was 
important to the determination of fertility in Kerala, there is no reason why its 
importance would be less in 1991. 
The above review suggests that the role of education in explaining fertility decline 
in Ker ala is unclear. Its role has changed over time and under different 
circumstances. Apparently, all the studies documented in the review recognise that 
education influenced fertility either directly, by postponing marriages or delaying 
first birth because of particular careers, or indirectly, by changing attitudes towards 
number or quality of children. Also, education influenced the spread of birth control 
ideas to illiterates and less educated couples. However, the linear association 
between education and fertility that perhaps existed in the past needs to be re-
examined in the present social, demographic and economic environment of Kerala. 
As we have seen, while fertility declined, education increased over the same period, 
allowing statistical analysis to come up with a high negative correlation. The 
interaction between education and fertility could be mutually reinforcing, rather than 
one influencing the other all the time. In my view, education in Kerala has been a 
cause and a consequence of caste-system changes. And, therefore, education needs 
to be seen in the context of the social, economic and political relationships that 
existed in Kerala in the past and present. For example, higher education, higher 
marriage age, and lower fertility could be three separate goals of couples in a given 
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institutional environment. The relationships between them, or lack of them, depend 
on the institutional environment that shapes their aspirations and constraints on 
achieving those aspirations. 
3 .4.1.2 Culture and status of women 
In addition to education, Kerala's cultural traditions are often cited in explanations 
for fertility decline. Culture is seen by some researchers as a reason for the higher 
status of women in Kerala (Iyer, 1970:76-77; Jeffrey, 1992) and its subsequent 
influence to lower fertility (Fuller, 1976; Gulati, 1976; Nag, 1989; Devi, 1997). The 
most cited cultural practice in Kerala associated with status of women is the practice 
of marumakkathayam 11 , the matrilineal, matrilocal and matriarchal system of 
inheritance. This was discussed chiefly when considering age at marriage, but it is 
of such centrality to many explanations of fertility change that it merits a more 
detailed consideration. Devi ( 1997), in a comparative study of Kerala and Madhya 
Pradesh (a north-central Indian state), emphasised the need to understand 
demographic change in relation to culture. She suggested that in Kerala the culture 
of the matriarchal system gave women status in the family, recognising them as 
individuals of significance. The lower fertility in Kerala, according to Devi, is a 
product of cultural norms and values that are conducive to a reduction in fertility. 
The higher fertility in Madhya Pradesh, on the other hand, is due to the lack of such 
a cultural environment. 
The role of marumakkathayam in enhancing the status of women in Kerala society 
can be questioned on two grounds. Firstly, the marumakkathayam system virtually 
disappeared from Ker ala before the onset of fertility decline. Evidence suggests that 
the marumakkathayam system had ceased to exist by around 1930 (Kurup et al., 
1965:23; Fuller, 1976: 100; Franke and Chasin, 1989:93; Nair, 1965: 185). Further, 
marumakkathayam was not practised by the entire population. 
Secondly, under the marumakkathayam system that prevailed in Kerala it is hard to 
rule out the role of male dominance. For example, Fuller ( 197 6) presents a detailed 
sketch of matrilineal joint families of Nairs in his study in Ramanakara, Kerala. The 
joint family, called tharavad, is a large group consisting of members of a matrilineal 
segment. The legal guardian of the tharavad is the oldest man, known as karanavan. 
11 The history of Kerala suggests that the patriarchal system of family organisation prevailed in Kerala from early times and the matriarchal system was a development of the later period. The 
special circumstance which led to the transition from patriarchy to matriarchy was the war between Chera and Chola which continued for hundreds of years, AD 1000 -1325 (Nair, 1965:186). 
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Fuller reported that his respondents from Ramnakara often compared karanavan of 
the past with Rajas. The authority over children in the tharavad was vested in the 
karanavan, who was often their mother's brother: 
He [karanavan] is responsible for day-to-day discipline in the home and also for major decisions taken on behalf of the children, such as arrangement of their marriages (Fuller, 1976:55). 
The marriage system of matrilineal communities such as the N airs was known as 
sambandam. In sambandam male partners only visited women at night and did not 
stay with them in their tharavad. Both men and women were permitted more than 
one sambandam partner. Fuller (1976: 108) reported that the karanavan's consent 
was essential before a man could become one of a woman's partners. Thus, women's 
power in the tharavad may have been limited, as is evident from the examples of 
Ramanakara and other literature (Zachariah, 1968: 110; Fuller, 1976). A detailed 
investigation is needed to assess the status of women of marumakkathayam 
communities in Kerala. 
What is not discussed, surprisingly, with reference to the higher status of women in 
Kerala is the extreme injustice suffered by the women of the Namboodiri, the 
highest caste. Among N amboodiris only the eldest sons were supposed to marry. 
Thus, many N amboodiri women would have remained unmarried as there would not 
have been enough first sons for all the women. The seclusion of these otherwise 
privileged women also did not allow them to travel to schools or markets, or be seen 
outside their house compounds. These N amboodiri women use a suffix 
antharjanam, or 'inside person', after their names, a reference to their being kept 
inside the large house all their lives (Franke and Chasin, 1989:91). These customs of 
the N amboodiris can scarcely be regarded as related to the higher status of their 
women. Those who advocated the role of cultural practices such as 
marumakkathayam as an important reason for the higher status of Ker ala women 
have generally ignored the fate of Namboodiri women who were even deprived of 
their basic biological and social right to reproduce. Thus, literature on the status of 
women in Kerala exaggerated the role of marumakkathayam in the higher status of 
Kerala women. 
Nag (1989) analysed indicators such as age-specific mortality rates of women, the 
percentage using purdah, the percentage supporting equal inheritance rights, the 
percentage of main female workers to the total female population, the ideal number 
of . sons pref erred, the ideal number of daughters pref erred, and the son preference 
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index for Kerala and Punjab. On the basis of these indicators Nag suggested that 
Kerala women had a higher status than women in Punjab because the above 
indicators were in favour of Kerala. For example, the infant mortality rate for rural 
Kerala in 1976 was 54 per 1000 female live births compared to 61 per 1000 male 
live births. In contrast, in Punjab the infant mortality for females was 127 per 1000 
live births compared to 108 per 1000 male live births, showing substantial female 
disadvantage. 
Mahadevan and Sumangala ( 1987) in their study of one village each in Kerala and 
Andhra Pradesh ( a south Indian state) showed that women in Kerala were more 
emancipated than women in Andhra Pradesh. They included six measures in their 
emancipation scale: (i) the individuality of women; (ii) dependency on husband; (iii) 
freedom of action in several aspects; (iv) participation in decision making; (v) roles 
generally performed; and (vi) permissibility of argument with husband. They also 
found a negative association of emancipation of women with fertility behaviour in 
both states. Since Kerala women were more emancipated than Andhra Pradesh 
women, Mahadevan and Sumangala concluded that this difference was responsible 
for the lower fertility in Kerala than in Andhra Pradesh. Why Kerala women are 
more emancipated than women in Andhra Pradesh is largely unanswered in their 
study. 
However, analysis carried out by Rajan et al. (1996) using the Kerala Fertility 
Surveys of 1981 and 1991 concluded that Kerala women cannot be said to enjoy a 
high level of autonomy. They indicated that, although one-fourth of women hold 
property and/or an independent source of income, only a small proportion even of 
those women retain it under personal control. Furthermore, about two-thirds of 
women felt that they needed either their husbands' or their in-laws' permission to 
purchase personal goods. However, women were capable of deciding on their own 
in matters pertaining to child health, often because of the urgency of the matter. 
They suggested that female autonomy increased with education and they ruled out 
the role of historical cultural factors. 
Asari's ( 1994) study of high school teachers in 14 districts of Kerala revealed that 
contraceptive use was not related to the sex combination of children of a couple. 
The determining factor in contraceptive use was the family size preference and not 
the gender preference. Asari's findings bring an important question: is there sex 
preference in Ker ala? If couples terminate childbearing after having two sons, would 
it indicate son preference? If couples terminate childbearing after having two 
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daughters, would it indicate daughter preference? In my view, such a situation better 
explains the particular institutional environment in the society that does not permit 
more children so as to achieve at least one child of the desired sex. To understand 
sex preference we need to study the institutions of family and marriage more than 
the acceptance of terminal methods of family planning. 
In sum, as with the education hypothesis, the overall effect of Kerala's culture of 
female autonomy can be exaggerated. Compared with much of the rest of India, 
Kerala women are generally less disadvantaged. But the specific mechanisms that 
turn this into low fertility are not always obvious. 
3.4.1.3 Land reforms 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in Kerala the traditional caste-system used to be the 
principle that governed the pattern of land ownership and cultivation. Under the 
traditional caste system the landlords were mostly N amboodiris, the upper-caste 
Hindus (Oommen, 1971:11). They, along with Nairs, another upper-caste group, 
controlled the bulk of wet land in Kerala. But neither community cultivated the 
land. They leased out land to lower-caste tenants such as the Ezavas, who, along 
with the untouchables, cultivated the land (Varghese, 1970:39; Franke and Chasin, 
1989:55). A detailed discussion of these caste-land relationships was given in 
Chapter 2. 
In 1970, land reform in Kerala provided ownership to tenants of a small piece of 
land on which their hut was located. In most cases the land reform provided ten 
cents12 of land in rural areas and much less in urban areas. One of the ways in which 
land reform might influence fertility in the long term could be that those families 
that benefited from the land reform would find it difficult to get house sites for their 
children (Zachariah and Kurup, 1984:61; Zachariah, 1997:100). Zachariah and 
Kurup ( 1984) also suggested that landlords would not be prepared to lease their land 
to new tenants, fearing that they would never get it back. Nevertheless, the most 
important effect of land reform on fertility according to Zachariah and Kurup ( 1984) 
was the fundamental change in the attitude of people towards landed property: 
Land, particularly agricultural land, lost its prime position in the economics of Kerala 
society, and its place was taken by acquired qualifications. This basic change in value 
system has had a much deeper and long-lasting effect on the demand for fertility 
control than the various redistributions brought about by the land reforms (Zachariah 
and Kurup, 1984:65). 
12 100 cents= 1 acre; 1 acre= 0.40 hectares . 
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As revealed in Chapter 2, the land reform did not devalue landed property among 
those who received it. In fact, the land reform gave them what they have been 
denied for generations. It seems that Zachariah was trying to explain the fertility 
decline of the upper castes, who certainly have felt the 'value' of land declining as 
they have no tenant labourers to work for them. I believe that land reform did give 
the utmost importance to land for those tenants who received tenure of land as a 
result of the implementation of land reform in the 1970s. 
Zachariah's ( 1983) study, using World Bank Fertility data from three districts of 
Kerala in 1980 to examine the role of land reforms in Kerala's fertility decline, 
yielded ambiguous evidence. The analysis indicated slightly higher fertility among 
those who gained land than among those who were not affected by the land transfer. 
Zachariah attributed this lack of association between fertility and land reform to the 
sterilisation and economic incentives of the family planning programme. He argued 
that much of the fertility decline in Kerala could be related to the high sterilisation 
rate, which is negatively associated with landownership. If Zachariah's finding is 
valid, India's population problem could have been solved with economic incentives. 
We have overwhelming evidence that economic incentives have little connection 
with acceptance of family planning in India (Bose, 1988). Furthermore, Zachariah's 
analysis of the association between fertility and land reform has ignored the 
principle of the caste system upon which landownership in Kerala was based. Any 
analysis without considering such dimensions of the caste system yields only 
ambiguous results. 
According to Mahadevan and Sumangala (1987:29), the class of people who 
benefited most from the land reform were tenants and landless people. Ownership of 
land has led them to a greater consciousness of their situation, while those who lost 
land through land reform have faced economic difficulties in maintaining traditional 
status. Partitioning of landed property was no longer feasible because of the reduced 
land area as a result of successive land reforms and division among relatives. 
Similarly, those who gained landed property through reform were unable to divide 
the house site because it was too small to divide. Thus, those who lost or gained land 
had to limit their family size to maintain their status. These speculations, though 
promising, have not been explored in their study. 
In sum, while land reform was a highly significant part of the creation of the 
modern Kerala society, its direct effect on fertility is unclear. In particular, by itself, 
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it cannot easily explain the differentials in fertility we observe today. 
3.4.1.4 Family Planning 
Although there are government claims that the national family planning programme 
efforts are responsible for Kerala's fertility decline (Ratcliffe, 1983: 16), Nair (1974) 
noted that fertility decline in Ker ala took place in the 1960s before the 
intensification of the family planning programme in 1965. The programme in Kerala 
was very limited during the period 1955 to 1963 (Nair and George, 1976:37). 
In general, Kerala's family planning followed the Indian programme. Zachariah 
( 1997: 106) noted that the official family planning programme is not merely a means 
for providing contraceptive services, but also an independent causal factor in 
_ changing family size norms. The economic incentives given to the official acceptors 
of family planning were an important factor in the generation of demand for family 
planning services. Zachariah found that the success of family planning programmes 
in Kerala was because of the timing of its introduction. He argues that 'Kerala's 
family planning programme would have been much smaller and more temporary 
had the programme been introduced prior to a substantial reduction in IMR and 
substantial improvements in female education' (Zachariah, 1983: 109). Regarding the 
role of family planning in Kerala's fertility decline, Zachariah and Kurup made the 
following conclusion from their World Bank Fertility Survey: 
Thus, in conclusion, the Kerala fertility survey provides enough evidence to show that 
the official family planning programme made a significant dent on the marital fertility 
rate of Kerala women, especially those in the middle and lower strata. In the absence 
of a public programme, the fertility decline in the state would have been only about 
two-thirds of the actual decline experienced (Zachariah and Kurup, 1984:70) 
However, while increased use of family planning is obviously a necessary element 
in fertility decline, the extent to which the programme can be judged as the 
underlying cause of that decline is not clear. It is probably better seen as an enabling 
mechanism than as a fundamental factor in its own right. 
3.4.1.5 Mortality decline 
Kerala's fertility decline was preceded by a long-term decline in mortality. Ratcliffe 
(1983: 16) argues that since mortality decline took place long before fertility decline, 
it is not possible to accept that fertility decline was an adaptive response to increases 
of infant and child survival. Zachariah and Kurup ( 1984) suggest that even at the 
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level of the individual family the gradual perception of falling inf ant and child 
mortality may be reducing fertility because of the expected increase in the cost of 
bringing up children. In Basu's (1986:275) view the time lag between mortality and 
fertility decline in Kerala may have some bearing on the fertility decline through the 
increasing density of population in the state. 
Mahadevan and Sumangala (1987: 165) in their village study near Trivandrum13 
have shown that there is a direct relationship between the level of mortality and the 
level of fertility irrespective of age of couple. They inferred from their study that the 
past decline in mortality in Kerala has substantially contributed to the recent decline 
in fertility in the state, but they have not provided any evidence for this conclusion. 
Nair ( 197 4) showed that the fall in birth rates in the early 1960s could have been the 
consequence of the decline in infant and child mortality rates during the late 1950s, 
following the extension of primary health centres and other public health measures. 
Overall, while mortality decline acted in some deep sense as a long-run precondition 
for fertility transition, there is little evidence of any tight causal relationship. 
3.4.1.6 Poverty 
Kerala's poor economic situation is yet another factor identified by researchers as 
one of the important reasons for fertility transition (Mencher, 1980; Basu, 1986). 
Mencher's study in two paddy-growing regions of Kerala--Palghat and Kuttanad-
revealed that a large amount of fertility decline in Kerala has come from the lowest 
socio-economic groups, the landless agricultural labourers, and to some extent the 
industrial labourers: 
... the main reason why agricultural labourers in Kerala, in the beginning of 1980s, prefer to have fewer children is that it is no longer economically advantageous to have 
them, because of the extreme pressures on employment that exists in the state as a 
whole, and in agriculture in particular (Mencher, 1980: 1783). 
After a careful scrutiny of evidence on employment opportunities and the actual 
number of days people were employed as agricultural labourers, Mencher 
( 1980: 1787) suggested that 'the fertility decline among agricultural labourers need 
not be seen as an indication of improvement in their quality of life. In the Kerala 
context, it can equally well be seen as a sign of greater poverty'. In my view, 
Mencher needs more long-term data to put her findings in perspective. That means, 
whether economic conditions of the agricultural labourers have deteriorated or 
13 The name Trivandrum has been changed to Thiruvananthapuram by the Government of Kerala. 
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improved from their earlier periods is more important than simply attempting to 
explain one time status. 
Basu ( 1986) provided more substantial evidence to indicate the role of poverty-
induced fertility transition in Kerala. She pointed out that there is a marked 
difference between the poor of Kerala and those in the rest of India. In Ker ala, the 
poor are largely in the wage-earning category, while it is the self-employed who 
constitute the majority of the poor in other parts of the country. She argued that it is 
not just poverty per se, but poverty coupled with wage-earning status which 
provides the conditions for fertility decline. She totally rejected the theory of 
socially-led fertility transition in Kerala. The hypothesis she proposed for Kerala's 
fertility decline is that: 
At the top of the scale are the couples who voluntarily restrict the sizes of their families for the traditional reasons of changing aspirations and values. However, a 
significant proportion of the fertility decline is negatively inspired-i.e. it is 
attributable to fertility control by a section of the population which is motivated by its 
own special kind of poverty rather than by increasing affluence or welfare (Basu, 1986:278). 
Basu's arguments are questioned by Bhat and Rajan (1997:64-65). They argue that 
agricultural labourers in Kerala are more literate than their counterparts in other 
states of India, they live in a society where most can read and write, knowledge of 
family planning methods is highly diffused, and the use of these methods does not 
meet social disapproval. 
In my view, if Basu's argument is valid, the agricultural labourers in Kerala should 
have had lower fertility than the non-labouring population in the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s, because they were much poorer than in the 1990s. However, that did not 
happen in Kerala. Thus, it is true that the sterilisation acceptors in Kerala were 
mostly agricultural labourers, but is unlikely that this was due to their poverty. 
A recent study by James (1997), using fertility data from Palghat and Alappuzha, 
two rice-growing districts, has examined the hypothesis of Mencher ( 1980) and 
Basu ( 1986) that fertility decline in Kerala was largely due to peculiar situations of 
impoverishment that prevailed in Kerala. To understand the level of poverty in both 
districts, James constructed an index using indicators such as per capita household 
expenditure, amount of land owned, ownership of livestock, type of ownership of 
house, education of husband and wife, source of drinking water, sanitation facility, 
and energy used for lamp. Unfortunately, the index developed is not representative 
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of poverty for two reasons. First, inclusion of social indicators such as education, 
source of drinking water, and sanitation biases the index to a more developed part of 
Kerala, such as Alappuzha. For example, a household which: (i) has half an acre of 
land (ii) spends less per capita on household expenses because they cultivate rice 
and some vegetables on their land (iii) has uneducated or elementary-educated 
family members (iv) possesses its own house and one cow (v) and does not have a 
well or pipe for drinking water, according to James, will come under the category of 
extremely poor or very poor. Such a situation is more common in Palghat than 
Alappuzha. On the other hand, a household with just a hutment land, run by an 
educated couple, who spend more per head on household expenses because they do 
not produce anything (because of lack of land), with a modern sanitary facility, and 
which uses a modern source of energy, according to James, will come under the 
category of non-poor. Again such a situation is more common in Alappuzha than 
Palghat. Thus, selection of poverty indicators may be biased or manipulated to serve 
a particular purpose. Secondly, the indicators used by James are mostly region or 
district-specific and have little value for comparative purposes. The conclusion 
drawn from James's study that ' the poor breed more' is based on defective analysis 
and can neither prove nor disprove Basu's (1986) or Mencher's (1980) argument of 
poverty-induced fertility transition in Kerala. A more careful analysis is required 14. 
3.4.1.7 Location advantage 
In addition to social and economic factors, Kerala's ecology, population density, and 
settlement pattern are reported as having influenced fertility decline, for example by 
making social services more accessible and facilitating social development (Nayar, 
1986; Franke and Chasin, 1989:22-23; Srinivasan, 1995:246). 
Locational factors may also have played a long-run role in shaping tradition and 
culture. Kerala has a western sea coast of 425 kilometres. It gets both the North-
West and South-East monsoons which provide a plentiful supply of water during the 
greater part of the year. Backwaters, family ponds15, and family wells are common 
in Kerala. Some traditions, such as taking a bath every morning and washing clothes 
every day, may have some relation with the environmental position of the state. 
Researchers believe that these traditional practices may have improved personal 
hygiene and thus improved the general health situation (Bhat and Rajan, 1997:48). 
14See Krishnaji (1983) for a critical review of literature on 'fertility and poor'. 15Family ponds are now J(iisappearing as land becomes scarce. As a result of family property division, it has become inevitable that families convert ponds into housing plots as land availability is very limited. 
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But the conversion of family ponds to housing plots, and increasing density of 
houses may not have the same leverage on public health as in the past. For example, 
swimming used to be an essential part of the daily bathing of both men and women, 
but lack of family ponds or changes of life style now prevent many Keralites from 
swimming, an exercise believed to be good for health. This may have some 
influence in what Panikar and Soman ( 1984) found in Kerala: coexistence of high 
morbidity and low mortality. They found low mortality due to a better health care 
system and high morbidity due to degenerative diseases such as cardiovascular 
disease and cancer. 
According to Nair ( 1986) the long western sea coast also made it possible for both 
Christianity and Islam to enter Kerala. Nayar (1986: 158) argues that the geographic 
setting of Kerala is crucial for its present religious composition, which includes 21 
per cent Christians and 21 per cent Muslims. It is important to note that the 
percentage of Christians in India as a whole is only three per cent (Srinivasan, 
1995:247). This cultural difference in religious composition is often related to 
fertility variations between states. But as Table 3 .11 shows, evidence suggests that 
the early acceptors of family planning in Kerala were disproportionately Hindus, 
mostly agricultural labourers, and relatively few were non-Hindus. 
Table 3 .11: Adoption of contraception by religion, Kerala, 1961-62 
Religion 
Hindu 
Christian 
Muslim 
Total 
Religious groups as per 
cent of total population 
60 
20 
20 
100 
Source: Ratcliffe, 1983:16. 
Per cent of contraceptive 
acceptors 
72 
18 
10 
100 
The settlement pattern is yet another factor unique to Ker ala. Households in Ker ala 
are widely scattered. Each house has some garden or coconut field surrounding it. 
Villages in Kerala are continuous; it is hard to locate where one village ends and 
another begins. Kumar ( 1965: 87) pointed out that villages in Malabar ( one of the 
northern districts of Kerala) were not of the standard Indian pattern, for in Malabar 
there were no sharply demarcated areas composed of all the village houses. Instead, 
there was an almost continuous stretch of plots, with a family residence in the centre 
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of each. For administrative purposes, groups of plots were aggregated into an 
administrative unit, but these did not have the corporate life of other Indian villages. 
In Kerala, there is also no specific location in a village where a specific community 
will have houses. One of the important roles of a scattered settlement pattern is that 
it has promoted individualism and competition in political and economic pursuits 
(Nayar, 1986: 158). Researchers also believe that the scattered settlement pattern has 
helped check the spread of diseases, and this helped reduce mortality (Bhat and 
Rajan, 1997:48). 
The scattered settlement pattern has demanded a greater network of roads to link 
different scattered households; it is estimated that Kerala has one of the highest road 
densities in India. Well-connected roads accelerate communication, enable 
newspapers to reach every corner of the state, and help in the quick delivery of 
health and family planning services. Nayar (1986) and Nag (1989: 148) argue that all 
these factors have had a significant impact on the mortality and fertility of Kerala. 
The size of villages is another striking feature of Kerala. About three-fourths of the 
villages in Kerala have a population of 10,000 or more, whereas the all-India 
proportion of villages of equal size is only 0.3 per cent (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram 
and IIPS, 1995:4). 
Finally, Kerala has had higher population density historically than India as a whole 
(Kurup, 1978; Zachariah, 1995:96). Even in 1901 the population density in Kerala 
was more than twice that of India. Zachariah ( 1995) suggests that high population 
density and the peculiar settlement pattern in the state make land reform and other 
socio-economic reforms more relevant in Ker ala than in other states of India 
(Zachariah, 1995:96). One of the important reasons for the success of the public 
distribution system (PDS) in Kerala could be the accessibility of distribution outlets 
to a majority of the rural population. According to Srinivasan (1995:246), higher 
population density in Kerala is one reason for Keralites to adopt the Malthusian 
check-to increase age at marriage. 
Taken together, those environmental factors clearly have played a role in Kerala's 
unique history. However, it is surely stretching geographical determinism beyond 
plausible limits to argue that they played any immediate and direct role in bringing 
about fertility decline. 
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3.5 Synthesis of existing explanations for Kerala' s fertility decline and 
scheduled caste and non-scheduled caste fertility turnaround 
The most prominent explanation for Kerala's fertility decline is education. Almost 
every study reviewed mentions the direct or indirect role of education in the present 
fertility decline in Kerala. While it may be true that education in Kerala is the key to 
its fertility decline, the circumstances that led Keralites to opt for education go far 
beyond the need for education per se. While the traditional explanations such as 
education, increase in age marriage, and mortality decline have a positive role in the 
fertility change, they only explain part of the story. Although much is published 
about Kerala's fertility change, few analyses are based on field studies, others draw 
solely on secondary data. Clearly, there is a lack of field-based micro studies in 
Kerala. The review of studies of Kerala very strongly suggests that the time has 
come to use the available secondary data sources as a foundation and to combine 
them with field-based research to seek answers to Kerala's fertility decline. 
Another point about the studies to explain fertility change in Ker ala is that studies 
attempting to explain fertility decline in Kerala ironically neglect differentials in 
fertility between caste groups. The fact is that Kerala is not a homogeneous society 
nor does it have homogeneous fertility among its various social groups. Thus, 
explanations of fertility change in Ker ala have to incorporate the fundamental social 
and economic organisation of contemporary Ker al an society. To my know ledge no 
study has touched upon the issue of caste-system changes or the impact of these on 
the social and economic organisation of Kerala society, and thereby on the fertility 
transition. An investigation of fertility differentials may provide deeper insights into 
Kerala's fertility decline. In this regard it is important to note that no study so far has 
been published dealing with the exceptionally low fertility of the lower-caste 
communities of Kerala. In summary, to explain Kerala's fertility decline an 
investigation of Kerala as a heterogeneous society is required. And as Mencher 
(1980) has noted: 
When it comes to the question of fertility, this is a much more complex issue. It is 
necessary to look separately at different socio-economic classes within the population 
to find the reasons for the declining birth rate (Mencher, 1980: 1782). 
Finally, the available literature did not give clear answers to the questions posed in 
the beginning of section 3.4. Although abundant interpretations are available to 
explain fertility decline in Kerala, the debate continues unabated. However, a debate 
on yet another topic is still to come: on scheduled caste fertility decline and the 
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turnaround. I consistently argue in this review that understanding the caste system 
and its changes is important to understand what apparently is the 'Kerala Paradox'. 
3.6 Relevance off ertility transition theories in Ker ala's fertility decline 
Given the above reasoning, which theory could explain the fertility change 1n 
Kerala? Regarding classical demographic transition theory, its relevance to Kerala is 
very remote (Ratcliffe, 1983). The context in which demographic transition is 
envisaged in the classical theory is industrialisation and modernisation which cause 
changes in the benefits to parents from having children. Kerala has had neither 
significant industrialisation nor urbanisation which can account for the remarkable 
fertility decline during 1960-1990. What is seemingly supportive of demographic 
transition theory in Kerala is the decline in mortality which occurred much earlier 
than fertility decline. But the much longer lag between declines in morality and 
fertility casts doubt on their close relationship. Though Kerala illustrates typical 
demographic transition stages, the underlying causes are not those postulated in 
classical transition theory. 
Did diffusion of birth control ideas play any significant role in Kerala's fertility 
transition? The nature of the innovators of family planning determines the nature of 
diffusion of birth control ideas. Evidence suggests that fertility decline took place 
earlier in the princely states of Cochin and Travancore than in those of the Malabar 
region which was under the Madras Presidency. But there is no suggestion of the 
possible diffusion of birth control ides from the former to the latter. Furthermore, 
the first users of modern family planning are reported to have been 
disproportionately poor agricultural labourers (Mencher, 1980; Basu, 1986). Given 
Kerala's caste system in the 1960s and the educational backwardness of agricultural 
labourers compared to land-owning upper-caste communities, it is not likely that 
any ideas would flow from the less-educated working class to more-educated upper 
castes. Some researchers believe that the diffusion of birth control ideas from 
literate to illiterate is the most appreciated mechanism that has given rise to fertility 
decline in Kerala (Bhat and Rajan, 1997). But this possibility is refuted by others 
(Saseendran, 1998). Evidence provided by Basu (1986) that agricultural labourers 
were the first modern contraceptive users in Kerala also contradicts the claim of 
Bhat and Rajan that birth control ideas spread from the educated to the less-
educated. 
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Western material culture has influenced Kerala significantly. The migration of 
Keralites to cosmopolitan centres in India and foreign countries, trade relations with 
the West, and modern media have probably contributed to this influence. How 
much that Western influence has changed the emotional and economic nucleation 
of Kerala families is doubtful, however. This may be true for the joint families, with 
tharavad changes among N airs and illam changes among N amboodiris. Kerala, 
under the rigid caste system, had a strong land-owning class and a tenant labouring 
class. The land-owning class never cultivated the land themselves; thus the familial 
mode of production envisaged by Caldwell (1976, 1980, 1982) in his wealth-flow 
theory did not exist among the Nairs or Namboodiris. Among the Nairs, it was the 
head of the joint family, tharavad karanavar, who managed the agricultural 
production. Roles of children in agricultural production or other economic affairs of 
the family were very limited. Rather children were involved only in education-
related activities until they were well into their twenties. Thus, among the land-
owning N airs and N amboodiris, wealth-flows were from the older generation to the 
younger, even under relatively high marital fertility regimes. 
Mainstream economic theory has perhaps the least potential to explain fertility 
transition in Kerala. In the absence of a strong consumer economy in the 1960s, 
when fertility started to decline sharply, the question of consumer choice between 
children and other consumer durables did not arise. Even Easterlin's ( 1978) 
synthesis cannot explain the causes of fertility change beyond the role of education 
in changing the motivation for regulating fertility. Desiring small families, for 
example, and the role of land reform in motivating new small land-owners can 
hardly be explained by Easterlin's ( 1978) famous synthetic framework. 
An institutional approach seems to be a more promising way to investigate fertility 
decline in Kerala, particularly to explain the fertility differentials and turnarounds 
that have been illustrated above. The institutional approach allows us to examine 
local patterns of social organisation-particularly the family and local community; 
family and property law and the local dimension of public administration; the 
stratification system and the mobility paths it accommodates; and the labour market 
(McNicoll, 1994:206). It is a particular version of institutional theory (Greenhalgh, 
1988) that will, therefore, be used as the explanatory framework of this study. 
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3. 7 Conclusion 
In the previous chapters and this chapter, the purpose was to draw a macro level 
institutional framework of Kerala and its unique position in India. On the 
demographic front, the two significant factors about Kerala are its low fertility and 
still lower fertility of the scheduled castes. On the social front, the significant factor 
is the transition of Kerala society from a traditional caste system to a non-traditional 
caste system. Although the caste system changes are the most important aspect of 
Kerala society in the twentieth century, such explanations have not occurred in the 
explanations for fertility decline. The anomaly of scheduled-caste fertility and its 
turnaround with non-scheduled caste fertility are issues that are not yet identified in 
the literature. 
The chapters that follow are devoted to understanding fertility transition in the 
Vettuvan community, a selected scheduled caste community in Kerala. Chapter 4 
provides a detailed picture of fertility and family planning among the Vettuvans, in 
order to know precisely what it is that we need to explain. 
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Chapter 4 
Fertility and Fa01ily Planning 
A01ong the Vettuvans 
4.1 Introduction 
The first three chapters of this thesis have delineated the intellectual scope of the 
research. The next four deal mostly with the detailed results of the investigation. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine fertility levels and trends, fertility 
preferences, and family planning practices among the Vettuvans of Engandiyour. 
Information on the data sets used for the calculation of various fertility measures is 
given in Table 4.1. The chapter has four sections. The section on fertility examines 
fertility levels, birth intervals, fertility differentials and trends using various 
demographic methods such as rates, ratios and cohort parity achievement. The 
section on family planning investigates the status of ever-use, current use, and non-
use of modern contraception, and future use intentions with regard to modern 
family planning methods. Desire for additional children, family size, and sex 
preferences are discussed in the section on fertility preferences. In order to provide 
a proper perspective on the relatively small sample, wherever possible, comparisons 
will be made with scheduled castes of Kerala and with Kerala as a whole. 
Table 4.1: Data sources for various fertility measures used in Chapter 4 
Total population Total no . of Total no. of Total no . of Total no. of Total number of ever-
covered in the ever-married widowed currently married currently married married women 
studya women women women women interviewed in the age 
interviewed b group 60-79c 
1886 371 20 351 308 68 
Notes: This study did not collect fertility-related data for the age group 50-59; avettuvan Household Survey, 1997; bvettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; bvettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997;cElderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
4.2 Fertility 
4.2.1 Current fertility levels 
4.2.1.1 Birth rate 
During the survey reference period, from 1 March 1996 to 28 February 1997, the 
crude birth rate (CBR) was 13.8 live births per 1000 population. Since numbers of 
births are vital in the calculation of CBR and other fertility measures, all births that 
occurred in the surveyed families were recorded in the household survey schedule. 
This was made possible by repeatedly reminding the interviewers of the need for 
probing and examining the filled-out interview schedules on the same day as data 
collection. Furthermore, local interviewers were, to some extent, knowledgeable 
about the vital events which happened in their neighbourhood. In addition, repeat 
visits to each household for subsequent interviews1 enabled us to check the 
household information if we had any doubt on the non-inclusion of births or about 
infant deaths. Wives' interviews in particular helped to verify our household data on 
births. Therefore, birth data recorded for this sample are of acceptable quality, and 
hence the CBR is reliable. 
A CBR of 13.8 indicates that current fertility in the community is low. A CBR of 
21 was set as India's fertility goal in the Sixth Five-Year Plan to be achieved by the 
year 2001 (Srinivasan, 1995 :42)2. Vettuvan fertility, therefore, was substantially 
lower in 1997 than the national fertility goal set for the year 2001. Since the CBR is 
a crude measure, it can only be used as a rough indication of the possible fertility 
levels. More refined measures of fertility discussed in the following sections will 
shed more light on this aspect. 
A comparison of the Vettuvan age-standardised CBR with the Kerala and India 
NFHS is shown in Table 4.2. The comparison is potentially inexact, as about four 
years elapsed between the Kerala NFHS and the Vettuvan survey. Nevertheless, this 
comparison helps indicate the relative position of Vettuvan fertility in a wider 
1 After the household survey, we had to arrange three visits to each household for interviewing husbands and wives, elderly men and women, school-going children, and non-school-going individuals. However, in households without the above categories, only one visit was enough. 2Other targets recommended along with a CBR of 21 were (i) crude death rate of 9 (ii) infant 
mortality rate of 60 (iii) life expectancy of 64 years and (iv) effective couple protection rate of 60. These were the demographic goals of India set in the Sixth Five-Year plan for the year 2001 (Srinivasan, 1995:42-43). All are already far exceeded in Kerala. 
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context. The CBRs for Kerala and India were 17.9 and 27.5, respectively, in 1997 
according to the Sample Registration System (SRS, 1998) estimates. Although 
these are of comparable dates, they are non-standardised CBRs. The standardised 
CBRs for Vettuvans, Kerala and India were 13.8, 21.8 and 38.5 per 1000 live 
births, respectively. The most plausible conclusion that can be drawn is that 
Vettuvan fertility is markedly lower than the average Kerala levels and much lower 
than that of India as a whole. However, only standardised figures of comparable 
dates can confirm this claim. 
Table 4.2: Age-standardisedf crude birth rate (CBR) for the Vettuvans, Kerala 
and India, various years 
Vettuvan 
13.8 (1996-97? 
Kerala 
21.8 (1990-93)b 
17.6 (1990-93)C 
17 .9 (1997)d 
India 
38.5 (1990-93f 
27.2 (1997)d 
Notes and Sources: avettuvan Household Survey, 1997 (directly standardised); CBR based on 
one year preceding the survey of 1997; bpRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:55 (directly 
standardised); cPRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:55 (not standardised); Based 
on two years preceding the 1992-93 survey; dsRS, 1998: 1 (not standardised). 
errps, 1995:90 (directly standardised); CBR based on two years preceding the 
survey of 1992-93; fshryock and Siegel (1993:2-5), Section: Standardisation, Chapter 6. 
Standard Population is the Vettuvan Population. 
4.2.1.2 Age-specific and total marital fertility rate 
The CBR is a crude measure of fertility influenced by the age-sex structure of a 
population. A more accurate picture of fertility can be obtained from the age-
specific fertility rates (ASFRs) and the total fertility rate (TFR). The ASFRs for 
various age groups are given in Table 4.3. The pattern has a distinctive inverted U-
shape experienced the world over. In a typical fertility pattern, fertility rises sharply 
from practically zero at age 15 to a peak in the 20s and then declines gradually and 
reaches zero again at around 50 years of age (UNFP A, 1993: 10.5). In the Vettuvan 
sample, no births were reported in the age group 15-19, and hence the ASFR is zero 
for that age. This may be because the proportion of married women in the 15-19 
age group was very small (see Table 6.2) and also because very few women in that 
age group give birth. Also no births were reported in the age group 35-39 years and 
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above3. One of the possible reasons for not having births for this age group may be 
a complete termination of childbearing after 35 years of age. Whatever the reason, 
all births in the sample were confined to age groups 20-24 to 30-344. Among the 
three age groups 20-24, 25-29 and 30-34, fertility was highest in the age group 20-
24. This also follows the general pattern of fertility observed in many populations 
in the world. 
The age-specific marital fertility rates are given in Table 4.3. The ASMFRs show a 
similar pattern to that of the ASFRs. Since all births reported in this analysis are 
'legitimate', that is, within marriage, the ASMFRs must be higher than ( or equal to) 
the age-specific fertility rates. The greater difference in the ASMFRs and ASFRs in 
the younger age groups indicates that a higher proportion of women remained 
unmarried in those age groups. 
The analysis carried out in this section shows that reproduction is confined to 
women 20-35 years of age, which suggests that there is a strong effort to control 
fertility among the Vettuvans at higher ages. Contraceptive-use status discussed in 
section 4.3.2 will enable this pattern of age-specific fertility to be confirmed. 
3The Kerala NFHS states: 'The age specific fertility rates for women belonging to scheduled 
caste/scheduled tribe, ... indicate that during the three years preceding the survey, there were no births to scheduled caste women age 35 and above' (PRC Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS Bombay). 4The effective reproductive span when calculated using the average age at first birth (21.2 years) 
and last birth (28.4 years) for the women in the age group 45-49 is 7.2 years. However, when we 
used the age at first birth (20.6) and average age at last birth (24.2) of all women who had adopted 
a permanent family planning method, the effective reproductive span was reduced to 3.6 years. 
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Table 4.3: Age-specific marital fertility rates (ASMFRs), and age-specific fertility 
rates (ASFRs) for the Vettuvans, Engandiyour, 1996-97 
Age of 
women 
(years) 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
Total 
number 
of births 
na 
18 
5 
3 
na 
na 
na 
Total number 
of married 
women 
9 
68 
79 
45 
71 
41 
38 
Notes: na indicates no births in that category. 
Total 
number of 
women 
104 
137 
101 
57 
78 
52 
45 
Total marital fertility rate= 1.97 (Calculated from the Table 4.3) 
Total fertility rate= 1.17 (Calculated from the Table 4.3) 
Births refer to period March 1996 to February 1997. 
Age-specific Age-specific 
marital fertility fertility 
rate rate 
(ASMFR) (ASFR} 
na na 
0.265 0.131 
0.063 0.049 
0.067 0.053 
na na 
na na 
na na 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997; Births and ages of 21 
married women who were not part of the Vettuvan Wife's Survey included in this calculation. 
The total fertility rate (TFR) is a summary measure that indicates the number of 
children a woman would bear during her reproductive years if she were to 
experience the age-specific fertility rates prevailing at the time of the survey 
(Hobbs and Bogue, 1993:10.3-10.4). The TFR calculated for the Vettuvans in 
Engandiyour is 1.17 children per woman. This is much below the replacement-level 
fertility of 2.1 5 children per woman. 
The total marital fertility rate (TMFR) is yet another summary measure of fertility. 
For the Vettuvans in Engandiyour this is 1.97 children per woman. This means, on 
average, a married woman would bear 1. 97 children during her life time if she were 
to bear children throughout her reproductive years at the rates specified by the 
schedule of age-specific marital fertility rates that prevailed during the Vettuvan 
Wife's Survey. Because the TMFR and TFR are cross-sectional measures, full 
details of fertility dynamics6 are difficult to access unambiguously using them. 
Nevertheless, a few points are self-evident. 
5 A TFR of 2.1 children per woman is one of the recommendations of the document on national policy on population prepared by K.C. Pant, Head, Planning Commission, Government of India, for a discussion in the Union Cabinet in 1999 (Times of India News Service). 6For example, postponement of births or compensation for an earlier decision to delay birth may give a completely different picture of fertility. 
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A comparison of TFRs of the Vettuvans in Engandiyour with the scheduled castes 
of Kerala, and the whole populations of Kerala and India is given in Table 4.4. The 
TFR of the Vettuvans, like other measures discussed in this section, shows a lower 
value than for those in Kerala and India. The various measures of fertility discussed 
in this section suggest that Vettuvan fertility is most likely to be lower than that of 
the whole population of Kerala and the average Indian level. In absolute terms, the 
current fertility levels of the Vettuvans show that it is well below replacement level 
(because mortality levels too are low 7). 
Table 4.4: Comparison of TFR of Vettuvans with TFRs of whole of 
Kerala, India, and scheduled castes of Kerala, various years 
Type of 
Population 
TFR 
Vettuvana 
1.17d 
Kerala scb 
1.37e 
Keralab Indiac 
2.oe 3_39f 
Notes:dRates refer to one year preceding the 1997 survey; eRate refers to 1990-93; 
fRate refers to 1990-93; SC = Scheduled caste. 
Sources: avettuvan Wife's Survey 1997; bpRc, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:58; 
cups, 1995:97. 
4.2.2 Fertility Trends 
Trends in parity attainment by exact ages for various age cohorts are given in Table 
4.5. The average parity attained at exact ages is calculated using the information on 
age of women and the number of births. While average parity is calculated at exact 
age for each age cohort, the lower limit of that particular age cohort is used as a 
cut-off for analysis because all the women in that cohort have passed through that 
age. If an upper age limit were used, on the other hand, a woman at the upper age 
limit might have had higher fertility than a woman at the lower age limit which 
would result in a truncation problem. The exact ages and their intervals shown in 
the table are decided on the basis of giving the base age of each age cohort and the 
pace of attainment of parity for the purposes of a clearer illustration. 
7 According to the Kerala 1992-93 NFHS, the CDR was 6.2 and IMR was 23.8 (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:125, 129) 
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From the data gathered in this study it is impossible to trace exactly when fertility 
began to decline among the Vettuvans in Engandiyour. However, there is an 
indication that fertility had declined in the age cohort 65-69 compared to that of the 
age cohort 70-798. A decline in fertility in the age cohort 65-69 broadly suggests 
that fertility had declined from around the period 1948-1950s9. 
Clear evidence of fertility decline can be seen in the age cohort 45-49 and below. In 
the age cohort 45-49, for example, there was a negligible increase in the average 
parity after age 30, and no addition after 39 years of age, whereas the parity 
achievements for the age cohort 60-64 and above continued until the age of 45 
years. These changes indicate the possibility of stronger deliberate birth control, 
possibly use of a permanent family planning method in the age cohort 45-49, and 
the absence of such efforts, or permanent family planning use, in the older age 
cohorts 10 . Translation of this information into calendar years suggests that stronger 
motivation to control fertility may have begun at least from the years 1968-1972, if 
not earlier. 
The age cohort 35-39 exhibits more evidence of deliberate efforts to control 
fertility. There were no births reported in this age cohort after they reached 32 years 
of age. Their average parity at age 32 was 2.5 children per woman. Although it is 
possible, theoretically, for these women to have children, it is quite unlikely that 
this cohort will have a significant further increase in their fertility, because the open 
birth interval of this cohort is 3-7 years. It will be seen in section 4.3.2 that 
contraceptive use between births is negligible among the Vettuvans. It is more 
likely, therefore, that the age cohort 35-39 terminated childbearing by adopting a 
permanent family planning method. 
For the age cohort 30-34, the increment in parity from exact age 28 to exact age 30 
was only 0.06, while the increment for the older cohorts is considerably higher for 
the same ages. This suggests that majority of women of the age cohort 30-34 started 
terminating childbearing as early as age 28. 
8Special efforts were made to reduce the memory lapse about children who died at very early ages. This involved confirming birth history with sisters, brothers and other reliable sources . 9Tois calculation assumes fertility beginning at 20 years of age. 10we cannot rule out deliberate effort to control births in the higher age cohorts, but if it occurred, its impact was slight. 
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Table 4.5 also indicates that at exact age 20 and lower, the average attainment in 
parity is slightly higher among the younger age cohorts than the older age cohorts. 
The parity attainment at exact age 30 or higher, on the other hand, is lower for the 
lower age cohorts than the higher age cohorts. This indicates an increasing tendency 
to complete childbearing early in younger age cohorts compared to older age 
cohorts. Table 4.5 also indicates the shorter reproductive span among the younger 
age cohorts (not as a part of the age effect) compared to the higher age cohorts. 
To sum up, the following conclusions can be made about fertility trends among the 
Vettuvans from the parity trend analysis just discussed. First, fertility has been 
declining among the Vettuvans at least from the 1950s, and the declining trend is 
continuing unabated. Secondly, stronger fertility control may have begun from the 
years 1968-70, with possible use of terminal methods of family planning. Thirdly, 
there is a greater tendency to terminate childbearing at an early age in the younger 
age cohorts compared to the older ones. In short, the cohort analysis clearly 
indicates a massive fertility transition among the Vettuvans, from a moderately high 
fertility to a very low fertility. 
Table 4.5: Distribution of average parity attained by exact ages for age cohorts, 
Vettuvan women, Engandiyour, 1997 
Age at the time of interview 
Exact 
age 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 60-64 65-69 
18 0.27 0.27 0.32 0.29 0.20 0.14 0.25 0.19 
19 0.58 0.36 0.57 0.58 0.38 0.38 0.43 0.23 
20 0.81 0.59 0.85 0.86 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.46 
23 1.20 1.53 1.53 1.55 1.65 1.39 1.00 
25 1.56 1.85 2.03 2.10 2.14 1.96 1.50 
28 2.13 2.39 2.40 2.62 2.60 2.19 
30 2.19 2.46 2.60 2.94 2.96 2.69 
32 2.50 2.68 3.05 3.07 2.92 
35 2.50 2.70 3.20 3.53 3.31 
39 2.75 3.27 3.96 3.69 
40 2.75 3.27 4.00 3.73 
45 3.27 4.18 4.07 
No. of 59 63 46 59 40 37 26 27 
women 
Notes: Since information in this table has come from the Vettuvan Wife's Survey which takes in the 15-49 
year age group, and the Elderly Vettuvan Survey which takes 60+ ages, there is unfortunately no information about the 50-59 age group. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
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70-79 
0.20 
0.20 
0.55 
1.05 
1.50 
2.00 
2.60 
3.15 
3.95 
4.80 
5.10 
5.65 
20 
4.2.3 Children ever born and surviving 
In addition to considering fertility on its own, it is also possible to assess the joint 
effect of fertility and mortality in producing the number of surviving children. 
Table 4.6 shows children ever born (CEB) and children surviving (CS) for the 
Vettuvans of Engandiyour and the whole population of Kerala. For the Vettuvans 
of Engandiyour, the average CEB per woman in the age group 45-49 was 3.3 
children. The corresponding figure according to the 1992-93 Kerala NFHS was 4.3 
children per woman (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:63). The CEB for 
all age groups, except 20-24, was lower among the Vettuvans of Engandiyour than 
the figure for the whole of Kerala. Since there is a time lag of 4-5 years between the 
two surveys, the difference in the CEB cannot necessarily be taken as a true 
difference in their fertility. However, a reasonable inference would be that the 
fertility of the Vettuvans is certainly not higher than fertility for Kerala as a whole. 
The comparison of children ever born and children surviving indicates that survival 
probabilities, in absolute terms, among the Vettuvans are high. In 1997, nearly 
nine-tenths of the children born to women in the age cohort 45-49 were surviving. 
This may have important implications for the fertility strategies of the Vettuvans. 
Interviews with Vettuvan women revealed great optimism about the survival of 
children as infant deaths are very rare; during the 12 months period 1995-96 there 
was only one infant death recorded in the village11 (Engandiyour 
Gramapanchayath, 1996: 31). 
11see Chapter 3 for details about health and mortality in the study village. 
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Table 4.6: Distribution of average number of children ever born (CEB) and 
surviving (CS) by age of mother, Vettuvan (1997) of Engandiyour and Kerala as a 
whole, 1992-93 
Vettuvansa Keralab 
Age group 
of women Children ever born Children surviving Children ever born Children surviving 
15-19 0 0 0.4 0.4 
20-24 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 
25-29 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8 
30-34 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.4 
35-39 2.8 2.6 3.0 2.9 
40-44 3.2 2.8 3.5 3.3 
45-49 3.3 3.0 4.3 3.8 
Average 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.4 
Sources: avettuvan Wife's Survey 1997; bpRc, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:63. 
4.2.4 The pattern of fertility initiation and progress 
Among the Vettuvans marriage is the point of entry to a woman's reproductive 
career. Marriage provides the legitimate right to couples to cohabit and reproduce. 
In the sample of 308 women (15-49 years) in Engandiyour, women married on 
average at 19.5 years 12. 
4.2.4.1 Time elapsed before the first live birth 
Among the Vettuvans, the period between marriage and first birth is relatively 
brief. The distribution of conception times after marriage is given in the last column 
of Table 4.7. About 72 per cent of women conceived within the first year of their 
marriage13 ; 14.5 per cent conceived within 1-2 years of marriage; 5.5 per cent 
conceived within 2-3 years; 3.5 per cent conceived within 3-4 years, and the 
remaining 4.2 per cent conceived after 4 years of marriage. Both the waiting time to 
first conception and mean age at first birth indicate that there was a strong desire 
among the Vettuvans of Engandiyour to have children soon after marriage. 
12Chapter 6 gives details about age at marriage. 13This matches the mean age at first birth of 20.6 years calculated for the Vettuvans of Engandiyour in this study. 
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Evidence from the Vettuvan community of Enagandiyour supports this. There was 
a widespread belief in the community that healthy couples conceived within three 
to six months of their marriage. If conception was delayed for more than a year 
after marriage, it was a clear indication to the average Vettuvan that there was some 
biological problem. Women were generally blamed for inability to conceive. These 
attitudes were being questioned by the younger generation of girls and women, who 
had college education; however, the dominant belief among the Vettuvans was that 
conception mainly depends on a woman's biological ability. Another reason for 
having the first child soon after marriage was the desire to have grown-up children 
when parents were old. A higher age at marriage, the changed social and economic 
situation of the village and the Vettuvans themselves may have influenced the 
attitudes regarding the timing of first birth. Nevertheless, there was an incentive for 
women as well as for the couple to have children as soon as possible after 
marriage14. Among the Vettuvans of Engandiyour, therefore, deliberate birth 
control could not be expected from among those couples who did not have children. 
4.2.4.2 Interval between higher-order births ( closed birth intervals) 
Once having begun childbearing, those Vettuvans who intend to go on to have more 
children do so relatively promptly. Frequency distributions of conception intervals 
between different birth orders were calculated by first computing the total elapsed 
time between successive live births and by subtracting the estimated gestation time 
of nine months from each one. The results are shown in Table 4.7, for each order, 
and for an average of all birth orders second to sixth. Table 4. 7 shows that the 
pattern of the distribution does not differ greatly among higher birth orders. This 
probably indicates that the same sets of forces were responsible for different birth 
intervals. According to Bogue (1993a: 10-62), such a pattern may indicate a lack of 
planned birth spacing. The most common pattern was that Vettuvan women 
conceived within two years of the date of previous delivery. For example, in about 
62 per cent of the cases the conception time from first birth, and in about 67 per 
cent of cases the conception time from second and fourth births, occurred within 
two years. A pattern of this kind may be found in both low and high-contraception 
populations (Bogue, 1993a). In contrast, according to Bogue, it is the open birth 
interval that makes it clear whether it is a low or high contraception population. 
14In many other communities in India a woman needs to have a son in order to establish her right in her husband's family. Among the Vettuvans no such attitudes are prevalent. 
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Table 4. 7: Percentage distribution of conception times for second and higher order 
births, Vettuvan women, Engandiyour, 1997 
Elapsed time 
(years) 
<l 
1-2 
2-3 
3-4 
4+ 
Total 
2nd 
23.8 
37.7 
18.4 
6.3 
5.3 
100 
Birth orders 
3rd 
22.0 
44.7 
17.9 
3.2 
5.6 
100 
4tha 
29.6 
37.0 
18.5 
3.7 
3.7 
100 
Average 
2nd -7th 
23.7 
40.0 
18.4 
5.0 
5.4 
100 
Marriage to first 
conception 
71.6 
14.5 
5.5 
3.5 
4.2 
100 
Notes:aThis includes average elapsed time of 5th, 6th, and 7th order births. There are only 4, 2, and 1 births in the category of 5th, 6th and 7th birth orders, respectively. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997. 
The factors that influence a closed birth interval according to Bogue (1993a: 10-61) 
are postpartum amenorrhoea, duration of breastfeeding, postpartum abstinence, 
health problems of mother and infant, interference with sex exposure, 
contraception, and sub-fecundity. In the absence of detailed data on these factors it 
is difficult to assess precisely their effect on the observed birth intervals among the 
V ettuvan community. However, an approximate assessment is made in this section 
from available information gathered from the field work and other secondary 
sources. 
Interviews with Vettuvan men and women showed that Vettuvans breastfeed 
(though with supplementary feeding) for 18-24 months15 ; breastfeeding is universal 
among the Vettuvans. Since there is a link between breastfeeding and postpartum 
amenorrhoea, it is most likely that postpartum amenorrhoea may have some 
influence on the birth intervals by delaying the resumption of ovulation (PRC, 
Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995;71-72; Bogue, 1993a:10-61). Breastfeeding 
becomes more important in determining closed birth intervals when contraception 
is minimal between two births. 
15Breastfeeding is the most economical way to feed children. Infant formula is very expensive in Engandiyour: in 1997, one kilogram of infant formula cost about ten Australian dollars, which was 
equal to two days' wages for a male labourer. 
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Interviews with Vettuvan men revealed that postpartum abstinence was very 
common in their community. Traditionally, a woman went to her natal home when 
she was seven months pregnant and returned to her husband's home three months 
after delivery16. Although such practices were changing by 1997 it was still a 
common practice among the Vettuvans. Husbands never accompanied their wives 
during these visits, and visited only occasionally. Whenever the husband stayed in 
his wife's house after the delivery, he was given a separate room or place to sleep. 
Often the wife's mother slept in her room. When the women returned to their 
husbands' house, they were taken care of by their mothers-in-law. It was still 
common practice that the mother-in-law slept in the room of her daughter-in-law as 
long as the grandchild was less than a year old. It was believed that mothers-in-law 
were to assist when need arose in the night. Taboos that restricted men from having 
sex with their wives who had infants were less common. However, circumstances 
were, to say the least, unfavourable to the resumption of regular sexual relations 
within a year after delivery. While it is difficult to assess the effect of these cultural 
practices on closed birth intervals, it is reasonable to believe that they may have had 
some influence. 
The health problems of mother and infant can also reduce the frequency of sexual 
relations, and thus result in prolonged birth intervals. In the absence of data on 
these factors, it will be difficult to assess their role in the length of open birth 
intervals in this study. However, during the field work we did not encounter any 
common health problems of mothers and infants among the Vettuvans that seemed 
to influence the birth intervals. But this possibility cannot be ignored. 
Another phenomenon which potentially disrupts sexual relations is migration. 
However, about 95 per cent of the Vettuvan men who participated in the study both 
lived and worked in Engandiyour. No woman who participated in the study lived 
and worked outside the village. The ref ore, migration does not seem to have 
influenced closed birth intervals of Vettuvan women surveyed in this study. 
It will be demonstrated in section 4.3.2 on family planning that use of a modern 
contraceptive method is nearly non-existent among the Vettuvans as a spacing 
method. However, the role of traditional methods of contraception cannot be 
disregarded without further investigation 17 . In the absence of data on subfecundity 
l6on the 90th day after birth children were given their names. This ceremony was conducted at 
the husband's home and the woman returned to her husband's home a few days before this 
ceremony. 
17 According to the Kerala NFHS the use of traditional methods of family planning in 1991-92 was 
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it is not possible to assess its role in the closed birth intervals. 
4.2.4.3 Open birth intervals 
As mentioned above, data on closed birth intervals are often ambiguous, as similar 
patterns are often found in populations whose members ultimately have different 
fertility. Analysis of open intervals overcomes this difficulty. The open birth 
interval is the time that elapsed between the birth of the last child and the date of 
interview. Information on open birth intervals revealed from the Vettuvan Wife's 
Survey is displayed in Table 4.8. If a population is genuinely serious about 
attaining small family size, there will be a substantial proportion of the women with 
long open birth intervals, because they have terminated childbearing at some date in 
the past (Bogue, 1993a: 10-62). In analysis of Vettuvan open birth interval data, 
about 50 per cent of the women had an open birth interval of more than eight years. 
It can be inf erred from this that women have terminated their childbearing at an 
early age and have been using some form of contraception. 
9.1 per cent among the currently married women. 
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Table 4.8: Per cent distribution of various birth intervals according to time span, 
Vettuvan women, Engandiyour, 1997 
Time Waiting time closed birth Open Cumulative per Cumulative Cumulative per 
span to conception interval (1st to birth cent of waiting per cent of cent of open birth (years) 7th) interval time to closed birth interval 
conception interval 
<2 86.1 63.7 14.2 86.1 63 .7 14.2 
2-3 5.5 18.4 9.3 91.6 82.1 23 .5 
3-4 3.5 7.6 6.9 95 .1 89 .7 30.4 
4-5 2.1 5.0 3.5 97 .2 94.7 33.9 
5-6 0.7 1.8 6.5 97.9 96.5 40.4 
6-7 1.0 1.4 3.1 98 .9 97 .9 43 .5 
7-8 0.4 0.9 3.5 99.3 98 .8 47.0 
8-9 0.7 1.2 3.5 100.0 100 50.5 
9-10 
-- 3.5 --
-- 54.0 
10-11 --
-- 3.8 --
-- 57.8 
11-12 --
-- 5.2 
--
-- 63 .0 
12-13 --
-- 4.5 --
-- 67.5 
13-14 --
-- 4.1 
--
-- 71.6 
14-15 --
-- 3.4 --
-- 75 .0 
15-16 
--
-- 4.5 
--
-- 79.5 
16-17 --
-- 2.1 
--
-- 81.6 
17-18 --
-- 2.7 
-- -- 84.3 
18-19 --
-- 2.7 
--
-- 87 .0 
19-20 
--
-- 3.8 --
-- 90.8 
20+ 
--
-- 9.2 -- -- 100.0 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997. 
Table 4.9 shows the comparison of open birth intervals with conception times for 
second and higher birth orders. The difference is immediately obvious; practically 
all (94.7 per cent) of conception times are accounted for within five years, while the 
open birth interval distribution is much longer. Almost half ( 46.1 per cent) of open 
birth intervals are of 10 years or more The concentration of open birth intervals at 
higher time intervals suggests that there was an accumulation of older and higher-
parity women who wished to terminate their childbearing and hence were sterile or 
were avoiding pregnancy by means of sustained contraception. 
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Table 4.9: Comparison of per cent distribution of open birth intervals with 
conception time for closed birth intervals for second and higher-order live 
births, Vettuvans, Engandiyour, 1997 
Length of interval Open interval 
(years) 
<2 14.2 
2-3 9.3 
3-4 6.9 
4-5 3.5 
5-6 6.5 
6-7 3.1 
7-8 3.5 
8-9 3.5 
9-10 3.5 
10-14 21.0 
14-19 15.9 
20+ 9.2 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997. 
4.2.5 Fertility Differentials 
4.2.5.1 Fertility variations 
Second and higher 
order births 
63.7 
18.4 
7.6 
5.0 
1.8 
1.4 
0.9 
1.3 
00 
00 
00 
00 
Difference 
-49.5 
-9.1 
-0.7 
-1.5 
+4.7 
+1.7 
+2.6 
+2.2 
+3.5 
+21.0 
+15.9 
+9.2 
While the Vettuvans of Engandiyour form a fairly cohesive group, individual 
variation is, of course, present. The following sections examine this diversity. The 
distribution of women according to the number of children they had at the time of 
survey is given in Table 4.10. There is a concentration of women having two or 
three children. Nearly three-fifths of women have fewer than two children. The 
proportion of those women with more than five children is substantially low. About 
six per cent of women are without children. Thus, fertility appears to be converging 
to low levels. 
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Table 4.10: Distribution of Vettuvan women according to the number of 
children they had at the time of survey, Engandiyour, 1997 
Children ever No. of women Per cent 
born (N=308) 
0 18 5.8 
1 66 21.5 
2 107 34.7 
3 92 29.9 
4 17 5.6 
5 5 1.6 
6 1 0.3 
7 1 0.3 
8+ 1 0.3 
Note: N=308. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997. 
Cumulative per 
cent 
5.8 
27.3 
62.0 
91.9 
97.5 
99.1 
99.4 
99.7 
100.0 
Table 4.11 shows number of sons and daughters women had at the time of survey. 
It is evident from the table that there are more male children than female children 
among the Vettuvans. While about 18 per cent women did not have a son, about 29 
per cent did not have a daughter. 
Table 4.11: Distribution of Vettuvan women according to the number of sons 
and daughters they have at the time of survey, Engandiyour, 1997 
No. of children Son Daughter 
(%) (%) 
0 55 107 
(17.8) (34.7) 
1 135 129 
(43.8) (41.9) 
2 73 53 
(23.7) (17.2) 
3+ 27 19 
(8.7) (6.2) 
Note: N=308. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997. 
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4.2.5.2 Education and fertility 
Table 4.12 shows the educational levels and fertility of Vettuvan women. When 
illiteracy and lower educational levels were common in the higher age cohorts, 
fertility seems to have been influenced little by education. For example, while 
fertility increased with an increase in education in the age group 40-44, fertility 
decreased with an increase in education in the age group 45-49. When education 
became more widespread and length of education increased, education seems to 
have an influence on fertility. For example, in the age cohort 20-24 and 25-29, 
fertility is significantly lower for those women who have college education than for 
those who have 10 years or less of schooling. Since we do not know whether 
women who have college education will have more children at a later stage, we 
cannot conclude that education really influenced final family size negatively, it may 
simply be a timing effect. What we can definitely conclude from the age cohorts 
40-44 and 45-49 ( assuming that they have completed their family size) is that 
educational improvements from no schooling to less than seven years of schooling 
had no consistent effect on fertility. 
Table 4.12: Average number of children ever born according to educational level 
and age of Vettuvan women, Engandiyour, 1997 
Age group of women 
Years ( ears) All 
of schooling 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 ages 
No schooling -- nc 2.6 3.3 3.0 3.8 3.2 (3) (9) (6) (4) (17) (39) 
1-7 years of 1.4 (23) 1.7 2.6 2.8 3.4 3.2 2.5 
schooling (30) (21) (40) (28) (17) (158) 
8-10 years of 1.4 (25) 1.8 2.0 2.7 nc nc 1.9 
schooling (25) (15) (12) (6) (3) (87) 
College 0.8 (12) 1.3 nc nc na na 1.2 
education (6) (2) (1) (21) 
Notes: na = no cases in this category; nc = not calculated because of small number of cases; Figures in brackets indicate numbers of women. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997. 
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4.3 Family planning among the V ettuvans 
Clearly, to achieve such low levels of fertility the Vettuvans must make extensive 
use of birth control. The family planning programme18 operations in the village 
were carried out by both private and public-sector health institutions. In the public 
sector, family planning services were provided by nursing staff at the Primary 
Health Centres and Sub-centres: the nursing staff mainly provided oral pills and 
condoms to clients; sterilisation operations and IUD (Intra-uterine device) 
insertions were performed by doctors. In the private sector, all three hospitals 
provided family planning services. The role of private-sector institutions in family 
planning in this village was very significant. Deliveries of most babies took place in 
the village private hospitals. Although there are no statistics readily available to 
support this view, my experience, observations and interviews with health workers 
revealed that villagers preferred to go to a private hospital in the village rather than 
a public hospital about 10-15 kilometres away from the village. This was mostly 
due to lack of family support-related factors. In 1997 families had very few 
unoccupied family members who could attend deliveries and provide all kinds of 
support. This reason was common not only for deliveries but also for other medical 
treatments. 
4.3.1 Ever-users of modem family planning 
Table 4.13 shows ever-use of family planning among the currently married 
surveyed women19 in Engandiyour in 1997. About 71 per cent of currently married 
women were ever-users of a modern contraceptive method20 . According to the 
Kerala 1992-93 NFHS, the percentage of ever-users among the currently married 
women was 64.2 (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:81). In the Vettuvan 
community of Engandiyour, about 66 per cent of the currently married women 
were ever-users of a modern permanent family planning method, and about 6 per 
cent a modern temporary family planning method. Switch-over or change in 
contraceptives was reported only in two cases. 
18Family planning data documented in this paragraph are compiled from the data collected by the family planning programme nurses of the village. 19Tois includes methods that are specific to men, such as condom and vasectomy. 20This study did not collect information about traditional methods of family planning. 
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No currently married woman in the age group 15-19 had ever used a modern 
contraceptive method. These young women did not have any children. This 
confirms the claim made in section 4.2.4.1 that couples did not like to delay their 
first child, and that contraceptive use may be non-existent. However, nearly half of 
the women in the age group 20-24 were ever-users of a modern family planning 
method or methods. The percentage of ever-users increased in the subsequent age 
groups and reached a level of 86.5 per cent for the age group 45-49. In general, the 
ever-use of a modern method of family planning increased with age, becoming 
more-or-less universal by the later years of reproduction. 
Ever-use of a permanent family planning method was about 34 per cent among the 
currently married women in the age group 20-24, and about 51 per cent in the age 
group 25-29. In these two age groups, all users of the permanent family planning 
methods were women (no male sterilisation was reported). In the age group 30-34 
the ever-users of a permanent family planning method amounted to about 79 per 
cent, a substantially higher percentage compared to the previous age cohorts. For 
the age groups 35-39 and above, the percentage of ever-use of permanent methods 
was between 83 and 86 per cent. Among the users of permanent family planning 
methods in the higher age groups, from 30-34 and above, men also became 
involved. For example, in the age group 45-49, 35 per cent of the sterilisation 
adopters were men. 
The temporary methods of family planning used by Vettuvans in the study were 
IUD, condom, and oral pills. Ever-users of temporary methods were about 6 per 
cent of total users of family planning among the Vettuvan women. A greater 
percentage of users of temporary methods was found in the younger cohorts than 
the older. For example, nearly 14 per cent of the couples in the age group 20-24 had 
used a temporary method, None in the age cohort 40-44 and above had ever used a 
temporary method. 
The analysis presented above suggests two conclusions. First, permanent family 
planning methods dominate over temporary methods among the ever-users of 
modern family planning methods. And second, while some of the ever-users of 
permanent family planning methods in the older age groups were men, virtually all 
permanent users in the younger age cohorts were women. 
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Table 4.13: Percentage of currently married Vettuvan women, who (or whose husband) had ever used a modern contraceptive method, by 
specific method and age, Engandiyour, 1997 
Age Percentage Percentage of Total percentage Percentage of ever-users of a modem 
(years) ever used a ever-users of a modem of ever-users of temporary family 
modem family permanent family planning a permanent planning method 
planning method family planning 
method method 
Female Male Oral pills Condom 
sterilisation sterilisation 
15-19 - - - - -
-
20-24 47 .5 33.9 - 33.9 - 6.8 
25-29 60.3 50.8 - 50.8 3.2 1.6 
30-34 80.9 72.3 6.5 78.8 2.1 -
35-39 82.8 77 .5 5.3 82.8 - -
40-44 82.5 55 .0 27 .5 82.5 -
-
45-49 86.5 51.4 35 .1 86.5 -
-
All 70.5 55.6 9.7 65 .3 1.0 1.6 
al!;es 
Notes: aThere is multiple ever use (switch-over) of contraception in this category. 
- indicates no cases. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997. 
Cu.T 
(IUD) 
6.8 
4.8 
-
1.7 
-
-
2.9 
Total percentage Percentage of Total per Total 
of ever-users of a never-users of a cent number 
temporary family modem family of 
planning method planning method women 
-- 100.0 100.0 4 
13.6 52.5 100.0 59 
9.6 39.7 100.0 63 
2.1 19. l 100.0 47 
-- 17.2 101.7a 58 
-- 17.5 100.0 40 
- - 13 .5 100.0 37 
5.5 29.5 100.3a 308 
4.3 .2. Current users of modem family planning methods 
The current users of family planning methods among the currently married 
women21 are shown in Table 4.14. The majority of the currently married women 
who had ever used a modem contraceptive method were currently using a method. 
This is precisely because most of the ever-users were adopters of a permanent 
family planning method (see Table 4.13). Current use of contraception in the 
V ettuvan community in 1997 was about 68 per cent, with about 65 per cent of 
women practising a modem permanent contraceptive method and about three per 
cent using a modem temporary method of family planning22. The current use of a 
modem contraceptive among currently married women in Kerala according to the 
Kerala NFHS in 1992-93 was 54 per cent: 48 per cent using a permanent method 
and 6 per cent using a temporary method of family planning (PRC, 
Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:83). 
Since there will be usually no difference in proportion between ever-users and 
current users of permanent contraceptives, the difference in the ever-use and current 
use is due to changes in the number of women using temporary methods of family 
planning. Current users of temporary methods of family planning were only half the 
number of the ever-users. Only about 6 per cent of the 308 currently married 
women in the Vettuvan community in Engandiyour have ever used a temporary 
family planning method. 
The discussion of current and ever-users of modem family planning methods above 
leads to the following conclusions. First, there is limited use of more than one 
method of family planning among the Vettuvans. Secondly, sterilisation operations 
dominate both ever- and current use of family planning methods. Thirdly, female 
sterilisations are more common than male sterilisations. Fourthly, temporary 
methods of family planning are not very popular in the community. 
21This includes methods that are specific to men, such as vasectomy and condom. 22 According to the data compiled by the health workers of the village for the fiscal year 1996-97 (not published), the major method of family planning adopted by villagers was postpartum 
sterilisation; about 92 per cent of the adopters of family planning were sterilisation users and the 
remaining 8 per cent Cu.T (IUD), condom, and oral pill users. The total current family planning 
use status in the village in the fiscal year 1996-97 was around 60 per cent. 
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Table 4.14: Percentage of currently married women, who ( or whose husband) currently using a modern contraceptive method, by specific 
method and age, Vettuvan, Engandiyour, 1997 
Age Percentage of Percentage of current users Total percentage of Percentage of current users of a modern Total percentage Percentage of Total 
(years) current users of a of a modern permanent current users of temporary family planning method of current users of current non-users number of 
modern family family planning method permanent family a modem of a modern women 
planning method planning method temporary family family planning 
planning method method 
Female Male Oral pills Condom Cu.T 
sterilisation sterilisation (IUD) 
15-19 - - - - - - - - 100.0 4 
20-24 45 .8 33 .8 - 33.8 - 5.1 6.8 l 1.9 54.2 59 
25-29 52.4 50 .8 - 50.8 l.6 - - 1.6 47.6 63 
30-34 80.8 72.3 6.4 78.7 2. l - - 2.1 l 9.1 47 
35-39 82.8 77 .6 5.2 82.8 - -
- - l 7.2 58 
40-44 82.5 55 .0 27.5 82.5 - - -
- l 7.5 40 
45-49 86.5 51.4 35 .1 86.5 - - -
- 13.5 37 
All 68 .5 55.8 9.7 65 .5 0.6 l.0 l.3 2.9 31.5 308 
ages 
Note: - indicates no cases . 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997. 
4.3.3 Age at the time of sterilisation 
The age at which women adopt a permanent family planning method (or, women's 
age at the time of husband's sterilisation) is an important indicator of the fertility 
status of a population. As sterilisation is considered a permanent family planning 
method, age at sterilisation, generally, denotes age at the end of reproduction23 . 
Although sterilisation is reversible, this is done only in very rare cases. In our study 
sample no such case was reported24. 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 show the distribution of women according to their age at 
sterilisation or at the time of their husband's sterilisation. Table 4.15 shows that 
slightly more than half of those women who adopted a permanent family planning 
method did so before 25 years of age; and the percentage of those sterilised before 
30 years of age was nearly 85. An examination of age at sterilisation of the cohorts 
40-44 and 45-49 indicates that there was a shift in the age at sterilisation towards 
earlier ages. For example, in the age cohort 45-49, 47 per cent of the women were 
sterilised when they were less than 30 years of age, whereas in the age cohort 40-
44, nearly 68 per cent of women were sterilised at under 30 years of age. This 
indicates that age at female sterilisation has been declining among the Vettuvans in 
Engandiyour village. 
The mean age at female sterilisation among the Vettuvans in Engandiyour was 25.5 
years, while the mean age of sterilisation of men was 28.4 years. One of the reasons 
for the lower age at sterilisation of women could be the practice of postpartum 
sterilisations. Our interviews with health workers of the village revealed that 
postpartum sterilisation was common among the Vettuvans. Female sterilisations 
(tubectomies) were done either while the women were undergoing delivery by 
caesarean section, or a few days after delivery. Interviews with Vettuvan men and 
women revealed that they believed that if both delivery and sterilisation occur at the 
same time it is convenient for the family to take care of the woman. As families 
were becoming smaller, there was less family support available. Lack of family 
support was felt by women in the study. Since many deliveries were done by 
caesarean section, sterilisation had become easier. In fact, doctors in the study 
village recommended women to undergo sterilisation if their deliveries were to be 
23Effectiveness of sterilisation is considered as 95 per cent or higher. 
24 A health worker reported one case where an Ezava woman underwent an operation to reverse 
her sterilisation. 
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done by caesarean section. Although exact statistics were not available, there was a 
growing concern in the village about the increasing number of deliveries by 
caesarean section. 
A higher mean age at sterilisation of men compared to women may be for the 
following reasons. (i) Men were sterilised according to both social and economic 
convenience. For example, men did not opt for sterilisation during the summer, 
when they obtained plenty of work. Similarly, during important festival seasons, or 
when they observe certain religious traditions that last for months at a time, 
sterilisation operations were often deferred. (ii) No husbands of currently married 
women below 30 years had undergone vasectomy (see Tables 4.14 and 4.16). This 
means that those who had already undergone vasectomy represented older cohorts 
and thus show past trends, while age at female sterilisation gives more recent trends 
in age at sterilisation. (iii) This may be influenced by the difference in age at 
marriage of husbands and wives. 
To sum up, whatever the immediate determining factors, age at sterilisation is very 
low among the Vettuvans and thus plays a significant role in ensuring low fertility 
Table 4.15: Percentage distribution of Vettuvan women according to their age at 
tubectomy, Engandiyour, 1997 
Current age Age at the time of women's sterilisation Number of 
of women (years) sterilised 
(years) <20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 women 
(%) 
20-24 10.0 90.0 -- -- -- 20 
25-29 3.1 53.1 43.8 -- -- 32 
30-34 -- 52.9 35.3 11.8 -- 34 
35-39 2.2 51.1 35.6 8.8 2.2 45 
40-44 4.5 22.7 40.9 18.2 13.6 22 
45-49 -- 26.3 21.0 31.5 21.0 19 
All ages 2.9 48.8 32.6 10.5 5.2 172 
Note: Mean age at sterilisation= 25.5 years. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997. 
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Table 4.16: Percentage distribution of Vettuvan women according to their age at the 
time of their husband's vasectomy, Engandiyour, 1997 
Current 
age of wife 
(years) 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
All ages 
Wife's age at the time of her husband's 
sterilisation 
20-24 
75.0 
75.0 
18.2 
7.6 
23.3 
25-29 
25.0 
54.5 
46.1 
43.3 
30-34 
25.0 
27.3 
23.1 
23.3 
35-39 
23.1 
10.0 
Total number 
of sterilised 
men 
3 
3 
11 
13 
30 
Notes: Mean age of wives at the time of their husbands' vasectomy operation= 27.8 years; 
Mean age of sterilisation of husbands= 28.4 years. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997. 
4.3.4 Number of living children at the time of first contraceptive use 
The impression from earlier sections that Vettuvans tend to bear their children quite 
soon after marriage, then immediately get sterilised, is confirmed by an 
examination of the number of living children at the time of first use of 
contraception for currently married women. This is shown in Table 4.17, which 
suggests that about 96 per cent of currently married women adopted a permanent 
family planning method as their first method of family planning. In the Vettuvans 
of Engandiyour 45 per cent of women had one or two living children at the time of 
tubectomy as their first method of contraception. Similarly nearly 88 per cent 
women had three or fewer children at the time of tubectomy as their first method of 
contraception. The mean number of children women had at the time of tubectomy 
as their first method of contraception was 2.8. 
About 57 per cent of men had two living children at the time of vasectomy as their 
first method of contraception. No man accepted vasectomy as his first method of 
contraception when he had one child. The mean number of children men had at the 
time of vasectomy as their first method of contraception was 2.5. 
Among the Vettuvans of Engandiyour temporary methods as their first method of 
contraception were in general used when couples had one child or no children. 
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Table 4.17: Percentage distribution of Vettuvan acceptors of various family 
planning methods according to the number of living children they had at the time of 
first contraceptive use, Engandiyour, 1997 
Number of living children 
Family planning 
method 
Tubectomy 
Vasectomy 
Cu.T (IUD) 
Oral Pill 
Condom 
All methods 
0 
-
-
-
-
25 
0.5 
1 2 
2.4 43.5 
- 56.7 
100 -
50 -
75 
-
3.8 44.1 
Notes: nc = not calculated; - indicates no cases. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997. 
3 
41.8 
36.7 
-
50 
-
40.3 
4 5+ 
7.6 4.7 
3.3 3.3 
- -
-
-
- -
7.1 4.3 
Mean no. 
children 
2.8 
2.5 
nc 
nc 
nc 
2.6 
Number of 
women 
172 
30 
4 
2 
3 
211 
4.3.5 Adoption of a permanent family planning method and sex composition of a 
couple's children 
In many societies the sex combination of sibling sets is regarded as a significant 
issue. This section considers its role for the Vettuvans. Table 4.18 shows the 
proportion of women ( or husbands) who adopted a permanent family planning 
method after having children with a particular sex composition. Among the 
currently married women who adopted a permanent family planning method the 
most common sex composition was one son and one daughter. A quarter of the 
women were in this category. The next most common sex combinations were two 
sons and a daughter, and two sons. These two categories together accounted for 
another quarter of the respondents. 
Among those women who had adopted a permanent family planning method 43 .4 
per cent had done so with one son; 32.7 with two sons; 11.7 with three sons; 0.5 
with four sons; 0.9 per cent with five sons; and 9 per cent with no sons. Thus, about 
nine-tenths of the couples who had adopted a permanent family planning method 
had at least one son. 
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Among currently married women who adopted a permanent family planning 
method 24. 7 had done so without a daughter; 43 per cent with one daughter; 19 .4 
per cent with two daughters; and 12.1 per cent with three or more daughters. The 
small size of the data set produces more subtle analysis of this issue here. But, at 
first view, there is no evidence of strong sex preference. The matter is considered 
below when assessing future fertility intentions. 
Table 4.18: Percentage of Vettuvan women (or husbands) sterilised, according to 
sex composition of children, Engandiyour, 1997 
Number of daughters 
Number of Total 
sons per cent 
0 1 2 3+ 
0 0 1.8 3.4 5.1 10.3 
1 2.3 25.0 11.0 5.1 43.4 
2 13.0 13.6 4.3 1.9 32.8 
3 or more 9.7 2.9 0.9 - 13.5 
Total 2er cent 25.0 43.3 19.6 12.1 100 
Note: N=192. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997. 
4.3.6 Reasons for not using a modem contraceptive method 
Although sterilisation becomes a virtually universal aspect of life, there are some 
women who do not use contraception. Those women who were not currently using 
a modern contraceptive were asked reasons for non-use. Various reasons are shown 
in Table 4.19. The major reason for currently not using a modern contraceptive was 
their desire to have more children. Nearly three-fifths of the women reported this 
reason. These women had not completed their families. Thus, these women may use 
a family planning method in future, once their families are complete. Menopause 
and inability to conceive were the next important set of reasons reported for the 
non-use of contraception: nearly a quarter of the women who did not use 
contraception gave this reason for their non-use. Matters related to poor health, 
absence of husband, postpartum amenorrhoea, and pregnancy were another set of 
reasons for non-use of contraception. All these account for slightly over one-tenth 
of the non-users. The above information suggests that there is little unmet need for 
family planning among the Vettuvans: less than two per cent. 
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Table 4.19: Distribution of Vettuvan women's reasons for not using a modern 
contraceptive method, Engandiyour, 1997 
Reasons for not using Number Per cent 
Need more childrena 57 58.7 
Menopause or secondary sterility 24 24.7 
Husband away 4 4.1 
Poor health 4 4.1 
Do not like any family planning method 2 2.1 
Postpartum amenorrhoea 4 4.1 
Pregnant 2 2.1 
Total 97 100.0 
Note: aThis includes 18 women who did not have children. Total number of women using a 
family planning method= 211. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997. 
4.3.7 Future use of family planning 
Future intention of Vettuvan women in Engandiyour to use a modern family 
planning method is given in Table 4.20. According to the table about three-fifths of 
the women who were currently not using a family planning method indicated that 
they would use a modern family planning method in future. Slightly less than one-
third indicated that they would not use any modern family planning method in the 
future, and the rest were undecided. 
Among those who indicated that they would not use a modern contraceptive in the 
future were women who had reached menopause, were sterile, or in poor health. 
Women who were undecided about the future use of contraception included women 
who did not like family planning methods, whose husbands were away, were 
pregnant, or were breastfeeding. 
Of those who wished to use a family planning method in future, when asked about 
the method they would use, about three-fifths indicated that they would choose 
female sterilisation; about one-tenth said they would use Cu.T (IUD); the rest were 
undecided about the method they would use in the future (Table 4.21) . Those 
women who intended to adopt sterilisation indicated they would do so once they 
completed their families. Those who reported that they would use Cu.T (IUD), on 
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the other hand, would do so after the first birth. Those who were undecided about 
the method were undecided about the timing as well. 
Table 4.20: Vettuvan women's future intention to use a modern family 
planning method, Engandiyour, 1997 
Intention to use contraception in future 
Yes 
No 
Undecided 
Total 
Note: 211 women use a family planning method. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997. 
Number of women 
57 
28 
12 
97 
Per cent 
58.8 
28.9 
12.4 
100 
Table 4.21: Vettuvan women's intention to use specific methods of family 
planning, Engandiyour, 1997 
Methods for future use 
Female sterilisation 
Cu.T (IUD) 
Undecided 
Total 
Number 
35 
5 
17 
57 
Per cent 
61.4 
8.8 
29.8 
100 
Note: Women (no. 40) who had no intention to use family planning excluded from the table. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997. 
4.4 Fertility Preferences 
4.4.1 Desire for additional children 
Vettuvan women who had at least one child or were pregnant were asked about 
their desire for an additional child. Similarly men who had at least one child were 
asked about their desire for additional children. About 18 per cent of the women 
and men said that they did not want an additional child. Various reasons for 
wanting additional children among those who desired additional children are given 
in Table 4.22. About three-fifths of women and slightly more men desired an 
additional child because they had only one child. Slightly over a quarter of women 
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and about one-third of men wanted an additional child because they wanted a 
daughter. Similarly, slightly less than a quarter of women and less than one-tenth of 
men wanted a son as an additional child. 
Table 4.22: Reasons for wanting additional children among Vettuvan women, 
Engandiyour, 1997 
Men Women 
Reasons Number Per centa Number Per centa 
Only one child, need more 31 65.9 33 60.0 
Need daughter 17 36.2 15 27.3 
Need son 4 8.5 13 23.6 
Two children necessary 4 8.5 6 10.9 
Othersb 3 6.4 4 7.3 
Total number of women/men 55 47 
Notes: Reasons for wanting additional children were asked only of those desiring additional 
children. aPercentage exceeds 100 owing to multiple responses; bfear of death, fear of children 
becoming disobedient. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
The desire of Vettuvan women and men for additional sons according to the 
number of living sons is shown in Table 4.23. Among the women who had no son, 
everyone desired one son. Of those who had one son, nearly two-fifths wanted no 
additional son, and the remainder wanted one more son. Among women who had 
two or more sons, about four-fifths did not want an additional son, and the 
remainder wanted one more. 
Among men who had no son, about nine-tenths wanted a son; one-tenth wanted two 
sons. However, among those who had one son, about three-fifths wanted no son and 
the remainder wanted two sons. About four-fifths of men who had two or more 
sons did not want any son and the remainder wanted one son. 
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Table 4.23: Percentage distribution of number of sons of Vettuvan women 
according to desire for sons, Engandiyour, 1997 
Desired 
number of 0 1 
sons 
women 
None - 43 
1 100 57 
2 - -
Total 100 100 
No. of women 4 46 
Note: Number of women 55, of men 47. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997. 
Number of sons at the time of surve~ 
2 or more 0 1 2 or more 
men 
80 - 58 80 
20 90 42 20 
- 10 
100 100 100 100 
5 14 28 5 
Table 4.24 shows the desire for daughters according to the number of daughters 
Vettuvan women and men already had. Among the women who did not have a 
daughter, nearly three-quarters wanted a daughter, and the remaining quarter did 
not want a daughter. Those women who had one or more daughters did not want an 
additional daughter. This clearly suggests that this group of women wanted a 
maximum of one daughter. 
Among men who did not have a daughter, about 86 per cent wanted a daughter and 
the remainder did not. Of those men who had one daughter, 70 per cent did not 
want an additional daughter and the remainder wanted one more. 
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Table 4.24: Percentage distribution of number of daughters of Vettuvan men and 
women according to their desire for daughters, Engandiyour, 1997 
Desired 
number of 
daughters 
0 
1 
Total 
No. of 
women/men 
0 
26 
74 
100 
48 
Number of daughters at the time of survey 
1 2 or more 0 1 
women 
100 
100 
7 
14 
86 
100 
29 
men 
70 
30 
100 
17 
Note: Number of women 55, of men 47; - indicates no case. 
Source: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997. 
2 or more 
100 
100 
1 
Tables 4.23 and 4.24 indicate a clear but not a huge preference for sons over 
daughters among Vettuvan men and women who wanted additional children. What 
seems important from the two tables is the decreasing trend to have children with 
the same sex. For example the vast majority of the women and men do not want an 
additional son if they have one or two sons already. Similarly, the overwhelming 
majority of men and women did not want an additional daughter if they already had 
one or two. 
4.4.2 Ideal number of children 
In order to determine the ideal number of children a Vettuvan couple should have, 
an appropriate question was asked in the Vettuvan Wife's and Vettuvan Husband's 
Survey. The ideal number is the number that is considered necessary for the social 
and economic well-being of a Vettuvan family. The mean ideal number of children 
reported by both Vettuvan men and women in the study was 2.3 children (Table 
4.25). The most preferred sex combination was one son and one daughter. 
However, there was a preference for male children over female children; that is, the 
mean ideal number of sons was slightly higher than that of daughters. 
Table 4.26 indicates that the actual number of children the respondents had 
influenced the ideal number only marginally. For example, men and women who 
did not have any children had an average of 2.1 children as ideal; the ideal was 2.5 
for those who had more than four children. Clearly, the number of children the 
Vettuvans considered necessary for the social and economic welfare of their 
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families in 1997 was around two. Analysis here and in the previous section 
provides an indication that a 'number preference' is emerging among the V ettuvans, 
along with the preference for son and daughter. Vettuvans in this study wanted 
roughly two children; they also wanted one son and one daughter; if they had two 
sons, they did want more children of any sex; if they had two daughters, they did 
not want any more children of any sex. This issue will be considered for further 
discussion in Chapter 7. 
Table 4.25: Percentage distribution of ideal number of sons and daughters 
among the Vettuvans, Engandiyour, 1997 
Ideal Sons Daughters Sons+Daughters 
number 
0 1.7 2.1 0.2 
1 71.0 92.7 0.7 
2 24.4 3.5 70.5 
3 or more 0.5 0.2 27.4 
Othersa 1.6 1.6 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Mean 1.258 1.032 2.305 
Notes: N=577; aDid not give a numerical answer. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
Table 4.26: Distribution of actual and ideal number of children, Vettuvans, 
Engandiyour, 1997 
Living children 
0 
1 
2 
3+ 
Total 
Mean ideal number of 
children 
2.1 
2.2 
2.3 
2.5 
2.3 
Note: N=577 (husbands and wives). 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The analysis carried out in this chapter suggests that there has been a transition in 
fertility to a very low level from a moderately high level during the last five 
decades among the Vettuvans of Engandiyour village. There is clear evidence in 
this study that sterilisation, particularly tubectomy, is the single most important 
method of contraception. There is an increasing trend to achieve the required family 
size as early as possible after marriage and then to adopt a permanent family 
planning method. Although there is son preference, the couples in this study seem 
not to have continued childbearing indefinitely to have a son. Rather, they stopped 
bearing children once the family size norm was achieved. Thus, family size has had 
an important role in determining the cessation of childbearing among the 
Vettuvans. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to document unambiguously the user-specific 
nature of the fertility of the Vettuvans. With these now clearly delineated, we can 
move on to a consideration of the wider social and economic position in Kerala's 
modem society. That is the focus of the following three chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
Micro Institutional Environinent: 
Caste-System Changes and the Status of the 
Vettuvans in Engandiyour 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 documented the fertility and family planning characteristics of the 
Vettuvans. With those now clearly delineated, the purpose of this chapter and the 
next two is to explain the low levels of fertility revealed in Chapter 4. As a part of 
the top-down approach adopted in this study, this chapter is intended to provide the 
micro-level institutional environment. Such information is important because it has 
bearing on the security and mobility costs and benefits of children. In this study the 
micro-level institutional environment primarily means information about the study 
village and community. The village-level information includes the village's 
administration, population, population density, settlement pattern, religion and 
caste, caste system, education, economy, transport, and housing. The details 
concerning the Vettuvans specifically include historical information, population 
and its distribution in Engandiyour, economic characteristics, and educational and 
occupational structure. This micro-level institutional environment has close links, 
of course, with the institutional environment in Kerala more generally, discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
5.2 Engandiyour village 
Engandiyour is a coastal village. It is situated about 24 kilometres west of Trichur, 
the district headquarters. Its western border is the Arabian Sea; the northern and 
eastern borders are the Chetuwa river, and the southern border is Vadanapally 
village. In 1997 Engandiyour had 10 administrative wards, each with a population 
of 2,000-2,500. The village has two divisions, Kundaliyour and Engandiyour. The 
local government of Engandiyour is called Engandiyour Village Gramapanchayath 
(village council), consisting of the Panchayath President and other elected 
members. Each ward has an elected member to the village Panchayath and the 10 
elected members chose the village Panchayath President. The village Panchayath 
was established in 1949. Since 1964, the village Gramapanchayath has been under 
the leadership of left-wing parties (Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996:8). The 
Government of India Panchyathiraj Act of 1995 had provided more power to the 
village Panchayaths to plan, implement and monitor various development 
programmes in the village. Under this plan each village will identify its problems, 
prioritise them, identify possible solutions and work out a plan to implement such 
solutions in the form of developmental projects. Under this system the local 
administration (government staff) will be accountable to the village Panchayath 
(elected members of village council). In 1997 Engandiyour made substantial 
progress in implementing the Panchyathiraj recommendations 1. 
Administratively, the village is under the village officer, who is in charge of the 
village administration. Above the village officer is the taluk head, or thahasildar, 
and then the collector at the district level. It is the village-level administration 
which confirms the economic and social position of any member of the village for 
any economic or educational privileges. For example, the village officer certifies 
the income level of a family in order for them to receive economic assistance of 
any kind from the state and central governments. Any privilege based on caste also 
has to be certified by the village officer. The local administration is responsible for 
the collection of property and revenue taxes. They provide maintenance for 
Panchayath roads and other facilities. They also implement government 
programmes which need to be administered through the village. 
5.2.1 Population, population density and settlement pattern 
The population-related details of Engandiyour are given in Table 5 .1. As can be 
seen from the table, in 1991 the population of Engandiyour village was 20,756 
persons. The population of Engandiyour grew by about 53 per cent from 1961 to 
1991. Table 5.1 also indicates that from 1971, the growth rate of the population has 
been declining. The sex ratio of the village population during 1961 to 1991 has 
been less than 100 men for every 100 women (Director of Census Operations, 
1991:90). In 1991 there were about 86 men for every 100 women in Engandiyour. 
Thus, the population growth and sex ratio of population in Engandiyour resembles 
1 Based on my communication with Panchayath staff. 
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the all-Kerala situation discussed in Chapter 3. 
Given the land area of 14.12 square kilometres in Engandiyour, the population 
density was 1469 persons per square kilometre in 1991 (Director of Census 
Operations, 1991:90). This is about double the population density of Kerala, which 
was 7 49 persons per square kilometre in 1991. The concept of population density 
can, of course, be misleading as it incorporates the entire land area: agricultural, 
non-agricultural, and residential areas. The density of population is most relevantly 
considered within the housing area of the village. Adding agricultural area outside 
the inhabited boundaries of the village will give a lower density when people may 
be living in a highly crowded situation. If we consider such an indicator of density 
we see that people in Engandiyour live in less crowded circumstances than do 
people in other states where the settlement pattern is very different. Thus, despite 
the high population density in the village, Engandiyour is not an overcrowded 
village, as it might seem from the density per se. 
Table 5 .1: Population of Engandiyour village, Kerala, 1961-1991 
% intercensal Sex ratio: 
Year Male Female Total growth rate males per 
(decadal) 100 
females 
1961a 6,330 7,216 13,546 - 87.7 
1971b 7,531 8,614 16,145 19.2 87.4 
1981c 8,372 10,003 18,382 13.9 83.7 
1991d 9,579 11 ,177 20,756 12.9 85.7 
Source: asuperintendent of Census Operations, 1966:62; bDirector of Census Operations, 
1974:144; coirector of Census Operations, 1981:100; dDirector of Census Operations, 1991:90. 
The settlement pattern in the village resembles that of the rest of Kerala. Houses 
were built in a pattern which allows each house to have its own garden. Depending 
upon the economic position of each family the area of garden-land varies from less 
than two cents to over an acre. In Engandiyour, there was no segregation of 
scheduled caste houses from the rest of the village. There was no particular part of 
the village exclusively occupied by any particular community: the location of the 
household could not give any clue about the caste or religious identity of its 
members. As will be seen, the settlement pattern and the population density in the 
village are important aspects in the determination of household strategies, 
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including fertility. 
5 .2.2 Religion, caste and caste system 
The village is a mixture of Hindus, Christians and Muslims. Since village-level 
statistics on religion are not readily available, I used records of Primary Health 
Centres to estimate the religious composition. The records indicate that in 1997 
about 65 per cent of the population in Engandiyour was Hindu2, 20 per cent 
Christian and about 15 per cent Muslim. 
The major castes in the village were Namboodiri, Nair, Ezavan, Mukkuvan, Valan, 
Kurup, Asari, Panikkar, Panan, Vettuvan, Parayan, Mannan, Nayadi, and Pulayan. 
Of these, Vettuvan, Paray an, Pulayan, N ayadi, and Mannan are scheduled castes. 
According to the 1991 Census information the percentage of scheduled castes in 
Engandiyour was 23.6 per cent or 4893 persons (Director of Census Operations, 
1991:90). In 1981, the percentage of scheduled castes in Engandiyour was 23.5 per 
cent or 4292 persons. The intercensal growth rate for the scheduled castes in the 
1981-91 decade was 14 per cent. 
Until the early decades of the twentieth century, social and economic relationships 
1n Engandiyour were determined by the caste system (Engandiyour 
Gramapanchayath, 1996:7). According to senior villagers, 'untouchability' and 
'unapproachability' prevailed in Engandiyour until the early years of the twentieth 
century. Interviews with senior members of scheduled castes of the village 
revealed that they were 'untouchables' and 'unapproachables' to Nairs, and 
'untouchables' to Ezavas. In Engandiyour such practices were prevalent until about 
the mid-1930s. The forces that abolished 'untouchability' and 'unapproachability' 
from the village are difficult to establish from the information collected through 
interviews because the respondents had little detailed knowledge about such 
customs. In addition no literature on caste-system changes in the village is 
available. It is reasonable, however, to assume that the major forces such as the 
educational activities of Christian missionaries and lower-caste reformers must 
have influenced the caste-system practices in the village before the 1950s. 
There is no precise information about practices of forced labour, slavery, and the 
ban on breastcloths in the twentieth century in Engandiyour; it is likely that such 
2 All scheduled castes in the village were Hindus. 
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practices disappeared from the village in the late nineteenth century. Although 
untouchability and unapproachability were abolished from the village during the 
1930s, many social and economic relations remained unchanged until the 1970s. 
These included tenancy and high rent; non-entry for scheduled castes to the upper-
caste temples; non-entry for scheduled castes into upper-caste houses; Vettuvans 
not dining with the upper castes; and scheduled castes not invited to the upper 
castes' social functions. How these constraints have changed in the Vettuvan 
community is discussed in the following sections. 
5.2.3 Health 
Good health and hygiene practices have long been a part of the lifestyle in 
Engandiyour. The traditions of having a bath in the morning, particularly when one 
is attending prayers, and cleaning both the inside and outside of the house every 
morning are examples of this. The settlement pattern and availability of plentiful 
water are conditions favouring better health practices. 
Before the modern system of medicine became available, the villagers had a strong 
tradition of Ayurveda, the indigenous system of medicine. Some of the most 
famous Ayurveda scholars were from this village, and Ayurvedic practice has been 
an important branch of medical practice in the village (Engandiyour 
Gramapanchayath, 1996:28). In 1997 there was one public Ayurvedic clinic in the 
village. Allopathy (Modern or Wes tern Medicine) has become very popular, 
particularly for those with urgent medical needs. In 1997 there were three hospitals 
and one clinic in the village with inpatient facilities. These hospitals also provided 
specialised services in almost all branches of medicine. These hospitals and the 
clinic were in the private sector. In the public sector, there was one Primary Health 
Centre (PRC) and four Sub-Primary Health Centres. The Primary Health Centre 
was manned by a medical doctor, while nurses took care of Sub-centres. The 
doctor from the PRC made regular visits to the four Sub-centres to examine 
patients. 
Family welfare services such as maternal and child health (MCH) and family 
planning (FP) services were provided primarily through the network of public 
health service outlets such as Primary Health Centres and Sub-centres. There were 
19 Anganvadi centres functioning in the village under the Integrated Child 
Development Programme3. These centres provided all children under the age of 
3Programme of Government of India to provide a wide range of health, nutritional and 
recreational activities for children of pre-school age. 
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five with food, health check-ups, recreation, and advice on immunisation and other 
health aspects. 
According to the immunisation data for 1997-98 fiscal year, the coverage of 
immunisation in the village above 90 per cent for all vaccines. For example, the 
BCG coverage was 95 per cent, first DPT dose 99 per cent, and first polio dose 94 
per cent. In the case of tetanus toxide (TT) immunisation for pregnant women, the 
coverage was 97 per cent during the fiscal year 1997-98. 
The health status of the village, as indicated by the death rate, inf ant deaths, and 
number of maternal deaths suggests that the village has good health standards 
(Table 5.2). Effective institutional delivery, good nutrition, a decreasing number of 
higher-order births, prenatal and postnatal care, and the accessibility and 
affordability of health services may be some of the reasons for the notable 
achievements in health such as low infant and maternal death rates in the village. 
Table 5.2: Some health indicators of Engandiyour village, 1995-96 
Death rate in one-year 
period 1995-96 
(per 1000 population) 
4.9 
Number of infant 
deaths reported in one 
year during 1995-96 
1 
Number of maternal 
deaths in one year 
during 1995-96 
0 
Note: The report does not indicate the exact duration of the rates and incidences 
referred to. The duration given in the table is based on my discussion with some of the 
people involved in the preparation of the report. 
Source: Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996:31. 
5 .2.4 Transport 
Engandiyour has a very good network of roads. In 1996 the total length of roads in 
the village was 44.8 kilometres (Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996:40). The 
National Highway 17 (NH 17) passed through the village. Public and private 
transport was widely available. In 1997, buses were available to nearby towns 
almost every five minutes. About 40 taxi cars and 70 auto-three-wheelers were 
available for public use. The nearest railway station was about 10-12 kilometres 
away. The international airport at Calicut and domestic airport at Cochin are only 
2-3 hours' journey by bus. In 1999, an international airport was opened near 
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Trichur, the district headquarters. It takes about an hour to get to the new 
international airport from the village. 
5.2.5 Housing 
Information on housing within the village is limited, but the available statistics on 
roofing type give some idea of the improvement in housing standards over recent 
decades. In the 1950s, almost all houses in the village were either huts or houses 
with mud walls and roofs of coconut-leaf thatch (Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 
1996:46). Interviews with elderly villagers revealed that only a very few houses of 
the upper castes had tiled roofs in the 1950s. As revealed in Table 5.3, on the other 
hand in 1996, about 42 per cent of the houses in the village had a concrete roof, 
about 27 per cent of houses had a tiled roof and the remaining 31 per cent had a 
coconut-thatched roof (Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996:68). In 1991, the 
density of houses in the village was 27 4 per square kilometre (Director of Census 
Operations, 1991). 
Table 5.3: Type of roof of house, Engandiyour, Kerala, 1996 
Concrete Tiled 
2668 (42.2) 1706(27.0) 
Note: Figures in brackets indicate percentages. 
Source: Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996:68. 
5.2.6 Education 
Coconut-leaf thatch 
1952(30.8) 
Total 
6326 (100) 
The village has a long tradition of education. The first school was established in 
1895 by a local man. In 1961 there were two high schools, two middle schools, 
two primary schools and four pre-schools (Director of Census Operations, 
1961:93). In 1997, in the public sector, the village had two high schools, four 
upper primary4 schools and four lower primary5 schools. A total of 4,259 students 
attended these schools in 1995 in classes ranging from first to tenth grade 
(Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996:26). In 1997, in the private sector, there 
4Schools with classes up to seventh grade. 
5Schools with classes up to fourth grade. 
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was one English-medium6 primary school with a student enrolment of about 100 
(personal communication with the principal). In 1997 there was one computer 
training institute, two commerce institutes, one parallel college, seven tuition 
centres and five nursery schools. No higher-education centres were available in the 
village, but such facilities were available within 15 kilometres of any part of 
village. The district headquarters, Trichur, had some important educational centres 
such as a medical college, an agricultural university, and many other colleges 
under both public and private ownership. 
One of the latest developments in Kerala's education in general and that of 
Engandiyour in particular has been the shift in the choice of school from 
Malayalam-medium to English-medium schools. The Gulf migration probably 
changed the attitudes of middle and lower-middle class people towards the good 
communication skills needed for better employment prospects. It may be noted 
here that a good proportion of Gulf migrants were not fluent in English, and that 
many have had difficulties in seeking employment and dealing with every aspect of 
migration (Gulati, 1983). English proficiency is rational, therefore, from the point 
of view of migrants who in 1997 had the economic capability to send their children 
to full-fee-paying English-medium schools. Between eight and nine in the morning 
private school buses can be seen going to each corner of the village taking students 
to schools located 5-20 kilometres away. This scene would have been unthinkable 
15 or 20 years ago. 
In the late 1990s the growth of English-medium schools has been a clear threat to 
the local Malayalam-medium schools. Fewer students were enrolled each year in 
the local schools. Added to this phenomenon was the impact of the lower birth 
rate. In the village schools several divisions of one grade have been cancelled 
during the last five years; teachers have been transferred or lost their jobs7. These 
local schools which once played a very significant role in education are now less 
significant. Most of the students at local schools in 1995 came from the 
economically backward families in and around the village (see Table 5.4). While 
people in the village accept on patriotic grounds that they should send their 
children to the local schools, they see that English-medium schools can give their 
children a better future. They have experienced how important English is for a 
highly migratory society. It seems hard to reverse this trend, whatever the state 
political leaders may wish. 
6where the instruction is in English. 
7Based on personal communication from staff and managers of various schools. 
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Table 5.4: Percentage distribution of scheduled-caste children in various schools 
in Engandiyour, 1995. 
Name of school 
Thirunarayana L.P School 
St. Mary's L.P School 
G.F. U.P School, Kottapuram 
G.M.U.P, Chetuwa 
St. Mary's L.P School 
Sree Narayana U.P School 
St. Thomas L.P School 
St.Thomas High School 
National High School 
Thirumangalam U.P School 
All schools 
Total 
Students 
296 
161 
224 
499 
72 
233 
544 
1323 
678 
229 
4259 
Number of 
SC students 
90 
36 
43 
136 
35 
81 
117 
303 
180 
86 
1107 
% of SC 
students to 
total students 
30 
22 
19 
27 
49 
35 
21 
23 
27 
38 
26 
Note: The number of students enrolled includes children from nearby villages. 
SC= Scheduled castes. 
Source: Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996: 28. 
The tradition of education and the number of schools in Engandiyour are reflected 
in the literacy levels. As is evident in Table 5.5, in 1961 nearly half of the 
population in Engandiyour was literate. The corresponding figure in 1991 was 
about 78 per cent. Literacy of women in Engandiyour, although slightly lower than 
men, has been slightly higher than for Kerala and much higher than the all-India 
level (Table 2.11). According to the 1996 village report, Engandiyour is effectively 
fully literate, as 90 per cent of the population in ages above seven years were 
literate (Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996:25). 
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Table 5.5: Total literacy rate (all ages) in Engandiyour, 1961-1991. 
Year 
1961 
1971 
1981 
1991 
Males 
57.42 
66.29 
77.01 
80.62 (93.15) 
Females 
44.29 
58.09 
71.41 
76.50 (87.24) 
Notes: Figures in brackets indicate based on 7+ population. 
Total 
50.42 
61.90 
73.97 
78.4 (89.69) 
Sources: Director of Census Operations (1974: 137), District Census Handbook, Town and 
village Directory, Series 9, Kerala, Trichur District, Primary Census Abstract. 
District Census Handbook, 1966, 4, Trichur, Kerala State, pp. 62-63; 
Director of Census Operations (1991:90), Series 12, Paper 3 of 
1991, Final Population Totals. 
The long tradition of the importance of knowledge and literacy levels is evident 
from the number of libraries functioning in the village. As early as 1916 the village 
had its first library. Since then numbers have increased and in 1996 there were 
seven libraries functioning in the village. These village libraries are not simply 
collections of books but places where young people meet and discuss various 
issues that range from the local to the international. They also serve as venues for 
social activities such as adult education, voluntary help in crises, blood donations 
and other such activities. Interviews with some of librarians revealed that 
scheduled castes were making use of these libraries to a much greater extent than a 
few decades ago. 
Table 5.6: Libraries functioning in Engandiyour, 1995 
Name of Ii brary 
C. Krishnavilasam Library 
Kerala vayanasala 
Desabimani vayanasala 
Brothers' library and reading room 
Ramu Karyat grandhasala 
Jay Bharat Library and Reading Room 
Velukutty Master Memorial Library 
Total 
Source: Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996:55. 
Year 
established 
1916 
1956 
1982 
1986 
1990 
1991 
1991 
-
Number of 
members 
130 
148 
120 
411 
241 
125 
80 
1255 
No. of books 
10,450 
6386 
1098 
1443 
1279 
1000 
1200 
22,856 
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5.2.7 The economy 
5.2.7.1 The economy in the traditional-caste-system period 
Informal interviews with senior villagers and literature dealing with the economy 
of the Malabar8 region suggest that the economy was near subsistence level at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Major sources of livelihood for the village 
during the period 1920-30 were agriculture and fishing. Rice and coconuts were 
the main agricultural products at that time. Since data on agricultural crops of the, 
village are not available, agricultural information for Ponnani9 taluk, of which 
Engandiyour was a part, is used here. According to the information, paddy was the 
most important crop in the taluk during the period 1925-26, as about 62 per cent of 
the area cultivated was used for rice. As Table 5. 7 shows, a variety of crops were 
cultivated during 1925-26, but rice predominated. 
Table 5.7: Distribution of crops in Ponnani taluk, Malabar, 1925-26. 
Type of crops 
Rice 
Ragi 
Other cereals 
Oil seeds 
Other oil seedsa 
Condiments and spices 
Sugarcane 
Cotton etc. 
Other 
Garden produce 
Total area 
Area (acres) 
132,917 
2300 
6214 
724 
83,648 
4315 
467 
40 
17,429 
7820 
21,2089 
Per cent of total area b 
62.6 
1.1 
2.9 
0.3 
39.4 
2.0 
0.2 
8.2 
3.7 
Notes: asince there is no mention about coconuts, it appears that this category 
may indicate coconut fields. bTotal exceeds one hundred because some 
crops are cultivated twice a year. 
Sources: Malabar District Gazetteers, 1933. 
Some industries such as coir, timber, tile, weaving, fish-oil, steel umbrellas, metal 
works, coconut-shell carving, beedi (Indian cigarettes), safety matches, oil, and 
8Toe village was administratively part of the Malabar district of Madras Presidency. 9 Now Engandiyour is a part of Chavakkad taluk. 
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soap industries were established in some parts of the Malabar District before 1930 
(Madras District Gazetteers, 1933:xxiii). Coir and fishing were the two small-scale 
industries functioning in the village before 1930. Although cashew trees were 
abundant in the village, their value in those days was very low, compared to 
coconuts or rice, and hence did not give any impetus for economic progress. 
Evidence suggests that the floods of 1924 and the cyclone of 1925 hit both the 
Malabar region and the village (Madras District Gazetteers, 1933:xxxi, xxxiii). 
Such calamities must have resulted in serious economic hardship for the villagers. 
Interviews with senior members of the village revealed that the occupational 
structure in the village during the decade 1920-30 was primarily based on the caste 
system. Accordingly, the Namboodiris and Nairs were the landlords who 
controlled agricultural production in the village. Other communities, mostly 
Ezavas, rented land to cultivate based on patam from Nairs and Namboodiris. The 
Vettuvans were labourers who lived as tenants on the land of the Nairs, 
Namboodiris or temples (called devasam land) which was leased out to Ezavas on 
patam. Thus, the land in the village was cultivated by the Ezavas with the labour of 
the Vettuvans. The Ezavas were responsible for the patam that had to be given to 
the landlords or temples. 
In Engandiyour, the Mukkuvan and the Valan were fishing communities on the sea 
coast and backwaters of the village. Some Muslims from the coastal areas were 
also engaged in fishing. Christians were mostly small businessmen or were 
working in a salaried jobs. Castes and their traditional and present occupations are 
given in Appendix 5. 
Senior villagers revealed that the poor distribution of agricultural products led the 
lower castes to have little to eat during the time of the traditional caste system, 
particularly when there were natural calamities such as floods. Those who 
managed and worked agriculture for the landlords had little of their own as most of 
the produce had to be given as rent. The poverty and injustice that prevailed in the 
village may have led to frustration on the part of the Ezavas. Such frustrations are 
evident from the migratory trend observed in the village from the Ezava 
community during the 1930s. It is reported that men from the Ezava community 
migrated to Ceylon (Sri Lanka)10 for employment in the 1930s. Most of these 
1 O Although migration to Burma and Malaya during the 1930s from Kerala is documented in the 
literature (Isaac, 1997:270), my investigation indicated that no one from the village migrated to 
those countries. It is important to note that migration in the 1930s and 1940s was limited to only a 
few families in the village. 
160 
migrants were engaged in small business in Cey Ion. Because of unfavourable 
circumstances in Ceylon, most returned to the village during the 1950s and 
established successful businesses in Kerala using their savings. These families were 
some of the very rich in the village even in 1997. However, only very few families 
from the village migrated to Ceylon. 
Migration to other states in India also began during that period. Nasik (in 
Maharashtra state), Mumbai (Bombay) and Chennai (Madras) were the major 
destinations of villagers. Again the push factors were the poor economic and social 
conditions that prevailed in the village. In short, in the early decades of the 
twentieth century Engandiyour was a economically backward village where 
agricultural production was controlled by a small section of the upper-caste 
Hindus. During the 1940s and 1950s, the traditional caste system-based economic 
organisation in the village began to weaken because of various reform efforts. 
During the 1950s and 1960s the village started evolving an economic and social 
order based more on individual competence and less on the caste system. For 
example, in the 1960s Ezavans started to give up their traditional occupation, toddy 
tapping 11 , and became agriculturists, businessmen, and salaried workers, or 
migrated abroad or to other parts of India for employment. Similarly, N airs began 
to take up government positions during this period as their traditional status and 
wealth began to decline because of reforms within their communities. The other 
communities in the village, including the Muslims, did not change their 
occupations significantly during the 1950s and 1960s, however, as education in 
these communities remained at relatively low levels. Christians in the village 
remained mainly as petty businessmen or had salaried jobs in hospitals and 
schools. 
5.2.7.2. The Gulf migration, land reform and village economy 
Although migration had taken place to some degree before, nothing in prior 
experience compares with the effect of the exodus to the Gulf countries that began 
in the 1970s 12. Many men from the village went to the Gulf countries using sea-
going local vessels (launches) during the mid-1970s (Saseendran, 1986). The 
experience of the Mukkuvan in sailing and the availability of a suitable port 
11 Extracting toddy, a white alcoholic drink, from coconut trees. 12statistics are not readily available about the number of people working in Gulf countries. Based 
on my interviews with various people in the village it is reasonable to believe that on average one 
person per family worked in the Gulf. 
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(Chetuwa) in the village facilitated this voyage. The experiences of families in the 
village vary from great success to the tragic deaths of some travellers during their 
voyage. Those who were successful in reaching the Gulf countries became some of 
the richest families in the village. Families who lost their grown-up children on 
these voyages have not forgotten their bad luck13. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the number of villagers who migrated to the 
Gulf countries reached a peak. The first to go to the Gulf were fishermen 
belonging to the Mukkuvan, Valan and Muslim communities. Mukkuvan were 
expert sailors and fishermen and were associated with the traders from across the 
sea (Iyer, 1970). But once the migration was formalised, members from all 
communities except N airs and scheduled caste Hindus participated. During the 
1970s and 1980s migration from the village to other states in India also increased. 
A notable effect of Gulf migration on the village was to change the economic 
structure of the village. Interviews with Vettuvan, Nair and Ezavas revealed that 
the upper-caste Hindus, the N airs, did not choose to go to the Gulf, as they had 
enough landed property on which to depend. Furthermore, being upper-caste 
Hindus, the N airs did not like to mix with migrants who were mostly Muslims or 
Ezavas. Thus, the N airs remained at a distance from opportunities of economic 
development. Consequently, the Ezavas and Muslims in the village became richer. 
The economic position of the N airs started to deteriorate as agriculture became less 
profitable because of higher wages, and the prices of rice and wheat dropped as a 
result of imports from other states. As remittances from the Gulf started pouring 
into the village, the cost of living increased greatly. To have the resources needed 
for a living standard up to their traditional status, the N airs had to sell most of their 
land. Ironically, it was the Muslims or the Ezavas who purchased the land. The 
Nairs had education that enabled them to take up government jobs in Kerala. 
Compared to wages in the Gulf, however, the salaries of the government 
employees in Kerala were substantially lower. Thus, the N airs, once the landlords 
in the village, became one of the less prosperous groups. 
Yet another important event that took place in the village during the 1970s was the 
implementation of land reform. In Engandiyour land reforms started in the early 
1970s and ended by the mid-1970s. All tenants in the village were given 5-15 cents 
of land depending on the location. If the tenant hut was in a coconut plantation, 
13 Any discussion about Gulf migration in the village often reminds people of both the success 
and the tragedies. While many families were able to benefit from the initial migration, a few 
families lost their sons, money or both. 
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then the possible land size to which the tenant was entitled was around 5 cents. On 
the other hand, if the land was barren, the tenant might get between 10 and 15 
cents. 
Paddy and coconut were the major agricultural crops in the village until about 
1970. The cropping pattern of Engandiyour in 1995 is displayed in Table 5.8, 
which shows that in 1995 rice was cultivated only on about two hectares of land 
and coconut was cultivated on about 1015 hectares of land (Engandiyour 
Gramapanchayath, 1996). It is reported that about 75 per cent of the village was 
rice fields before 1970, while the proportion was less than one per cent in 1995 
(Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996: 11). There are several reasons for this shift. 
First, rice cultivation is more labour-intensive than a cash crop such as coconut. 
When wages increased, labour-intensive rice cultivation became uneconomic. 
Secondly, with a construction boom in the village, most agricultural labourers 
turned to construction as wages were higher than in agriculture. These and other 
changes in the village resulted in a severe labour shortage; hence, labour-intensive 
paddy cultivation had to be discontinued. When coconut growing became cheaper 
and more profitable, more and more rice fields became coconut plantations. 
Thirdly, many farmers found coconut more profitable as the price of rice fell 
relative to coconut prices. Fourthly, as land prices increased in the village, many 
farmers converted their rice fields into housing plots and sold them for 
exceptionally high prices to Gulf-migrant families. A visitor to the village after 15-
20 years would find it transformed. 
Table 5.8: Agriculture cultivation in Engandiyour, 1995 
Agricultural crop Area cultivated in hectares 
Paddy 2 
Vegetables 20 
Coconut 1055 
Banana 2 
Tapioca 2 
Black pepper 5 
Cashew nut 4 
Mango 2 
Jackfruit 1 
Source: Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996: 17. 
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Animal husbandry is another sector that has experienced a drastic decline. The 
village used to have a large number of cows, buffaloes, and goats as an important 
source of dairy products and manure (Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996: 18). 
With rice cultivation almost disappearing from the village, it was difficult for 
people to find grass and hay to feed animals. Importing hay from other places and 
buying other commercial food have raised the cost of raising livestock. 
Considering the increase in the cost of feeding and caring for cows and buff aloes, 
villagers consider it cheaper to buy milk. 
The major source of livelihood for the village in the 1990s has been the 
remittances from the migrants working either in the Gulf countries or in other 
Indian states: the village economy may be considered a 'remittance-based 
economy'. As can be seen in Table 5.9 the amount of foreign exchange received by 
various banks in the village during the financial year 1994-95 was 945 lakh 14 
Indian rupees15 (Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996:63). If remittances apart 
from those through banks16 are included, the amount coming to migrant families is 
still higher. Although comparatively small, the remittances from other Indian states 
are important to many families. Thus, the village economy is vulnerable because if 
remittances stop for any reason the villagers will find it difficult to manage their 
livelihood 17 . 
141 lakh = 100 thousand. 
15 Approximately 3,780,000 Australian dollars. 
l6 Illegal channels of remittance from the Gulf were noticed by Isaac (1997:284) in a village near 
Varkala the southern coastal migration belt of Kerala in June 1993. 171t should be noted here that savings are mostly used for construction of houses, or buying 
durables or to finance marriages. 
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Table 5.9: Foreign remittances to various banks in Engandiyour, 1994-95 
Name of the Bank 
Indian Overseas Bank 
The Federal Bank 
The South Indian Bank 
Catholic Syrian Bank 
Engandiyour Farmers's Co-operative Bank 
Total 
Amount in Indian 
rupees (in lakhs) 
395.00 
350.00 
125.00 
50.00 
25.00 
945.00 
Notes: One Australian dollar is about 25 Indian rupees. 
1 lakh = one hundred thousand. 
Source: Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996:63. 
Interviews and participant observation in Engandiyour revealed the living 
standards. Not only are these high, but they have also improved substantially since 
the Gulf migration began. Traditionally, the villagers used to eat kanji, rice gruel, 
for breakfast and dinner, with rice and fish curry or with yellow lentils. In the 
1990s, kanji has been replaced by eggs and milk, along with any rice preparation. 
Lunch and dinner with fish curry and vegetables is common. Chicken, lamb, and 
beef are eaten at least once a week by most of the villagers. In 1997, Hindus of the 
village not only ate beef but also advocated its use to those who did not eat it. 
Probably very few abstained from meat for reasons that are religious or caste 
based. In 1997 there was absolutely no starvation or evident hunger in the village 
in marked contrast to the situation 50 years ago. 
5.3 The Vettuvans 
5.3.1 Who are the Vettuvans? 
Clearly the social and economic circumstances of Engandiyour have been 
transformed in the last quarter-century. How does the Vettuvan community fit into 
this new setting? And indeed, who precisely are the Vettuvans? The name 
Vettuvan (Betwas or Wettowar) appears to be derived from the word Vedan 
meaning hunter (Luiz, 1962). There was a caste with the same name in Salem, 
Coimbatore, and Madurai in the neighbouring state of Tamil Nadu; members of 
this caste were soldiers under the Kongu Kings. The Vettuvans of Malabar and 
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Cochin, however, had very low status. They were a lower caste of agricultural serfs 
or collectors of forest produce in the jungles. According to Iyer ( 1909: 119), an 
authority on South Indian castes and tribes, it is not possible to know whether the 
Vettuvans of Malabar and Cochin are descendants of the Vettuvans from Tamil 
Nadu. 
The Vettuvans are said to have a legend showing that they were not originally so 
low in the social hierarchy. It is related that one of their tribe went and asked a 
high-caste Nair to give him a daughter in marriage. The Nair offered to do so on 
condition that the whole tribe would come to his place and dance on berries; each 
one who fell was to be shot with arrows. The tribe foolishly agreed to the 
condition, and went and danced, with the result that, as each one tripped and fell, 
he or she was mercilessly shot dead with arrows. A little girl who survived this 
treatment was secretly rescued and taken away by a compassionate Nair, who 
married her into his family. From this union, the present day Vettuvans trace their 
origin. (Madras Mail, 1907 quoted in Thurston, 1909:396). 
In Kerala Vettuvans are found in the Malabar and Cochin regions. In 1815 their 
population in the Malabar region was 3,347 (Kumar, 1965:50). According to the 
1901 census of Madras Presidency there were 6,349 Vettuvans, 3099 males and 
3250 females, in Malabar (Iyer, 1901:119). According to the 1971 Census there 
were 20,065 Vettuvans in Kerala (Director of Census Operations, 1971). Kumar 
(1965:50) reports that Vettuvans were slaves in some districts in Malabar. 
According to Panikkar (1900:339), in Malabar, Vettuvans lived on the coconut 
plantations of the Nairs and other well-to-do classes. Their main occupations were 
preparing coconut plantations, coconut plucking, tilling, and other allied work. Iyer 
( 1905 quoted in Thurston, 1904:400) gives the following account for the Vettuvans 
of Cochin region: 
They [Vettuvans] are pure agricultural labourers, taking part in every kind of work 
connected with agriculture, such as ploughing, sowing, weeding, transplanting, 
pumping water, and reaping. They are more day labourers. The males get two 
edangazhis of paddy (hardly worth of 2 annas), and the females an edangazhi and a 
half. In times of scarcity, they find it difficult to support themselves (Iyer, 1905 
quoted in Thurston, 1909:400-403). 
To sum up, clearly, Vettuvans constituted one of the most disadvantaged groups in 
Kerala. 
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5.3.2 The Vettuvans of Engandiyour 
There is no precise information about the history of the Vettuvans in Engandiyour, 
except the general view of villagers that their ancestors migrated to the coastal 
regions of Kerala from neighbouring Tamil N adu. With regard to traditions the 
Vettuvans of the village resembled the Cochin Vettuvans, documented by Iyer 
( 1905 quoted in Thurston, 1909). 
As mentioned earlier, in 1991 about 23.6 per cent of the population in the village 
belonged to scheduled castes. Since the majority of the scheduled cases in the 
village were in the Vettuvan community, it is estimated that in 1991 about 3,500-
4,000 Vettuvans lived in Engandiyour. Vettuvans were distributed fairly evenly 
throughout the village. During the traditional caste system one or more Vettuvan 
households were attached to each landlord, depending on the size of their landed 
property. It is probably due to such arrangements that the Vettuvan settlements 
were spread over the village without any specific concentration. However, some 
predominantly Vettuvan colonies have emerged recently in the village. These 
colonies were generated as a result of the 'one lakh housing scheme' of the 
government of Kerala in the 1970s to provide housing for the poor18 . 
5.3.3 Living standards of the Vettuvans 
Housing conditions and household amenities revealed in the Vettuvan Household 
Survey in Engandiyour are set out in Tables 5 .10 and 5 .11. In 1997, the housing 
conditions of the Vettuvans in the village were relatively poor compared to the 
overall village situation. For example, nearly three-fifths of the Vettuvan houses 
had roofs of coconut-leaf thatch, compared to less than one-third of such houses in 
the total village. Household amenities recorded in the 1997 Vettuvan Household 
Survey indicate tremendous scope for improving basic amenities. For example, 
over a quarter of houses still did not have a latrine. Similarly, 70 per cent of houses 
had no electricity. However, drinking water was available to most of the families 
within a walking distance of 5-10 minutes. The government had provided water 
pipelines where other sources of drinking water were not available. 
18 57,000 houses were built under this scheme in Kerala during 197 0-1977 (Jeffrey, 1992: 206). 
Panchayath recognised 10 colonies in the village to provide developmental assistance. 
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Table 5 .10: Type of roof of V ettuvan houses, Engandiyour, 1997 
Type of roof 
Thatched 
Tiled 
Concrete 
Per cent of houses 
Vettuvan 
. 61 
33 
6 
Village 
31 
27 
42 
Sources: Household Survey, 1997; PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and UPS, 1995; and 
Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996. 
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Table 5 .11: Housing conditions of the Vettuvans, Engandiyour, 1997 
Item 
Floor 
Mud 
Cement 
Mud and cement 
Walls 
Mud 
Leaf 
Brick 
Leaf and mud 
Mud and stone 
Electricity connection 
Yes 
No 
Modern latrine 
Yes 
No 
Number of rooms 
1-2 
3-4 
5+ 
Cooking fuela 
Wood (primary) 
Kerosene (secondary) 
Source of drinking water 
Own well 
Neighbours' well 
Pond 
Pipeline of water supply 
Government well 
Per cent of total 
houses 
28 
62 
10 
4 
44 
40 
10 
2 
30 
70 
70 
30 
38 
52 
10 
100 
9 
15 
16 
1 
60 
8 
Note: a Adds to more than 100 because of multiple use. 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
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To obtain a detailed picture of the living standards of the Vettuvans, the 
availability of some household possessions in the family was taken in to account. 
From Table 5.12 and my observations in the village during the field work, overall, 
household possessions of the Vettuvans are not indicative of comparable living 
standards to the rest of the villagers. However, considering their living conditions 
in the caste system, these possessions indicate their progress, although much would 
need to be changed to make their standard of living equal to the rest of the village. 
Table 5.12: Percentage of Vettuvan households possessing 
various goods, Engandiyour, 1997. 
Goods 
Chair 
Table 
Cupboard 
Cot 
Radio 
Watch 
Gold 
Grinder 
Tape-recorder 
Clock 
Fan 
Per cent households 
possessmg 
44 
32 
22 
21 
56 
60 
62 
4 
23 
50 
14 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
The standard of living in terms of food consumption indicates that on average Rs. 
631 a week was spent on cooked or raw food items. A family of 1-5 members 
spent Rs. 539 per week. The corresponding figures for families with 6-10 
members, and 11 and over were Rs. 783 and Rs. 1126, respectively. Interviews 
with Vettuvan men and women in Engandiyour revealed that the Vettuvans' 
standard of living in terms of food consumption was comparable with that of the 
non-Vettuvans19 . 
l9Disparities in mean per capita consumption of scheduled castes and non-scheduled castes in 
Assam, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal were revealed in a study by Saggar and Pan (1994). 
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That they have expenses higher than their income is evident from the debts of the 
Vettuvans. About two-thirds of the Vettuvans at the time of my study were in debt. 
The average debt of the family was Rs. 10,000; the range was Rs. 1000 to 40,000. 
The major reasons for borrowing money were house construction, marriage of a 
daughter, and medical treatment of a family member. 
Landholding of each surveyed Vettuvan household in 1997 is given in Table 5.13. 
The table reveals that nearly a quarter of the households had four cents or less; 
about 30 per cent between 5 and 9 cents; another 30 per cent between 10 and 14; 
and about 13 per cent over 15 cents. Only four per cent of households did not 
reveal their landholding size. The landholding account also suggests that, overall, 
there had been no increase in the land holding of the Vettuvans from what they 
received through land reform in the 1970s. My interviews revealed that in most of 
the cases 10 cents of land was given to each household at that time. 
Table 5 .13: Percentage distribution of Vettuvan households according to 
landholding, Engandiyour, 1997 
Land size in centsa 
Less than 4 
5-9 
10-14 
15-19 
20 and above 
Do not know/no answer 
Total 
Note: a 1 cent= .0004 hectares. 
Number and per cent of 
households 
81 (23.8) 
102 (30.0) 
101 (29.7) 
15 (4.4) 
29 (8.6) 
12 (3.5) 
340 (100.0) 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
Only about 6 per cent of the families surveyed subscribed to newspapers and about 
9 per cent to popular magazines. Vettuvans read newspapers or listen to those who 
read while having their morning tea at the local tea shop. These shops are a place 
for discussion on everyday political and other issues20 . However, women do not 
have this opportunity as they do not go to tea shops for their morning tea. Their 
source of information, on the other hand, is popular magazines, which are 
20 According to Mayer (quoted in Jeffrey, 1992:210) these function 'as centres for intercaste 
mixing, and have played a part in the weakening of caste restrictions'. 
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borrowed from the neighbours who subscribe to them. 
5 .3 .4 Educational status of the Vettuvans 
The educational achievements of the Vettuvans in the surveyed households are 
shown in Table 5.14. The age cohort 60 years or above had low levels of 
education, with nearly three-fourths of this age group never having been to school. 
The average number of years of schooling for this cohort, born in the year 1937 or 
earlier, was one year. This suggests that by 1944 or earlier ( since seven years was 
the approximate age at first entry to school in those days), the Vettuvans had some 
access to school attendance. However, until recently the educational history of the 
village shows that the educational facilities available were less effective in 
educating the Vettuvans on a large scale. Although statistics are not available, the 
field work for this study provided evidence to confirm that other communities, 
particularly the upper castes in the village, had much higher levels of education 
than the Vettuvans in the early twentieth century. Evidence suggests that the strong 
caste system prevented the Vettuvans from gaining an education21 . It may be 
recalled here that the Vettuvans were untouchables to the upper castes in the 
village and were not allowed even to use public places in the village until about 
the 1930s. Education was something that the majority of Vettuvans could not even 
think of. One elderly Vettuvan reported that the subordination of the Vettuvans 
restricted the thinking of the lower caste people, such as the Vettuvans, as they 
believed education was for upper castes and that it was 'inappropriate' for them to 
have education. It is, however, important to note that some Vettuvans could send 
their children to school as early as the 1940s. This owes much to the fact that a 
school in the village was opened as early as 1895 by an Ezavan. It is possible that 
some Vettuvans who had some kind of association with the Ezavas who managed 
the school could have sent their children to this school. However, further 
investigation would be needed to confirm this. 
21see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on restrictions on education for the lower castes. 
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Improvements in education, both in quality and quantity, can be seen from the 
younger age cohorts. For instance, the age cohort 20-2922 has shown significant 
improvement in the levels of education compared to higher age cohorts. A 
consistent increase in the average nun1ber of years of schooling was noticed among 
younger age cohorts, confirming an increasing trend in education. While it is hard 
to pinpoint exactly when Vettuvans began to educate their children, a trend in their 
education suggests a tentative view on the timing of an educational transition, as 
well as its speed. Although education among the Vettuvans had begun by the 
1940s, notable improvements took place after 1950. This is evident from the fact 
that in 1997 about half the age cohort 50-59 had some schooling. It may be further 
noted that about four-fifths of the Vettuvans in the age cohort 40-49 had some 
schooling, indicating a further boost in lower-caste education after the formation of 
Kerala state in 1956. The Kerala government recognised the need for education 
and put emphasis on opening more schools. By 1960, Engandiyour village had two 
high schools, two middle schools, two primary schools and four pre-schools23 . A 
further improvement in education is reflected in the age cohort 30-39 where nearly 
89 per cent of the Vettuvans had some schooling. Up to 1970, educational 
improvement for the Vettuvans was mainly concentrated at lower educational 
levels, mostly below high-school level. The age cohort 20-29, however, indicates a 
substantially shift to higher education, that is, beyond high school. About 17 per 
cent of the 20-29 age cohort had college education. This shift to higher education 
took place after the land reform and during Gulf migration from the village in the 
1970s. 
22Age cohorts younger than 20-24 were not considered for comparison because most of them in 
the 5-9 and 10-19 age cohorts may not have completed their education. Any calculation of 
education level in these categories will be highly influenced by their age; for example, in the 10-
19 age cohort there may not be many students in college simply because at 10-14 years children 
are too young to go to college. In this situation if we compare college level education at 10-19 
with the 20-24 age cohorts, our results may be biased. 23see Section 5.2.3 for a discussion on education in Engandiyour. 
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Table 5 .14: Educational levels of the Vettuvans ( 5 years and above), Engandiyour, 
1997 
Level of schooling Current age (years} 
5-9 10-19a 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ 
No schooling - 1.4 2.5 11.8 21.6 49 .2 76.1 
Primary, complete or 100 6.4 4.1 16.5 24.3 23 .9 14.7 
incomplete 
Upper primary - 36.8 25 .8 34.0 34.9 17 .4 6.7 
complete 
High school complete - 48.5 50.6 34.6 18 .8 9.4 2.4 
Pre-degree and above - 6.9 17.0 3.1 0.5 - -
Total per cent - 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Average number of - 7.79 8.53 6.11 4.59 2.55 1.00 
years of schooling 
Number of cases 98 362 437 297 218 138 163 
Notes: asince many children in this age group are not old enough to attend high school and 
college, the percentages given against each level need to be used only as an indicator of 
education. However, the 
category 'no schooling' can be taken for comparison without any problem. 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
From the above analysis the following conclusions can be made. First, an 
educational transition has taken place in the Vettuvan community, from a high 
level of illiteracy in the older age cohorts to a low level in the younger cohorts. 
Secondly, despite all the hurdles of the caste system in the village, some Vettuvans 
were able to start schooling as early as the 1940s. Thirdly, the land reform of the 
1970s and Gulf migration in the late 1970s were paralleled by a shift to higher 
levels of education. 
5.3.5 Female and male education 
Table 5.15 shows that female educational levels have improved significantly over 
the last four decades. In 1997, in the age cohorts 60 years or above about 84 per 
cent had never been to school compared to about 3 per cent in the age cohort 20-
29 years. No illiterates were found in age cohorts younger than 15 years. The 
average number of years of schooling also shows a similar trend. As indicated in 
the earlier section, results for younger age cohorts (below 20 years) are biased by 
age and, therefore, should be taken as an indicator of trend. The illiteracy level 
All 
ages 
17 .0 
17.2 
27 .0 
32.5 
6.3 
100 
5.89 
1717 
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noted above roughly indicates that female education was not very cornrnon in the 
1940s, and to some extent in the 1950s and the 1960s. A notable change in female 
education took place in the 1970s. During this time nearly 97 per cent women were 
literate. Not only were they literate, but about 90 per cent of them were educated to 
higher than primary level. It was during this time that college education became 
more popular among the Vettuvans. Nearly 21 per cent of the 20-29 age cohort had 
college education. An educational transition, from virtually total illiteracy to total 
literacy, among females appears to have been completed by about the early 1980s. 
Table 5.15: Distribution of Vettuvan females (5 years and above) by educational 
levels, Engandiyour, 1997 
Years of 
schooling 
No schooling 
1-4 
5-7 
8-10 
11+ 
Total per cent 
Number of cases 
Average no. of 
years of schooling 
5-9 
-
100 
-
-
-
100 
50 
2.3 
10- 14 
-
9.4 
67 .2 
23.4 
-
100 
64 
6.4 
Current age (years) 
15-19 20-29 
0.9 3.4 
- 5.0 
10.4 23 .5 
73.6 47 .5 
15 .1 20 .5 
100 100 
106 238 
9.6 8.7 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ 
17.0 30.9 65 .3 83.7 
19.3 28 .9 15.3 10.9 
30.3 28 .9 15 .3 4.3 
28 .8 11.3 4.2 1.1 
4.4 - -
-
100 100 100 100 
135 97 72 92 
5.6 3.6 1.8 0.6 
Educational levels of Vettuvan males are given in Table 5.16. In 1997, among the 
men, in the age cohort 60 years and over, about 66 per cent had no school 
education compared to less than 2 per cent in the age cohort 20-29 years. But the 
levels of education showed a marked increase in the age cohort 50-59 and below. 
In the age cohorts 30-39 and below the percentage of those with no schooling was 
less than 10. The percentage of men in the younger age cohorts with more years of 
schooling steadily increases. About 65 per cent in the age group 15-19 had high 
school education compared to only about 4 per cent in age cohort 60 years and 
over. The average number of years of schooling rose from 1.5 years in the age 
cohort 60 and over, to about 8.5 years in the age cohort 15-19 years. The average 
All 
ages 
21.8 
16.7 
22.7 
30.4 
8.3 
100 
854 
5.7 
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length of schooling of Vettuvan men in 1997 was 6 years. 
Table 5 .16: Distribution of Vettuvan males ( 5 years and above) by educational 
levels, Engandiyour, 1997 
Years of 
schooling 5-9 10-14 
Current age 
15-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ 
All 
ages 
No schooling 0.9 3.5 1.5 7.4 14.0 31.8 66.2 12.1 
1-4 100 14.8 1.1 3.0 14.3 20.7 33.3 19.7 18.0 
5-7 - 58.3 19.7 28.6 36.6 39.7 19.7 9.8 30.8 
8-10 - 25.9 65.1 54.3 39.7 24.8 15.2 4.2 34.7 
11+ - 10.5 12.6 1.9 0.8 - -
Total per cent 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
No. of cases 48 108 86 199 161 121 66 71 
Average no. 2.3 6.3 8.5 8.4 6.5 5.4 3.4 1.5 
of years of 
schooling 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
A comparison of male and female educational levels suggests that the educational 
transition began earlier among the males. However, although the educational 
transition started later among females, the pace of transition was faster than for 
males. This is evident from the more-or-less similar educational levels of males 
and females in the age cohort 30-39 and below in 1997. The mean number of years 
of schooling for males in 1997 was 6.0, and for females 5.7. The slightly higher 
level of schooling for males is due to the lower number of males than females in 
the 'no school' category in the higher age cohorts. 
5.3.6 Occupational status of the Vettuvans 
The major occupations of the Vettuvans under the caste system were coconut-
picking and other agriculture-related work. Under the tenancy arrangements the 
entire Vettuvan family was the workforce of their landlord. The work of a tenant 
family included agriculture, caring for domestic animals, performing household 
work, and any other work demanded by the landlord. With the abolition of tenancy 
4.4 
100 
862 
6.0 
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Vettuvans became free to decide for whom. they would work and what work they 
would do. No penalty could be imposed on a Vettuvan for not working for any 
particular family, including his previous landlord. Thus, it was the abolition of 
tenancy as a corollary of the land reform., which provided the basis for the 
occupational mobility of the Vettuvans. 
However, without ample job opportunities it would have been very difficult for the 
Vettuvans to avoid a backlash from. their previous landlords. The construction 
boom. generated by the Gulf migration in the village was able to absorb those 
Vettuvan families who left their previous landlord. During the 1980s Vettuvans 
worked mainly as helpers in the construction industry, as they had no other 
construction skill. By the late 1990s, an occupational transition, from. traditional to 
modern occupations, seems to have taken place. Table 5.17 shows that the 
percentage of m.en in labouring had been declining. For example, in the age cohort 
50-60 nearly two-thirds of m.en were labourers com.pared to slightly over one-third 
in the age cohort 20-29. Thus, more and more younger m.en were leaving 
labouring. An increasing trend towards skilled work, on the other hand, was 
observed in the younger ages. For example, the skilled workers in the age cohort 
20-29 com.prised nearly two-fifths, com.pared to only 3 per cent in the age cohort 
50-59. This is another remarkable change. As indicated earlier, job opportunities as 
a result of the Gulf migration were considerable. The specific areas in which the 
Gulf migration provided jobs included construction and transport-related industry. 
Construction-related industry included electricians, carpenters, masons, welders, 
plumbers, and contractors. The transport sector jobs include drivers and auto-
m.echanics. In 1997 the majority of jobs in the construction and transport industry 
in the village were occupied by V ettuvans. It m.ay be recalled here that 40 taxis and 
70 auto-three-wheelers were available to hire for public use, apart from. the public 
bus services and private cars. It is comm.on in the automobile workshops to see 
young school dropouts working as trainees. Considering the high wages in the 
unskilled labour market in the village, automobile training at private workshops 
m.ay appear irrational to an outsider. To become a fully trained auto-mechanic 
would take not less than five years of training. These trainees did not receive 
wages or benefits in the first two or three years, except morning tea, and some 
money during important festivals such as onam or Christmas. The following is a 
sum.m.ary of an interview with the mother of a Vettuvan mechanic who worked in a 
town in Tamil Nadu (Kerala's neighbouring state). This sum.m.ary demonstrates the 
importance given to a non-labouring occupation, even if it is poorly paid. The 26 
year-old auto-mechanic was a high school dropout from. a local school. Since then 
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he had been an apprentice in several workshops in the village, in a nearby town, 
and in another state. During the previous 9-10 years of apprenticeship, his two 
brothers and mother paid for his food, lodging, transport, and clothes. According to 
his mother, who was a widow, this was possible because his two brothers were 
labourers. With the assistance from these two brothers their mother could meet the 
marriage and dowry expenses of their sisters, and buy gifts for their children. Yet 
the mother was proud of the son who was an auto-mechanic. 
What then motivated young Vettuvans such as this to go for lower-paid skilled 
work compared with highly paid unskilled work? Only the attitudes of the 
Vettuvans could explain this behaviour; economics has a lesser role. Interviews and 
observation in Engandiyour revealed that an unskilled labourer has lower status 
than a helper in the automobile workshop; the driver of an auto-three-wheeler 
driver had a higher status than an unskilled labourer, even though an unskilled 
labourer receives higher wages than an auto-three-wheeler driver or a trainee in an 
automobile workshop. The marriage market was yet another place where skilled 
and semi-skilled workers were more in demand. They even demanded higher 
dowry. To some extent this was due to the fact that most of the unskilled workers 
were much less educated than the skilled workers. Although government and 
public sector jobs were reserved for the scheduled castes, the study revealed that 
this has not yielded any worthwhile effect on the number of Vettuvans from 
Engandiyour working in those sectors: only 3.3 per cent of males and 3.7 per cent 
of females aged 20-59 were in government or public sector jobs. The reason was 
simple: the number of applicants greatly outnumbered the availability of jobs. It 
may be important to mention at this stage that there were several hundred migrants 
from the neighbouring state, Tamil Nadu, working in the village, mostly as masons 
and construction assistants. It was reported that higher wages in Kerala than Tamil 
Nadu attracted these migrant workers. It was a widely held opinion in the village 
that these migrant workers were not 'as good' as the local masons or workers, and 
that people still preferred to have their construction done by the local workers if 
possible. Villagers also complained that migrant workers brought children of 
around 12-15 years of age to work for low wages. Villagers insisted that they did 
not want their work done by children. Thus, the migrant workers did not make a 
serious impact on the local labour market in displacing the local workers or 1n 
reducing wages significantly. 
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Table 5.17: Occupational structure of Vettuvan males, Engandiyour, 1997 
Age group (years) 
Category 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ All Ages 
Labouring 5.6 37.7 56.9 62.4 66.2 42.8 40.2 
Small business 0.5 9.5 12.5 12.8 13 .8 5.7 8.5 
Skilled work 13.5 38.2 22.5 10.3 3.1 1.4 19.0 
Professionals 0.5 2.5 1.9 6.8 3.1 - 2.4 
Not doing any job 17 .1 11.0 6.2 7.6 13.8 50.0 14.7 
Student 62.7 1.0 -
- -
- 15.3 
Total per cent 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total 193 199 160 117 65 70 804 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
Women, too, were part of the labour force of the landlord under the caste system. 
When tenancy was abolished, women also became free to work wherever they 
wished. The occupations of surveyed women are given in Table 5.18. Overall, 
women had withdrawn from labouring; they were predominantly engaged in 
household duties. Among women, in the age cohort 50 years and over, labouring is 
less common than in the age groups 30-50 years. This highlights the following 
changes in the Vettuvan community: older women withdraw from labouring as 
their children see it as inappropriate for their mothers to continue to work as 
labourers; men feel more status if their women folk are not working as labourers; 
and as living standards improved among the Vettuvans, women were needed at 
home to meet the demands of the household. A higher percentage of labouring 
women in the age group 40-49 partly indicates the life-cycle phase where children 
could be still in school and the husbands' parents may have retired from work, thus 
needing economic support from the women. This group of women may, at the 
same time, have support from their husbands' parents with household work and 
thus be free to work. The age cohort 20-29 showed a remarkably low proportion 
working as labourers. While this had some relation to the family life cycle, an 
increasing trend in structural changes in occupation for this group is evident. For 
example, more than one-tenth of women in this age group entered skilled or 
professional services, for instance as teachers, nurses, shop-assistants, and clerks. 
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As in the case of males, labouring paid a substantially higher wage than non-
labouring occupations. For example, in 1997, a wage-earning female labourer 
received Rs. 80-100 a day, while the monthly salary of a shop assistant was 
between Rs. 250 and Rs. 350. If transport and other costs were taken into account, 
there was hardly any money left over. Again the question is why Vettuvans take 
low-earning higher-status jobs compared to high-earning low-status jobs. Again, 
the reason is attitudinal. Low-profile jobs keep status lower, while high-profile jobs 
keep status higher. A desk job was considered of higher status than work that 
required standing or physical activities. Similarly, a job that required pen and paper 
was considered a higher status job than a job that did not. In my study, no women 
who had a high-school education were found working as labourers. In the age 
cohort 10-19, less than 2 per cent of women were engaged in labouring. The 
majority of the women in this age cohort were students, or limited to household 
work. Among the Vettuvans, expansion of education was pushing them to white-
collar jobs or confining them to the home. One of the important reasons for women 
not engaging in labouring was, as in the case of men, its association with lower 
status. It did not raise a father's status to have his daughter working as a labourer, 
or for a husband to have a wife engaged in labouring. 
Table 5.18: Occupational structure of Vettuvan women, Engandiyour, 1997 
Age group (years) 
Category 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ All ages 
Labouring 1.8 10.9 28 .9 39.6 18.3 7.8 14.7 
Small business 
- -
- 1.0 1.4 - 0.2 
Skilled work 3.0 6.3 4.4 1.0 1.4 - 3.6 
Professionals 1.2 4.6 3.7 2.1 2.8 - 2.8 
Housework 41.3 76.9 63 .0 56.3 76.1 82.1 66.3 
Not doing any work - -
- -
- 10.1 10.1 
Student 52.7 1.3 - -
-
- 11.4 
Total per cent 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total number of cases 167 238 135 96 71 90 797 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
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5.3.7 The implementation of land reform and changes in Vettuvans' status 
In order to understand the transformation of the Vettuvans' social and economic 
world we must go back more than 25 years, to the land reform of the early 1970s. 
A notable change in the status of the Vettuvans in Engandiyour took place in the 
1970s when the land reform provided the Vettuvans with small parcels of land on 
which their huts were located. In Engandiyour, the land reform was implemented 
over a period of eight years. However, most of the land reform was performed 
within four years from January 1970, the official commencement date of the Land 
Reform Act (see Table 5.19). According to interviews with Panchayath officials, 
Vettuvans, and previous landlords, each Vettuvan household in Engandiyour 
received five to 20 cents of land under the land reform24 . According to the village 
officials, every single Vettuvan tenant family received land from the land reform. 
The land reform in Engandiyour was thus complete as far as the tenant Vettuvans 
were concerned. 
Table 5 .19: Percentage distribution of Vettuvan households that received land 
through land reform according to the year of receipt of land, Engandiyour 
Year of recei.2t of land 
1970-1974 
1975-1978 
No answer/do not know/others 
Total 
Note: N = 340 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
% of Vettuvan families 
83 
14 
3 
100 
This reform probably made more difference to the Vettuvans' aspirations than to 
their immediate economic welfare. It was remarkable for V ettuvans to gain 
ownership of the huts and the land that they were unable to own for generations. 
The elderly Vettuvans were overwhelmed when discussing the transfer of land with 
us. 
24In the Vettuvan Household Survey a question was asked on the land each family received 
through land reform. Some households were formed by partition since the implementation of land 
reform, and these households did not report that the land they had was received through land 
reform because they inherited the land from their parents. Therefore, no detailed statistics on the 
amount of land received by each Vettuvan household through land reform could be obtained from 
the Vettuvan Household Survey. 
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The land reform had a significant impact on the landlord-tenant relationship in 
Engandiyour. With land reform, the former landlords lost their traditional grip on 
their previous tenants, mostly the Vettuvans. Former landlords could no longer 
demand subordinate behaviour from the Vettuvans. Under tenancy arrangements 
and the caste system, the Vettuvans used to address their landlords as achan, 
'father', and their wives as amma, 'mother'. They even had to address their 
landlords' children with great respect, mon, son and mol, daughter. Interviews 
revealed that this usage had been disappearing from the village since the late 
1970s, and had completely disappeared by 1997,. In 1997, the Vettuvans addressed 
an elderly man from an upper caste as chetan, 'elder brother', and a senior member 
of the upper caste as achachan, 'grandfather'. The Vettuvans used these expressions 
to address their own caste-fellows as well. These behavioural changes of the 
Vettuvans signal their desire to narrow social distance from other communities in 
the village, as well as to prove social mobility. By 1997, upper-caste villagers had 
no option but to accept the behaviour of the Vettuvans for the following reasons. 
Land reform provided the Vettuvans with a sense of security as well as self-
respect. Security meant that they had their own land, and nobody could evict them 
or demand subordinate behaviour. Self-respect meant that they were no longer 
somebody's tenant and were thus free from the obligations of tenancy. In summary, 
since the 1970s they had been free from the bondage of tenancy and the traditional 
caste system. How the changes brought about by the land reform could sustain and 
further improve the social and economic situation of the Vettuvans is discussed in 
the following section. 
5.3.8 Gulf migration from the village and changes in Vettuvans' status 
At first sight, the direct effect of Gulf migration on the Vettuvans may seem 
limited, as few have themselves gone to the Gulf. In spite of this, the migration has 
been critically important. The migration from the village to the Gulf countries that 
began in the mid-1970s has been yet another factor that has helped the Vettuvans 
to improve their social position in Engandiyour by removing caste-system 
subordination. Until about 1990, the Vettuvans did not participate in the Gulf 
migration. Their poor economic and social status played an important role in their 
non-participation. Interviews with elderly villagers, returned Gulf migrants and 
earlier studies revealed that in the 1970s illegal boat operators charged Rs. 500 per 
person as a transport charge to the Gulf (Saseendran, 1986). This was far beyond 
the financial ability of an average Vettuvan in those days. In the 1980s, migration 
to the Gulf became legal and it required a visa. Interviews with families of recent 
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migrants to the Gulf revealed that in 1996-97, recruitment agents charged around 
Rs. 50,000 for a visa, again a huge amount for the Vettuvans. Apart from economic 
reasons, the low social status of the Vettuvans meant that upper-caste Hindus, 
Muslims, and Christians were reluctant to help them to obtain visas, because this 
would result in sharing the accommodation and other facilities25 . 
Although the Vettuvans did not take part, the indirect influence of Gulf migration 
on their social and economic life has been enormous. Gulf migration worked in 
two ways to influence the social status of the Vettuvans. Firstly, it generated 
demand for labour in the village as construction of new houses and other allied 
activities in the village increased rapidly after the 1970s. During the 1990s, 200 
new houses were estimated to have been constructed in the village each year 
(Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996). Interviews with senior members of the 
village indicated that the house construction boom in the village had begun in the 
1970s. Studies conducted elsewhere in Kerala showed that house construction 
boomed generally after the Gulf migration in the 1970s (Jeffrey, 1992:204-205; 
Mathew and Nair, 1978: 1151). Since the labour supply in Engandiyour has been 
less than the demand since the 1970s owing to the construction boom, the 
Vettuvans were able to refuse to work for a particular person or family should they 
find their behaviour inappropriate to their expectations. This situation was 
reinforced by the changes brought by land reform, education, and other social 
changes that occurred in the village. Furthermore, the Vettuvans were the only 
village community that specialised in coconut-picking. If they refused to do this 
job, it was very hard to find people with the same skills in the village. The higher 
demand for labour in general, as well as for coconut-pickers in the village, 
probably put the Vettuvans more in demand. A group in high demand is more 
difficult to maltreat. 
Secondly, Gulf migration paved the way for many Vettuvans to diversify their 
occupations from the traditional occupation of coconut-picking and other 
agriculture-related work to skilled and semi-skilled occupations such as taxi-
driving, electricity, carpentry, masonry, welding, plumbing, and contracting. 
Young non-Vettuvan men were working in the Gulf countries, forcing their 
families to depend fully on the labouring class for any major work. This situation 
further shrank the already lean unskilled labour class, and led to a further increase 
in the demand for unskilled labour in the village. This again had a tremendous 
251t is the responsibility of the person helping an applicant to obtain a visa to arrange 
accommodation and food till the applicant gets a job and settles down. 
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effect on the behaviour of employers towards the labouring class. It was very 
common in the village to see people wanting to hire labour frequently visiting the 
houses of the Vettuvans, as Vettuvans often do not work on a previously agreed 
date. Again, employers had no way of forcing the Vettuvans, who comprise a 
majority of the labouring class, to work on committed dates. Any such attempt 
would result in a total boycott of any future work for a particular family, or the 
labourers would demand exorbitant wages as a punishment for this behaviour. 
5.4 Interaction of Vettuvans with non-Vettuvans in Engandiyour: 
the social status of Vettuvans in 1997 
The relative social status of Vettuvans has manifestly improved in recent decades. 
This section attempts to assess how far the old caste-derived inhibitions and 
restrictions have been eliminated. To assess the social status of the Vettuvans in 
1997 in Engandiyour a question about visits to the nearest neighbour was asked of 
each family. The percentage of Vettuvan families that visited their nearest 
neighbours during the reference period is presented in Table 5.20. The reference 
period was the two months before the Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. Table 
5.20 shows that, overall, during the reference period, slightly more than a quarter 
of the Vettuvan families did not visit their nearest neighbour. Table 5.20 also 
shows the caste or religion of the nearest neighbour. A quarter of the Vettuvan 
families did not visit their Vettuvan neighbour during the reference period. 
Certainly, this could not be due to the caste factor as there is no special hierarchy 
among the Vettuvans26. Informal interviews and observations revealed that 
brothers or close relatives who lived in nearby houses (as a cluster) on a small plot 
of land, mostly inherited from their parents, often had disputes over property and 
hence had very little interaction. Only about 10 per cent of Vettuvan families did 
not visit their Ezavan neighbours. The major reasons reported by the Vettuvans for 
not visiting their Ezavan neighbours were disputes over property, the inferior 
economic position of the Vettuvans, their poor educational levels, and incidence of 
infectious diseases of the Vettuvans, such as tuberculosis and skin diseases. 
Vettuvans had low levels of interaction with the Hindu fishermen and their Muslim 
neighbours. The major reasons reported by Vettuvans for not visiting a Muslim or 
Hindu fisherman's family included the economic inferiority of the Vettuvans, lack 
of any need to visit, and disputes over property. Among those who had a Christian 
or Nair neighbour, about a quarter of the Vettuvans did not visit them. The main 
26Though not significant, divisions according to education and occupation are gradually 
emergmg. 
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reason for Vettuvans not visiting their Christian and Nair neighbours was the lack 
of a need to visit them. According to the Vettuvans, it was no longer caste status as 
such that was hindering their interaction with non-Vettuvans, but their poor 
economic and educational status. 
Table 5.20: Percentage of Vettuvan families that interacted with their neighbours, 
Engandiyour, 1997 
Neighbour 
Vettuvan Ezava Muslim Fisherman Christian Nair Total 
Vettuvans who visited 75 89 74 61 65 65 71 
Vettuvans who did not 25 11 26 39 35 35 29 
visit 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
The percentage of neighbours who visited the Vettuvan families is displayed in 
Table 5.21. Nearly one-third of the Vettuvans' neighbours did not interact with the 
Vettuvans. While Vettuvans had the highest interaction with Ezavas compared to 
other communities, the Ezavas did not show the same level of interaction with their 
Vettuvan neighbours. This asymmetry indicates that some Ezavas were not visiting 
their Vettuvan neighbours, even though the Vettuvans were visiting them. 
According to the Vettuvans, their own poor economic conditions were responsible 
for this. 
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Table 5.21: Percentage of Vettuvans' neighbours who interacted with Vettuvan 
families, Engandiyour, 1997 
Neighbour 
Vettuvan Ezava Muslim Fisherman Christian Nair Total 
Visited Vettuvan 76 67 73 61 60 61 69 
Did not visit Vettuvan 24 33 27 39 40 39 31 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
To understand the purposes of visits of Vettuvans and their neighbours, each 
Vettuvan household was asked to provide the most important reason for visiting 
their nearest neighbour and for the neighbour visiting them during the reference 
period. The details that emerged from the analysis are summarised in Table 5.22. 
Overall, the visits of Vettuvans to their neighbours were limited to general 
conversations. In over half of the cases, a Vettuvan family visited a Vettuvan 
neighbour for general conversation. Borrowing money and goods was the reason in 
one-fifth of the cases. Interviews with elderly Vettuvans indicated that there had 
been strong economic co-operation among the Vettuvan families in the 1960s. 
Higher wages and availability of shops in every corner of the village probably 
contribute to the lack of economic co-operation between families today. Other 
reasons for the Vettuvans visiting a Vettuvan family were to watch television, to 
fetch water, and to attend a social function. Important reasons for a Vettuvan 
visiting an Ezavan family included general conversation, to borrow money or 
goods, to watch television, and to fetch water. The reasons for Vettuvans visiting 
their Muslim neighbours included general conversation, to watch television, and to 
attend social functions. The reasons for Vettuvans visiting their Christian 
neighbours included general conversation and to watch television. Vettuvan 
families' visits to Nair families were limited to fetching water. 
When Vettuvans visited their non-Vettuvan neighbours, conversation took place 
outside the homes of non-Vettuvans. Normally, a college-educated Vettuvan or a 
white-collar job holder was given a chair to sit on at a non-Vettuvan's house. 
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However, when Vettuvans visited non-Vettuvans upon an invitation to a social 
function, they were received without regard to educational and economic status. 
Table 5.22: Percentage distribution of reasons for Vettuvans visiting their nearest 
neighbour, Engandiyour, 1997 
Reasons to visit 
Type of visit General Work-related Attend Watch TV Borrow Fetch water Others 
conversation functions money/ 
onl oods 
Vettuvan visiting a 53 2 10 2 20 3 
Vettuvan family 
Vettuvan visiting an 37 10 4 14 16 13 
Ezavan family 
Vettuvan visiting a 75 - - 25 
Christian family 
Vettuvan visiting a Nair - - - - - 100 
family 
Vettuvan visiting a 48 5 10 29 - 8 
Muslim famil 
Note: - indicates no cases in that category; all rows add to 100 per cent. 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
The reasons for the nearest non-Vettuvan families visiting a Vettuvan family are 
displayed in Table 5.23. About 43 per cent of the Ezavan neighbours visited 
Vettuvans for general conversation, and slightly more than a quarter visited for 
work-related reasons. Another 13 per cent of Ezavan neighbours visited a Vettuvan 
family to borrow money or goods. About half of the Christian neighbours visited 
Vettuvan families for work-related reasons, and a quarter for general conversation. 
Muslim neighbours visited Vettuvan families mostly for conversation and to attend 
social functions. Nair neighbours visited their Vettuvan neighbours only for work-
related reasons. 
The Vettuvan Household Survey also revealed that the conversations between the 
Vettuvans and the non-Vettuvans took place outside the homes of the Vettuvans. 
Poor housing conditions and lack of furniture were reported as reasons for the 
conversation taking place outside their homes. If the Vettuvan family was educated 
and economically better off, non-Vettuvans sat and talked about the purpose of 
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their visit, if any. 
Table 5.23: Percentage distribution of reasons for nearest neighbour visiting 
Vettuvan family, Engandiyour, 1997 
Reasons for visiting 
Type of visit General Work-related Attend Watch TV Borrow Fetch water Othersa 
Nair visiting Vettuvan 
Ezavan visiting 
Vettuvan 
Christian visiting 
Vettuvan 
Muslim visiting 
Vetttuvan 
conversation 
43 
23 
50 
100 
27 
46 
13 
functions money/ 
only goods 
5 5 13 -
8 8 
31 
Note: aTo seek help for any matter, emergency; - indicates no case in that category; all rows add 
to 100 per cent. 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
The analysis provided in this section reveals that a significant proportion of 
Vettuvans and non-Vettuvans visited each other. However, there was still a 
distance between the Vettuvans and non-Vettuvans, mostly in economic , and 
educational levels. The analysis and interviews with Vettuvans indicate that unless 
the educational and economic positions of the Vettuvans improve, the social gap 
between the Vettuvans and the non-Vettuvans in the village will most likely remain 
unchanged in the years to come. Although the economic and social situation of the 
Vettuvans has improved since the traditional caste system changed in the village, 
their relative economic position compared to the non-Vettuvan communities in 
1997 remained almost unchanged. 
Qualitative methods, including interviews, focus-group discussions, and participant 
observations were used to assess the social and economic status of the Vettuvans in 
Engandiyour. Participant observation at various functions in the village revealed 
that Vettuvans participated in various social functions of non-Vettuvans. These 
occasions included marriages, death ceremonies, birthdays and house warming. On 
such occasions, Vettuvans sat and dined with everyone who participated in the 
function, irrespective of caste or religion. This would have been unthinkable up to 
the 1960s. In those days Vettuvans received only the leftovers from functions 
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organised by non-Vettuvans. Vettuvans were never invited to any non-Vettuvan 
social functions, and if they attended it was to work. Everything has changed since 
the 1970s when significant changes in the social and economic relations in 
Engandiyour began. In 1997, without a formal invitation, no Vettuvan would 
attend any function organised by either a non-Vettuvan or a Vettuvan. 
An educated Vettuvan family in the village interacted with non-Vettuvan families 
more frequently and intensively than a less educated Vettuvan family. If a 
Vettuvan family was educated, its economic and caste status was less important to 
interaction with non-Vettuvans. The value attached to education in the village was 
so great that educated families had become more respectable than economically 
prosperous families. 
Compared to education, slightly less important was the association between 
economic position of the Vettuvan family and their interaction with non-Vettuvans. 
Interviews revealed that economically better off Vettuvan families without 
education did not have frequent social and economic interaction with non-
Vettuvans. An exception was the richest family in the village which, ironically, 
was Vettuvan. It was found that this Vettuvan family was paid respect in the 
village by the upper-caste communities. Upper-caste people visited this family's 
temple during a festival that the Vettuvans organised each year, spending several 
thousands of rupees. 
No element of caste per se could be seen as a point to discriminate against 
Vettuvans in the village. The Vettuvans' status in 1997 was that of the working 
class. What made the Vettuvans different from the rest of the communities in the 
village in 1997 was their poor economic, educational and occupational status. The 
awareness of this situation strongly fuels aspirations for further social mobility 
among the Vettuvans. 
189 
5.5 Conclusions 
In the present chapter the micro-institutional environment of Engandiyour village 
been described with a view to assessing how it helps shape the mobility, costs and 
benefits of children, and ultimately the fertility patterns. Overall, Engandiyour, the 
study village, represents a microcosm of Kerala. For example, as in Kerala, in the 
early decades of the twentieth century Engandiyour displayed social and economic 
relationships based on the principles of the caste system. The subsistence economy 
and the caste system prevailing in those days pushed the scheduled castes and other 
lower-caste communities to the lowest social and economic strata of society. The 
Vettuvans, who form the largest scheduled-caste community in Engandiyour were 
untouchables and unapproachables to upper-caste Hindus until the early decades of 
the twentieth century. The reform activities throughout Kerala seems to have 
abolished some of the caste-system-based subordinate behaviour of the lower 
castes in Engandiyour in the early decades of the twentieth century. However, in 
the 1950s and 1960s the Vettuvans continued to suffer from economic 
backwardness and social seclusion. In the 1970s, when the land reform was 
implemented in Engandiyour, the caste-system-based social and economic 
relationships began to change rapidly. During the late 1970s, the village witnessed 
several behavioural changes, occupational changes, and an increase in wages 
among the Vettuvans. Thus, a non-traditional caste system society in Engandiyour 
evolved in the 1970s replacing the traditional caste system, providing opportunities 
for social and economic mobility to the Vettuvans. 
A major factor that made these changes sustainable and opened the possibility of 
further improvements was the Gulf migration from Engandiyour. From the late 
1970s this further consolidated the caste system changes brought about by land 
reform. Although the Vettuvans did not take part in the Gulf migration in a 
significant way, the remittances into the village brought significant changes in their 
social and economic status. High demand for Vettuvans' labour and their economic 
independence in the village were the pivotal forces that changed the social 
subordination of the Vettuvans in Engandiyour. These two forces, the land reform 
and Gulf migration, reinforced each other in making Engandiyour a non-traditional 
caste system society. In 1997, caste in Engandiyour is limited to official purposes 
and not a significant part of the daily life of people. In 1997, no one could prevent 
a Vettuvan from taking up any prestigious occupation. The effect of this new 
institutional setting on the Vettuvans' aspirations for further social mobility and 
thereby on their fertility is the subject of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 6 
The Vettuvan Fa01ily: 
Caste-System Changes, Marriage, 
Family Systems, 
Sex-Roles, and Mobility Strategies 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 showed that caste in Engandiyour is no longer the sole determinant of 
each individual's life chances. However, although caste-based bondage has been 
abolished, the relative social and economic position of the Vettuvans remained little 
changed in 1997. With caste-system changes, however, it became possible for the 
V ettuvans to climb the social and economic ladder and to aspire for social and 
economic advancement. This aspiration of the Vettuvans is examined in the context 
of family systems in the present chapter. The objective of this chapter is to examine 
the family systems of the Vettuvans in the traditional and non-traditional caste 
systems: it examines the sex-roles in the families in the traditional-and non-
traditional caste systems, the position of Vettuvan women and men in the family and 
the implications for fertility. The old-age support received by the elderly Vettuvans 
is examined in this chapter to understand the role of family. The constraints posed 
by the land reform and Gulf migration to family division are discussed as a 
motivation for fertility control. The strategies of the Vettuvan families for their 
social and economic mobility are discussed in the last section of the chapter. But to 
begin, the chapter looks at the role of marriage in the new institutional setting that 
faces the Vettuvans. 
6.2 Marriage practices of the Vettuvans 
6.2.1 Marriage practices in the 1950s and the 1960s 
Interviews with elderly Vettuvans revealed that among the Vettuvans, particularly 
the poorest, the form of marriage practice during the 1950s and 1960s was mostly 
oodipokal1, or elopement. The traditional marriage practices of the Vettuvans at the 
beginning of the twentieth century described by Iyer (1909) and Thurston (1909), 
however, did not mention elopement-type marriages. It may be possible that 
elopement-marriage had become common only by the 1950s and 1960s. During my 
field work I interviewed men and women who eloped in the late 1960s2. They said 
that they had eloped because their families were very poor and it might not have 
been possible to have an arranged marriage. Interviews with elderly Vettuvans 
revealed that elopement details were usually known to parents and/or close relatives 
of the bride and groom, but they ignored them because it was understood that this 
was the only way their daughters could get married. After elopement the couple 
usually stayed with one of the married sisters of the groom3; the usual practice was 
to stay there for two or three days. By that time most of the relatives and friends of 
both bride and the groom would have learnt about the elopement; after a few days, 
generally the bride's brother or a close relative would visit her and invite them to 
their home. If such things happened it was understood that their marriage had been 
recognised by the bride's family. If the alliance that the son made was according to 
their status (and not affected by an inter-family rivalry) , then the groom's parents 
would recognise the marriage, and they were able return to his parents' house and 
live there. But if the son made an alliance with a rival family, often the groom's 
parents would not permit the couple to live with them, and in that case the couple 
would live with the bride's family and eventually build a separate hut. 
1Meaning 'run away'. 
2It was not practically possible to find out how many couples in the present sample had married by 
elopement because they did not like to disclose this information. In 1997 elopement was considered 
by Vettuvans as an inappropriate and lower-status way of marriage. It was through key informants 
that I could identify eight men who were married by elopement. In one case when the key 
informant reported that a particular couple was married by elopement, the couple denied this and 
were unhappy about the informant's view of their marriage. 
3Elopement and arranged marriages were not permitted within the same lineage among the 
Vettuvans. While cross-cousin elopements were permitted, parallel cousins were considered 
brothers and sisters. Widow remarriage was forbidden for women. But men could marry their wife's 
sister should they have no children, or should their wife die. Divorce has been uncommon among 
the Vettuvans. 
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Elopement by its very nature was difficult to practise for very young boys and girls, 
say below 17 or 18 years, for the following reasons. First, the opportunity to meet 
and form friendships was possible only when both men and women went to work 
without being accompanied by parents. Secondly, the decision to elope involved 
courage, determination, and some money. Taking into account the economic and 
social conditions that prevailed in the village at the time, only couples in their 
twenties could make elopement a manageable prospect. This suggests that the poor 
economic conditions that prevailed among the Vettuvans actually raised the age at 
marriage rather than lowering it. The median age at first marriage of men and 
women aged 45-49 was 19 and 26 years, respectively4 . The age at marriage given by 
Iyer for Vettuvan women was 12-15 years and for men 16-20 years in the early 
twentieth century (Iyer, 1909: 129). Since age at marriage at the beginning of the 
twentieth century was lower, it may be possible to argue that in those days the 
Vettuvans did not practise elopement. However, further investigation is needed to 
confirm this argument. 
In the 1950s and 1960s arranged marriages were usually performed among Vettuvan 
families who could afford the expenses of marriage. Such marriages were usually 
arranged at early ages, often below 18 years for women and below 20 years for 
men. Until the late 1970s the economic position of the Vettuvans in the village was 
very weak as they had not yet recovered from the economic subordination posed by 
the caste system. The changes that have taken place in the marriage practices of the 
Vettuvans since their economic and social position has improved are discussed in 
the next section. 
6.2.2 Marriage practices in non-traditional caste system 
Marriage by elopement has disappeared from the Vettuvan community since the 
1970s, and arranged marriages5 have been common. Marriages have been 
monogamous and near-universal, but not early. Although cross-cousin marriages 
were socially approved, such marriages are reported to be very rare. In fact, 
marriage between relatives in Kerala as a whole according to the 1992-93 NFHS 
was only about 9 per cent of ever-married women compared with 16.4 in India as a 
whole (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:52; IIPS, 1995:87). There appears 
4In contrast, in some of the North Indian states child marriages were very common among the lower 
socio-economic sections of the society. In fact, one reason for child marriages being promoted in 
those states has been to reduce the burden of dowry. As the age of the bride increases, so too does 
the dowry (Misra and Saseendran, 1987). 
5Marriages organised by parents of both bride and groom. 
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to be an urge among the V ettuvans to conduct marriages similar to those of caste 
Hindus in Engandiyour. Elopement is considered by the V ettuvans as an inferior 
way of marriage6• This may be because elopement was practised when Vettuvans 
were both socially and economically backward. Changes in marriage practices 
probably were felt by Vettuvans as an essential step in their social mobility. Along 
with changes in marriage practice came the introduction of dowry 7 . It was found 
during the field work that even a poor V ettuvan spent much more than he could 
comfortably afford for his daughter's marriage. The major part of the marriage 
expense was the stridanam, the dowry. In 1997 the standard dowry for a labourer 
was ten pavan (80 grams of 22 ct gold) and 10,000 rupees among the Vettuvans. 
The common expression for this standard stridanam was pat hum pat hum, ten 
pavans of gold and ten thousand rupees. Marriage lunch expenses would be around 
Rs.5,000 to 7,500 depending on the number of guests. If the groom's house was 
more than 3-4 kilometres away from the bride's, there would be an additional 2,000 
rupees for transport. Other expenses, such as printing invitation cards, making the 
pandal (stage) and decorating, can cost about Rs. 1,500. Over and above all these, 
one week after marriage, the bride's parents are supposed to give her a gift. During 
the field work the most common gift was a steel cupboard; the cheapest cupboard 
cost about 4,000 rupees in 1997. The total expenses of marriage of a daughter for 
the Vettuvans thus could be something between 55,000 and 60,000 rupees. This was 
much more than the ability to pay of an average V ettuvan in 1997, and most of the 
money needed for such occasions was borrowed from various sources. In 1997 the 
average debt of a household that borrowed money for the marriage of their daughter 
was about Rs. 15,000. Since this was the debt amount at the time of the Vettuvan 
Household Survey, the actual money borrowed for marriage could be higher than 
this, as these households may have already repaid some, particularly debt incurred in 
marriages which took place more than a year ago8. According to the Vettuvan 
Household Survey about 29 per cent of all the Vettuvan families surveyed had debt 
incurred from borrowing for the marriages of daughters. Since not all the 
households surveyed had such a marriage in the past five years, the actual 
percentage among those households which could have had a debt on daughters' 
marriage is likely to be higher than the 29 per cent. 
6For example, if an upper-caste Hindu marries by elopement, people would comment 'They have 
done like a Vettuvan'. 
7The equivalent term in Sanskrit is vara-dakshina, meaning 'gift to the bridegroom'. Over the 
centuries this has become an ingrained custom in Hindu society, whereby the parents of the bride 
have to give considerable sums of money, golden jewellery, vessels etc. Heavy expenditures are 
incurred by the parents at the time of the marriage of their daughter (Srinivasan, 1995:315). 
8 According to key informants, it takes one to five years to repay the loan taken for marriages 
among the Vettuvans. 
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Two important factors facilitated the extravagance in marriages among the 
Vettuvans: the effects of Gulf migration and land reforms9. The roles of these two 
factors in providing money for the Vettuvans to spend on marriages were often 
interlinked. After the land reform, virtually every Vettuvan family in the village 
owned some land. That meant they could do whatever they wanted with that land-
they could sell it, mortgage it, or rent it. Migration to the Gulf countries from the 
village, on the other hand, greatly increased effective money supply and thus raised 
land prices very high. Under such circumstances the Vettuvans could sell their land 
at higher prices or could mortgage it for a higher value. In either case they could get 
a major portion of the funds required for the marriage. 
6.2.3 Marital status and age at first marriage 
The marital status of Vettuvans as recorded in the Household Survey is shown in 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2. About two-fifths of males and slightly over a quarter of females 
were currently married. Early marriages were uncommon among the Vettuvans aged 
15 years and above. In the age group 15-19, 99 per cent of males and about 91 per 
cent of females were never-married. About 15 per cent of females and 5 per cent of 
males were unmarried in the age group 40 and over. 
Interviews and focus-group discussion with Vettuvans revealed that the most 
important reasons for both men and women not marrying in the V ettuvan 
community in Engandiyour were a physical handicap, poor health due to disease, or 
very poor economic conditions10• Physical problems for example, were paralysis due 
to polio, very poor health due to tuberculosis, or some other disease. Economic 
difficulty in marrying because parents had many daughters, and family 
responsibilities or obligations, are some of the reasons for men and women 
remaining unmarried 11 . 
The proportion of women widowed indicates that women began to lose their 
husbands from early ages. The proportion of women who were widowed was about 
7 per cent in the age group 30-34 which increased to over half for age 50 years and 
over. For men the proportion of widowers in the age group 50 and over was about 
9Chapter 5 gives a detailed account of Gulf migration and land reform in Engandiyour. 
10Some of the respondents in the study reported that in the past parents who had many daughters 
found even a minute handicap an excuse for them not to marry. 
11Similar findings were reported by Jayasree (1989). 
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11 per cent, a much lower level compared to women in the same age group as is 
expected given higher male mortality. There was only one case of divorce each for 
men and women in the study sample. 
Median age at marriage for males and females is given in the last column of Tables 
6.1 and 6.2. The median age at first marriage is used instead of the mean age at 
marriage because the median, unlike the mean, is not biased by age truncation. That 
means, in the age cohort 25-29 (Table 6.1) mean age of first marriage will be 
ultimately influenced by marriages that occur in this age cohort after the survey. But 
the median age at first marriage for the age cohort will not be so affected because 
more than 50 per cent of the women in the cohort were married before age 20. 
The median age at first marriage for women does not show any marked increase 
across various age cohorts. This confirms the suggestion made earlier in this chapter 
that the introduction of dowry and the desire of the Vettuvans to conduct the 
wedding in an expensive manner kept the marriage age at a higher level. The 
median age at first marriage of men shows a similar pattern to that of women. 
Table 6.1: Percentage distribution of Vettuvan women according to their 
marital status and median age at first marriage, Engandiyour, 1997 
Age of women at Never Currently Widowed Median age 
the time of survey married married at marriage 
(years) 
15-19a 91.3 8.7 -- nc 
20-24 51.0 49.0 -- nc 
25-29b 20.1 78.2 1.0 20 
30-34 14.0 78.9 7.0 20 
35-39 5.1 91.0 3.8 19 
40-44 9.6 79.0 11.5 20 
45-49 2.2 85.0 13.3 19 
50+ 3.6 45.1 50.6 n.a 
Total 28.3 57.6 14.0 19 
Notes: There was one case of divorce in the age group 25-29 for males. 
aNo marriage took place before age 15 years. bMore than 50 per cent of women in 
this age group were married by the age that defines the lower boundary of the age group. 
nc = not calculated because fewer than 50 per cent in this age cohort were unmarried. 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
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Table 6.2: Percentage distribution of Vettuvan men according to their marital 
status and median age at first marriage, Engandiyour, 1997 
Age group 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34a 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50+ 
Total 
Never 
married 
99.0 
94.0 
57.0 
25.0 
14.0 
1.8 
2.0 
1.5 
38.5 
Currently 
married 
1.0 
6.0 
42.0 
75.0 
86.0 
92.8 
98.0 
87.6 
58.8 
Widowed Median age at 
marnage 
-- nc 
-- nc 
-- nc 
-- 25.9 
-- 26.5 
5.4 24.7 
-- 25.9 
10.9 
2.6 24.6 
Notes: There was one case of divorce in the age group 25-29 for males. 
nc = not calculated because fewer than 50 per cent in this age cohort were unmarried. 
aMore than 50 per cent of men in this age group were married by the age that defines 
lower boundary. 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
The singulate mean age at marriage, SMAM, calculated using age-specific 
proportions never married for age groups 15-19 to 45-49 (United Nations, 
1998:225-229) for males and females is shown in Table 6.3. The value of SMAM in 
1997 was 29 .2 years for males and 23. 9 for females. According to the 1992-93 
NFHS the SMAM values for Kerala males and females were 28.1 and 22.1, 
respectively. It may be noted here that the minimum legal marriage age in India 
stipulated by the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1978 was 18 years for females and 
21 years for males (Misra and Saseendran, 1987). Clearly, the Vettuvans have been 
marrying at ages higher than prescribed by the law. 
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Table 6.3: Singulate mean age at marriage, Vettuvans, Engandiyour, 1997 
Vettuvan 
Kerala 
Males 
29.2 
28.1 
Females 
23.9 
22.1 
Difference 
5.3 
6.0 
Notes: SMAM was calculated using the procedure given in Manual X, Indirect Techniques 
for Demographic Estimation (United Nations, 1983:225-229). 
Sources: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997; PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:47 
6.3 The family systems 
One of the continuing debates on family systems is about the transition of the family 
from joint to nuclear and the causes of such changes (Caldwell, Reddy and 
Caldwell, 1988:108). The 1931 Census report of the Madras Presidency noted that 
the joint family system was weakening in south India in those days. Evidence 
suggests that in Kerala the joint family system has eroded in a notable way among 
the upper-caste Nair and Namboodiri communities. The traditional joint family 
called Nair taravad and N amboodiri illam once accommodated a large number of 
people (Fuller, 1976:52). Today it scarcely exists. However, there is a scarcity of 
literature about family systems of other communities, particularly the lower castes, 
in Kerala. 
Despite the loosening of the joint family system in Kerala, household size has been 
increasing. For example, average household size increased from 5.3 to 6.0 during 
the period 1951-1971 (Singh, 1985:36). In 1992-93, the average household size 
stood at 5.7 (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995:28). 
There are several views on what constitutes various family types. In this work 
definitions of various family types by Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell ( 1988) are 
adopted. 
(i) In this study the term nuclear family will mean a conjugal couple with their 
unmarried children. 
Extended nuclear family: Conjugal couple, their unmarried children and other 
relatives or persons. 
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(ii) A stem family will describe two married couples in different generations. 
Extended stem family: Two married couples in different generations, and other 
relatives or persons. 
Eroded stem family: Two married couples in different generations, their 
widowed mother or father. 
Extended eroded stem family: Two married couples in different generations, 
their widowed mother or father and other relatives. 
(iii) A joint family refers to married siblings living together. 
A joint stem family: Older couple has with them more than one of their 
married children and usually grandchildren as well. 
Extended joint stem family: Older couple has with them more than one of their 
married children, grandchildren and other relatives. 
6.3.1 Family systems under the traditional caste system 
Among the Vettuvans in Engandiyour there is no evidence of any joint family 
system during the traditional-caste-system period12. My interviews with senior 
members of the Vettuvan community indicated that they had stem and nuclear 
families more commonly than any other family type. Their lower-caste as well as 
tenancy status in the village may have limited the need for a large family. As 
described above Vettuvans, until about the early 1970s, were tenants of the Ezavas 
or the upper castes13 . Under the tenancy arrangements, the Vettuvans had no 
ownership of land but could build a hut on the property of landlords and live there 
as a kudikidappukaran or tenant. In such an arrangement, landlords did not seem to 
object to any new hut being built on their property as this had no effect on the 
ownership status of the land. Rather it enhanced the potential care of the property 
that was occupied. People in the village believed that human contact improved land 
quality and hence would enhance yields. It was the requirement of a tenant to care 
for the coconut gardens around his hut. Tenancy would also increase the loyalty of 
the tenant family to the landlord. Over and above this, once the tenancy was granted, 
the tenants were liable to work in the households of the landlords for no pay doing 
such work as sweeping the courtyard, washing utensils in the morning, filling water 
12Accounts provided by Thurston (1909) do not indicate a joint family system for the Vettuvans of 
Kerala in the late 19th century. 
13It may be recalled here that tenancy was abolished in the village when the land reforms were 
implemented during the 1970s. 
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containers, cleaning cow sheds and feeding animals14. 
Interviews with elderly Vettuvans revealed that the division of a Vettuvan family 
under tenancy did not involve property division as the land was not owned by them. 
Since the Vettuvans did not own land, they did not possess agricultural equipment. 
The only assets they owned were some clay pots and a few metal utensils. Thus, 
family division and formation of a nuclear family were less complicated in those 
days. 
The common practice of partition among the Vettuvans was that the eldest son built 
a separate hut when he began to have children or once the younger brother married, 
whichever came earlier. Often the hut was made on the same piece of land and on 
the property of his parent's landlord. Sometimes if the landlord had an unoccupied 
parambu, or a piece of land in some other location, he would ask the new tenant to 
live there. The size of the hut was referred to by respondents as the main cause for 
the eldest son to build a new hut. Interviews with elderly Vettuvans revealed that 
small huts were insufficient to accommodate the large number of members. A 
typical hut in the past consisted of a small room that could be treated as a bedroom 
where the head of the household slept; another common room where children and 
other members slept; a small kitchen; and a yard. The yard was generally used by 
couples, if there were any. Why did the Vettuvans confine themselves to small huts? 
What prevented them from having larger huts? In the traditional caste system period 
raw materials for making huts were limited to locally grown bamboo and coconut. 
Given the Vettuvans' lower social and economic status, they had no access to skilled 
workers to build huts for them: they had to build their own huts. Since they did not 
have professional skills they could build only small huts with the raw materials 
given to them by their landlords. Therefore, the quantity of raw materials available 
ultimately decided the size of the hut. The landlords were very concerned about the 
size of the hut the Vettuvans built; a bigger hut meant higher status. According to 
elderly Vettuvans, the upper-caste landlords never liked the Vettuvans, their tenants, 
increasing their social status by making larger huts. All this meant that the 
Vettuvans had to have small huts and that they had to make separate living 
arrangements once their family size increased 15 . 
14The number of tasks would depend on the number of tenants the land owner had. See Chapter 2 
for a detailed discussion about the tenant-landlord relationship. 
15In the old Kerala, the right to build two-storey houses and to tile their roofs was reserved for the 
high castes and great Syrian Christian or Mappila families (Jeffrey, 1992:205). 
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Furthermore, because the Vettuvans were tenants, they did not require a large joint 
family to take care of a large area of agricultural property. For example, Caldwell, 
Reddy and Caldwell ( 1988) have shown that in Karnataka villages large families 
were valued as an asset by families as they had large areas of agricultural land 16 . 
Yet another reason that promoted nuclear and stem families in the traditional-caste-
system period was the entitlement that each tenant household had from their 
landlord. For example, the landlord provided rice, vegetables, bananas, and money 
during onam, the harvest festival, and vishu, the Malayalam new year, to each of 
their tenant households. It was the right of tenant families to have such contribution 
from their landlord. Therefore, the more households, the more the entitlements17 . 
In summary, the caste system that prevailed in Engandiyour until the middle of the 
twentieth century was not conducive to a large joint family system for the 
Vettuvans. Rather it promoted nuclear and stem families. Before family systems in 
the non-traditional caste system are discussed, an examination of family 
relationships in the caste-system period is essential. 
6.3.2 Sex roles and family relationships under the traditional caste system 
Among the Vettuvans in Engandiyour, during the traditional-caste-system period, 
the separation of the eldest son from the parental family marked the end of parental 
control over the son. Respondents said that parents did not play any role in the day-
to-day functions of their separated son's family. Where the separated son was in the 
same or a nearby parambu, piece of land, his children normally spent their day time 
with their grandparents. Also there was a great deal of co-operation in terms of 
mutual assistance in supplying food and physical help whenever needed. Separation 
of the son from the parents did not mark any emotional detachment from parents; 
rather, respondents suggested that such separations made the relationships between 
parents and sons stronger because they did not involve conflicts of interests between 
parents and son. 
As indicated, the departure of a son to his new hut denoted the withdrawal of formal 
control of the father over the matters related to his son's family. Since the separation 
usually took place when the sons were in their late 20s, a considerable part of their 
16Mamdani (1972) showed similar findings from Manupur village in Punjab. See Nag and Kak 
(1984) for an examination of Manupur in the changed social and economic setting in 1982 to early 
1970s. 
17Number of members does not matter much in this case. 
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reproductive life was spent in a nuclear-type family arrangement. Culturally, it was 
padilyathathu, a taboo, for a father to talk about anything that had sexual meaning. 
In this context, the father had no role, direct or indirect, in aspects of his sons' 
reproduction. 
The study in Engandiyour revealed that the role of mothers-in-law in moulding the 
behaviour of their daughters-in-law was also limited. During the traditional-caste-
system period, an unmarried girl of 18-19 years would have spent at least 3-4 years 
as a full-time labourer in the village. No Vettuvan girl in this age group would have 
escaped from working, as the caste system demanded work from the Vettuvans. 
These girls were socialised in their work places18 about the role of a wife, a mother 
and a daughter-in-law. The work place also provided information about sex, 
contraception, and marriage to young girls through their married friends or elderly 
colleagues. These girls knew about the whole range of domestic work as they helped 
their parents with household work from a very early age. There was very little that 
they needed to know from their mothers-in-law. Moreover both daughter-in-law and 
mother-in-law were income-earning members of the family. Since marriages usually 
took place within the same village or neighbouring villages, the girl would normally 
know everyone in the prospective husband's family either as her workplace 
companions or as a villager. In summary, a Vettuvan girl was very well equipped to 
handle all aspects of married life well before her marriage. The implication for the 
position of women, particularly daughters-in-law, is that she enjoyed a high social 
and economic status in her in-laws' family. Such arrangements seem to have made 
mothers-in-law less powerful in moulding the behaviour of their daughters-in-law. 
Culturally, it was padilyathathu, or taboo, for a mother-in-law to discuss sex-related 
topics with her daughter-in-law. The daughter-in-law's ideas about how many 
children she would have was influenced by the groups of women with whom she 
worked. If she violated the group norms with regard to fertility, or for that matter 
any behaviour, she was subjected to gossip and teasing. 
Under the caste system, a Vettuvan man had a limited role in deciding his own 
affairs. The role of family head, karanavar19, was mostly to arrange his family work 
force for the landlord. Although decisions were taken by the family head about the 
marriage of a son or daughter, he had to seek consent from the landlord, because 
18The work place could be a rice field or coconut plantation. Normally a particular group of women 
and men worked together on most occasions. This was especially the case when the landlord had 
many tenants and plenty of land. 
19 Karanavar among the Vet tu vans means the oldest man in the family. 
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without his permission it was impossible to conduct a marriage. It was the landlord 
who lent money and goods to his tenants on occasions such as marriage and death 
ceremonies. The availability of resources from the landlord and his willingness20 to 
provide support decided the timing of a Vettuvan marriage. Thus, the caste system 
seems to have influenced the family relationships to a greater degree than did the 
structure of the family. 
It is evident from the above sections that the family systems, sex roles and family 
relations that existed among the Vettuvans in Engandiyour during the traditional 
caste system were determined by the social and economic organisation guided by the 
caste system. The family systems, sex roles and family in the non-traditional-caste 
system are discussed below with emphasis on the situation in 1997. 
6.3.3 The family systems in the caste-system-free period 
The family of the Vettuvans is called kudumbam; the family head is called 
kudumbanadhan or karanavar. Traditionally, the family is patrilineal, patrilocal and 
patriarchal. The lineage is traced through the males and each lineage farms a 
tharavad. Marriages are normally not permitted between members of the same 
tharavad, as members of one tharavad are considered brothers and sisters. The rule 
of residence dictates that sons remain with their parents after marriage, while 
daughters leave their parents upon marriage and join their husbands in their family. 
Parental property (no land during tenancy) and the family name are inherited by the 
sons. Daughters have no right to inherit parental property or the family name. How 
far do such traditions persist? What are their implications for security and mobility 
goals and strategies? 
The Vettuvan family systems in 1997 identified from the household survey of the 
Vettuvans are shown in Table 6.4. Definitions of family systems by Caldwell, 
Reddy and Caldwell (1988), as discussed earlier in this chapter, are used in the 
present classification. The predominant family type revealed in the household 
survey is various forms of nuclear family. Slightly over two-fifths of the families 
were in this category. The typical nuclear family among the Vettuvans consists of 
one couple and their unmarried children. They account for over four-fifths of the 
nuclear families. The second important type is a form of extended nuclear family, 
consisting of a couple, their unmarried children and other relatives. About 9 per 
2
°For example, if there was a death in the family of the landlord he would not permit any marriage 
to take place before the first death anniversary, sardham. 
203 
cent of the total nuclear families were of this type. No other family type was 
common. 
The nuclear families of the Vettuvans in most of the cases were formed as a result of 
the separation of the eldest son and his family from the parental family. The 
marriage of a younger brother or brothers was often a point at which the eldest son's 
family considered separation. While the partition of a joint family is inevitable at 
some point in time, the causes of partition at a particular time is often a family 
dispute. Increased cost of living and the increased living standards21 exacerbated 
family disputes. Couples who had children reported that they found it hard to meet 
the various demands of children and other family members (husband's parents, 
brothers and their family, and other relatives) with their wages. Such couples 
thought that once they had their own household it would be easier for them to care 
for their children better. This feeling was very strong among those who were prime 
earners in the undivided family. 
In 1997, great importance was attached to education in Engandiyour22 . It was the 
aspiration of the Vettuvans to give children better education and care, along with a 
good standard of living, that motivated them to move to a nuclear family. How was 
the aspiration to have a nuclear-family arrangement able to become a reality in at 
least about two-fifths of the surveyed households? As indicated in Chapter 2, 
although land reform in Kerala was implemented in the 1970s, land reform 
initiatives were begun strongly by 1957, when the Communist government23 was 
formed. Interviews with elderly Vettuvans and local council officials in 
Engandiyour revealed that no new tenancy was granted in the village after the late 
1950s. Thus there could have been an increase in the number of members in each 
household, even though fertility was declining. Similarly, there could have been 
more nuclear-family units (husband, wife, and children) living together. When they 
received land through the land reform, they were able to divide it and have separate 
living arrangements. Thus, the formation of nuclear families in the 1970s has been 
possible primarily because of the land reform. The Gulf migration from the village 
also helped to form nuclear families, as some Vettuvans were able to sell their land 
for higher prices and buy cheaper land to divide between brothers. 
21 See Chapter 3 for a discussion on costs and living standards among the Vettuvans and in the 
study village. 
22Chapter 7 has a more detailed discussion of education among the Vettuvans. 
23See Chapter 3 for details. 
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In the 1997 Vettuvan Household Survey, slightly less than one-third of the 
households were stem families. There are two common stem family types among the 
Vettuvans: (i) one couple, their unmarried children and the husband's widowed 
mother; (ii) one couple, their unmarried children and the husband's parents. These 
two types account for about 67 per cent of the total number of stem families. The 
stem family pattern among the Vettuvans has resulted from the separation of the 
eldest brother's family from the parental family. When the eldest brother's family 
became nuclear, the remaining parental family with the other younger brothers 
became a stem family. This process, however, depends on how many sons the 
couple have, and how many of them are married. 
About 12 per cent of families in the surveyed households were joint families. The 
most common type of joint family consisted of two married siblings, their 
unmarried children and widowed mother. About one-third of the families of the 
joint-family type had this particular composition. One important reason for many 
couples remaining in the joint family as revealed from interviews with Vettuvans 
was the economic hardship in obtaining land, housing and household items. Higher 
land prices following the Gulf migration have made it practically impossible to buy 
a housing plot in the village from the savings of a labourer or a semi-skilled worker. 
Land reform, on the other hand, has denied access to the previously enjoyed 
freedom to build huts on the landlord's property as a tenant. 
About 14 per cent of families among the V ettuvans do not fall into any of the 
categories in the present classification. However, a major category emerged 
consisting of a widow and her unmarried children. This accounted about three-fifths 
of the 'other family types'. 
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Table 6.4: Family structure of the Vettuvans, Engandiyour, 1997 
Family type 
Nuclear family 
One couple only 
One couple and their unmarried children 
Extended nuclear family 
One couple, their unmarried children and other relativesa 
Eroded nuclear family 
Stem family 
One couple, their unmarried children, husband's parents 
One couple and husband's parents 
Extended stem family 
One couple, their unmarried children, husband's parents, husband's unmarried 
brother/sister 
One couple, husband's parents, husband's unmarried brother/sister 
One couple, their unmarried children, husband's parent (either father or 
mother), husband's unmarried brother/sister 
Eroded stem-family 
One couple and husband's widowed mother 
One couple, their unmarried children, husband's widowed mother 
One couple, their unmarried children, husband's widowed father 
Extended eroded stem family 
One couple, their unmarried children, widowed mother, husband's brother 
One couple, widowed mother, husband's unmarried brother/sister 
Number and 
Percentage 
151 (44.4) 
7 
131 
13 
103 (30.3) 
30 
2 
3 
3 
12 
2 
40 
2 
5 
4 
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Table 6.4 continued 
Joint family 
Two or more married brothers and their wives, their unmarried children 
Joint stem family 
Two married brothers and their wives, their unmarried children, their parents 
Two married brothers and their wives, their unmarried children, their widowed 
mother 
Two married brothers and their wives, their unmarried children, their widowed 
father 
Two married brothers and their wives, their parents 
Three married brothers and their wives, their unmarried children, their parents 
Extended joint stem family 
Two married brothers and their wives, their parents, their unmarried brother 
Other types 
Widow and unmarried children 
Widow only 
Unmarried single male 
Widowed mother, widowed daughter and daughter's children 
Unmarried siblings 
Widow, her sister's children 
Total 
40 (11.8) 
5 
8 
14 
4 
3 
5 
1 
46(13.5) 
26 
2 
5 
3 
9 
1 
340 
Note: Classification based on Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell (1988: 111); awife's brother, wife's 
mother. 
Source: Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997. 
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Sex-roles in the non-traditional caste system 
The prevailing family systems of the Vettuvans have influenced the relationships 
between members in each family type. Traditionally, Vettuvan women enjoyed a 
relatively equal partnership with their husbands in family affairs. Evidence gathered 
during field work suggests that Vettuvan women still enjoy broad equality with men 
in the family. For example, family expenses, such as how much money was to be 
spent on each food item to be purchased, were managed by women. Women 
reported during the focus group interviews that if men are not considered good 
managers of money, women take over such responsibility. 
The position of women in the family can be linked to the family types prevailing 
among the Vettuvans. The formation of nuclear families among the Vettuvans in the 
non-traditional caste system was by the departure of the eldest son from his parental 
home. The second eldest son would leave when his younger brother married or 
when he started having children. However, if there was no younger brother, he 
would continue to live with his parents and inherit the house. Although adhering to 
this timetable has become difficult by 1997 owing to unavailability of landed 
property, this was still the most preferred timetable for partition among brothers. 
The average duration of stay of a married couple with the husband's parents was two 
to three years. That means couples did not spend a significant part of their 
reproductive life in their parents' house; this has had a tremendous influence on the 
role of women in the family. The separated family normally consisted of husband, 
wife and young children. Since the husband's parents had no direct control over the 
day-to-day activities of the separated family, women had a considerable role to 
perform in areas of family management. This situation prevented mothers-in-law 
controlling the behaviour of their daughters-in-law24 . 
Regarding a married younger brother who lived with his parents, as a member of a 
stem family, the role of the mother-in-law was also limited. Since the average age at 
marriage of males in Engandiyour was around 25 years in 1997, by the time the 
younger brother married his parents had normally reached 50-55 years of age. In the 
age group 50 and over, over half of the women were widows and nearly one-fifth of 
the men were widowers. Also, because a mother-in-law would not, in most cases, 
earn as much as a daughter-in-law, the economic leverage of mothers-in-law was 
limited. It is likely that such a situation would result in lessened authority of 
24The role of mothers-in-law in moulding the behaviour of daughters-in-law is documented in 
literature as a factor influencing higher fertility in northern India. 
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mothers-in-law over their daughters-in-law. Thus, Vettuvan women enJoy a 
relatively independent life, without being controlled by their mothers-in-law. The 
survey of Vettuvan households in Engandiyour indicated that in about three-quarters 
of the families, a currently married woman did not have a resident mother-in-law. 
Traditionally, the overall responsibility for the family among the Vettuvans has been 
with women. This continued in 1997. For example, men brought in money, but 
when they were unemployed for several days, it was often the women who found 
ways to feed the family. Men generally did not keep track of the availability of food 
grains and the other groceries necessary for daily use at home; it was women who 
did all this. Women had the ability to save food grains for the rainy season, when 
normally the men do not get enough work. It was women who usually borrowed 
money from neighbours and friends. People in the village trusted Vettuvan women 
more than Vettuvan men regarding repayment. It is possible that the family system 
that prevailed among the V ettuvans promotes a significant role of women in family 
matters. 
While women enjoyed considerable autonomy, they also took the predominant role 
in carrying out domestic tasks. Equality does not generally extend to housework. It 
was women who prepared food, and served their husbands, children and parents-in-
law. Women ate last with any other female members of the family, excluding their 
mothers-in-law. Leftovers normally constituted the major portion of their food. 
There was a strong belief and pride among the V ettuvan women in their 
responsibility to see that everyone in the family had enough to eat25 . 
It was also the responsibility of women to wash the clothes of all the family, bring 
water for both drinking and washing, clean the house and look after children. In 
joint families women generally did such activities jointly. 
Since slightly over two-fifths of the Vettuvan families were nuclear, there was 
hardly anyone to help women with household work. If the woman was a labourer, 
she had to do all these jobs once she returned from work. If she had a grown-up 
non-school-going daughter, she would get some assistance from her. Otherwise, it 
was women's responsibility to do all household work. As a result of government 
efforts to supply water to those with limited access to water, these days there are 
public water taps available within 2-3 minutes walk from most households. This has 
25In the focus-group discussions this point was discussed at length. All women participating agreed 
to their role in the family. 
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reduced the burden of women to some extent. 
Vettuvan women play an important role even outside their family. When children 
and parents-in-law fall sick, it is generally the women who take them to the local 
doctor, obtain medicines, and look after them26. Even though the role of women was 
so important in their family, their role in social life was limited. For example, if 
only one person was invited from a family to attend a social function, it was men 
who generally attended that function. Women would not go alone to such functions; 
they would have to be accompanied by a family member. 
Vettuvan women were well informed about many events happening locally, 
regionally and even nationally. Women were usually seen shopping in the nearby 
shops in the evenings, normally after they returned from work. When they went 
shopping they often met their friends, relatives, and members from other 
communities. Such activities were very important because they provided an 
opportunity for new information to be exchanged. Information may be about 
immunisation of children, side-effects of contraceptives, family politics, children's 
education, or even about national politics. Such informal chats constitute very 
important communication networks. Field observation indicated that these practices 
were not common in other communities in the village. 
In the 1997 context, it appeared that a Vettuvan woman had no incentive for having 
many children, because of her responsibilities in the family. The increasing 
importance of education among Vettuvans made the household responsibilities of 
women more onerous. Women in the focus-group interviews strongly believed that 
women should have only that number of children for whom they can provide good 
education, good food, and thus, a good future. The Vettuvan women's role in the 
family seems to be a strong reason for these women desiring few children. 
The most pertinent question regarding family type here is its relationship with 
fertility. However, it is difficult to establish any simple relationship between fertility 
and family type, because each woman spends her reproductive span in different 
family situations (Bebarta, 1977: 16). For example, among the Vettuvans, marriage 
invariably leads to residence in the groom's parental home. Normally, the couple 
spends two to three years there before they move out into a new house. Fertility data 
26Rajan et al. (1996:287) demonstrated that in Kerala women take initiatives in health care only 
during an emergency. Among the Vettuvans it is just the opposite: men take initiatives when it is 
an emergency. 
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indicate that about 63 per cent of Vettuvan women conceived within three months 
and nearly 92 per cent within two years of their marriage (see Table 4.8). Thus, 
reproduction began when the couple spent their first few years after marriage in the 
husband's parental house, as there was no time lag between marriage and 
consummation27 of marriage among the Vettuvans. In the 1997 survey of Vettuvan 
wives, the average age at sterilisation was 25.5 years, and 85 per cent of women 
were sterilised before age 30 years. Thus, if a newly married Vettuvan couple lived 
with their parents for two to three years, and the average age of female marriage was 
19. 7 years, it is possible that at least the first birth would have taken place when the 
women were living with their in-laws. The nuclear family arrangement, considered 
from the point of view of women's reproduction, is the place where her reproduction 
ends. The joint and stem families seen in this survey are thus a transitory family 
arrangement for the few years when she is newly married and having her first child. 
Thus, overall, it was the family relationships based on the nuclear family that had 
influenced the fertility behaviour of the Vettuvans most decisively, as fertility 
usually terminated when they were in the nuclear rather than joint or stem families. 
6.3.4 Constraints in family division 
In any family system, household division is an important and potentially decisive 
matter. For some families partition was very difficult because of the very small size 
of land holding. As revealed in the household survey, about a quarter of the 
Vettuvans owned less than four cents,28 and slightly over half owned from five to 
seven cents of land. It was practically impossible to divide property for at least a 
quarter of the families, where they had only four cents or less. They would have to 
find land somewhere else should they want partition to take place. For the nearly 
half of the households which had five to seven cents of land, division would be 
possible but difficult, as the land would be too small to accommodate two normal 
huts29 . Thus, three-fourths of the Vettuvan households would find it effectively 
impossible to partition their land. This is likely to become even more difficult for 
future generations. 
27In many parts of India there is a time lag between age at marriage and consummation. See Misra 
and Saseendran (1987). 
28 100 cents =1 acre; 1 acre=0.40469 hectare. 
29This issue needs to be considered in relation to the economic position of the Vettuvans and their 
traditional ways of making huts. For example, 5-7 cents of land may be too small for a hut but 
sufficient to accommodate several families if they construct a multi-storey block of flats. 
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The survey data show that over nine-tenths of households that had less than seven 
cents of land were nuclear, stem or 'other' family types. That means the division of 
the property in these families would be between children of the household head and 
not between the brothers of the household head (the effect of the family life-cycle). 
In such a situation the household heads can avoid or delay the partition among their 
children if they control their fertility and plan for their children's careers. For 
example, if they produce only one child, there will be no partition; if they have one 
male and one female, there will be no partition ( due to patriarchy); if they have two 
sons, they can postpone the partition until one son settles in a job, but cannot avoid 
partition; but if they have more than two sons partition of the land is inevitable. 
Since the land reform of 1970, some initiatives from the government of Kerala have 
reduced the problem of division of land among Vettuvan families. The laksham 
veedu paddhathi, or the 'one lakh housing scheme', was an initiative of the 
government during 1972-76 to provide free houses to economically backward 
scheduled castes in the purambok, or unoccupied government land in, the village. 
Although exact statistics on this are not available, reliable sources indicated that 
some 100 houses were built and given to scheduled castes in the 1970s in 
Engandiyour30. Since there was no purambok available in Engandiyour in 1997, this 
was no longer a possibility. However, this scheme had reduced problems related to 
the availability of land for housing soon after the land reform was implemented in 
the village. 
The Gulf migration since the 1970s has had two effects on the prospects of 
partitioning among the Vettuvans. On the negative side, the Gulf migration lessened 
the possible avenues for the Vettuvans to buy land because land prices rose. On the 
positive side, the Gulf migration enabled the Vettuvans to sell their land for higher 
prices and buy more land in a cheaper locality. This also averted some of the severe 
consequences of land shortage for houses among the Vettuvans. 
In 1997, the situation in Engandiyour with regard to availability of land was 
alarming. The village had only 15.68 square kilometres of land. It has 6326 houses, 
an average density of over 400 households per square kilometre. During the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s, all possible efforts were made by the government and people to 
cope with the demand for housing plots. For example, several of the village paddy 
fields were converted into housing plots. According to the 1995 data from the 
30In Kerala as a whole about 57,000 were built during 1970-77 under the 'one lakh houses' 
campaign (Jeffrey, 1992:206). 
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village Panchayath, only two acres of land in the village was used for paddy in 
contrast to about 70 per cent of land area under paddy cultivation before 1970 
(Engandiyour Gramapanchayath, 1996: 17). Finding land for housing is a worrying 
problem not only for the Vettuvans, but for everyone in the village. The future of 
the family systems and family strategies of Vettuvans in Engandiyour will depend 
on these issues. 
6.4 The family and the support of the elderly in the non-traditional caste 
system 
6.4.1 Demographic status of the elderly 
Within the demographic literature, considerable emphasis is given to issues of 
familial support for the elderly as a reason for high fertility. How far are such 
arguments relevant to fertility decline of Vettuvans? According to the Vettuvan 
Household Survey in Engandiyour, 8.731 per cent of the population were over 60 
years of age, 5.5 over 70, and 0.6 per cent over 80. The Vettuvan Household Survey 
revealed that among the elderly women about 85 per cent were widows, and among 
the elderly men 15 per cent were widowers. This reflects the higher mortality among 
adult men than among adult women. These mortality differentials have significant 
implications for living arrangements and support, as will be discussed later. 
The Elderly Vettuvan Survey covered a total of 138 elderly persons 60 years and 
over, 60 elderly men and 78 elderly women. Details of the Vettuvan Elderly Survey 
are given in Chapter 1. Age distribution of the 138 Vettuvans is given in Table 6.5. 
31 The proportion of Kerala population 60 years and above, according to the Kerala NFHS, was 8.2 
per cent (PRC, Thiruvananthapuram and IIPS, 1995). 
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Table 6.5: Age distribution of the elderly Vettuvans, Engandiyour, 1997 
Age group Elderly men Elderly women Total 
N (%) N(%) N (%) 
60-69 39 53 92 
(65.0) (67.9) (66.7) 
70-79 16 20 36 
(26.7) (25.7) (26.1) 
80+ 5 5 10 
(8.3) (6.4) (7.2) 
Total 60 78 138 
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
Table 6.6 shows the work status of the elderly men and women among the 
Vettuvans in Engandiyour. As the table shows, nearly half of the elderly men and 
two-thirds of the women were not doing any paid or unpaid work (housework). 
While nearly two-fifths of the elderly men were engaged in labouring, only about 
one-tenth of elderly women were doing such work. Another contrast in the work 
status of the elderly men and women was that more elderly women were engaged in 
household work compared to elderly men. The analysis suggests that at least half of 
the elderly men in the study may not have needed any financial assistance from their 
children as they themselves were earning. The most dependent people in this 
category were the elderly women; nearly nine-tenths of them needed financial 
assistance from others as they were not earning anything. 
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Table 6.6: Work status of elderly Vettuvan men and women, Engandiyour 
1997 
Work status 
Not doing any work 
Labouring 
Skilled work 
Petty business 
House work 
Total 
Notes: - indicates no cases. 
Elderly men 
N(o/o) 
28 
(47) 
23 
(38) 
5 
(8) 
2 
(3) 
2 
(3) 
60 
(100) 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
Elderly women 
N(o/o) 
50 
(64) 
7 
(9) 
1 
(1) 
20 
(26) 
78 
(100) 
Table 6.7 shows the distribution of the elderly according to the number of living 
sons. Slightly over a quarter of the elderly had one living son, and about two-thirds 
had two or more sons at the time of the study. Thus, nearly nine-tenths of the elderly 
had at least one living son. Of those who did not have a living son, more of the 
elderly were women than men. 
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Table 6.7: Distribution of the elderly Vettuvans according to the number of living 
sons, Engandiyour, 1997 
Category 
No living son 
One living son 
Two or more living sons 
Total 
Elderly men 
N(o/o) 
3 
(5.0) 
19 
(31.7) 
38 
(63.3) 
60 
(100) 
Elderly women 
N(o/o) 
7 
(9.5) 
18 
(24.3) 
49 
(66.2) 
74 
(100) 
Total 
N(o/o) 
10 
(7.5) 
37 
(27.6) 
87 
(65.0) 
134 
(100) 
Notes: Four unmarried elderly women are excluded from the analysis as childbearing is restricted to 
married couples in the Vettuvan community. 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
Table 6.4 shows the distribution of elderly Vettuvans according to the number of 
living daughters. Slightly less than a quarter of the elderly had one living daughter; 
nearly three-fifths had two or more daughters; and slightly less than one-fifth had no 
daughter. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 taken together indicate that there were fewer living 
daughters than living sons for the elderly Vettuvans: 91 daughters for every 100 
sons. Whether an elderly Vettuvan has a living son, a living daughter, or neither, has 
a significant influence on their living arrangements and support. 
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Table 6.8: Distribution of the elderly Vettuvans according to the number of living 
daughters, Engandiyour, 1997 
Category 
No living daughters 
One Ii ving daughter 
Two or more living daughters 
Total 
Elderly men 
N(%) 
11 
(18.3) 
10 
(16.7) 
39 
(65.0) 
60 
(100) 
Elderly women 
N(%) 
13 
(17.6) 
21 
(28.4) 
40 
(54.0) 
74 
(100) 
Total 
N(%) 
24 
(17.9) 
31 
(23 .1) 
79 
(59,0) 
134 
(100) 
Notes: Four unmarried elderly women are excluded from the analysis as childbearing is restricted to 
married couples in the Vettuvan community. 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
6.4.2 Living arrangements of the elderly 
Living arrangements for the elderly are widely seen as an important measure of the 
extent of support from families especially for poor populations (Amin, 1998:203). 
Living arrangements of the elderly Vettuvans in Engandiyour are shown in Table 
6.9. Nearly 87 per cent of elderly parents were staying with their sons; this was 
possible because in about 90 per cent of cases parents had at least one surviving son. 
About 7 per cent of the elderly were living with their daughters. These elderly 
persons had no surviving sons. The remaining 6 per cent were living with other 
relatives such as a sister or brother, or lived alone. These elderly people were mainly 
unmarried or widowed. Typically, the elderly among the Vettuvans lived with their 
married and unmarried sons. This, however, does not mean that they are receiving 
significant economic support from their sons. 
217 
Table 6.9: Living arrangements of the elderly Vettuvans, Engandiyour, 1997 
% of elderly staying with 
at least one son 
87 
Note: N=138. 
% of elderly staying 
with daughter 
7 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
% of elderly staying with 
other relatives/alone 
6 
A more detailed examination of living arrangements of the elderly is given in Table 
6.10. According to the table, about 70 per cent of the elderly were living with their 
younger married sons. In about two-fifths of the cases, at least one married son 
reported living separately from his parents. In the majority of the cases these were 
the eldest married sons, living with their spouses and children in a nuclear family, 
mostly in the neighbourhood of their parents' houses. About 36 per cent of the 
elderly had their unmarried sons living with them. In another 5 per cent of cases the 
elderly had an unmarried son living away from them. 
Table 6.10: Living arrangements of the Vettuvan elderly with their sons, 
Engandiyour, 1997 
% having married 
sons living with them 
70 
% having married sons 
living away from them 
41 
% having unmarried 
sons living with them 
36 
% having unmarried sons 
living away from them 
5 
Notes: N=124; percentage calculated for each category separately; 10 elderly people without a 
living son and four unmarried elderly women excluded from the analysis. 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
The Elderly Vettuvan Survey in Engandiyour in 1997 revealed that about 63 per 
cent of the elderly had a married daughter living away from them with her husband 
(Table 6.11). Nearly 12 per cent of parents had a married daughter living with them. 
This situation arose because 10 elderly persons did not have a living son. We did not 
come across any elderly parent permanently living with their married daughter if 
they had a son. The generally held view about the residence of elderly parents in 
Engandiyour as a whole, and also among the Vettuvans, was that parents must live 
with their son. Both the parent and son would be the subject of gossip should they 
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violate this rule of residence. But if there was no married or unmarried son then it is 
not only right for parents to stay with a daughter, but also regarded as most 
appropriate. In such cases it was the daughter or daughters who shared the 
responsibility of caring for their parents. They would also share parental property 
according to their contribution to the care of their parents. It was the sole 
responsibility of the daughter who intended to occupy her parents' house and 
property to look after her parents economically. However, elderly parents who had a 
son did stay in their married daughter's house for a few days or on any occasions 
that required support from parents. Nearly a quarter of the elderly had unmarried 
daughters living with them. No parent had their unmarried daughters living away 
from them. 
Table 6.11: Living arrangements of the elderly Vettuvans, Engandiyour, 1997 
% having married daughters not 
living with them 
63 
% having married 
daughter living with them 
12 
% having unmarried 
daughters living with them 
24 
Notes: N=131 (elderly having a living daughter); Percentage calculated for each category 
separately. 
Three elderly people who did not have a living daughter and four unmarried women are 
excluded from the analysis. 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
6.4.3 Support from sons 
An examination of living arrangements alone will not give full details of the support 
that the elderly Vettuvans in Engandiyour receive from their children. In the non-
traditional caste system the role of sons in taking care of their old parents was well 
defined among the Vettuvans. Sons were expected to meet all the needs of their 
elderly parents. To examine expectation of support from sons, a question was asked 
in the Elderly Vettuvan Survey of 1997 of each elderly person with a married living 
son about the economic support they received from their married sons. A summary 
of the responses is given in Table 6.12. Nearly four-fifths of the elderly parents who 
had living married sons received all necessary support from at least one of them. 
This support included food, clothing, medicine and pocket money for their other 
day-to-day needs. The support from the married son, however, should not be 
interpreted as the only source of support for the elderly. For example, if there was 
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more than one son in the family, it was likely that one son would get work some 
days and another son would get work on other days. Thus, whoever had work 
provided support to the parents: both the children would be treated by the parents as 
potential sources of necessary support. 
About 4 per cent of the elderly reported that they received only practical economic 
support from their married sons, while about 17 per cent of parents did not receive 
any support32 from married sons. In the 17 per cent were about 10 per cent of 
parents whose married sons were living with them, and 7 per cent whose married 
sons were living away from them. These elders, however, are not without support. 
Within the 17 per cent of elderly people who did not get support from their married 
sons, 5 per cent received support from unmarried sons, and 3 per cent received 
support from married daughters. The remaining 9 per cent were without support 
from any of their children. They were either working or did not want economic 
support from their children. Age data indicated that they were in the age group 60-
69. In fact, these elderly people may have been supporting their married sons. 
Table 6.12: Percentage of elderly Vettuvans rece1v1ng economic support from 
married sons, Engandiyour, 1997 
% of the elderly receiving % of the elderly receiving 
all necessary support some support from married 
from at least one married son(s) 
son 
79 4 
Note: N=107 (elderly with married living sons). 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
% of the elderly receiving 
no support from married 
son(s) 
17 
The support that the elderly received from the unmarried sons is summarised in 
Table 6.13. Nearly two-thirds of the elderly who had living unmarried sons received 
full support, from at least one of them. About one-third of the parents could not 
obtain any support from their unmarried children. In these cases either the 
unmarried son was unemployed, or the parents did not need support from their 
unmarried sons, or it may be that they were getting support from married sons. 
Interviews revealed that unmarried children who were working supported their 
families in whatever way they could, while those who did not support their parents 
32This means that these parents in this study did not consider that they received anything significant 
that needed to be mentioned. 
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had no regular work or were physically handicapped or sick. 
Table 6.13: Percentage of elderly Vettuvans rece1v1ng economic support from 
unmarried sons, Engandiyour, 1997 
% of the elderly 
receiving all needed 
support from at least one 
unmarried son 
67 
% of the elderly receiving 
some support from 
unmarried sons 
10 
Note: N=55 (elderly with unmarried living sons). 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
6.4.4 Support from daughters 
% of the elderly receiving no 
support from unmarried son/s 
23 
Table 6.14 shows the support the elderly received from their married daughters. 
Support from married daughters to the elderly parents, in general, was limited. Only 
about half the elderly parents who had living married daughters received some 
support from at least one of them; this support was limited to a few occasions. For 
example, slightly over one-third of the elderly received some money when their 
daughters visited them. This was the most common way married daughters helped 
their elderly parents. Elderly Vettuvans in Engandiyour in 1997 received help in 
personal care and being taken to their daughter's home for short periods. 
Focus-group discussions revealed some of the reasons why married daughters had 
become unable to provide support. Daughters rarely visited their natal home; 
married women were tied up with their family and were very rarely able to visit 
their parents. This was particularly true when children attended school and the 
family was nuclear. Another factor that reduced the frequency of visits of married 
daughters to their natal home was the distance. In the late 1990s Vettuvans married 
their daughters to men who lived 20-30 kilometres away, compared to mostly 
walkable distances in the past. Although bus services were very frequent, Vettuvan 
women did not travel alone. They had to be accompanied by either their husband or 
children. Often such opportunities only occurred occasionally. Overall, married 
daughters' role in the old-age support of their parents seemed to be relatively small 
compared to the past. 
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Table 6.14: Percentage of elderly Vettuvans rece1v1ng support from married 
daughters, Engandiyour, 1997 
% of the % of the elderly % of the elderly % of the % of the % of the elderly 
elderly rece1v1ng money occasionally elderly elderly staying with 
rece1 v1ng no when daughters taken to taken care rece1v1ng married daughter 
support visited them daughters' house of when sick medicine 
51 37 2 2 6 2 
Note: N=98 (elderly with married daughters). 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
The various kinds of support the elderly receive from their unmarried daughters is 
shown in Table 6.15. The role of unmarried daughters in the care of old parents 
seems to be limited to the physical care they provided. About three-fourths of the 
respondents shared this view. Elderly parents reported having received financial 
assistance from working daughters, who constituted about 12 per cent of the 
unmarried daughters. About 6 per cent of parents received care during sickness from 
their unmarried daughters. The remaining 9 per cent of the parents reported that they 
did not receive any assistance from their unmarried daughters. 
Table 6.15: Percentage of elderly Vettuvans rece1v1ng support from unmarried 
daughters, Engandiyour, 1997 
% of the elderly receiving % of the elderly 
assistance in housework rece1 vmg money 
73 12 
Note: N=33 (elderly with unmarried daughters). 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
% of the elderly cared 
for when sick 
6 
% of the 
elderly 
rece1 v1ng no 
support 
9 
To gain some idea about the quality of support the elderly received from their 
children, we asked them how they compared the support they provided to their own 
parents with the support they currently received from their children. The answers are 
summarised in Table 6.16. Overall, about three-fifths of the elderly parents were of 
the opinion that they received better support from their children than they had 
provided to their parents. This view was held by slightly more women than men. 
About one-fifth of the elderly reported that they received the same level of support 
as they have given their parents. Those who reported receiving poorer support from 
their children than they had given made up only around one-tenth of the total 
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number of elderly persons in the survey. 
Table 6.16: Comparison of care the elderly Vettuvans received from their children 
with the care they provided to their parents, Engandiyour, 1997 
Opinion about the care given by children 
Better than I gave to my parents 
Same as I gave to my parents 
Worse than I gave to my parents 
Total 
Males 
N (%) 
35 
(62.5) 
15 
(26.8) 
6 
(10.7) 
56 
(100) 
Females 
N (%) 
47 
(72.3) 
10 
(15.4) 
8 
(12.3) 
65 
(100) 
Total 
N(%) 
82 
(67.8) 
25 
(20.7) 
14 
(11.5) 
121 
(100) 
Note:alncludes (four men and 13 women) those without children or who did not have an elderly 
parent to take care of as their parents died early. 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
In order to understand the nature of physical support to the elderly when they fell 
sick, and the economic support provided by paying bills for medical treatment, all 
elderly persons in the study were asked to give information on the people who 
provided such help when they fell sick. Table 6.17 shows various members of the 
family who provide this support to the elderly. The general pattern is that sons pay 
the bills for doctors, hospital and medicine, and daughters and daughters-in-law 
provide physical support. Physical assistance includes help with eating, moving 
around, having a bath, and the other help needed when an elderly person is sick or 
too old to perform such activities alone. Sons and daughters-in-law were found to be 
of pivotal importance in providing support to the elderly Vettuvans. The daughter's 
role was less significant than the son's and the daughter-in-law's in both financial 
and physical support to elderly parents. 
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Table 6.17: Distribution of providers of care to the elderly Vettuvans, 
Engandiyour, 1997 
Relationship 
Son 
Daughter 
Wife/husband 
Daughter-in-law 
Grand children 
Other family members 
Total 
Take care of while 
sick 
N(%2 
20 
(14.9) 
30 
(22.4) 
18 
(13.4) 
34 
(25.5) 
8 
(5.9) 
24 
(17.9) 
134 
(100) 
Pay bills for 
medicine/ doctor 
N(%) 
100 
(78.1 ) 
13 
(10.1 ) 
2 
(1.6) 
2 
(1.6) 
11 
(8.6) 
128 
(100) 
Note: 14 elderly people who did not require medical treatment excluded from the analysis . 
Source: Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997. 
6.5 Education: the strategy for social and economic mobility 
Education is seen by everyone in the Vettuvan community as a key element in social 
and economic mobility. In order to understand the educational aspirations of the 
Vettuvans a question was asked of parents about the level to which they would 
educate their children. Responses are given in Table 6.18. About 55 per cent of the 
respondents want their children to study to as high a level as they can reach. About 
one-fifth of the respondents would educate their children as long as they could 
afford to do so. About 17 per cent of the parents wanted to educate their children at 
least up to matriculation. It was not only essential to pass at each level of education, 
but also to obtain higher marks to receive admission. Interviews with Vettuvan 
parents revealed that even with the concession for scheduled castes in educational 
institutions, it was hard to obtain admission to courses of choice. Therefore, parental 
desires alone would not enable parents to have their aspirations fulfilled; the 
performance children in studies was also important. 
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Table 6.18: Vettuvan parents' aspirations regarding the education of their children, 
Engandiyour, 1997 
Educational aspirations 
As long as they can study 
As long as we can afford it 
At least up to matriculation 
Others 
Others 
Boys 
N(o/o) 
84 
(60.0) 
20 
(14.3) 
24 
(17.1) 
12 
(8.6) 
140 
(100.0) 
Source: Survey of School-Going Children, 1997. 
Girls 
N (%) 
58 
(50.9) 
31 
(27.2) 
18 
15.8) 
7 
(6.1) 
114 
(100.0) 
Total 
N (o/o) 
142 
(55.9) 
51 
(20.1) 
42 
(16.5) 
19 
(7.5) 
254 
(100.0) 
What were the parents' motivations in educating their children? Interviews with 
Vettuvan parents revealed that when the caste-system-based social and economic 
relationships disappeared with the land reforms, they felt a great deal of 
independence. The non-Vettuvans of the village demonstrated that education was a 
prerequisite for well-paid employment in order to become economically and socially 
better off. It was accepted among the Vettuvans that educated families were socially 
and economically better off than non-educated families. When the caste system 
changed, individual qualities became important yardsticks in the social and 
economic scaling; education was the most important factor. 
In 1997 educating a Vettuvan child in Engandiyour involved at least the following: 
sending the child to the best available school; providing the child with all necessary 
books and other equipment needed at school; providing the child with good-quality 
clothing while going to school; giving the child ample opportunity to play after 
school; helping the child to complete homework assignments. Education was, 
therefore, not simply a matter of sending a child to school, as it was two decades 
ago in Engandiyour. 
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The following are the implications of these changes in education. First, the best 
available school need not be the nearest one. If the nearest school was not a good33 
school, parents sent their children to a good school; this often required transport. 
Sending a child to a school which was not within walking distance from home 
meant that parents had to spend money on transport and pack lunch every morning 
before the child left home; and if the child was attending a kindergarten or primary 
school, the parent or someone else needed to accompany the child to the school. 
Secondly, parents were expected to buy the necessary books and other educational 
accessories recommended by the school: there was social pressure on parents to 
obtain those items for children on time. Third, all the schools in the village, private 
and public, had a system of uniforms for children to wear on school days. It was 
important for parents not only to provide such uniforms, but also to provide good-
quality ones; this forced parents to buy new clothes before school began. Fourth, 
once children returned from school, they were supposed to be playing or studying, 
and not working. From among 254 school children surveyed in the study about half 
were doing some work at home. For girls, this included helping their mother clean 
the house and courtyard, fetching water, and cleaning utensils. For boys, the work 
included going to the shop and caring for animals. However, this work of boys and 
girls did not involve more than one hour a day. None of the children ever worked 
for wages. Thus, the economic contribution of school-going children to the family 
was limited. Finally, parents were supposed to supervise any homework given by 
the school. Parents had to help the child or engage a private tutor to help the child to 
do homework. To meet the educational needs of children discussed above it was 
certainly easier and sometimes only possible with few children. 
Why did the Vettuvans educate their children? Answers given by the Vettuvan 
parents to this question are given in Table 6.19. About nine-tenths of parents 
reported that the main reason for educating their children was to enable them to 
obtain good jobs so as to improve the social and economic status of the family. For 
the Vettuvans education was a mobility strategy for achieving social status in the 
village. An educated Vettuvan could command a much higher status from non-
Vettuvans compared to an uneducated Vettuvan. Therefore, the role of education 
was first viewed as something that brought status; the economic benefit was only of 
secondary importance. It is important to note that only about one-third of the parents 
said that they were educating their children to obtain a job. About a quarter of the 
33The quality of a school is judged by the number of students who pass the 10th year examinations 
in the case of high schools. In other schools, quality of teaching is judged on the basis of opinion 
prevailing in the village. 
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parents reported that they were educating their children because they wanted to see 
their children 'educated', so that they could read, write, and go anywhere without 
assistance, fill out application forms (for various purposes), and most importantly, 
they would not be ridiculed or cheated by anyone, particularly the upper castes. In 
sum, education was the pathway to full participation in society. 
Table 6.19: Distribution of Vettuvan parents' reasons for educating their children, 
Engandiyour, 1997 
Reasons 
To obtain a job 
To enable family to increase 
economic and social status 
To see that children were educated 
Total 
Boys 
N (%)a 
39 
(27.8) 
111 
(79.3) 
35 
(25.0) 
140 
Girls 
N (%)a 
45 
(39.5) 
108 
(94.7) 
24 
(21.1) 
114 
Notes: aPercentages exceed 100 because of multiple responses. 
Source: School-Going Children Survey, 1997. 
6.6 Occupational aspirations of Vettuvans 
Total 
N (%)a 
84 
(33.1) 
229 
(90.2) 
59 
(23.2) 
254 
To find out about occupational aspirations of parents regarding their children, a 
question was asked about what occupation parents would like their children to have 
in the future. Responses are given in Table 6.20. About half of the respondents 
wanted their children to be in a non-labouring occupation. The most common desire 
among the V ettuvans was that they did not want their children to be labourers like 
themselves or their parents. What was learned through the interviews about 
Vettuvans' attitudes regarding labouring was that they considered it to have a close 
relation to their lower-caste status. Individuals were respected and treated differently 
according to what profession or occupation they were in. A labourer occupied the 
lowest position in the occupational structure, even if he or she earned better wages 
than a white-collar worker. The most desirable occupation among the Vettuvans was 
that of udyogasthan, an office-worker who used pen and paper. Slightly over a 
quarter of the respondents indicated that they wanted their children to become 
government servants and about half wanted their children in any non-labouring 
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occupation. Some respondents (13 per cent) specified a profession such as teaching, 
medicine or engineering, or employment as a technician or a policeman. 
Table 6.20: Occupational aspirations about children, Vettuvans, Engandiyour, 1997 
Professional aspiration 
Government job 
Non-labouring job, but what exactly 
depends on their education and 
opportunities 
Other (Good job, bank, police, doctor, 
teacher, should work) 
No answer/respondent was not parent 
Total 
Boys 
N(o/o) 
42 
(30.0) 
68 
(48.6) 
20 
(14.3) 
10 
(7.1) 
140 
(100.0) 
Source: Survey of School-Going Children, 1997. 
Girls 
N (%) 
30 
(26.3) 
54 
(47.4) 
13 
(11.4) 
17 
(14.9) 
114 
(100.0) 
Total 
N(o/o) 
72 
(28.3) 
122 
(48.0) 
33 
(13.0) 
27 
(10.6) 
254 
(100.0) 
When asked why they wanted their children to have the occupation they indicated, 
the majority of parents responded that they wanted social and economic progress in 
the family through such occupation. Economic progress through good education and 
occupation is the most preferred way of mobility among the Vettuvans. 
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6. 7 Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this chapter has shown that caste-system changes, land 
reform, and Gulf migration have modified the family system, indirectly influencing 
the sex roles, old-age support system, and marriage practices. The family, thus, has 
been the unit organising and executing the needed changes for the social and 
economic enhancement of the Vettuvans. 
Crucially, the caste-system changes have made it possible for the Vettuvans to 
progress socially and economically. The educational aspiration of the Vettuvans is 
to provide the maximum education they can to their children, depending on the 
ability of the child. In any case the lower limit is to provide matriculation-level 
education, the minimum educational qualification required for a government job. 
The Vettuvans have also shown a change in their occupation, from labourers 
attached to one family to construction workers or skilled and semi-skilled 
occupations. As with education, these changes were made possible by land reform 
and Gulf migration. While the Vettuvans want a salaried government career for their 
children, they did not object to any job other than labouring. 'We do not want our 
child to be a labourer', 'We do not want our children and grandchildren to suffer like 
us'. Such comments form the background to all family and childbearing decisions. 
Chapter 7 investigates how such aspirations affect parental demand for children. 
The family also remains a key institution in providing support for the elderly. In this 
regard, the role of sons remains vital, given the patrilocal residence pattern. 
However, all family aspirations need to be seen in the context of the overwhelming 
desire for social mobility: to escape the legacy of the Vettuvans' low position in the 
traditional caste hierarchy. 
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Chapter 7 
Fertility as Mobility: 
Security-Mobility Costs and Benefits of 
Children Among the Vettuvans 
7 .1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 discussed the role of the V ettuvan family as a social and econonnc 
security and mobility unit. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the security and 
mobility benefits1 and costs2 of children as viewed by husbands and wives for their 
own as well as their children's security and mobility. For example, how many 
children, and of what sex, would enable parents to achieve their security and 
mobility goals, in the changed institutional environment? Old-age security is often 
seen as one of the most important aspects of the value of children, particularly sons 
in less developed countries. This chapter will also focus especially on the old-age 
security value of Vettuvan male and female children in Engandiyour. Given the very 
different roles played by sons and daughters, there is little point in considering the 
'value of children' without reference to their sex. Thus this chapter examines the 
security and mobility costs and benefits of sons and daughters separately. The 
ultimate objective of the chapter is to demonstrate how security and mobility 
benefits and costs of sons and daughters reported by Vettuvan wives and husbands 
are linked with their fertility levels and fertility preferences examined in Chapter 4. 
7.2 Sons: the nature of security and mobility costs and benefits 
In the present study nearly all Vettuvan husbands (98 per cent) and wives (99 per 
cent) in Engandiyour felt that it was necessary for a couple to have at least one son. 
1Benefits and advantages are interchangeably used in this chapter. 
2Costs and disadvantages a.re interchangely used in this chapter. 
This information is a clear indication that, as in many other communities in India 
and similar cultures3, sons were highly valued among the Vettuvans in Engandiyour. 
Why were sons essential to a Vettuvan couple? What characteristics of the 
Vettuvans contributed to this felt necessity? These issues are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
Table 7 .1 shows views of Vettuvan wives and husbands on why at least one son was 
essential to a Vettuvan couple. The major reason that emerged was old-age support. 
Slightly more than half the wives and slightly less than half the husbands shared this 
view. The concept of old age is relative and situation-specific. Among the 
Vettuvans, old age was the end of physical ability to work4, and becoming a widow 
(at roughly 50 or over) in the case of women. There was no clear age-specificity 
attached to 'old age'. Evidence shows that widowhood among the Vettuvans was 
very high5, suggesting a greater demand for their care. Since the majority of 
Vettuvans were still employed in daily-wage-earning occupations, their inability to 
work would change their status to that of a dependant6. This means that a sizeable 
proportion of men and women aged 60 years and above among the Vettuvans 
needed assistance from others. Thus, the magnitude of the old-age situation 
influenced by demographic, social and economic factors seems to have some 
relation to the reported importance of sons as an old age security asset. It has been 
demonstrated in Chapter 6 that most of the elderly received the support they needed 
from their children, particularly sons. 
Among the Vettuvans, old-age support incorporated both social and econormc 
support. The economic aspect is that sons supported parents by providing basic 
necessities such as food, clothing, shelter and medical care. The social meaning is 
that sons provided a 'security and status symbol' which enabled parents to receive 
higher status in their old age, both in the family and village circles. However, 
educated and employed (in non-traditional occupations) sons provide better status to 
their parents than do less educated and unemployed ( or employed in traditional 
occupations) sons. The economic and social components of old age were not two 
3For example, Vlassoffs (1979) study carried out in Maharashtra state in India stressed the 
i1nportance of culture-related values for desiring sons. Cain (1977, 1981, 1983, 1986) in a series of 
publications, on the other hand, argued the economic value of sons in societies in Bangladesh, 
where elaborate alternatives for old-age support are lacking. Also see Mamdani (1972) in Manupur, 
and Nag et al. (1978) in a Javanese and a Nepalese village with similar values for sons. 
4Vlassoff and Vlassoff (1980:498) showed from their Maharashtra study that old age beyond the 
productive period was not the normally expected outcome. See also Vlassoff (1990) . 
5Nearly half of the women aged 50 years and above were widows. For more details, see Chapter 6. 6No adequate savings were reported among the Vettuvans. A nominal old age pension (Rs. 61 per 
month) is reported to be inadequate to meet their various needs. 
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distinctive aspects for the Vettuvans. The usage vayasakumbol nokkan, to care in old 
age, is an omnibus term; it can incorporate everything that can make an old person 
feel that he or she has been taken care of, according to the given social and 
economic situation of the family. 
The caste-system changes and land reform have contributed to the importance of 
family in the support for the elderly among the Vettuvans. As seen in Chapter 6, the 
breakdown of the traditional landlord-tenant relationship significantly increased the 
role of the Vettuvan family in the care of its family members, particularly the 
elderly. Under the traditional landlord-tenant arrangement, the Vettuvans had very 
little option in caring for aged parents or other needy people in the family. 
Everything was pre-determined. All family members had to contribute to the 
landlord's work until the last day of their life. Neither children nor the elderly were 
exempted from work. When tenancy was abolished and the V ettuvans became 
independent from the caste-system bondage, the role of the family in caring for its 
older members became a norm. There was a greater pressure not to let parents 
continue working if their health was poor and to provide parents with medical care, 
along with other necessities. There were sons in the Vettuvan community who 
demanded the withdrawal from labouring of their mothers who were 60 years of 
age, even when the mothers were healthy. In the absence of a non-familial 
dependable system for the care of the elderly population for the Vettuvans in 
Engandiyour, it was likely that Vettuvans would regard their sons as potential 
carers 7 in the old age. 
The second important reason for the necessity to have sons was related to the 
economic support that children provided to their parents and family (Table 7.1). In 
contrast with old age support, which is normally associated with the non-productive 
years ( older and sick) of parents, the economic support to the family is the support 
that parents might receive during their productive years. Slightly less than one-third 
of wives and slightly more than one-third of husbands considered that having a son 
was important for economic reasons. Considering the widely held view8 that 
7 A similar argument was advanced by Cain (1983): 'where financial and insurance markets are 
poorly developed, and where, consistent with the joint household formation system, there is no 
tradition of extrafamilial welfare institutions, children have a number of desirable properties as 
security assets. Most importantly, with respect to security for elderly parents, they fulfil the need 
for an annuity' (Cain, 1983:694). 
8Nag et al. (1978:301) demonstrated from their study in Javanese and Nepalese villages that the 
work output of children to their families was quite substantial. DeTray's (1983:452-453) study 
based on the 1976 Malaysian Family Life Survey concludes that both male and female children 
make productive contributions to their families. See also Cain (1977) for a similar finding from 
Bangladesh. However, Muller (1976) using aggregate and life-cycle models showed that children 
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children, particularly sons, are economic assets in poor economic settings9, this 
percentage may appear small. This implies that changes have taken place in the 
village that could have influenced the economic value of children among the 
Vettuvans. Important changes that have taken place in the village in this regard were 
in the areas of education and occupation. Chapter 5 showed that the education of the 
Vettuvans has increased significantly in the 1990s; and it documented a significant 
shift in the occupation of the Vettuvans from traditional to non-traditional areas. 
Both education and modern occupations can delay entry into work. These changes 
not only delay but also lessen the contributions of sons to the family economy, in 
Caldwell's (1982) terms reducing wealth-flow from children to parents. The other 
reason for the small percentage of husbands and wives considering sons as economic 
assets may be because children in the traditional caste system may not be significant 
contributors to their family economy. In-depth interviews revealed that the caste 
system compelled the Vettuvan children to work10 long hours as early as 10-12 
years11 • Under the caste system the beneficiaries of child labour were the landlords. 
That means in the traditional caste system, those who produced children and those 
who benefited from children were two different sets of people, the tenant Vettuvans 
and the landlords, respectively. Again according to Caldwell's (1982) term, the 
wealth-flow from sons to parents or family was not significant. Therefore, both in 
the traditional caste system and the non-traditional caste system, younger Vettuvan 
children in Engandiyour were probably not economically beneficial to their parents 
during their productive ages. It is reasonable, therefore, to speculate that the 
economic contributions of younger children to their family economy had been less 
substantial among the Vettuvans12. The fact that in 1997 about a third of the couples 
still expected economic support from children indicates that the V ettuvan 
community had not fully transformed to an economy where the flow of economic 
support is overwhelmingly from parents to children. 
have negative value in peasant communities; in peasant societies children-from birth to the time 
of their own marriage-tend to produce less than they consume. 
9It may be recalled here that Vettuvans were one of the poorest sections of Engandiyour village. 
10This work included carrying food to the fields, caring for animals, collecting coconuts and 
generally helping parents in their work. 
11 Dyson (199l)argues that children work because people have children, rather than people 
producing children in order to make them work. See Vlassoff (1991) for a similar view. 
12It is important to understand the social and economic context of the caste system to explain this 
situation. An increase in the labour force in the family only contributed more wealth to the 
landlord. The share the tenants received was not fully based on how much they produced, rather on 
how many members were in the family. Thus, the addition of labour increased the agricultural 
output of the landowner, but not necessarily the tenant family's. See Muller (1976) for an analysis 
of negative economic value of children in peasant societies. 
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The third reason suggested by the respondents for feeling that sons were essential to 
a couple was the socio-cultural dimension related to the preservation of the family 
name and traditions. This was reported by about one-third of wives and a slightly 
lower proportion of husbands (Table 7.1). It may be noted that the Vettuvans 
followed the patrilineal kinship pattern. In societies where kinship is traced along 
the lines of males, the importance of having at least one son is found to be higher 
than in matrilineal societies, for reasons related to keeping the family name and 
traditions (Kapadia, 1966: 182). Among the Vettuvans, if a couple did not have a 
son, normally one of their married daughters would continue to live in her parents' 
house: the parents would adopt the son-in-law as a son. After the death of the father, 
the family name would be changed to the daughter's husband's family name. In this 
process, veetuperu, the family name would be changed forever. In other words, the 
lineage lost a member family. This was something that no Vettuvans would like to 
happen to them. Vettuvans were deeply concerned about the tharawad nashikkal, 
'the peril of the family'. They expressed the view that their family karanavanmar, or 
'ancestors', would be unhappy because the new authority might not perform 
veeduvekkal, 'offerings to ancestors and family deities'. Vettuvans, like other lower-
caste Hindus in the village, offered special food, normally a dish prepared from a 
rooster raised locally, and toddy to their ancestors, believing that such actions would 
keep their souls happy. There was a widely held belief among the Vettuvans that if 
ancestors were unhappy, that could cause disease, mishaps, delays in accomplishing 
tasks, and other misfortunes. It was also the worry of the Vettuvans that the son-in-
law (new authority) might sell off the property in order to settle in his own 
locality13 , maybe in another village. The concern about selling off the house was 
related to the emotional bond Vettuvans had with the land on which they had lived 
for generations. Their grandparents, and other relatives, and in some cases even their 
parents, were all buried in the compound of their house14. This, however, was not 
the case for those households that had recently moved to a new location. The 
economic value of sons and culture-related importance of sons seemed to have 
almost equal importance among the Vettuvans. 
The physical-security value of sons was reported by about one-fifth of wives and 
one-sixth of husbands (Table 7 .1). Observation and informal interviews with 
Vettuvans in Engandiyour indicated that people believed that, if there were men in 
13There would be less recognition of a couple, particularly the husband, if they decided to live in 
the house of the wife. Villagers considered the husband an outsider. It might take several years 
before he was fully accepted in the village. Acceptance means being invited to social functions, 
talking freely, and so on. 
14V ettuvans buried their dead in their own housing compound. 
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the family, they would not be subjected to improper behaviour or other such actions 
by anyone. However, there was no evidence in the village that people behaved 
improperly to those Vettuvan families without a son. Studies conducted elsewhere in 
India, however, demonstrated the importance of sons for physical security 
(Mamdani, 1972). 
In this survey only one-tenth of wives and slightly fewer husbands held the view 
that a son was essential to carry out the last rites for his parents. Sons played an 
important role in the last rites of parents in the past; among the Vettuvans only 
males could perform these rites. While one's own daughters were not permitted to 
perform the last rites, close or even distant male relatives could do so. Couples who 
did not have a son usually established good relations with the husband's brother's 
sons or those males who had the potential to perform the last rites for them. It was 
considered a disgrace for the deceased to have an 'enemy' ( or their enemy's son) 
performing the last rites. To have a son to perform the last rites was thus important 
for a couple. However, because sons were often in other states and countries at the 
time of death, the traditional view of Hindus in Engandiyour that sons were the 
preferred ones who could perform such rites was being relaxed. This seemed to have 
influenced Vettuvan attitudes regarding the role of sons in performing last rites for 
parents, although few members from the Vettuvan community work in other states 
or countries. 
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Table 7 .1: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their opinion 
about the necessity of sons for a Vettuvan couple, Engandiyour, 1997 
Opinion about the necessity of sons 
To support parents in old age 
To support family economically 
To keep family name and traditions 
Physical protection of the family 
To perform last rites for parents 
Othersa 
Number of respondents 
Wife 
N (o/o)b 
159 
(52.6) 
90 
(29.7) 
98 
(32.4) 
58 
(19.2) 
30 
(10.0) 
23 
(7.6) 
302 
Husband 
N (o/o)b 
131 
(49.1) 
94 
(35.2) 
77 
(28.8) 
43 
(16.1) 
19 
(7.1) 
33 
(12.3) 
267 
Total 
N (o/o)b 
290 
(51.0) 
184 
(32.3) 
175 
(30.8) 
101 
(17.8) 
49 
(8.6) 
56 
(9.8) 
569 
Notes: Those who indicated that sons were not essential to a couple or who were indifferent were 
excluded from this analysis. There were six wives and two husbands in these categories. 
aothers include: 'Sons remain at home after marriage'; 'To perform work which women do not'; and 
'To look after mother when father dies'. 
bTotal percentages exceed 100 because of multiple responses 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
The above discussion shows that a son was essential to a Vettuvan couple in 
Engandiyour in 1997. The old-age security aspect emerged as the most significant 
reason to have at least one son. A wide range of socio-economic aspects surrounded 
the perceived necessity for a son. The necessities could be considered as security-
and mobility-related benefits to parents and family from having at least one son. 
One pertinent question arises at this point: if at least one son is important to a 
Vettuvan couple, why did such a view not translate to their fertility outcomes? As 
revealed in Table 4.18, about 10 per cent of the 192 wives in the Vettuvan study did 
not have a son and had undergone sterilisation. More significantly, demand for 
many sons seems to be lacking in this community, although at least one son is 
reported to be essential. Before addressing this apparent paradox between wanted 
and achieved, various aspects of having one son are discussed. 
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7.2.1 Benefits to parents and family from having only one son 
Although the demographic literature on the value of sons to parents generally 
ignores the number of sons a couple has, there may be reasons why parents might 
not want several sons, even if the need for one son is strongly expressed. Thus it is 
useful to consider the value of having one son, and then the value of having two or 
more. For example, if there is a markedly different value in having one son and two 
or more sons, it almost pointless to discuss the value of sons without referring to 
their number. 
All the Vettuvan wives and the husbands in the present study were asked their views 
about the benefits parents and families would receive from having only one son in 
the social and economic situation prevailing in Engandiyour in 1997. This question 
was administered irrespective of the number and sex of children each respondent 
had. The results are given in Table 7 .2. For slightly over two-fifths of Vettuvan 
wives and husbands, an important benefit to parents from having one son was that 
parents would be easily able to meet the son's various needs. Two inferences can be 
made from this observation. First, with one son it would be easy to provide care 
comparable to that provided by other communities to their children. This includes 
sending children to good schools, and providing them with good food, clothes and 
other necessities. Secondly, in the social and economic environment that prevailed 
in 1997 in Engandiyour, an educated person would have higher social and economic 
status than a less educated person. Thus, by having one son parents could improve 
the economic opportunities for their children and increase their children's as well as 
their own social status, a 'win-win' situation, where both parents and children would 
benefit. This observation is consistent with the study of Vlassoff and Vlassoff 
(1980:499) in a Maharashtra village where they noted that parents were not selfish 
in having only one son for their benefit. However, Bulatao (1980: 101), using data 
from 23 countries, argues that parents' aspirations for their own lives were a more 
plausible explanation for fertility decline than parents' aspirations for their children. 
There was a widespread belief in Engandiyour that if a couple had only one son, 
parents could give him their full 'attention'. Once again, this indicates the desire of 
parents to provide for their children's welfare and progress. The general feeling 
among the Vettuvan parents we interviewed was that there was a limit to what they 
could do to ensure the economic and social welfare of their families. They believed 
that it was their children who could further change the social and economic position 
of the family by better education and employment. This is somewhat a different 
situation from other studies where sons were seen as mostly useful for the 
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immediate day-to-day needs of the family (Cain, 1977), rather than a long-term 
mobility investment. The implication of this for their fertility is that the Vettuvans 
would limit the number of sons to a minimum for whom they can provide all needed 
care15 . In the circumstances in Engandiyour and Kerala where the cost of living was 
high, education of children was valued highly, and non-traditional occupations were 
preferred to traditional ones, the poor Vettuvans had no other option than to have 
only son to meet their aspirations to climb the social and economic ladder. For 
Vettuvans, these aspirations were a result of caste-system changes and abolition of 
tenancy. 
Slightly more than a quarter of wives and about one-fifth of husbands reported that 
disputes over land could be avoided if a Vettuvan couple had only one son. In 1997, 
as indicated in Chapter 6, among the Vettuvans, land was the main source of dispute 
between relatives, and of family division. In families where there was only one son 
the land was not supposed to be shared, as land was not shared with sisters16. Thus, 
having only one son ensured no dispute over property between brothers. There were 
examples in my interviews among the V ettuvans of very peaceful transfer of 
parental property to the only son. Such transfers demonstrated that land-related 
disputes could be minimised if a couple had only one son. The land reform which 
provided fixity of land to the Vettuvans resulted, indirectly, in no further avenues 
for land for tenancy from the landlords. Given the land prices and poor economic 
conditions of the Vettuvans, it was then inevitable to share the land given to them 
through land reform between brothers. Having only son can, thus, avoid disputes 
that may arise from the division of a very small piece of land. The role of land 
reform in raising the value of having only one son is reflected in the view presented 
in this paragraph and the fertility data presented in Chapter 4. 
Slightly fewer than one-fifth of wives and about one-seventh husbands reported that 
having only one son would ensure support in parents' old age. These respondents 
believed that when a couple has one son, there would be no opportunity for the son 
to share the responsibility of caring for parents with brothers, which may result in 
neither caring for the parents. A situation where there is only one son normally 
results in the only son providing all the support to parents. 
15Bhattacharyya and Hayes (19??) showed from rural Bangladesh that the socio-economic 
development in rural areas first increase perception of parents of the long-term benefits from 
sending children to schools. However, when the cost of sending children becomes economic 
burden, parents would reduce their fertility. That means parents will have only fewer children to 
whom they can provide education easily. 
16Dowry given at the time of a girl's marriage was considered to be the daughter's share in the 
property of parents. 
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To sum up, in the social and economic situation prevailing in Engandiyour in 1997, 
there were several security and mobility benefits in having only one son. These 
benefits were generated primarily by the effects of caste-system changes, land 
reform and Gulf migration. It appears that these benefits of having only one son 
have resulted in their fertility outcomes and norms about fertility discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
Table 7 .2: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their opinion 
on the benefits to parents and family of parents having only one son, Engandiyour, 
1997 
Benefit of having one son 
No benefit 
Parents can meet children's needs 
Less dispute over property 
Will look after parents 
Cost and benefit the same 
Othersa 
Number of respondents 
Wife 
N(o/o)b 
14 
(4.5) 
140 
(45.5) 
91 
(29.5) 
59 
(19.2) 
47 
(15.3) 
17 
(5.5) 
308 
Husband 
N (o/o)b 
19 
(7.1) 
113 
(42.0) 
52 
(19.3) 
41 
(15.2) 
49 
(18.2) 
36 
(13.4) 
269 
Total 
N (o/o)b 
33 
(5.7) 
253 
(43.9) 
143 
(24.8) 
100 
(17.3) 
96 
(16.6) 
53 
(9.2) 
577 
Note: aothers include: 'more affection towards parents'; 'there is benefit'; 'less responsibility to 
parents'; and 'peace of mind'. bTotal percentages exceed 100 owing to multiple responses. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
7 .2.2 Disadvantages to parents and family of having only one son 
Having examined the various security-mobility benefits from having only one son, 
this section considers the security-mobility costs, or disadvantages to parents and 
family. Table 7.3 portrays the costs to parents and family of having only one son 
reported by Vettuvan wives and husbands. According to the table nearly three-
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quarters of wives and slightly more husbands reported that there were no security-
mobility disadvantages to parents and family from having only one son. That means, 
having only son would not negatively influence the security-mobility efforts of the 
Vettuvans. 
The only significant concern expressed by the respondents was the disadvantage to 
parents if the only son became disloyal to the family or died. This concern was 
reported by slightly less than a quarter of the wives and one-fifth of husbands. Other 
types of costs reported by less than five per cent of the wives and husbands were 
'lower strength to the family', 'lower income to the family', and 'more responsibility 
to the son'. 
Table 7.3: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their opinion 
on the costs to parents and family of parents having only one son, Engandiyour, 
1997 
Disadvantages of having only one son 
None 
If they become useless or die, it is a 
heavy loss to family 
Othersa 
Number of respondents 
Wife 
N (%)b 
228 
(74.0) 
73 
(23.7) 
17 
(5.5) 
308 
Husband 
N(%)b 
211 
(78.4) 
55 
(20.5) 
9 
(3.3) 
269 
Total 
N (%)b 
439 
(76.1) 
128 
(22.2) 
26 
(4.5) 
577 
Notes:aOthers include: 'lower strength to family'; 'if separated', 'more problem to parents'; 'lower 
income to family'; and 'more responsibility to sons'. bTotal percentages exceed 100 because of 
multiple responses. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
To sum up, a comparison of the benefits and costs or disadvantages to parents and 
family from having only one son, as viewed by the Vettuvan wives and husbands in 
Engandiyour, suggests that the benefits outweighed the costs. When asked about the 
benefit of having one son to parents and family only about 5 per cent of respondents 
indicated no benefit; on the contrary, nearly three-quarters reported no cost to 
parents and family when asked about the cost of having only son. The benefits of 
having only one son are not only the benefits that children bring to parents or to the 
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family, but also that this makes it possible for parents to provide the care that 
matches the prevailing norms in the society. Ultimately, one well educated and 
employed son will bring more social and economic status and support to parents and 
family than several uneducated and unemployed sons. 
7.2.3 Benefits to parents and family from having two or more sons 
This section discusses the views of Vettuvan wives and husbands about the benefits 
parents and family would receive from having two or more sons. As will be seen, 
although having one son is seen as essential, attitudes to having more are 
ambiguous. As Table 7 .4. reveals, slightly less than one-third of both wives and 
husbands reported that there was no benefit to the parents or their family from 
having two or more sons. The rest indicated various benefits, but many of the 
benefits they proposed were conditional. For example, about two-fifths of the wives 
and nearly half the husbands held the view that if all the sons of a couple were in 
suitable employment, then it might be beneficial for parents. Similarly, a few 
respondents indicated that two or more sons would be beneficial to parents only if 
they possessed good character. What they indirectly indicated, perhaps, was that in 
the situation of 1997 (in Engandiyour and Kerala) having two or more sons was 
unlikely to bring any worthwhile benefit to their parents because of the potential 
difficulty in finding employment for sons in non-traditional sectors, and the 
increasing chances of sons becoming disloyal to parents. There was a great fear in 
the village in general and among the V ettuvans in particular that more and more 
young men would be trapped in the habit of alcohol consumption and spending 
money on gambling. Thus, nearly four-fifths of the respondents held the view that 
two or more sons would entail either no benefit or conditional benefit in the social 
and economic setting that prevailed. 
A benefit of having two or more sons was the possibility that at least one son would 
look after his parents in their old age. This was reported by about a quarter of the 
wives and husbands. A similar finding was reported by Hull (1977:244) in Java: 
'many people also verbalise the notion that it is better to have many offspring in 
order to ensure that they will have children about them as they approach old age'. A 
very small proportion, less than five per cent of both wives and husbands, reported 
that if they had two or more sons, parents could have less responsibility for meeting 
day-to-day expenses in running the family once their children grew up. The very 
low percentage suggesting this view is probably an indication of the growing 
concern among parents about the limited returns from sons, particularly during the 
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parents' productive years. 
Physical protection for the family was reported by about three per cent of both 
wives and husbands as a benefit of having two or more sons. In comparison, about 
one-fifth of the wives and husbands reported that sons would provide physical 
security for the family when we asked them about the reasons for feeling the 
necessity of having sons (see Table 7.1). Thus, it appears that the greater number of 
sons was not the key factor that provided physical protection to the family, but their 
quality: education and employment17 • That is in the context prevailing in 1997, one 
educated son employed in the non-traditional sector was enough to provide physical 
security to the family. Physical protection in Engandiyour was no longer a matter of 
physical defence, it was more related to the ability of the family to use legal means 
should anyone physically assault the family or the property. 
Each of the 'other reasons' was reported by less than one per cent of the wives and 
husbands. The proposition that more sons means more status seems to be very weak 
for the Vettuvans: only about one per cent of the couples indicated that more sons 
would bring higher status to the family 18 . Among the Vettuvans if sons were 
unemployed and uneducated they could not bring status to the family and parents. 
On the contrary, it was shameful for the family to have grown-up male children 
without work. Another reason that emerged among the benefits of having two or 
more sons was related to the ability of the family to make a good marriage alliance 
for their daughters. Yet another set of benefits reported was that parents could stay 
with either son. Few of the wives and husbands indicating the benefits reported in 
the 'other reasons' make reference to any unique conditions of the Vettuvans. 
17Tois is in clear contrast to what Mamdani found in a Punjabi village. 
l8studies conducted elsewhere in India sometimes demonstrated the correlation of status of family 
with number of sons: more sons, more status (Mamdani, 1972). 
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Table 7 .4: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their opinion 
on the benefits to parents and family of parents having two or more sons, 
Engandiyour, 1997 
Benefits from two or more sons Wife Husband 
N (%)b N (%)b 
No benefit 87 80 
(28.2) (29.7) 
If all sons work, then there is benefit 123 137 
(39.9) (51.0) 
At least one will look after parents in old age 81 72 
(26.3) (26.8) 
If all have good character, it makes no difference 15 17 
(4.9) (6.3) 
There will be less economic responsibility for parents 11 10 
(3.6) (3.7) 
Each brother can share family responsibility 6 2 
(2.0) (0.7) 
More physical strength to the family 11 8 
(3.6) (3 .0) 
Othersa 10 6 
(3.2) (2.2) 
Total number of respondents 308 269 
Notes:aOthers include: 'more relations through marriage will emerge'; 'status to the family'; 
'daughters can be married to good families'; and 'parents can stay with each child'. bTotal 
percentages exceed 100 due to multiple responses. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
7 .2.4 Disadvantages of having two or more sons 
Total 
N(%)b 
167 
(28.9) 
260 
(45.1) 
153 
(26.5) 
32 
(5.5) 
21 
(3.6) 
8 
(1.4) 
19 
(3.3) 
16 
(2.8) 
577 
Views of Vettuvan wives and husbands on the cost of having two or more sons to 
their parents and family are depicted in Table 7.5. The most important disadvantage 
revealed by the wives and husbands in the study was the possibility of disputes over 
land among the brothers. More than half of the respondents reported this issue. As 
we have seen in Chapter 5, the majority of Vettuvans held less than five cents (0.02 
hectares) of land obtained through the land reform. It would be practically 
impossible to accommodate more than one house on such a small piece of land. The 
rise in land prices prevented Vettuvans from buying land for constructing houses. 
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The growing attitude towards educating and providing for children with all possible 
facilities has led, and is likely to continue to lead, many Vettuvans to have separate 
households. It would be hard to avoid land-related conflict, should parents have a 
large number of sons. Under such circumstances there are few incentives to parents 
to have more than one son. In fact one of the important benefits of having only one 
son was to reduce land-related disputes. A comparison of the benefit from having 
only one son and the cost of having two or more sons confirms the view of Vettuvan 
wives and husbands in Engandiyour that land-related disputes can be avoided if 
Vettuvan parents limit their number of sons to one. 
Slightly less than one-third of both wives and husbands reported that if there were 
more sons it would be difficult to control them, and the sons would end up drinking 
and gambling. Parents would eventually lose their peace of mind. It was also 
possible that some sons would create problems outside the family and parents would 
have to face the consequences. About 6 per cent of wives and husbands reported that 
if they had more sons it was unlikely that any son would take on the responsibility 
for parents. That is, each one would think that it was the responsibility of the other 
to look after the parents. Economic difficulty in bringing up children as a cost was 
reported by about 4 per cent of wives and 6 per cent of the husbands. A few wives 
and husbands reported that lack of co-operation among brothers might be a cost of 
having two or more sons. Those 'other reasons' included 'none will help in old age'; 
and 'if no job for children, higher responsibility to parents'. 
In sum, taking together the benefits of having only one son and the costs of having 
two or more sons confirms the attitude of the Vettuvan wives and husbands that they 
prefer one son. 
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Table 7.5: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their opinion 
on the costs to parents and family of parents having two or more sons, Engandiyour, 
1997 
Disadvantages of two or more sons 
None 
Dispute over property 
Difficult to control 
Economic difficulty to bring them up 
May not look after parents 
Less co-operative 
Othersa 
Number of respondents 
Wife 
N (%)b 
58 
(18.8) 
176 
(57.1) 
85 
(27.6) 
12 
(3.9) 
18 
(5.9) 
8 
(2.6) 
8 
(2.6) 
308 
Husband 
N (%)b 
38 
(14.1) 
163 
(60.6) 
78 
(29.1) 
16 
(6.0) 
16 
(6.0) 
14 
(5.2) 
13 
(4.8) 
269 
Total 
N(%)b 
96 
(16.6) 
339 
(58.8) 
163 
(28.2) 
28 
(4.9) 
34 
(5.9) 
22 
(3.8) 
21 
(3 .6) 
577 
Notes:aOthers include: 'if poor, there is a problem'; 'if no jobs for children' , 'higher responsibility to 
parents'; 'none will help in old age'; 'after marriage sons will have less relation with parents'. 0Total percentages exceed 100 owing to multiple responses. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
A comparison of the two sets of responses, costs and benefits to parents of having 
one son with costs and benefits of having two or more sons, clearly suggests that 
couples in general do not favour the idea of having two or more sons. As evident 
from Table 7.6, about 94 per cent of respondents (wives and husbands) considered 
there were benefits in having only one son, whereas only about 20 per cent of the 
respondents (wives and husbands) reported benefits from two or more sons. The 
disadvantages of having only one son were reported by slightly less than a quarter of 
respondents (wives and husbands) compared to more than three-quarters in the case 
of disadvantages associated with two or more sons. 
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Table 7 .6: Percentage distribution of Vettuvan respondents according to their 
opinion on the benefits and costs to parents and family of parents having one 
son, and two or more sons, Engandiyour, 1997 
Benefits/Costs 1 son 2 or more sons 
Benefits to 94_3b 20.sa,d 
parents and 
family 
Costs to parents 23.9c g3.4e 
and family 
Notes: aThis considers conditional benefits such as 'if all sons work, then there is benefit' and 
'if all have good character, then there is benefit' as not benefits of two or more sons. 
Sources: Tables 7.2b, 7.3c, 7.4dand 7.5e. 
7.3 Daughters: the nature of security and mobility costs and benefits 
It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that Vettuvan wives and husbands in 
Engandiyour felt that daughters were of equal importance with sons. The reasons for 
the importance of daughters differed from those attributed to sons, and mostly 
related to providing physical support. The most prominent reason, reported by over 
four-fifths of the wives and husbands in the study, was that they helped their 
mothers in household work. As noted in the previous chapter, among the V ettuvans 
household work was strictly performed by women, so a helping hand was 
considered highly useful. For example, when a mother was working for wages or 
sick, the family could depend on daughters for cooking and other household work. 
These benefits of daughters were limited to the period before their marriage. The 
role of daughters among the Vettuvans is, therefore, significant when they are 
unmarried and living with parents. 
The role of daughters in caring for aged parents was another reason pointed out by 
slightly over a quarter of the wives and husbands. When parents reach old age, 
usually their daughters are married. The old-age support from a daughter, therefore, 
refers to the support parents get from a married daughter. Usually, non-monetary 
support is provided by daughters when parents are sick or bedridden. Traditionally, 
among the Vettuvans it is the responsibility of daughters to look after their parents, 
even if they are married or live far away from them. Interviews with Vettuvans 
revealed that married daughters would have to return to their natal home to care for 
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parents when summoned by their brother or parents. For example, if parents were in 
hospital it was the daughter who would normally stay with them and look after their 
non-monetary needs. But we have seen in Chapter 6 that the circumstances do not 
often permit daughters to perform their traditional role as carers of parents in 
Engandiyour in the 1990s. 
The role of daughters in making a prosperous home was mentioned by one-fifth of 
the respondents. This role is largely confined to the time when the daughters are 
unmarried and living with parents, because once they are married they will be living 
with their husbands in their houses. The role of daughters in a prosperous home has 
its roots in tradition. Among Hindus, it is women who light vilaku, the lamp, in the 
evenings. This symbolises women providing 'light' to their families by receiving 
'light' from the Sun God in the evening. A home without a daughter is thus 
considered less prosperous. In general, women are considered essential to a family 
for their distinctive roles as daughters and home-makers. While the demographic 
and social changes in Engandiyour were making it difficult to continue the past role 
of daughters, changes in the traditional roles of women among the Vettuvans were 
yet to be seen on a large scale. 
To sum up, the necessity for a Vettuvan couple to have a daughter as indicated by 
wives and husbands in this study is largely as an assistant to the mother in carrying 
out household work. Since daughters live with their husbands in their houses after 
their marriage, the assistance that mothers receive from their daughters is limited to 
the time they remained unmarred. The role of daughters after their marriage is 
limited as indicated by relatively low percentages of wives and husbands expecting 
old-age support from daughters. 
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Table 7. 7: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their opinion 
about the necessity of a daughter for a Vettuvan couple, Engandiyour, 1997 
Opinion about the necessity of daughters 
To help mother in household work 
To look after parents in old age and sickness 
To make a prosperous house 
Othersa 
Total number of respondents 
Wife 
N(o/o)b 
268 
(89.0) 
106 
(35.2) 
58 
(19.3) 
18 
(6.0) 
301 
Husband 
N (o/o)b 
213 
(83 .2) 
66 
(25.8) 
48 
(18 .8) 
21 
(8.2) 
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Total 
N (o/o)b 
481 
(86.4) 
172 
(30.9) 
106 
(19.0) 
39 
(7.0) 
557 
Notes: aothers include: 'look after other children' ; 'brothers need sisters'; 'to understand mothers' 
problems'; 'to cry when parents die'. bpercentages exceed 100 owing to multiple responses. 
c. Those who indicated that daughters were not essential to a couple (about 1 % ), or who were 
indifferent, were excluded from this analysis. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
7.3.1 Benefits to parents and family from having one daughter 
Table 7.8 shows the opinion of Vettuvan husbands and wives on the benefits to 
parents and family from having one daughter. Slightly more than three-fourths of 
wives and about two-thirds of husbands felt that there would be fewer financial 
difficulties if a couple had only one daughter. Given the magnitude of dowry 
payments described in Chapter 6, this is not surprising. The ability of parents to 
provide education, good food and other opportunities was reported as the benefit by 
about one-third of the of the wives and a slightly lower proportion of husbands. 
Thus, having only one daughter ensures that parents can provide necessary facilities 
when daughters are young, marry them by paying dowry, meet the delivery 
expenses, provide gifts to grandchildren, and meet other needs of the daughters. A 
successful parent among the Vettuvans in the 1990s was one who could meet such 
demands. 
248 
The 'other' responses included 'daughters give more love to parents', 'there is this or 
that benefit', 'will look after parents', 'more love among siblings', 'parents can 
control', 'parents can give equal attention', and 'peace of mind to parents'. About 6 
per cent of wives and 8 per cent of husbands reported no benefits to parents and 
family from having one daughter. Thus, the analysis suggests that the low financial 
liability accruing from having one daughter is the single most important factor that 
the Vettuvan wives and husbands identified. 
Table 7.8: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their opinion 
about the benefits to parents and family of parents having one daughter, 
Engandiyour, 1997 
Benefits of having one daughter 
No benefit 
Low financial liability 
Can give education and good food 
Othersa 
Total number of respondents 
Wife 
N(o/o)b 
18 
(5.8) 
234 
(76.0) 
112 
(36.4) 
29 
(9.4) 
308 
. 
Husband 
N (o/o)b 
21 
(7.8) 
169 
(62.8) 
77 
(28.6) 
46 
(17.1) 
269 
Total 
N(o/o)b 
39 
(6.8) 
403 
(69.8) 
189 
(32.8) 
75 
(13.0) 
577 
Notes: aothers: 'daughters give more love to parents'; 'there is this or that benefit'; 'will look after 
parents'; 'more love among siblings'; 'parents can give equal attention'; 'peace of mind to parents'; 
'parents can control'. bTotal percentages exceed 100 owing to multiple responses. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
7.3.2 Disadvantages to parents and family from having one daughter 
Table 7.9 shows the opinion of Vettuvan wives and husbands on the costs having 
one daughter to parents and family. A significant majority (about 85 per cent) of the 
Vettuvan wives and husbands reported that there were no disadvantages to having 
only one daughter. This suggests that one daughter is an acceptable number to the 
Vettuvans in Engandiyour in the context of the security-mobility aspirations. 
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Nearly six per cent of wives and about two per cent of husbands had the view that 
there would be less assistance from only daughters in the day-to-day household 
work. About one-tenth of husbands and about four per cent of wives had the view 
that even one daughter is an economic drain on the family. This indicates the extend 
of financial burden that parents have in marrying and meeting other expenses of 
daughters. 
Table 7.9: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their opinion 
on the cost to parents and family of parents having one daughter, Engandiyour, 1997 
Disadvantages of having one daughter 
None 
Less assistance from daughter 
Economic drain 
Othersa 
Total number of respondents 
Wife 
N(o/o)b 
263 
(85.4) 
19 
(6.2) 
12 
(3.9) 
24 
(7.8) 
308 
Husband 
N(o/o)b 
223 
(82.9) 
4 
(1.5) 
30 
(11.2) 
17 
(6.3) 
269 
Notes:aOthers include 'benefit and loss the same' and 'less support from daughters'. 
bTotal percentages exceed 100 owing to multiple responses. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
7.3.3 Benefits to parents and family of having two or more daughters 
Total 
N (o/o)b 
486 
(84.2) 
23 
(4.0) 
42 
(7.3) 
41 
(7.0) 
577 
While having one daughter is felt to be beneficial to a couple, having two or more 
daughters is not. Table 7 .10 shows views of Vettuvan wives and husbands about the 
benefits parents and family would have if parents had two or more daughters. About 
three-fifths of the wives and husbands in the study reported that two or more 
daughters would bring no benefits to their parents and family. In other words, two 
or more daughters will not benefit parents in their efforts to rise in the social and 
economic hierarchy of Engandiyour. 
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About a quarter of wives and a slightly lower proportion of husbands pointed out 
that if daughters were educated and had a job, then two or more would be useful for 
parents and family. Once again, given the grim employment situation in Kerala and 
Vettuvans' own poor economic conditions, it is unlikely that Vettuvans could 
educate more than one daughter and provide them with suitable employment in the 
non-traditional sector. About 8 per cent of wives and husbands suggested that if a 
parent had two or more daughters, at least one would be able to help her parents in 
old age. Clearly, there was no precise benefit that wives and husbands in this study 
could point to as an advantage of having two or more daughters. 
Table 7 .10: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their opinion 
on the benefits to parents and family of parents having two or more daughters, 
Engandiyour, 1997 
Advantages of having two or more daughters 
None 
If they can get good education and job, it is good 
At least one will care for parents 
Othersa 
No answer/can't say 
Total number of respondents 
Wife 
N(o/o)b 
182 
(59.0) 
78 
(25.3) 
24 
(7.8) 
24 
(7.8) 
10 
(3.3) 
308 
Husband 
N (o/o)b 
159 
(59.2) 
60 
(22.3) 
21 
(7.8) 
28 
(10.4) 
6 
(2.2) 
269 
Total 
N(o/o)b 
341 
(59.1) 
138 
(23.9) 
45 
(7.8) 
52 
(9.0) 
16 
(2.8) 
577 
Notes:aOthers include: 'prosperity to family'; 'benefit and loss the same'; 'always people at home'; 
'mourn when parents die', 'if rich then good'; 'can perform house work'; 'obedient'. 
bTotal percentages exceed 100 owing to multiple responses. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
7 .3 .4 Disadvantages to parents and family of having two or more daughters 
Table 7 .11 shows the opinion of Vettuvan wives and husbands on costs to parents 
and family if the parents had two or more daughters. The most important costs of 
having two or more daughters are associated with dowry. About two-thirds of wives 
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and four-fifths of husbands felt that arranging dowry would be a serious problem if 
a Vettuvan couple had two or more daughters. Usually, parents of many daughters 
receive sympathy from villagers, anticipating the difficulty they will have in getting 
them married. Taking together the views on the benefits of having only one 
daughter and costs of having two or more daughters, it is clear that financial 
difficulties in arranging dowry expenses are the most important reason for the 
Vettuvans limiting the number of desired daughters to one. 
Nearly a quarter of the wives and husbands showed concern in bringing up the 
daughters including educational costs, living expenses and meeting marriage 
expenses. A further important concern, expressed by one-fifth of wives and one-
tenth of husbands, was that there would be expenses to be met every day if there 
were many daughters. These include delivery expenses, giving gold to the newborn 
child, and gifts to the daughter's family during festivals. Women in the focus-group 
interviews particularly expressed concerns over delivery-related expenses. Some 
respondents even said: 'daughters are life-long trouble; they need something or other 
every day from their parents or natal home; more daughters means less peace of 
mind to parents'. Some respondents mentioned the chances of being wayward as a 
cost of having two or more daughters, though this was not an important objection. If 
any daughter eloped, it was often considered the result of having more daughters as 
parents could not marry them on time. As previously mentioned, elopement is 
considered by the Vettuvans as an inferior way of marriage. 
Table 7 .11: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their opinion 
on the costs to parents and family of parents having two or more daughters, 
Engandiyour, 1997 
Disadvantages of having two or more daughters 
None 
Dowry will be a problem 
To bring them up will be difficult 
Chance to become divergent (loss of reputation) 
Wife 
N (o/o)b 
14 
(4.5) 
215 
(69.8) 
74 
(24.0) 
43 
(14.0) 
Husband 
N(o/o)b 
1 
(0.4) 
216 
(80.3) 
66 
(24.5) 
36 
(13.4) 
Total 
N (o/o)b 
15 
(2.6) 
431 
(74.7) 
140 
(24.3) 
79 
(13.6) 
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There will be expenses every day 63 27 90 
(20.4) (10.0) (15.6) 
Othersa 11 8 19 
(3.6) (3.0) (3.3) 
Total number of respondents 308 269 577 
Note: aothers include: 'benefit and loss the same'; 'family economy will fall'; 'only costs'; and 'if 
rich no problem'; bTotal percentages exceed 100 owing to multiple responses. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
A comparison of the benefits and costs to parents and family of having two or more 
daughters with the benefits and costs of having one daughter is given in Table 7 .12. 
While nearly 97 per cent of the respondents (wives and husbands) indicated one way 
or another the disadvantages of having two or more daughters, benefits from two or 
more daughters were stated by less than two-fifths of the respondents (wives and 
husbands). Benefits to parents and family from having one daughter were reported 
by 93 per cent of the respondents (wives and husbands) and costs by only about 16 
per cent. This clearly suggests that among the Vettuvans in Engandiyour one 
daughter is a norm. 
Table 7 .12: Percentage distribution of Vettuvan respondents according 
to their opinion on the benefits and costs to parents and family 
of parents having one daughter, and two or more daughters, Engandiyour, 1997 
Benefits/Costs 1 daughter 2 or more daughters 
Benefits to 93.26 17.oa,d 
parents and 
family 
Costs to parents 15.8c 97.4e 
and family 
Note: aThis considers conditional benefits such as 'if all daughters work, then there is 
benefit' and 'if all have good character, then there is benefit' as not benefits of two or more 
daughters. 
Sources: Tables 7.13b, 7.14c, 7.15dand 7.16e. 
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7.4 Managing old age: how currently married couples saw it 
Following the examination of the various security and mobility benefits and costs to 
parents and family from having sons and daughters, this section examines the more 
specific issue of old-age support of the wives and husbands who are not yet 
considered old, at least in strict age terms, i.e., 60 years. For example: what do the 
Vettuvan wives and husbands in the present study think about their old-age 
economic support? Do they consider sons an important old-age asset? Do they 
consider daughters an old-age asset? Do they consider economic assets or pensions 
for their old age? How far have the·se old-age security considerations shaped their 
fertility levels and preferences? 
In order to understand the old-age security strategies of the Vettuvan wives and 
husbands in Engandiyour, a question about their plans to meet their economic 
requirements in old age was asked. Table 7 .13 shows answers to this question. 
Nearly two-thirds of the wives and slightly more husbands had no plan at all for old 
age. Children were reported as a source of old-age security only by about a quarter 
of the wives and about 15 per cent of the husbands. Around one-tenth of the wives 
and husbands had not given a thought to old age. These answers may indicate 
different life-cycle stages of the wives and husbands in the study. For example, very 
young wives and husbands may not have given any thought as to how they would 
manage their old age, while couples approaching 50 years may have been thinking 
about their children as their old-age security assets. It is, therefore, necessary to 
explore further to find out the old-age security value of children. In order to do so, a 
variety of follow-up questions were asked. 
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Table 7.13: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their 
proposed strategies to meet old-age economic requirements, Engandiyour, 1997 
Strategies to meet old age economic 
requirements 
Nothing 
Children 
Not given a thought 
Othersa 
Total number of respondents 
Wife 
N(%)b 
201 
(65.3) 
78 
(25.3) 
37 
(12.0) 
27 
(8.8) 
308 
Husband 
N(%)b 
188 
(69.9) 
39 
(14.5) 
31 
(11.5) 
21 
(7.8) 
269 
Total 
N(%)b 
389 
(67.2) 
117 
(20.4) 
68 
(11.8) 
48 
(8.4) 
577 
Note:aOthers include: 'do not have children'; 'from savings'; 'chits' (a form of saving organised by 
local financial institutions); 'old age pension'; 'will work up to death'; 'farmer's pension'. 
bTotal percentages exceed 100 owing to multiple responses. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
7 .4.1 Expectation of old-age support from sons 
Table 7 .13 noted an unclear view about old-age security management plans among 
the Vettuvan husbands and wives in Engandiyour. However, interestingly, when we 
asked whether they would expect old-age support from their sons, nearly nine-tenths 
of the wives and husbands answered positively (Table 7.14). This clearly indicates 
that parents expect old-age support from their sons, but that they did not seem to 
have such an expectation from sons as an explicit objective in producing sons. On 
the contrary, if they had sons, they expected them to provide support in old age. A 
similar view was advanced by Dyson ( 1991) and Vlassoff ( 1991) in their articles on 
child labour and fertility. As indicated in Table 4.18, nearly one-tenth of those who 
had adopted a terminal family planning method did not have a son, once again 
showing, at least in some cases, that to have sons was not the sole reproductive 
objective, although it is very important. 
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Table 7 .14: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their 
expectation of economic assistance from their sons, Engandiyour, 1997 
Expectation of economic assistance from 
sons in old age 
Expect assistance from sons 
Do not expect assistance from sons 
Not sure/Do not know 
Total 
Wife 
N(o/o) 
208 
(89.7) 
21 
(9.0) 
3 
(1.3) 
232 
(100) 
Husband 
N(o/o) 
184 
(90.6) 
13 
(6.5) 
6 
(2.9) 
203 
(100) 
Total 
N(o/o) 
392 
(90.1) 
41 
(7.8) 
9 
(2.1) 
435 
(100) 
Note: This question was asked of those wives and husbands who expected old-age support from 
their children. Numbers of wives and husbands who expected old-age support from their children 
were 232 and 203, respectively. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
Reasons for expecting old-age support from sons are shown in Table 7.15. Nearly 
three-quarters of those husbands and wives in the study who expected old-age 
support from their sons believed that parents provided all possible care for their 
children when they were young, and that the children would have to care for their 
parents when they became old. This forms the core argument of Vettuvans to expect 
support from sons in old age. Taking this table together with Tables 7.13 and 7.14, it 
is possible to argue that (i) to have a son is a chance and, therefore, to depend on a 
chance for old-age support is implausible for the Vettuvans; (ii) however, once they 
have a son, then they expect old-age support from him, (iii) because they provide 
him with all facilities accounting to their ability. 
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Table 7 .15: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to the reasons 
for expecting assistance from sons, Engandiyour, 1997 
Reasons for expecting old age assistance 
from sons 
We have brought them up, so they have to 
support us in our old age 
They will have some job 
Othersa 
No answer 
Total 
Wife 
N(o/o) 
162 
(77.8) 
21 
(10.1) 
18 
(8.7) 
7 
(3.4) 
208 
(100) 
Husband 
N(o/o) 
138 
(75.1) 
11 
(6.0) 
26 
(14.1) 
9 
(4.8) 
184 
(100) 
Notes: aothers include: 'only son'; 'good children', 'obedient'; 'hope to get help'. 
Total 
N(o/o) 
300 
(76.6) 
32 
(8.2) 
44 
(11.1) 
16 
(4.1) 
392 
(100) 
This question was addressed to only those 208 wives and 184 husbands who expected old age 
support from son (Table 7.14). 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
As indicated in Table 7 .14, less than one-tenth of the respondents reported that they 
did not expect any assistance from their sons. Reasons for not expecting old-age 
support from sons are given in Table 7.16. Nearly half the respondents believed that 
in the present circumstances of a higher cost of living it might not be possible for 
the children to support many people, including their own parents. These 
respondents, in general, seemed to recognise that kaalam maari, times had changed, 
and this was the inevitable consequence of such change. They blamed modern 
attitudes as the main culprit for these changes. The proportion of Vettuvan wives 
and husbands not expecting old-age support from sons being less than 10 per cent, 
this seems not to be the mainstream thinking of the Vettuvans. 
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Table 7 .16: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their reasons 
for not expecting assistance from sons, Engandiyour, 1997 
Reasons for not expecting assistance from sons Wife Husband Total 
N(o/o) N (%) N(o/o) 
Children can earn only to feed their family 19 11 30 
(90.4) (84.6) (88.2) 
Times have changed 2 2 4 
(9.6) (15.4) (11.8) 
Total 21 13 34 
(100) (100) (100) 
Note: This question was addressed to 21 wives and 13 husbands who did not expect old-age support 
from sons (Table 7.14). 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
In sum, the discussion in this section suggests that Vettuvan wives and husbands in 
this study expected old-age support from their sons. However, this expectation does 
not seems to have come before they had a son, suggesting that a very high old-age 
support value of sons co-existed with less clear-cut plans of old age security. 
7 .4.2 Expectation of old-age support from daughters 
This section addresses the issue of how in Engandiyour Vettuvan wives and 
husbands viewed the daughters in regard to their economic old-age security. Table 
7 .17 shows old-age support expected from daughters: slightly more than half of the 
wives and about two-thirds of husbands did not expect old-age support from their 
daughters. This suggests a limited role for daughters in their parents' old-age support 
compared to the role of sons. Further analysis indicated that these wives and 
husbands have a son to depend on for old age. It suggests that old-age support is 
expected from a son, but if there is no son, then it must come from a daughter. 
However, it is important to note that about half of the wives and husbands expected 
economic help from their daughters. From the demographic point of view, the 
current fertility levels of Vettuvans are indicative of some couples having no son. 
This indeed was revealed in the present study (Table 4.11). Thus, some husbands 
and wives may expect economic support from daughters as they have no sons or 
dependable non-familial support system. 
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This expectation of old-age economic support from daughters, however, did not 
appear as a reason for the necessity to have daughters. It seems, therefore, that old-
age support expectations from daughters are an inevitable consequence of fertility 
decline that results in some couples having only daughters. For example, if there is 
no son, the property of the parents will be inherited by daughters, and hence the 
responsibility to take care of parents in old age. These issues are discussed in detail 
in Chapter 6. 
To sum up, the expected role of daughters for old-age security among the Vettuans 
of Engandiyour was less than that of the sons. Vettuvan wives and husbands in the 
present study considered their sons as a source of security, even if they had a 
daughter. However, if they had no sons, a daughter was considered as a source of 
old-age security. 
Table 7.17: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their 
expectation of old-age economic support from daughters, Engandiyour, 1997 
Expectation of old-age economic support from 
daughters 
Not expected 
Expected 
No answer 
Total 
Wife 
N(%) 
110 
(54.7) 
85 
(42.3) 
6 
(3.0) 
201 
(100) 
Husband 
N(%) 
115 
(66.1) 
51 
(29.3) 
8 
(4.6) 
174 
(100) 
Total 
N(%) 
225 
(60.0) 
136 
(36.3) 
14 
(3.7) 
375 
(100) 
Note: There were 95 cases with no daughter among husbands; there were 107 cases with no 
daughter among wives (for details, see Table 4.11). 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
7 .4.3 Expectation of old-age pension 
The old-age pension, or Agricultural Workers' Pension, was given to economically 
poor individuals in each family in Kerala. Table 7 .18 shows the views of Vettuvan 
wives and husbands in Engandiyour regarding their expectation of various pensions. 
Slightly over half of wives and husbands reported that they would receive the 
government pension. Nearly two-fifths of wives and one-third of husbands reported 
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that they did not expect to receive an old age pension. 
Table 7 .18: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their 
expectation of government pension, Engandiyour, 1997 
Expectation of government pension 
Expect 
Do not expect 
Not sure what will happen 
Do not know 
Total 
Wife 
N(o/o) 
174 
(56.5) 
124 
(40.3) 
5 
(1.6) 
5 
(1.6) 
308 
(100) 
Husband 
N(o/o) 
145 
(53.9) 
90 
(33.5) 
17 
(6.3) 
17 
(6.3) 
269 
(100) 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
Total 
N(o/o) 
319 
(55.3) 
214 
(37.1) 
22 
(3.8) 
22 
(3.8) 
577 
(100) 
Those who expected to receive the old-age pension were asked their reasons for 
such expectations; the answers are given in Table 7 .19. The most important reason 
was the feeling that it was their right to receive a pension from the government. 
Slightly over three-fifths of wives and over half of the husbands reported this view. 
There was a widespread belief among the Vettuvans that governments should 
provide assistance to needy people. This feeling had some relation to the various 
Communist governments, present and past, in Kerala. The other reasons reported for 
hoping for a government pension included 'poverty', 'lack of a son', 'sons may not 
help', and 'hope to receive it through agriculture pension scheme'. Some of these 
views were influenced by the eligibility criteria set by the village Panchayath for 
approving the old-age pension. For example, if the applicant for the old-age pension 
had a grown-up son, he or she was unlikely to be granted the pension. 
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Table 7 .19: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their reasons 
for expecting government pension in old age, Engandiyour, 1997 
Reasons for expecting government 
pens10n 
When not in a position to work 
government should give pension 
Poverty 
Have no sons 
Othersb 
Total number of respondents 
Wife 
N(o/o)C 
111 
(63.9) 
58 
(33 .3) 
22 
(12.6) 
25 
(14.3) 
174 
Husband 
N(o/o )C 
82 
(56.2) 
40 
(27.6) 
16 
(11.0) 
23 
(15.9) 
145 
Total 
N (o/o)C 
193 
(60.5) 
98 
(30.7) 
38 
(11.9) 
48 
(15.1) 
319 
Notes: a. This question was addressed to 174 wives and 145 husbands who replied that they 
expected the old-age pension from the government (Table 7.22) . bothers include: 'Hope to get' , 
'Sons may not help' , 'Paying contribution for agriculture pension'. cTotal percentages exceed 100 
owing to multiple responses. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
Various reasons given by Vettuvan wives and husbands for not expecting the 
government old-age pension are shown in Table 7 .20: the most important reason 
was the administrative difficulty involved, such as the procedure of applying, and 
following it up. It was the widely held view in Engandiyour that an affiliation with 
the political party in the village Panchayath was necessary for access to benefits that 
operated through the village. Vettuvan husbands and wives in Engandiyour also 
recognised that having a son would debar them from becoming eligible for the old-
age pension. The very small amount of the pension and the difficulty in getting it 
clearly indicate the lack of a well established old-age support system in 
Engandiyour. 
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Table 7.20: Distribution of Vettuvan husbands and wives according to their reasons 
for not expecting the government old-age pension, Engandiyour, 1997 
Reasons for not expecting old-age pension 
Have sons 
Administrative difficulties 
Will die before being eligible for pension 
No-one in the family or relatives receives it 
Not thought of such things 
Husband will receive it 
No answer 
Total number of respondents 
Wives 
N(o/o)b 
18 
(14.5) 
39 
(31.5) 
11 
(8.9) 
24 
(19.4) 
17 
(13.7) 
3 
(2.4) 
12 
(9.6) 
124 
Husbands 
N(o/o)b 
10 
(11.1) 
53 
(58.9) 
7 
(7.8) 
14 
(15.6) 
15 
(16.6) 
--
--
90 
Total 
N (o/o)b 
28 
(13.1) 
92 
(43.0) 
18 
(8.4) 
38 
(17.8) 
32 
(15.0) 
3 
(1.4) 
12 
(5.5) 
214 
Notes: a. This question was addressed to 124 wives and 90 husbands who replied that they did not 
expect the old-age pension from the government (Table 7.22). bTotal percentages exceed 100 
owing to multiple responses. 
Sources: Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997; Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997. 
In sum up, the analysis of the role of children in old-age support in this section 
suggests that parents expect their children-sons and daughters-to provide old-age 
support for them. There was no viable alternative to one's own children for old-age 
support in the village or for that matter in Kerala, as the pension scheme provided 
only a nominal amount. Thus to ensure old-age security, husbands and wives in this 
study felt that it was essential to have a son. However, parents also realised that to 
receive old-age support from their sons, like their counterparts in other 
cornrnunities19, Vettuvans should have educated and employed sons. The social and 
economic situations in Engandiyour, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, suggest that 
this can be achieved easily with one son. 
19Field work gathered ample evidence that the elderly in the economically better-off families 
received better old-age support than those in the poor families. 
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Some Vettuvan wives and husbands expected support from daughters. However, this 
was not felt to be an expected benefit from having daughters, by parents in this 
study. Therefore, in the circumstances prevailing in Engandiyour and Kerala, 
daughters are to be seen as alternative to sons, and not complementary to sons, for 
old-age support. 
7 .5 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined how many children and of what sex are important in the 
security and mobility of Vettuvan parents and children in Engandiyour. The analysis 
revealed that in the changed social and economic environment discussed in Chapters 
5 and 6, having several sons was believed to be more of a liability than an asset to 
the parents. One son, on the other hand, was considered essential for a variety of 
social and economic mobility reasons. The analysis also demonstrated that daughters 
in general were considered as having a limited security and mobility role. Vettuvans 
considered one daughter an acceptable number for their traditional and practical 
reasons, but were totally against having more, as that would entail double the dowry 
costs and thus reduce the security and mobility prospects of the family. 
It is possible to conclude from this chapter that the level of fertility deemed 
necessary for security and mobility for the Vettuvans in Engandiyour was having 
one son and one daughter. While the role of a son was mostly to enhance the 
family's economic security and mobility, a daughter's role was more traditional and 
focused on practical assistance including old-age support. The fertility levels and 
trends revealed in Chapter 4 are thus a reflection of these attitudes of the Vettuvans. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
The fertility transition of the scheduled castes in Kerala is unique in India. As 
revealed in Chapters 1 and 3, in the 1992-93 Kerala NFHS, the scheduled castes, the 
lowest castes in the traditional caste system, had a total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.37 
children per woman. This is far lower than the TFR noted for the total population of 
Kerala in the same survey. No other Indian state demonstrated substantially lower 
fertility for its scheduled castes than for the total population. Perhaps even more 
significantly no other Indian state has scheduled castes' fertility lower than or even 
close to that of Kerala's scheduled castes. Another unique feature of fertility in 
Kerala is the turnaround in the scheduled castes' and higher-caste Hindus' fertility. 
The 1992-93 Kerala NFHS has evinced a lower fertility to scheduled castes than 
Hindus as a whole. However, surveys conducted in Kerala before the 1990s revealed 
that the scheduled castes had higher fertility than the total Hindus. Thus, Kerala has 
many unique features on its demographic front. 
A large number of studies have examined Kerala's success in controlling fertility; in 
general these have treated Kerala as a homogeneous society. As reviewed in Chapter 
3, such studies have produced a variety of explanations: improved education, high 
status of women, an ecology that facilitated better health and communication, 
poverty, and well administered family planning, to name a few important ones. 
However, although the transition of Kerala society from a traditional caste system to 
a non-traditional caste system is a landmark in the social and economic history of 
Kerala, this has not figured in any of the above explanations of fertility change in 
Kerala. This thesis argues that a perspective that considers caste-system changes in 
Kerala as a basic factor that transformed social and economic relationships 1s 
essential for an understanding of the fertility of Kerala's scheduled castes. 
As explained in Chapter 1, the main objective of this research has been to 
understand the causes of fertility change among the Vettuvans, a scheduled caste 
community in Kerala, using the institutional approach proposed by Greenhalgh 
(1988) and McNicoll (1994). This in the present research involved investigating 
fertility levels and trends (Chapter 4); security-mobility goals and strategies 
(Chapter 6); and security-mobility costs and benefits of children (Chapters 6 and 7). 
The study of the institutional environment included the social, economic, and 
political situation in Kerala (Chapters 2 and 3) and Engandiyour village (Chapter 5). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the field work to collect detailed data on the above 
aspects adopted the micro-demographic approach developed by Caldwell, Reddy 
and Caldwell (1988). 
A transition in fertility among the Vettuvans in Engandiyour from a moderately high 
level to a very low level during the period 1960s-1990s is evident from the analysis 
of cohort fertility data. In 1997 the levels of fertility were indicative of fertility well 
below replacement level. As revealed in Chapter 4, the TFR and TMFR were 1.2 
and 1.8 children per woman, respectively. Related to the low levels of fertility is the 
high level of family planning use among the Vettuvans. About two-thirds of the 
couples practised a modern terminal family planning method, and only a tiny 
proportion used temporary methods. Significantly, the number of children born was 
more important as a factor in the adoption of terminal family planning methods than 
whether the children were boys or girls. Among the Vettuvans, reproductive careers 
of women were simple: marry late, have two children quickly, and then get 
sterilised. The Vettuvan fertility is unique in India, where fertility is generally much 
higher and shows strong son preference, higher age at sterilisation, and lower age 
at marriage. 
As shown in Chapter 5, the caste-system changes triggered by the land reform of the 
1970s have led to fundamental social and economic change in Engandiyour that 
changed the cost and benefit of children and hence fertility. This reform gave the 
Vettuvans ownership of small parcels of land: their status changed from tenant to 
owner. This marked the end of an era of tenancy-related exploitation. With land 
reform, the previous landowners, the higher castes, lost their traditional grip on their 
former tenants, the scheduled castes. They could no longer demand work from 
scheduled castes for low wages or for no pay; they could no longer prevent them 
from working for other people; they could no longer prevent them from taking other 
occupations. On the social front, the land reform brought new behavioural changes 
to both lower castes and higher castes. While behavioural changes of the lower 
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castes worked to narrow their social distance from other communities, it was also 
essential that the upper castes changed their . behaviour to indicate the new 
relationship between the previous tenants and landlords. Land reform also gave the 
Vettuvans a sense of security as well as self-respect. Security meant that now they 
had their own land and no one could evict them. Self-respect came because they 
were no longer tenants, and thus they were free from several obligations of tenancy. 
Thus, the reform attacked the two basic principles upon which the caste system was 
based: economic exploitation and social subordination. It is, however, important to 
recognise that further changes within the Vettuvan community and in Kerala as a 
whole were needed for this progress to be sustained and improved. As I will explain 
later in this chapter, fertility control of Vettuvans was an essential step in this 
direction. 
Migration from Engandiyour to the Gulf countries for employment, which began in 
the mid-1970s, provided further impetus to the caste-system changes brought by the 
land reform. Although participation of the Vettuvans in the migration to the Gulf 
countries was insignificant compared to that of other communities, the migration 
had enormous influence in changing their social and economic status in relation to 
other communities. The Gulf migration worked mainly in two ways to dissolve the 
caste system in the village. Firstly, the remittances from the Gulf countries 
generated immense demand for labour as construction of new houses and other 
allied activities in the Engandiyour increased significantly after the beginning of the 
migration. Since the labour supply in Engandiyour was less than the demand, the 
Vettuvans could expect respectful behaviour from those who needed labour. This 
included the higher castes, thus reducing caste-based interpersonal behaviour. 
Secondly, Gulf migration provided opportunities for many Vettuvans to diversify 
their occupations. As remittances poured in, people started constructing and 
renovating houses, and investing money in property, such as land and vehicles. 
These activities in the village needed skilled workers such as masons, carpenters, 
welders, ·electricians, plumbers, auto-mechanics, and taxi drivers. Many Vettuvans, 
particularly the younger generation, changed their occupations to one of these high-
demand skilled areas. This has changed the occupation-based difference between the 
lower and upper castes. Such changes also generated more and more interaction 
between the upper castes and the Vettuvans. All these changes had a tremendous 
effect on the behaviour of the upper castes towards the lower castes, and thus 
speeded the process of caste-system change in Engandiyour. In short, social and 
economic mobility became realistic aspirations for the Vettuvans. 
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As demonstrated in Chapter 5, in 1997 the caste system did not determine social and 
economic interaction between the Vettuvans and members of other communities in 
Engandiyour. The principles that governed the interaction between members of the 
lower and upper castes in 1997 were the educational and economic status of the 
lower castes. An educated Vettuvan, for example, would have a higher degree of 
interaction with the higher castes than would a less educated Vettuvan. Although 
economic status is not as significant as education in determining inter-caste 
interactions, economically better-off Vettuvans have frequent interaction with non-
Vettuvans compared to economically lower-status Vettuvans. What limited the 
interaction of the higher castes with Vettuvans was their poor educational and 
economic status. In 1997, although caste retained some identity value, it is no longer 
used to discriminate or promote inter-personal and inter-family relationships. There 
has been a clear transition in the Vettuvan status from a lower caste to a poor 
working class, and in the society as a whole to a non-traditional caste system model. 
Having been freed from the traditional caste system, the next issue for the Vettuvans 
was to retain the achieved new status (security), and to improve it, (mobility), by 
enhancing their social and economic position. As shown in Chapter 6, the two 
important mobility goals of the Vettuvans were to improve their social status; and to 
become economically better off. The mobility units of the Vettuvans were the 
patrilineal, patriarchal and patrilocal family, the kudumbam. For reasons related to 
tradition, such a society depended on sons for its social and economic survival and 
enhancement. The strategies to enhance social and economic status adopted by the 
Vettuvans were to increase their education and to take up non-traditional 
occupations. Educating children became the prime concern of the Vettuvans. The 
most important reason for educating children was to enhance their social and 
economic position. Economic progress achieved through education is considered to 
have more prestige than success achieved through working as a labourer or through 
low-level jobs. No Vettuvans wanted their children to be labourers. A job that 
required 'paper and pen' was considered a symbol of prestige. As indicated, to 
achieve social and economic mobility, the Vettuvans require sons. Sons remain at 
home after marriage, while daughters leave after their marriage; thus, compared to 
sons, daughters have lower mobility value in the Vettuvan community. 
A further crucial factor in Vettuvan life is the issue of family division. As was 
shown in Chapter 6, before the 1950s, division of a Vettuvan family took place 
when the eldest married son started having children or when his younger brother 
married, whichever came first. The main reason for the division of a Vettuvan 
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family was the difficulty of accommodating the growing number of members in 
their small hut. These divisions were possible since it was easy to get land because 
of the benefits that landlords foresaw from having tenants. Thus, family divisions in 
the past did not involve landed property. In such a situation having more sons had 
little or no cost for the Vettuvans, as regards arranging land for housing. 
After the Agrarian Reform Bill was first passed in 1957, but before the actual 
implementation of land reform in the 1970s, availability of land on tenancy became 
extremely difficult. During this period no landowner was interested in leasing his 
land to tenants for fear that the new tenant would claim his land. Also, no land 
owner would permit the tenant to divide his land, again fearing that both families 
would claim land at a later date. Thus, from 1957 when the Agrarian Reform Bill 
was passed, until the implementation of land reform in the 1970s, Vettuvan families 
were unable to divide. 
Once land reform was implemented and the Vettuvans each received ownership of a 
small parcel of land, division of families resumed, probably at a much faster rate. 
However, there was a major difference: this time the division took place on their 
own land. This was the first time that Vettuvan family division was accompanied by 
division of landed property. In the village an average one-tenth of an acre of land 
was given to a tenant household under the land reform, usually where their house 
was located. According to the Vettuvan Household Survey, the land size of each 
Vettuvan family in 1997 suggested that there had been at least one division of the 
land received through the land reform. For example, a quarter of the households had 
less than four cents of land; another half possessed between five and eight cents. The 
family structure analysis suggests that slightly over half the Vettuvan families were 
nuclear: the potential partition among children would depend on how many male 
children each family had, and when each son married. The average number of sons 
in these families was one. Thus, the majority of these nuclear families would remain 
undivided in this generation, at least. Assuming the pattern of family formation in 
the late 1990s, partition is imminent in about one-third of the joint and stem families 
in which there are married brothers living together. Once these families divide, the 
land availability in nearly all the Vettuvan households will reach a level where 
further division of the land will be practically impossible. The diminishing of family 
land with each family division poses questions about the future land needs of the 
V ettuvans' children. 
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Chapter 6 also showed how migration to the Gulf countries had influenced the 
difficult land situation of the Vettuvans in two opposing ways. On the one hand, 
remittances increased the land prices and made it almost impossible for the 
Vettuvans to buy land, as most of them were labourers or low-income earners 
compared to those families who received remittances from the Gulf. On the other 
hand, some Vettuvans were able to benefit from the increase in land prices, as they 
could sell their land (if it was in a prime location) and buy more and cheaper land in 
a less expensive location. This, and the government housing scheme for the poor, 
alleviated part of the land problem for the Vettuvans in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. But by 1997 such avenues seemed to have closed, at least for the time being, 
because no unused government land was available in the village. Moreover, there 
was very little market value for very small plots, say less than ten cents, the size 
possessed by the Vettuvans. Under the economic situation prevailing in the village 
in the late 1990s, and to a large extent in Kerala as a whole, it was difficult for the 
Vettuvans, who still were in the lowest economic group, to buy any land in the 
village. It is also clear that the existing family land does not permit any further 
division in the given village context. In this situation, it is a heavy cost for the 
family if they have more than a son. 
Another crucial change in the V ettuvans' circumstances has been in the form and 
consequences of marriage. The marriage practices of the Vettuvans before the land 
reform were elopement and arranged marriages. While elopement was mostly 
practised by the poorest, marriages were arranged by the better off. As tenants, 
parents could not take the primary responsibility for their daughters' marriage 
because they depended on the landlord for a loan of money, groceries, firewood, and 
other necessities. Such opportunities from the landlord depended on his economic 
position and personal readiness to assist a marriage. Parents encouraged elopement 
as it was hard for them to arrange marriages. Landlords were also reported to have 
supported elopement as they did not need to lend money or give goods to their 
tenants. Elopement marriages were possible because young men and women started 
independent work for the landlord from age 16-18. It is important to mention here 
that a landlord typically had several tenants and this allowed for the mixing of 
several families. The workplace provided avenues for friendships for the young 
Vettuvan boys and girls. Normally, elopement marriages took place only among 
men and women around 20 years of age, because such marriages required some 
money, courage, support from some relatives, and determination. These 
requirements may have been difficult to achieve at earlier ages, say 17 or 18 years. 
Marriages arranged by parents, on the other hand, were reported to have taken place 
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when the girl was around 15 and the boy around 18; but such marriages were rare. 
Overall, among the Vettuvans, tenancy-related, poor economic conditions did not 
promote child marriages, but pushed the marriage age higher. Thus, before the land 
reform, daughters were not a substantial cost to parents, as elopement was the 
common marriage practice. 
After the land reform, marriages arranged by parents with the consent of both bride 
and groom became common among the Vettuvans. Since elopement marriages were 
practised when they were tenants and subordinate under the caste system, elopement 
was now considered inferior to arranged marriages. With arranged marriages the 
practice of dowry also emerged. Dowry was considered something that only the 
socially and economically better off could practise, and hence a good vehicle for 
demonstrating social mobility. In 1997 the prevailing dowry among the Vettuvans 
was far beyond their average earning capacity. Nearly one-third of the Vettuvan 
families surveyed had debt incurred from arranging dowry. Arranging dowry was an 
important reason for the Vettuvan couples to desire only one daughter. 
What seems to have made it possible to arrange such large dowries was the 
influence of remittances from the Middle East to the village. Increased land prices 
made it possible for the Vettuvans to mortgage or sell their land to meet the dowry-
related expenses, partly, if not fully. An increase in wages and the ability of 
villagers to lend money to Vettuvans have also helped the Vettuvans to arrange 
dowry. Since it took several years for a Vettuvan to arrange the dowry, parents 
could not marry their daughters early, and therefore prevented the age at marriage 
from falling. Similarly, when marriages were delayed for want of dowry, daughters 
continued their education. Parents were compelled to send their daughters to school 
or college until their marriages were arranged, because the most wanted brides 
among the Vettuvans were those either studying or in a non-traditional job. Parents 
often used schooling as a pretext to delay marriage, even though their financial 
difficulties may have been the real reason. 
In sum, what changed in the marriage practices of Vettuvans after the 
implementation of the land reform was the introduction of dowry to those families 
who had not practised it in the past, and reinforcement of the practice for those who 
already practised it. The effect of dowry was to considerably increase the cost of 
daughters in the 1990s compared to before the 1970s. 
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In the institutional environment under the non-traditional caste system, sons were 
considered to be an important source of economic and social support in old age. 
However, as demonstrated in Chapter 7, parents realised that in the changed 
environment support from sons was more likely if they were better educated and 
well employed. Given their financial status, it was very hard for the Vettuvans to 
educate and arrange proper employment for their children. The Vettuvans placed a 
high value on having fewer children and educating them to make them employable. 
They also wanted no further division of their small piece of land received through 
land reform. One son was considered the most appropriate number, should the 
parents want maximum benefit. The desire to have fewer sons was a strategy to have 
better support from children and to make their children's lives better, thus 
facilitating social and economic security and mobility of the family. 
Daughters, too, were considered essential to couples, mostly for their non-monetary 
roles. A daughter's role before marriage was largely confined to helping parents in 
performing household work. After marriage their role was to physically help parents 
when they were old or sick. An unmarried daughter was considered less able to help 
her parents economically in the late 1990s compared to the 1970s because of 
decreasing work participation before marriage as daughters now went to school. 
After marriage the daughter's own family responsibilities and the increased distance 
between their houses made it difficult for the daughter to provider longer and 
sustained help to parents when sick or old. Parents surveyed in this study wanted to 
have a maximum of one daughter. 
The fertility patterns of the Vettuvans analysed in Chapter 4 are essentially a 
reflection of these two factors: benefits and costs of sons and daughters. First, the 
benefits of having children are determined by the security and mobility role of 
children in the non-traditional caste system. Secondly, the costs are set by the 
institutional environment on bringing up children to a level that will be needed for 
social and economic mobility discussed in Chapter 7. Thus fertility was a key aspect 
of mobility for Vettuvans in Engandiyour. Vettuvans need one son; they also like to 
have one daughter. But to have more than one child of each sex is to run the risk of 
either creating great conflict between sons or incurring huge dowry costs for 
daughters. In this context, very low fertility is essential to maximise the scope for 
social and economic mobility. Thus the Vettuvans' circumstances provide a classic 
case of Dumont's (1890) social capillarity. 
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8.3 Implications for past and future research, and policy 
The implications of the present study for the fertility of the scheduled castes in 
Kerala are clearly significant. This study revealed that fertility in the Vettuvan 
community changed as a result of the combined effects of caste-system changes, 
land reform, and Gulf migration. Since land reform took place throughout the state 
in the 1970s in a very effective way, it is probable this has influenced the traditional 
caste system in the entire state to transform it to a non-traditional caste system. Gulf 
migration, although it had specific pockets in the initial phases, spread to most areas 
of the state in the 1980s and 1990s. The effect of Gulf migration was felt throughout 
Kerala, with higher land prices, labour shortages, and a higher standard of living. It 
is, therefore, possible to anticipate essentially identical causation for fertility decline 
in other scheduled-caste communities in Kerala. 
With regard to the turnaround in fertility between the scheduled cases and the rest of 
the Hindu population in Kerala, the present study suggests that the scheduled castes 
responded more significantly than the non-scheduled caste Hindus to the caste 
system changes, land reform, and Gulf migration. That means it was more important 
for the scheduled castes than for the non-scheduled castes to reduce their fertility in 
order to maintain and improve their social and economic situation in Kerala. 
In the light of the present research it is also justifiable to recommend further 
research to understand fertility transition in Kerala. As demonstrated in this study, 
caste system changes have brought several behavioural changes in the upper castes, 
and possibly among other religious communities. It is most likely that upper castes 
and other religious communities in Kerala have also responded to changes in the 
caste system to protect and improve their social and economic positions. Thus, the 
theme for future research is that caste-system changes, and the nature of social 
mobility, have played significant roles in the fertility transition of all religious and 
caste communities in Kerala, although the specific paths to fertility decline may 
differ. 
As the Kerala model of caste-system changes and subsequent fertility decline caused 
by land reform and Gulf migration has a unique social, economic and political 
history, it is not feasible to replicate it exactly in other parts of India. However, the 
caste system has been a common element in Indian society, north or south. In the 
light of present study it is_ possible to suggest that caste-system changes can 
influence fertility to come down through changes in the costs and benefits of 
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children. However, how the traditional caste system can be changed to a non-
traditional caste system depends on the particular social, economic and political 
environment of that particular state or region. Research is needed to identify such 
factors more widely. 
Regarding the question of why fertility of the scheduled castes in Kerala is the 
lowest among the scheduled castes in India, the present research cannot be 
definitive, but it provides ample evidence for speculation. A possible reason 
traceable from the present research is that Kerala has transformed itself into a non-
traditional caste system society more completely than societies in other parts of 
India. In other words, scheduled castes in Kerala have received the opportunity to 
visualise their progress more realistically than scheduled-caste communities 
elsewhere in India. This observation matches Davis's (1963) observations on North-
west Europe; the Schneiders' ( 1996) findings from Italy; Blake's ( 1972) 
investigation on Western Europeans; and Greenhalgh's (1988) findings from China. 
Focusing on India, the implications of the study for understanding fertility are 
potentially significant. There are states in India where the traditional caste system 
still exists and where fertility is still high. The present study suggests that caste-
system changes in those areas of India are necessary conditions for more rapid 
changes in fertility. As the existing positive discrimination polices of the 
government have limited impact on the traditional caste system and the fertility of 
scheduled castes in India, in general, policies that are effective enough to change the 
traditional caste system are very much needed. Ultimately, the more time taken to 
transform the traditional caste system in India to a non-traditional caste system, the 
longer it will take to move from high to low fertility. This research further suggests 
that unless and until the scheduled castes are given the opportunity to visualise their 
prospects of social and economic mobility by breaking the traditional caste system 
principles, little will be achieved in controlling their fertility, which is very high in 
several states of India. In the new millennium, the ref ore, we must discuss caste 
openly, collect details in the Censuses to know the social and economic status of 
various castes, and investigate appropriate interventions to transform the traditional 
caste system to a non-traditional caste system. 
The present research suggests that fertility decline can take place in the poorest 
section of a society. While education, occupation, age at marriage, family planning, 
status of women, sex preference, and old-age security have important bearing on 
fertility, the present study reveals that these factors are off shoots of the social and 
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economic organisation of the society. The ref ore, understanding how a society 1s 
organised is crucially important to explanations of fertility in terms of education, 
occupation and other factors. As the present research has shown, the institutional 
approach, incorporating the social, economic and political aspects of the society, and 
explicitly addressing the links between macro- and micro-level change in historical 
and contemporary perspectives, forms a potentially very helpful means to explain 
the determinants of fertility in the fullest sense. 
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Appendix-I 
Survey Instruments 
The Australian National University 
1. Vettuvan Household Survey, 1997 
A. Section: Identification 
001 Scheduled number: 
002 Date of interview: 
003 Name of interviewer: 
004 Respondent's name: 
005 Name of head of household: 
006 House number an some _identification mark: 
007 Write time now from your watch: 
B. Section: Housing conditions 
100 Type of roof: 
101 Type of wall (materials used): 
102 Type of floor (materials used): 
103 Number of rooms, except kitchen: 
104 Source of drinking water: 
105 Source of water for other purposes: 
106 Electricity connection: 
107 Main cooking fuel: 
108 Second main cooking fuel: 
109 Modern latrine: 
C. Section: Usual residents 
Include usual residents. Those who have not visited this household for the last 3 
Years will not be a part of this section. 
Name Relationship Age/ Marital Complete Main Work 
head of the sex status d occupation place 
household education 
200 Does everyone mentioned above eat from the same kitchen? 
201 How many family units are there in this household that prepare food 
separate I y? 
202 Why is it that such family units do not have separate living 
arrangements? Give two reasons: 
D. Section: Household items 
300 Chair: 
301 Number of chairs: 
302 Value: 
303 Table: 
304 Number of tables: 
305 Value: 
306 Cupboard: 
307 Number of cupboards: 
308 Value: 
309 Cot: 
310 Number of cots: 
311 Value: 
312 Radio: 
313 Number of radios: 
314 Value: 
E. Section: Domestic animals 
400 Cow/buffalo: 
401 Number: 
402 Value: 
403 Goat: 
404 Number: 
405 Value: 
406 Chicken: 
407 Number: 
408 Value: 
F. Section: Land holding 
500 How many cents of land does this family possess? 
501 How many cents are of coconut fields? 
502 How many cents are of barren fields? 
503 How much of the total land mentioned was received through land reform? 
504 When did this family receive land through land reform? 
505 Who is the legal occupant of the land? 
G. Section: Consumption 
600 For how many people does this family prepare food? 
601 How many kilos of rice would this family need for a week? 
602 How much money does this family spend in a week on groceries? 
603 How much money does this family spend on fish in a week? 
604 How much money does this family spend on meat/eggs in a week? 
605 How much money does this family spend on fruits and vegetables in a week? 
606 How much money does this family spent in a week on eating from 
restaurants? 
607 Does this family subscribe to any daily newspaper? 
608 Does this family subscribe to any weekly/monthly magazine? 
H. Section: Debt 
700 Does any one have debt in this family? 
701 How much? 
702 Debts? note items: 
703 Reasons for debt? Give two important reasons: 
276 
I. Section: Inter-community interaction 
800 Who is your nearest neighbour? Give his/her house name: 
801 Did your family members visit them in the last two months? 
802-803 For what purposes did you or your family members visit the 
neighbour? Give two purposes. 
804 Where does the conversation take place? 
805 Do they offer you anything to drink/eat? 
806-807 Why do they not offer anything to drink/eat? Give only two reasons: 
808 Did they visit your house during the last two months? 
809-810 For what purposes do they visit your house? 
811 Where does the conversation normally take place? 
812 Do you offer them anything to drink/eat? 
813-814 Why do you not offer anything to drink/eat? 
J. Section: Household management 
900 Who fetch drinking water in this family? 
901 Who prepares meals in this family? 
902 Who prepares meals when the above person goes to work? 
903 Who does cleaning work in the family? 
904 Who does it when the above persons go to work? 
905 Who does kitchen cleaning work? 
906 Who does it when the above persons go to work? 
907 Who does washing of clothes in the family? 
908 Who does it when the above persons go to work? 
909 Who takes care of domestic animals in the family? 
910 Who does shopping in the family? 
K. Section: Life styles 
1000 What do you and your family normally have for breakfast? 
1001 What do you and your family normally have at 11 am? 
1002 What do you and your family normally have for lunch? 
1003 What do you and your family normally have for dinner? 
L. Section: Other details 
2000 Any other relevant information? 
2001 Write time from your watch now: 
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2. Vettuvan Wife's Survey, 1997 
3. Vettuvan Husband's Survey, 1997 
A. Section: Basic information 
001 Husband/wife: 
002 Schedule number: 
003 Household schedule number and address: 
004 Husband/wife schedule number: 
005 Name of the interviewer: 
006 Date of interview: 
007 Record time now from your watch: 
008 Name of the respondent: 
009 Respondent's husband/wife: 
010 Completed age as on Vishu (14April1): 
011 Completed education: 
B. Section: Work-related information 
Main Hours in Days Weeks in Months 
occup a day ma a month ma year 
ation week 
200 201 202 203 204 
212 213 214 215 216 
224 226 227 228 229 
236 237 238 239 240 
How What this How much money is used 
much do money 1s for personal use in a 
you earn used for? week? 
In a 
week? 
207 208 209 
219 220 221 
232 233 234 
243 244 245 
C. Section: Views regarding children 
1 Later changed to January 1st as the cut-off date. 
Daily 
wage 
205 
217 
230 
241 
Work 
place 
210 
222 
235 
246 
To whom 
wage 1s 
given 
206 
218 
231 
242 
Age when 
started 
this 
particular 
work 
211 
223 
236 
247 
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300 How many children do you have? 
301 Are you satisfied with that number of children? yes• 311; no• 
If not, why do you think that you are not satisfied? Give two important 
reasons. 
302 ........................................................................ . 
303 ........................................................................ . 
How many more children do you want? 
304 Total 
305 Male children 
306 Female children 
Why do you want less than this many children? Give two important reasons 
307 ........................................................................ . 
308 ........................................................................ . 
Why do you feel more than these number of children is not needed? Give 
two important reasons. 
309 ········································································ 310 ........................................................................ . 
Why do you feel that this number of children is sufficient? Give two 
important reasons. 
311 ..................................................................... . 
312 ....................................................................... . 
313 In your opinion are sons essential for a couple? yes• 316; no• continue 
Why do you think sons are not essential to a couple? 
314 ....................................................................... . 
315 ....................................................................... . 
Why do you think sons are essential to a couple? 
316 ........................................................................ . 
317 ....................................................................... .. 
318 In your opinion are daughters essential to a couple? yes• continue; no• 
321 
Why do you think so? Give two important reasons 
319 ....................................................................... . 
320 ...................................................................... . 
Why do you think daughters are not essential to a couple? Give two 
important reasons. 
321 ....................................................................... . 
322 ....................................................................... . 
In your opinion how many children should one couple have? 
323 Total 
3 24 Male children 
325 Female children 
In your opinion if a couple has two or more sons, what are the advantages 
to parents? Give two advantages. 
326 ....................................................................... . 
327 ....................................................................... . 
In your opinion if a couple has two or more sons, what are the 
disadvantages? Give two disadvantages. 
328 ...................................................................... . 
329-330 ............................................................... . 
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In your opinion, if a couple has two or more daughters, what are the 
advantages to parents? Give two advantages. 
331 .................................................................... . 
332 ....................................................................... . 
In your opinion, if a couple has two or more daughters, what are the 
disadvantages to parents? Give two important reasons. 
333 ....................................................................... . 
334-335 ............................................................... . 
In your opinion, if a couple has one son, what are the advantages to parents? 
Give two important reasons. 
336 ................................................................... . 
337 ....................................................................... . 
In your opinion, if a couple has one son, what are the disadvantages? 
Give two important reasons. 
338 ............ ., ......................................................... . 
339-340 ............................................................... . 
In your opinion, if a couple has one daughter, what are the advantages to 
parents? Give two important reasons. 
341 ................................................................... . 
342 ....................................................................... . 
In your opinion, if a couple has one daughter, what are the disadvantages to 
parents? Give two important reasons. 
343 ..................................................................... . 
344-345 ............................................................... . 
D. Section: Old-age-related issues 
400 In your opinion up to what age should one work? 
401 Up to what age will you work? 
What are the precautions you have taken to deal with old age? Give two precautions. 
402 ..................................................................... . 
403 ...................................................................... . 
404 Will your sons provide economic assistance in your old age? 
Why will they help? Why will they not help? 
405 .......................................................................... . 
406 .......................................................................... . 
407 On whom will you depend in old age? 
408 Will you expect economic assistance from your daughters? 
409 Do you expect at least one son to help you in old age? 
410 Do you think that you will require economic assistance from your children? 
411 Do you think your children will be economically capable of helping you in old ag1 
Why do you think they will have the ability? 
Why do you think they will not have the ability? Give two important reasons. 
412 .......................................................................... . 
413 .......................................................................... . 
414 Do you expect the old-age pension from the government? 
Why do you think that you will get the pension? Give two important reasons. 
415 .......................................................................... . 
416 .......................................................................... . 
Why do you think that you will not get the pension? Give two important reasons. 
417 ........................................................................... . 
418 ........................................................................... . 
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E. Section: Benefits from children 
500 In your opinion is there any change in the benefits from sons compared to the past' 
What are those changes? Give two important changes. 
501 ............................................................................ . 
502 ............................................................................ . 
In your opinion why did such changes occur? Give two important reasons. 
503 .......................................................................... . 
504 ............................................................. ............... . 
505 In your opinion is there any change in the benefits from daughters compared to 
the past? yes• continue; no• 515 
What are those changes? Give two important changes. 
506 ......................................................................... . 
507 ......................................................................... . 
In your opinion why did such changes occur? Give two important reasons. 
508 ........................................................................... . 
509 ........................................................................... . 
510 Do you want your children to continue your occupation? yes• continue; no• 513 
Why do you wish so? Give two important reasons. 
511 ........................................................................... . 
512 ........................................................................... . 
Why do you not wish so? Give two important reasons. 
513 ............................................................................ . 
514 ............................................................................ . 
F. Section: Fertility-related issues 
600 How many children on average do people from your community in this village 
have? 
In your opinion why do they have no more than this? Give two important reasons. 
601 ...................................................................... . 
602 ..................................................................... . 
603 Which community has the highest number of children in your locality? 
In your opinion why do they have that many children? Give two important reasons. 
604 ......................................................................... . 
605 ......................................................................... . 
606 In your opinion which community has the lowest number of children in your 
locality? 
In your opinion why do they have that many children only? Give two important reason 
607 ....................................................................... . 
608 ....................................................................... . 
G. Section: Cost of living 
700 Would you be able to meet all the expenses of your family from your and 
your wife's/husband's 
wage/salary? yes• 705; no• continue 
If not, why? Give two important reasons. 
701 ...................................................................... . 
702 ...................................................................... . 
How do you manage the expenses of your family? Give two important sources. 
703 ...................................................................... . 
704 ...................................................................... . 
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What is the benefit of this work timing? Give two important reasons. 
706 .......................................................................... . 
707 .......................................................................... . 
708 Could you save anything from your wage/salary? yes• ??; no• ?? 
709 How much do you save in a month? 
Why do you save? Give two important reasons. 
710 ....................................................................... . 
711 ....................................................................... . 
712 How do you save? 
H. Section: Living arrangements 
800 Do you plan to have a separate house? yes•; no• 802 
801 When do you plan to do so? 
If not, give two important reasons 
802 .......................................................................... . 
803 .......................................................................... . 
J. Section: Fertilitv Hist 
900 Age at 
marnage 
Name of child Age Sex Alive/d 
ead 
901 902 903 904 
906 907 908 909 
911 912 913 914 
916 917 918 919 
921 922 923 924 
926 927 928 929 
931 932 933 934 
936 937 938 939 
941 942 943 944 
946 947 948 949 
J. Section: Family planning 
Age at death 
905 
910 
915 
920 
925 
930 
935 
940 
945 
950 
1000 Have you or your husband ever used a modern family planning method? 
yes• continue; no• Reasons for non-use 
1001 Name of the method 
1002 Are you currently using any family planning method? yes•; no• 
1003 Name of the method 
Reasons for non-use 
1004 ......................................................................... . 
1005 .......................................................................... . 
1006 At what age did you use family planning for the first time? 
1007 How many children did you have at that time? 
1008 Do you plan to use any family planning method in future? yes•; no• 
1009 Which method are you planning to use? 
1010 When do you plan to use it? 
Why do you plan to use this method? Give two important reasons. 
1011 ....................................................................... . 
1012 ....................................................................... . 
1013 Record time now 
1014 Any other comments about this interview 
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4. Elderly Vettuvan Survey, 1997 
A. Section: Identification 
001 Schedule number: 
002 Household schedule number, and address: 
003 Husband's/wife's schedule number: 
004 Date of interview: 
005 Name of interviewer: 
006 Now enter the time from your watch: 
B. Section: Demographic characteristics 
100 Name and sex of respondent: 
101 Completed age as on Vishu (14 April): 
102 Completed education: 
103 Marital status: 
104 Whether or not husband/wife is alive 
C Section 
Important work hours in a days in a months in a 
Being done day week year 
200 201 202 203 
205 206 207 208 
210 211 212 213 
D. Section 
wage 10 a 
day 
204 
209 
214 
Give two main kinds of work that you were doing when you were around 40 
years of age? 
300 .............................................................. . 
301 .............................................................. . 
If not doing any paid work, ask the following 
Why did you stop working? Give two important reasons: 
302 ................................................................. . 
303 ................................................................ . 
304 When did you stop working? 
305 Has your economic position improved compared to the past? 
Why do you think so? Give two reasons: 
306 ································································· 307 ................................................................ . 
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E. Section 
400 How many of your sons are alive? 
401 How many of your daughters are alive? 
402 How many of your married sons are alive? 
403 How many of your married sons live in Enagandiyour village? 
404 How many of your married sons live with you in this house? 
405 How many of your unmarried sons live with you in this house? 
406 How many of your sons live outside the village? 
407 How many of your married daughters are alive? 
408 How many of your married daughters live with you in this house? 
409 How many of your unmarried daughters live with you in this 
house? 
410 How many of your unmarried daughters live outside the village? 
F. Section 
What are the benefits you receive from your married sons? Give two important 
benefits. 
500 ............................................................... . 
501 ............................................................... . 
What benefits do you get from unmarried sons? Give two important benefits. 
502 .................................................................. . 
503 ..................................... ............................. . 
What benefits do you get from your married daughters? Give two important 
benefits. 
504 ................................................................... . 
505 ............................................. ...................... . 
What benefits do you get from your unmarried daughters? Give two important 
benefits. 
506 ................................................................... . 
507 ................................................................... . 
508 Who takes care of you when you are sick? 
509 Who pays your medical bills? 
G. Section 
600 Is the help you receive from your children better 
than the help that you provided to your parents? 
601 Are educated children more useful than uneducated 
children for helping parents in old age? 
602 In your opinion who assist parents more in their old 
age: married sons or unmarried sons? 
603 In your opinion who assist parents more in their old 
age: married daughters or unmarried daughters? 
1. Better 
2. Worse 
3. Same 
1. Educated 
2. Uneducated 
1. Married 
2. Unmarried 
1. Married 
2. Unmarried 
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H. 
Section 
700-
715 
For women only 
Names of children alive/not age at 
death 
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5. School-Going Children Survey, 1997 
A. Section 
001 Number of this interview schedule: 
002 Schedule number of household schedule and address: 
003 Schedule number of couple schedule (husband): 
004 Schedule number of couple schedule (wife): 
005 Name of interviewer: 
006 Date of interview: 
007 Record time now: 
B. Section 
008 Name of respondent: 
009 Relationship with child: 
100 Name and sex of child: 
101 Age of child (on 14 April): 
102 Standard in which the child is studying: 
103 School in which the child is studying: 
104 Distance to the school from home: 
105 Do you pay fees for the child? 
106 Fee for a year: 
107 How does the child go to school? 
108 Transport cost for one year for the child to go to the school: 
109 How much money do you spend on this child in one year for clothing, 
shoes, and other expenses ( excluding food)? 
110 Do you have to pay any other fees in the school? 
111 Such fees for one year: 
112 Total expenses for this child (excluding food): 
C. Section 
200 Why do you educate this child? Give two important reasons. 
201 Up to what level will you educate this child? Why? Give two important 
reasons. 
202 What are the problems that you and your family have to face because of 
sending this child to school? Give two important reasons. 
203 Professionally what you want this child to become when he is grown up? 
Why do you wish so? Give two important reasons. 
204 Did this child ever work for money? yes• 1 ; no• 2 go to question 217 
205 Does he/he still work for money? yes• 1; no• 2 
206 Give details for work that the child did/is doing: 
207 On which days does the child go to work? 
208 Wage from one day's work: 
209 To whom does the child give his/her wage? 
210 Does this child help in any work at home? yes• 1; no• 2 
211 What help? 
212 When did this child stop helping with home activities? 
213 Why did the child stop helping at home? 
214 Record time now: 
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Data quality tables 
Appendix 2.1: Single year age distribution of the household population by age and 
sex, household survey, 1997 
Age Male Female Age Males Female 
No % No % No % No % 
1 25 1.3 28 1.5 36 12 0.6 9 0.5 
2 17 0.9 10 0.5 37 7 0.4 15 0.8 
3 17 0.9 16 0.9 38 18 1.0 23 1.2 
4 9 0.5 18 1.0 39 8 0.4 11 0.6 
5 16 0.9 13 6.0 40 21 1.1 21 1.1 
6 14 0.7 14 0.7 41 5 0.3 4 0.2 
7 11 0.6 14 0.7 42 17 0.9 13 0.7 
8 9 0.5 14 0.7 43 6 0.3 7 0.4 
9 12 0.6 10 0.5 44 7 0.4 7 0.4 
10 23 1.2 11 0.6 45 23 1.2 18 1.0 
11 18 1.0 11 0.6 46 11 0.6 9 0.5 
12 14 0.7 18 1.0 47 10 0.5 5 0.3 
13 19 1.0 13 0.7 48 14 0.7 8 0.4 
14 35 1.9 10 0.5 49 7 0.4 5 0.3 
15 17 0.9 23 1.2 50 13 0.7 19 1.0 
16 18 1.0 19 1.0 51 3 0.2 5 0.3 
17 15 0.8 11 0.6 52 10 0.5 12 0.6 
18 18 1.0 31 1.7 53 1 0.1 1 0.1 
19 18 1.0 20 1.1 54 4 0.2 4 0.2 
20 22 1.2 34 1.8 55 16 0.9 17 0.9 
21 18 1.0 24 1.3 56 6 0.3 4 0.2 
22 17 0.9 25 1.3 57 6 0.3 2 0.1 
23 23 1.2 29 1.5 58 3 0.2 6 0.3 
24 18 1.0 25 1.3 59 4 0.2 2 0.1 
25 23 1.2 27 1.4 60 14 0.7 17 0.9 
26 20 1.1 23 1.2 61 4 0.2 0 
27 18 1.0 15 0.8 62 6 0.3 8 0.4 
28 24 1.3 19 1.0 63 
29 16 0.8 17 0.9 64 2 0.1 4 0.2 
30 30 1.6 24 1.3 65 10 0.5 21 1.1 
31 12 0.6 5 0.3 66 1 0.1 3 0.2 
32 14 0.7 15 0.8 67 1 0.1 2 0.1 
33 20 1.1 8 0.4 68 3 0.2 4 0.2 
34 13 0.7 5 0.3 69 2 0.1 1 0.1 
35 27 1.4 21 1.1 70 26 1.4 33 1.8 
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Appendix 2.1: Age distribution of currently married and interviewed women, 
Vettuvan Survey, 1997 
Age Currently married Interviewed per cent 
women women interviewed 
15-19 9 4 44.5 
20-24 68 59 86.8 
25-29 79 65 82.3 
30-34 45 45 100.0 
35-39 71 60 84.1 
40-44 41 40 97.6 
45-49 38 35 92.1 
All 351 308 87.7 
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Scheduled castes in Kerala, 1981 
SI. no Name SI.no Name 
1 Adi Andhra 35 Malia 
2 Adi Dravida 36 Malayan 
3 Adi Karnataka 37 Mannan 
4 Ajila 38 Mavilan 
5 Arunthathi yar 39 Moger 
6 Ayyanavar 40 Mundala 
7 Baira 41 Nalakeyava 
8 Bakuda 42 Nalkadaya 
9 Bandi 43 Nayadi 
10 Bathada 44 Padannan 
11 Bellara 45 Pallan 
12 Bharatar 46 Palluvan 
13 Boyan 47 Pambada 
14 Chakkiliyan 48 Panan 
15 Chamar, Muchi 49 Panchama 
16 Chandala 50 Pariyan, Parayan, Sambavan 
17 Cheruman 51 Paravan 
18 Domban 52 Pathiyan 
19 Govara 53 Perumannan 
20 Godagali 54 Pulayan, Cheruman 
21 Godda 55 Pulaya Vettuvan 
22 Gosangi 56 Puthiri Vannan 
23 Hasla 57 Raneyar 
24 Holeya 58 Samagara 
25 Kadaliyan 59 Samban 
26 Kakkalan 60 Semman 
27 Kalladi 61 Thandan 
28 Kanakkan,Padanna 62 Thoti 
39 Karimpalan 63 Vallon 
30 Kavra 64 Valluvan 
31 Koosa 65 Vannan 
32 Kootan, Koodan 66 Velan 
33 Kudumban 67 Vetan 
34 Kuravan, sidhanar 68 Vettuvan 
Note: This list is based on the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order (Amendement) Act 1976. 
Source: Director of Census Operations (1981) 
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Appendix-4 
A note on terminology used in the thesis 
Traditional caste system: This term is interchangalby used with caste system. It 
refers to stratification of Hindu society characterised by hierachy, heredity and 
pursuit of one or a few particular occupations, inequality, endgamy, restrictions to 
taking food from outsiders and the notion of purity and pollusion associated with 
hierarchy. The period from the eighteenth to mid-twentieth century is considered in 
the theis as the traditional caste sytem period. 
Non-traditional caste sytem: The caste system that existed from the mid-twentieth 
century is refered in this thesis as non-traditional caste system. Those restrictions 
posed on the lower castes under the caste-sytem has been absnet in the non-
traditional caste sytem. 
Lower castes: Those castes which fall in the lowest levels of caste sytem of Hindu 
society. That is Ezavas and below. 
Upper castes: Those castes which fall in the upper levels of the caste sytem of Hindu 
soceity. That is N airs and above. 
Scheduled castes: In this thesis the term scheduled castes refers to the scheduled 
castes listed by the Government of India after Independence ( under Article 341) and 
the so-called untouchables or depressed castes who were not a part of the 
chaturvarana of the Hindu caste system. The ref ore, the term scheduled caste in this 
thesis refers to both the pre-and post-Independent India, even though the term 
scheduled caste is used only in the context of post-Independent India. 
Gulf migration: Migration of Keralans to the Middle East which began on a large 
scale in the 1970s. 
Remitance based economy: The economy largely depend on remittance from the 
Gulf countries or other Indian state. 
Land reform: The Kerala Land Reform (Amentment) Act of 1969 which came into 
to effect on 1 January 1970: 
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Castes, their traditional and present occupations. 
Name of caste Traditional occupation Present occupation 
Namboodiri These communities were land owners of the Mostly government servants. 
Nair village. They were treated as upper Caste. White collar job holders in private 
sector. 
Ezava Ezavans are traditionally toddy tapers Mostly migrants to Gulf, other 
Mukkuvan Mukkuvans and Valans are fishermen. They states in India, business people 
ValanAsari were untouchable to upper caste Hindus. and Government servants. 
Kal-Kurup Asaries are carpenters 
Kollan Kal-Kurup belong to the house construction 
Panan caste. They were untouchables to upper caste 
Hindus 
Kollan were mainly leather workers 
Panans were musicians 
Vettuvan Vettuvans are agriculture labourers. Mostly skilled workers or 
Parayan Parayans make kitchen appliances from labourers in the village. Very few 
Mannan bamboo. They are untouchables to upper caste in Government jobs. 
Hindus. 
Mannans were washermen in the village. 
Nayadi Hunting community. They were untouchable to Labourers in the village 
upper caste Hindus. 
Note: The classification given denotes the social relations existed in this particular village only. 
And does not necessarily match with other classification of castes in Kerala or India. 
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